1. U.S. Coast Guard did not specify any TEMPEST related standard in the original contract other than Military Handbook 232A
2. ICGS did not comply with the standards set forth in Military Handbook 232A in regards to equipment, racks, cable, or power supply placement.
3. ISCG falsely claimed in their “Certificates of Conformance” that were in compliance with the Military Handbook 232A
4. Other TEMPEST related specifications were not specified in the original Delivery Task Order/Contract by the USCG.
5. Just prior to taking delivery of the first cutter the USCG “discovered” that the ships did not comply with Handbook 232A, nor any other TEMPEST related specification.
6. The USCG lacked a person with the formal credentials to properly inspect the first ship for TEMPEST compliance, and instead turned to the Navy to have them take the final measurements.
7. The Navy could not legally certify the ship(s), only the Coast Guard could do this, all the Navy could do was take instrumented measurements, and it was up to the USCG to accept the results of the measurements of the U.S. Navy.
8. The USCG was qualified to make visual observations only, and could not legally certify their own ships without the USCG having their own CTTA.
9. Ron Porter was the ACTING CTTA at the time, and was not instead a true CTTA and had not yet completed all of the steps required to become an NSA recognized CTTA, and thus could not certify the ships, which is why the Navy was brought in check the ships, although the Navy could not certify the ships.
10. The first ship in the series was subjected to a Navy instrumented TEMPEST inspection which it failed.
11. As Ron Porter was not a true CTTA he lacked the authority to issue waivers for the USCG TEMPEST related issues.
12. Ron Porter issued a series of waivers for the 123’ cutters TEMPEST related problems, even though he was not qualified, nor authorized to do so.
13. Many of the problems which Ron Porter waived represent serious breaches in security, and should have been resolved instead of being waived.
14. The Coast Guard falsified information which they provided to the DHS-OIG in regards to TEMPEST.
15. The DHS-OIG did not question the TEMPEST related information which had been provided, and as a result the DHS-OIG drew the wrong conclusions.
16. The 123 cutters remain a liability to national security
17. The Coast Guard is being evasive in answering basic unclassified questions in regards to the TEMPEST posture on these vessels, and only responded to Congress after strong political pressure from the Oversight Committee.
While this report or written document is fully unclassified, and is derived from either public documents, or information in the public forum and available to any citizen under FOIA or other civil requests. While the contents are

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