From: Steve Uhrig Date: Mon Feb 10, 2003 4:33pm Subject: Re: Unknown modulation On 10 Feb 2003 at 17:21, kondrak wrote: > I believe the tipoff is the 135% negative modulation. Its broadcast > AM. Ot someone trying awfully hard to sound broadcast, er.."quality".. Good call. I totally overlooked that. The latter makes more sense, maybe a good buddy. I would think commercial stations would have competent engineers, test equipment and requirements for spectral purity. Demodulating it would tell the story. Steve ******************************************************************* Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 "In God we trust, all others we monitor" ******************************************************************* 6904 From: Kirk Adirim Date: Tue Feb 11, 2003 3:28am Subject: re: Unknown modulation No mystery here as to what kind of modulation, the first sentence in the first paragraph tells you it's a commercial A.M. station. Quote "The waveforms taken on this page were all taken from the outputs of one or other of the two modulators fitted to Radio Carolines BTA-50H Ampliphase transmitter". Anybody in the broadcasting industry, SWL, european and over 35, or knows anything about pirate radio or "black broadcasting" knows Radio Caroline. Radio Caroline is an A.M. broadcast transmitter in England, used to be a pirate radio station back in the 60's. The author included a Banner Ad that links you to the Radio Caroline site and it's A.M. broadcasting history. Pretty clear to me. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 6905 From: Andre Holmes <1ach@g...> Date: Tue Feb 11, 2003 6:05am Subject: Re: Re: Unknown modulation Greetings I plucked a signal at 32 Mhz it was modulated AC sine wave but was extremely bunched up on other occasions the AC sine wave is spread. I could not get audio and did not try any other receivers. The Carrier is a first for this area I always keep tabs on everything around the Cincinnati Ohio area. There are CBers out here communicating outside of protocol, they use no handle and they surveil peoples directions in travel at 23 Mhz. I picked them up using a Kaiser 2044 Mobil. There is CB antenna on every other house out here. I have read somewhere that the FBI is using a public band 0-50 Mhz. That could have been there transmittion. I did pick a transmittion up once but its rare to see the 30 Mhz range in use out here and there. Sorry I could not get to you sooner you know work and all. ANDRE HOLMES. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Steve Uhrig" To: Sent: Monday, February 10, 2003 10:59 AM Subject: [TSCM-L] Re: Unknown modulation > On 9 Feb 2003 at 12:04, Andre Holmes wrote: > > > I was tuning my SA and ran across some modulations that I never seen > > before, so I started surveying some mod-schemes heres a start of my > > search. > > Do you live near: > > 1) An AM radio broadcast station? > > 2) A ham radio operator (within a block or two?). You frequently can > identify them by towers and large directional antennas. > > 3) A CB operator maybe running illegal high power? Or within a few > hundred feet of one running legal power? > > What you have described from the other website is signals from a pure > textbook AM transmitter. I listed above the most likely sources, but > there can be others. > > Do you hear anything when you try to demodulate the signal? That will > tell you for sure what it is. If it sounds like Donald Duck, it's > single sideband which most likely would be CB or amateur (ham). > > What you are seeing is the 'modulation envelope'. Straight out of the > textbook. > > Extremely unlikely to be hostile transmissions. > > Steve > > > ******************************************************************* > Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) > Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip > mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com > tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 > "In God we trust, all others we monitor" > ******************************************************************* > > > > ======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, > the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > =================================================== TSKS > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ > > 6906 From: Hawkspirit Date: Tue Feb 11, 2003 11:03am Subject: Sweep needed Residential sweep needed near Milwaukee Wisconsin, please contact me off list Roger Tolces Electronic Securtity 6907 From: Hawkspirit Date: Tue Feb 11, 2003 11:07am Subject: Sweep Needed Automobile sweep needed in Atlanta, please contact me off list. Roger Tolces Electronic Security 6908 From: kondrak Date: Tue Feb 11, 2003 0:45pm Subject: Re: Re: Unknown modulation Well, IF its a CB'er, he's got a 'precisely' proper negative modulation component. I find this type of equipment (CB and outbander) to be far from precise, as they're usually cobbled together by someone with the intent of a whomping signal, and little regard for modulation quality. On the other hand, a broadcast station makes careful adjustments to achieve around a 130-135% negative modulation for a tradeoff between audio power and "prescence" and spectral purity requirements. Sure, the guy might of hit it right, but I seriously doubt it... And Yes, I concur, get a sample on a modulation analyzer and a SA and see what it says.... At 17:33 2/10/03 -0500, you wrote: >On 10 Feb 2003 at 17:21, kondrak wrote: > > > I believe the tipoff is the 135% negative modulation. Its broadcast > > AM. Ot someone trying awfully hard to sound broadcast, er.."quality".. > >Good call. I totally overlooked that. > >The latter makes more sense, maybe a good buddy. I would think >commercial stations would have competent engineers, test equipment >and requirements for spectral purity. > >Demodulating it would tell the story. > >Steve > > >******************************************************************* >Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) >Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip >mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com >tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 >"In God we trust, all others we monitor" >******************************************************************* > > > >======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, > the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. >=================================================== TSKS > >Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ 6909 From: kondrak Date: Tue Feb 11, 2003 1:25pm Subject: Fwd: [ISN] Taking byte from Baghdad > > >http://www.gomemphis.com/mca/opinion_columnists/article/0,1426,MCA_539_1726690,00.html > >Gary Pounder >February 9, 2003 > >Although President Bush hasn't made a final decision about going to >war with Iraq, preparations for that potential conflict are almost >complete. Thousands of American troops have been deployed to the >Middle East in recent weeks, along with dozens of warships and >hundreds of combat aircraft. > >These preparations have been highly publicized, with daily pictures of >departing aircraft, naval vessels and military personnel, all designed >to convey a final warning to Saddam Hussein. But preparations for war >also are under way in less-visible areas. > >If Bush gives the order to attack Iraq, U.S. forces will initiate >information operations (IO) as part of their overall military >strategy. Aimed at disrupting Iraqi information systems, the expected >"information war" may represent the ultimate technology weapon in what >will be a high-tech campaign. > >Details of this war are almost nonexistent. Although the Pentagon has >spent billions of dollars on IO since the early 1990s, it has said >little about its capabilities in this area. > >What is known is that this investment has fostered the development of >highly specialized IO units, doctrine and tactics. Gen. Tommy Franks, >commander of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf region, has his own team >of IO specialists. > >Although IO is sometimes described in terms of computer attack or >cyber-warfare, it covers a variety of functions related to the use and >protection of information and information systems. The rationale >behind IO is simple: deny the enemy use of the information spectrum, >while protecting our own information assets. > >IO includes several disciplines that are almost as old as warfare >itself: intelligence collection, deception, psychological operations. >It also incorporates newer technologies, exploiting advances from the >information revolution of the past 20 years. > >Cyber-attack is one of the most intriguing and useful new tools of >information warfare. Because of the explosion of computer networks and >the Internet, it is now possible to gain access to information systems >that support an enemy's economy or military forces. Disrupting these >systems can wreak havoc with an adversary's war machine, potentially >shortening the war and reducing the number of allied casualties. > >The United States displayed the benefits of a computer war in the 1991 >Gulf War, when it conducted its first cyber-attack on Iraq's air >defense system. The highly automated system (nicknamed KARI) linked >Iraqi surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns in a computerized >command-and-control network. > >The KARI system could withstand air attacks reliably and still provide >critical information to Iraqi air defense commanders. Neutralizing >KARI was deemed essential to the allied air campaign. > >IO experts decided to attack KARI internally and externally. Allied >electronic warfare aircraft would jam and bomb KARI components, while >specially designed computer viruses would infect the system from >within. Agents inserted the virus in a printer shipped to an Iraqi air >defense site. > >The virus also was introduced via a fiber optic cable that connected >air defense nodes. A Special Forces unit infiltrated Iraq, dug up the >cable and inserted the virus. It remained dormant until the opening >moments of the air war, when it went active and crippled KARI. The >Iraqi air defense system never recovered, and allied losses in the air >campaign were minimal. > >Since the Gulf War, IO tacticians have added to their target lists >economic and infrastructure systems that support an enemy's ability to >fight: power grids, water supplies, banking networks. There are >unconfirmed reports that cyber-attacks helped shut down the Serb power >grid during the 1999 Balkans War. Information operations also have >been used in the war on terrorism to ferret out al-Qaida bank >accounts, trace financial transactions and identify potential >operatives. > >Officially, the Pentagon won't say what level of IO planning and >preparation is under way, but there are vague hints about what might >be in store for Baghdad. Several media outlets reported last month >that the United States was sending E-mail messages to Iraqi military >commanders, urging them not to fight if war breaks out. > >In a police state such as Iraq, E-mail directories are classified >material, off limits to anyone outside the military and security >establishment. Our ability to send E-mail to Iraqi generals suggest IO >teams have identified key computer networks, earmarking them for >potential disruption or destruction. > >There is a good chance the cyber-battle will spread beyond Iraqi >information systems. If the United States launches military action >against Baghdad, we can expect a vicious "war" between Middle Eastern >and western computer hackers. > >Remember the 2001 "spy plane" incident between the United States and >China? That relatively minor episode prompted a month-long >confrontation between American and Chinese hackers that resulted in >the defacement of thousands of Web sites around the world. > >A hacker war emerging from a new conflict with Iraq would be even more >intense, likely unleashing new computer viruses, denial-of-service >attacks aimed primarily at Internet providers and Web site >defacements. The potential cost of such a war could be staggering. > >The United States is not alone in developing information operations as >a tool of war. Although Iraq's IO capabilities in this area are >rudimentary, other potential adversaries - notably China - are >investing heavily in information warfare. More-sophisticated enemies >would have no qualms about mounting an IO campaign against us. > >As the most "wired" nation on Earth, the United States has the >greatest vulnerability to information attack. Although our government >and private companies have invested heavily in computer security, the >recent virus that disabled thousands of automated teller machines >illustrates the potential impact of even small-scale cyber-attacks. >The forces about to be unleashed on Saddam Hussein may be used against >us in the future. > > >Guest columnist Gary Pounder is a retired U.S. Air Force intelligence >officer who lives in Oxford, Miss. 6910 From: Steve Uhrig Date: Tue Feb 11, 2003 1:33pm Subject: Taking byte from Baghdad On 11 Feb 2003 at 14:25, kondrak wrote: > >Although President Bush hasn't made a final decision about going to > >war with Iraq, preparations for that potential conflict are almost > >complete. Thousands of American troops have been deployed to the > >Middle East in recent weeks, along with dozens of warships and > >hundreds of combat aircraft. Lot of US Mil traffic on 11.175 USB including some relays from UHF aircraft AM. All in the clear. Relatively weak and sporadic, but perfectly copyable here in MD with a decent tuned wire outside antenna and kit receiver. Periodically interesting. That is the primary interagency coordination channel. You're likely to hear almost anything there. May go hours with no traffic, then bursts of activity for an hour. Freq picked to be OK worldwide both daytime and night time. Reception depends a bit on the day's propogation. We're currently just coming down off the peak of an 11 year sunspot cycle, so HF worldwide is possible with excellent signals and low power. Steve ******************************************************************* Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 "In God we trust, all others we monitor" ******************************************************************* 6911 From: Fernando Martins Date: Tue Feb 11, 2003 2:42pm Subject: Re: Taking byte from Baghdad That issue remind me other ... COIAS - Converge Internet-ATM-Satellite If anyone is aware, was this just a study or it became used in aeronautical communications? FM ----- Original Message ----- From: "Steve Uhrig" To: Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2003 7:33 PM Subject: [TSCM-L] Taking byte from Baghdad > On 11 Feb 2003 at 14:25, kondrak wrote: > > > >Although President Bush hasn't made a final decision about going to > > >war with Iraq, preparations for that potential conflict are almost > > >complete. Thousands of American troops have been deployed to the > > >Middle East in recent weeks, along with dozens of warships and > > >hundreds of combat aircraft. > > Lot of US Mil traffic on 11.175 USB including some relays from UHF > aircraft AM. All in the clear. Relatively weak and sporadic, but > perfectly copyable here in MD with a decent tuned wire outside > antenna and kit receiver. Periodically interesting. That is the > primary interagency coordination channel. You're likely to hear > almost anything there. May go hours with no traffic, then bursts of > activity for an hour. Freq picked to be OK worldwide both daytime and > night time. Reception depends a bit on the day's propogation. We're > currently just coming down off the peak of an 11 year sunspot cycle, > so HF worldwide is possible with excellent signals and low power. > > Steve > > > ******************************************************************* > Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) > Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip > mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com > tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 > "In God we trust, all others we monitor" > ******************************************************************* > > > > ======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, > the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > =================================================== TSKS > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ > > > 6912 From: Paolo Sfriso Date: Wed Feb 12, 2003 4:45am Subject: Microtel Surveillance Recievers Dear Colleagues. I have recently seen for sale a MICROTEL MSR-904A Surveillance Receiver. Does anybody have experience with this piece of equipment and what are your opinions on its use for TSCM (particularly in the 2-18 GHz band). Kind Regards. Your Italian Connection. Paul Sfriso Director GRUPPO S.I.T. Security, Investigations & Technology Quarto d'Altino, Venice ITALY phone +39 0422 828517 fax +39 0422 823224 24hr GSM cellphone +39 335 5257308 www.grupposit.com paulsfriso@t... info@g... [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 6913 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Wed Feb 12, 2003 5:48am Subject: Re: Microtel Surveillance Recievers They are nice units, but are way, way out of date. Virtually impossible to obtain parts, very high noise figure (so you lose you signal), and most units lack the dual Sub Carrier mod, and the video module. -jma At 11:45 AM +0100 2/12/03, Paolo Sfriso wrote: >Dear Colleagues. > >I have recently seen for sale a MICROTEL MSR-904A Surveillance Receiver. > >Does anybody have experience with this piece of equipment and what >are your opinions on its use for TSCM (particularly in the 2-18 GHz >band). > >Kind Regards. > >Your Italian Connection. > >Paul Sfriso >Director >GRUPPO S.I.T. >Security, Investigations & Technology >Quarto d'Altino, Venice >ITALY > >phone +39 0422 828517 >fax +39 0422 823224 >24hr GSM cellphone +39 335 5257308 >www.grupposit.com >paulsfriso@t... >info@g... > > > > >[Non-text portions of this message have been removed] > > > >======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: >http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, > the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. >=================================================== TSKS > >Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. Atkinson Ph: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island GroupFax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Vocatus atque non vocatus deus aderit -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6914 From: A Grudko Date: Wed Feb 12, 2003 10:41am Subject: Re: Taking byte from Baghdad - Original Message - From: Steve Uhrig > Lot of US Mil traffic on 11.175 USB including some relays from UHF > aircraft AM. All in the clear. Relatively weak and sporadic, but > perfectly copyable here in MD with a decent tuned wire outside > antenna and kit receiver. Thanks for that - I'm getting a usable signal here on the southern tip of Africa. But the unsociable buggers don't answer me even if I put on an American accent and use the callsign Airforce One... Just kidding - I'm listening on about 10 metres of untuned wire. Andy Grudko (British), Grad I.S, South Africa SIRA investigators Reg. No. 8642 www.grudko.com , andy@g... . Est. 1981. International investigations (+27 12) 244 0255 - 244 0256 (Fax). IPA, SACI, WAD, CALI, UKPIN, IWWA. When you need it done right - first time 6915 From: Hawkspirit Date: Thu Feb 13, 2003 10:19am Subject: Re: Digest Number 1189 Parts are available from the manufacturer or should I say the company who took over Microtel, also the service manual lists oem sources on parts, anyone needing that info let me know and I will look it up. Also this unit runs circles around the newer digital units for resolution and seeing short duration R.F. spiked transmissions (burst bugs). Roger Tolces Electronic Security Co www.bugsweeps.com At 11:29 AM 2/13/03 +0000, you wrote: > Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2003 06:48:07 -0500 > From: "James M. Atkinson" >Subject: Re: Microtel Surveillance Recievers > >They are nice units, but are way, way out of date. > >Virtually impossible to obtain parts, very high noise figure (so you >lose you signal), and most units lack the dual Sub Carrier mod, and >the video module. > >-jma > > 6916 From: Paolo Sfriso Date: Fri Feb 14, 2003 5:01am Subject: New editions of the CODE MANUAL and the INTELLIGENCE AND SECRET SERVI Dear Colleagues. Following Email was received today from Klingenfuss: ----- Original Message ----- From: "Joerg Klingenfuss" To: Sent: Friday, February 14, 2003 11:46 AM Subject: New editions of the CODE MANUAL and the INTELLIGENCE AND SECRET SERVI Dear friends, we will soon publish a new edition of our famous RADIO DATA CODE MANUAL. The handbook will have more than 600 pages with 265 fascinating new screenshots and details on --- state-of-the-art digital data transmission systems such as ACARS ALE ALF-RDS ALIS ALIS-2 ARQ-E ARQ-E3 ARQ-M ASCII BULG-ASCII Chirp Sounders CIS-36 MFSK Clover Clover-2 Clover-2000 CODAN Coquelet DGPS DSC DUP-ARQ DUP-ARQ-2 DUP-FEC-2 FAX FEC-A G-TOR GW-CLOVER GW-PACTOR HFDL ICAO-SELCAL ITA2 MFSK-8 MFSK-16 MSI NAVTEX Packet Radio PACTOR PACTOR-2 PACTOR-2-FEC PACTOR-3 Piccolo POL-ARQ PSK-31 PSK-63F PSK-125F RUM-FEC SITOR SP-14 T-PLEX TWINPLEX; --- Military modem standards MIL-STD-188-110A MIL-STD-188-110B (Appendix B) MIL-STD-188-110B (Appendix C) MIL-STD-188-110B (Appendix F) MIL-STD-188-141A MIL-STD-188-141B (Appendix C) MIL-STD-188-203A-1 MIL-STD-188-203-3 MIL-STD-188-212 STANAG 4198 STANAG 4285 STANAG 4415 STANAG 4481 STANAG 4529 STANAG 4538 STANAG 4539 STANAG 4591 STANAG 5031 STANAG 5035 STANAG 5066 TADIL-A TADIL-B TADIL-C; --- teleprinter alphabets Arabic ATU-Arabic Chinese Cyrillic Latin Third-shift Cyrillic --- Unicode tables for Arabic Armenian Assamese Azerbaijani Bengali Bopomofo Burmese Chinese Cyrillic Ethiopic Farsi Georgian Greek Gujarati Gurmukhi Hebrew Hindi Japanese Kannada Khmer Korean Lao Latin Malayalam Mongolian Oriya Punjabi Sinhalese Tamil Telugu Thai Tibetan Vietnamese; --- latest versions of major meteorological codes AIREP AMDAR ARFOR BATHY METAR SPECI PILOT PILOT MOBIL PILOT SHIP ROFOR SHIP SYNOP SYNOP MOBIL TAF TEMP TEMP DROP TEMP MOBIL TEMP SHIP TESAC TRACKOB WINTEM; --- thousands of new WMO index numbers of observing stations particularly in Antarctic Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Brazil Canada China France Indonesia Kazakhstan Korea Oman Pakistan Romania Saudi Arabia Sweden Thailand Timor United Kingdom. This list is much more correct than the original WMO list that has many writing errors and omissions; --- thousands of new ICAO location indicators particularly in Albania Antarctic Austria Chile China Cuba El Salvador Germany Greenland Korea Mongolia Namibia New Zealand Norway Papua New Guinea Philippines Serbia Solomon Islands South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland Tanzania Timor Uganda Ukraine United Kingdom Uruguay. This list is much more correct than the original ICAO list that has many writing errors and omissions; --- solar and geophysical data; --- dozens of new Internet addresses; --- hundreds of new screenshots from our continuous radio monitoring; --- cryptology, intelligence and radio: the terrorism threat. If you're interested in the fascinating subject of HF e-mail and terrorist radio networks, please have a look at http://www.klingenfuss.org/terror.htm The new 17th edition will be published in March 2003. Price is 45 EUR including worldwide surface mail postage. If you would like to be among the first readers of the new book, you can place an advance order right now. ----------------------------------------------- A new edition of the superb ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECRET SERVICES has been published in January 2003. It has been considerably enlarged to 770 pages (!) and is, again, the most up-to-date international handbook on the current methods, techniques, and organization of secret services all over the world. On page 44 it even notes the new Kommando Strategische Aufklaerung created on 17 JAN 2002! The author is a noted expert from the Swiss military. This unique book is now available from us for 50 EUR including worldwide surface mail postage. Attention: this handbook is in French - there is NO English edition. I SAY AGAIN: THERE IS NO ENGLISH EDITION! The new edition can be ordered right now for immediate delivery. ----------------------------------------------- Save with our new package price for the RADIO DATA CODE MANUAL and the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECRET SERVICES: 90 EUR including worldwide surface mail postage! ----------------------------------------------- Due to excessive new so-called "service charges" and really absurd new authorization procedures, we can't accept Visa card payments any longer. The whole story behind that - and convenient alternatives for Visa card holders - can be found at http://www.klingenfuss.org/visa.htm ----------------------------------------------- A new edition of our bestseller GUIDE TO WORLDWIDE WEATHER SERVICES will be published later this year. If you live outside Europe, could you please check the worldwide NAVTEX schedule, as listed on pages 459-468 of our 2003 GUIDE TO UTILITY RADIO STATIONS. Please contact us for amendments and corrections in your region, and advise if you refer to the standard NAVTEX frequency of 518 kHz, or to the new additional frequencies 424 or 490 kHz. Proud users of WAVECOM Digital Data Decoder Cards are invited to send us their most interesting .w40 .w41 .w51 data files continuously - not only for NAVTEX ;-) Thank you for your cooperation. ----------------------------------------------- The WAVECOM W40PC DSP Digital Data Decoder Card now cracks MIL-STD 188-141A ALE. The next version of the superb software will include HFDL = ACARS-HF and further improvements. For recent reviews of WAVECOM Digital Data Decoders by happy customers and independent experts see http://www.klingenfuss.org/reviews.htm. Says Lee Reynolds in Monitoring Times, United States of America - January 2003: " If you're in the market for a high-end decoder, I can definitely recommend the WAVECOM line of products. One big plus for this device is that software updates are reasonably regular and, importantly, free! This compares extremely favourably with a competitor's offering of a 3.5" diskette with the latest software upgrade for their hardware for a mere USD 400. I may be crazy enough to be a digital utility monitor but I'm not crazy enough to pay that kind of money for a merely incremental software upgrade as well!" ----------------------------------------------- The WAVECOM W51PC DSP Digital Data Decoder Card for the PCI bus, and the WAVECOM W41USB DSP Digital Data Decoder Box for high portability and quick computer changes with the Universal Serial Bus (USB) system, are simply the very best professional data decoders available worldwide - at a reasonable price. Unfortunately, because these units decode certain paging modes, they are not legal for consumer sales in the US, but can only be sold to qualifying agencies. Please contact us if you have problems buying a WAVECOM decoder. We can name the decoder a "digital data interface PC card" or something similar if you ask us to do so (actually IT IS a "digital data interface PC card ;-)) and UPS will settle the customs clearing procedure for you - that's their job and they really know it! We ship worldwide by fully insured UPS express airfreight at original WAVECOM prices without additional costs or profit, and we throw in free Klingenfuss publications as well (at a value of 120 EUR) - you need them anyway to make full use of these worldwide leading decoders: 2003 Guide to Utility Radio Stations, the brandnew Radio Data Code Manual, 2003 Super Frequency List on CD-ROM, and Radiotelex Messages. ----------------------------------------------- Please note our new e-mail address info@k.... Recently, communication via e-mail has become more and more unreliable, and in the case of cyber attacks will crash completely. If you send us an e-mail message and don't get a reply within one or two days, we did not receive your message and you should contact us by other means. (But please note we're closed for a few weeks between April and September each year.) Good old telefax is still the safest and fastest way of communication, particularly for orders with payment by credit card. Forget that so-called SSL et al - it's latest versions have been perfectly hacked! ----------------------------------------------- Best wishes, Joerg Klingenfuss Klingenfuss Publications Hagenloher Str. 14 D-72070 Tuebingen Germany Phone ++49 7071 62830 Fax ++49 7071 600849 E-Mail info@k... Internet http://www.klingenfuss.org ----------------------------------------------- Latest references (for the full list please click http://www.klingenfuss.org/ref.htm) Mike Richards G4WNC, Decode editor of Shortwave Magazine, United Kingdom - February 2003: "Despithe the rapidly increasing use of the Internet, the 2003 Guide to Utility Radio Stations remains the most usable reference for most listeners. The 2003 Super Frequency List on CD-ROM continues to improve with every edition. This latest version is lightning fast. The most powerful is the word search. This is an incredibly fast and powerful search system that really allows you to make the most of the 10,000+ frequency list." Nils Schiffhauer DK8OK, editor of Funk, Germany - February 2003: "Der Meister hatte wieder einmal recht, wenn er einen steigenden Anteil privater Funkdienste, Militärfunk und die Kurzwelle als kostenlosen E-Mail-Ersatz prophezeite. Der 2003er-Jahrgang dokumentiert den Wahrheitsgehalt von Jörgs fundierten Vorhersagen auf eindrucksvolle Weise. 34 Jahre Erfahrung fließen auch in der 21. Auflage des Guide to Utility Radio Stations zusammen. Auch sein 2003er-Guide ist wiederum unverzichtbar für jeden, dessen HF-Horizont nicht beim Bayerischen Rundfunk endet. Er sollte zudem Pflichtlektüre für jeden Funkamateur sein, der daran sehen kann, wie dank neuer digitaler Betriebsarten der Äther brennt wie selten zuvor." Anker Petersen, Chairman of Danish Shortwave Clubs International, in Shortwave News - February 2003: "I found the following details essential for the DXer during his listening and identification of the transmitter and broadcast: station name, exact language, scheduled broadcast time, exact frequency and transmitter site. For identification purposes, it is necessary that all the essential details are readily available in the handbook. This was found to be the case in 68% of the checks in the WRTH, and 74% in 2003 Shortwave Frequency Guide." Bob Padula, Australia, in Electronic DX Press - 31 January 2003: "2003 Super Frequency List on CD-ROM ... Particularly neat is the "concurrent search" program, which when sued in combination with the incremental search represents a very powerful tool. A search for all broadcasters using the Al Dhabayya relay centre in Abu Dhabi gave us 131 results, in 1 millisecond. Program listeners may use the disk to obtain details of an almost infinite number of permutations, such as "all broadcasts in Arabic at 0615 UTC". I met with Joerg at his home some three years ago when I visited Germany, and was impressed with his dedication and superb attention to detail and topicality of all products and services he offers." David Fleming NS8S, United States of America - 23 January 2003: "Enjoy your website too! Fantastic!" John Kench G8JTQ, United Kingdom - 16 January 2003: "Have been looking at your website - absolutely magic! Saving up for a WAVECOM!!" Radio Nederland's Real Radio Booklist Review - 09 January 2003: "2003 Super Frequency List on CD-ROM ... an extremely comprehensive and accurate list ..." Giuseppe Gianotti, President of Associazione Italiana Radioascolto, Italy - 21 December 2002: "2003 Guide to Utility Radio Stations ... 2003 Super Frequency List on CD-ROM ... 2003 Shortwave Frequency Guide ... ringrazio sentitamente per queste stupende opere che sono una vera pietra migliare del radioascolto." Richard D'Angelo, Executive Director, North American Shortwave Association - 13 December 2002: "2003 Shortwave Frequency Guide... Mailed monday, and arrived today, Thursday ... very fast! ... another excellent edition of this very valuable resource." Radio Monitoring Station, Station Manager, Greenock, Scotland, United Kingdom - 12 December 2002: "2003 Guide to Utility Radio Stations ... 2003 Super Frequency List on CD-ROM ... Thank you again for your wonderful products." Kind Regards. Your Italian Connection. Paul Sfriso Director GRUPPO S.I.T. Security, Investigations & Technology Quarto d'Altino, Venice ITALY phone +39 0422 828517 fax +39 0422 823224 24hr GSM cellphone +39 335 5257308 www.grupposit.com paulsfriso@t... info@g... 6917 From: Andre Holmes <1ach@g...> Date: Sat Feb 15, 2003 2:19pm Subject: Re: Taking byte from Baghdad Hello all After reading Steves reply I would like to add that I heard a broadcast from a foreign country at around 12MHz it was a woman and the language barrier was in effect I could not piece together what she was saying, but a over broadcast of hers was present and I did here the words AMERICANS at least twice it was a male talking in a language I could not interpret. My message is that the enemys will communicate by simply over broadcasting a broadcast station. ANDRE HOLMES ----- Original Message ----- From: "Steve Uhrig" To: Sent: 11 February, 2003 02:33 PM Subject: [TSCM-L] Taking byte from Baghdad > On 11 Feb 2003 at 14:25, kondrak wrote: > > > >Although President Bush hasn't made a final decision about going to > > >war with Iraq, preparations for that potential conflict are almost > > >complete. Thousands of American troops have been deployed to the > > >Middle East in recent weeks, along with dozens of warships and > > >hundreds of combat aircraft. > > Lot of US Mil traffic on 11.175 USB including some relays from UHF > aircraft AM. All in the clear. Relatively weak and sporadic, but > perfectly copyable here in MD with a decent tuned wire outside > antenna and kit receiver. Periodically interesting. That is the > primary interagency coordination channel. You're likely to hear > almost anything there. May go hours with no traffic, then bursts of > activity for an hour. Freq picked to be OK worldwide both daytime and > night time. Reception depends a bit on the day's propogation. We're > currently just coming down off the peak of an 11 year sunspot cycle, > so HF worldwide is possible with excellent signals and low power. > > Steve > > > ******************************************************************* > Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) > Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip > mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com > tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 > "In God we trust, all others we monitor" > ******************************************************************* > > > > ======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, > the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > =================================================== TSKS > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ > > 6918 From: kondrak Date: Sat Feb 15, 2003 4:07pm Subject: Re: Taking byte from Baghdad Wouldn't surprise me at all, 12 mhz is the 25 meter International shortwave band. Actually, it's 11.650-12.050 mhz. Nice chart of allocations: http://www.pacificsites.com/~brooke/FA.shtml Its primarily in usage in Euro/Asia, so hearing a foreign story mentioning Americans isn't unusual. At 15:19 2/15/03 -0500, you wrote: >Hello all > >After reading Steves reply I would like to add that I heard a broadcast from >a foreign country at around 12MHz it was a woman and the language barrier >was in effect I could not piece together what she was saying, but a over >broadcast of hers was present and I did here the words AMERICANS at least >twice it was a male talking in a language I could not interpret. >My message is that the enemys will communicate by simply over broadcasting a >broadcast station. ANDRE HOLMES 6919 From: Date: Sun Feb 16, 2003 6:25am Subject: File - Gold List The current version of this list may be found at: http://www.tscm.com/goldlist.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Recommended U.S. TSCM Firms The following is a list of private TSCM firms who specialize in "bug sweeps" and wiretap detection and all of whom have legitimate TSCM training, credentials, and equipment (all are very well respected within the industry). While most TSCM specialists are available for travel outside of a specific geographic area they tend to avoid such engagements, or will limited the services to vulnerability analysis, pre-construction assistance, non-instrumented inspections, simple RF checks, in-place monitoring, or limited TSCM services involving only a briefcase sized in-place monitoring system (such as a single spectrum analyzer, MSS, Eagle, ScanLock, OSCOR, SPECTRE, ROSE, or similar system). These private TSCM firms tend to operate in a specific geographic area limited to a few hundred miles (usually within a four to six hour automobile drive). However, all of the TSCM firms listed here are available for travel anywhere in the United States or the World on short notice, but only provide limited services when operating outside of their normal coverage area. This limited coverage area is due to the logistics involved in transporting hundreds and often thousands of pounds of sophisticated, highly sensitive electronic instruments, equipment and tools. Bug sweeps and wiretap detection involves the use of ladders, pole climbing equipment, LAN analyzers, X-ray systems, large antennas and other equipment which is not easily transported by airplane. TSCM firms also tend to restrict their operations to a specific geographic area to facilitate an expert level of knowledge regarding the RF environment, construction methods used, community zoning, population demographics, civil engineering, aeronautic or maritime facilities, local military bases, and related areas. Knowledge of such regional information is critical for a successful TSCM project. The TSCM specialist must also have an intimate knowledge of the telephone systems, engineering methods, fiber optics, major cable locations, central office switches, test numbers, and related communications infrastructure present or being used in an area (which tends to be very regional). An understanding of what types of eavesdropping devices, methods, and frequencies are being used in an area is also important, as is a knowledge of what type of surveillance equipment is being sold within that region (and other areas). The TSCM Procedural and Protocols Guides used by a specialist also tend to be based on specific issues and variables present in that specific geographic area. On a more interesting note, many of these firms are located in, or near major maritime port cities. The heaviest concentrations are around major cities on the East and West coasts with a very limited presence in the Mid-West, Great Plains, and Rockies. If you are in the Mid-West, Great Plains, or Rockies area you would need to engage a TSCM firm from one of the major port cities. For example customers in Chicago, St. Louis, Memphis, Denver, Salt Lake City, Minneapolis, Billings, etc. would need to fly a TSCM specialist in from Boston, New York, Washington DC, Los Angles, Lexington, or Seattle. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Please be patient when contacting these firms, as if they are out serving a client they may not be able to return your call for several hours. Rates generally are non-negotiable and reflect the cost of the sweep practitioner's time, investment in equipment acquisition and maintenance, several weeks of in-service training a year, travel, administrative and communications time and expense to coordinate the sweep and written report, and a fair profit for their services. It is very unwise to shop for sweeps by using price as a criteria as it only invites getting ripped off. Legitimate TSCM professionals are not interested in, nor will then engage in negotiating for a lower price. When you contact persons on this list, you are talking with someone in the same league as an attorney or surgeon, not a salesman. In fact most of the people listed on this page have more time in their specialized training than do most attorneys or medical professionals. Anything beyond an initial phone call usually will be billable time. Attorneys and doctors don't consult for free, and neither do legitimate TSCM specialists. If a potential client calls with a long list of questions not pertaining directly to hiring the practitioner, or wants to know how to do his own sweep, or wants to know how to use the sweep kit he purchased on his own, expect to pay an hourly rate in advance for consulting services. If you are considering engaging (or have already engaged) a TSCM firm and they are not listed in the following directory you would do well to immediately ask some awkward questions. It is also important you understand that legitimate services by a competent TSCM firm rarely start at less then several thousand dollars for even a basic sweep. Keep in mind that there only a small number of legitimate and competent TSCM counterintelligence specialists or "Bug Sweepers" in the U.S. private sector. Legitimate TSCM firms are in very high demand, hard to find, and expensive; so be patient when trying to find one to help you. Also, the firms listed on this page are not attorneys and cannot tell you whether it is legal or illegal for you to monitor your own phones. Always call a competent licensed attorney for legal advice. Without exception, no one listed here performs eavesdropping services or sells surveillance equipment to any other than government agencies AND WILL NOT REFER YOU TO ANYONE WHO DOES. When you contact any of the following firms please mention that you saw them listed on this web site. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ All of New England, Upstate New York, and the Boston Metropolitan Area (MA, RI, CT, VT, NH, ME, New York State including Long Island, and some of New Jersey) Available on a limited basis to cover any location within 1000 miles of Boston. James M. Atkinson Granite Island Group 127 Eastern Avenue #291 Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 (978) 381-9111 Telephone URL: http://www.tscm.com/ E-mail: jmatk@tscm.com ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Stamford, Connecticut Metropolitan Area (also, Manhattan, Long Island, and New Jersey) Sam Daskam Information Security Associates, Inc. 38 Settlers Trail Stamford, CT 06903 (203) 329-8387 Telephone URL: http://www.isa-tscm.com/ E-mail:sales@i... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Norwalk, and Lower Fairfield Country Area (also, Manhattan, Long Island, Philadelphia, and New Jersey) Rob Muessel TSCM Technical Services 11 Bayberry Lane Norwalk, CT 06851 (203) 354-9040 Telephone URL: http://www.tscmtech.com/ E-mail:rmuessel@t... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Greater Philadelphia and Harrisburg Metropolitan Area (also, serving South-Eastern and Central Pennsylvania) Bob Motzer RCM and Associates 609 Sandra Lane Phoenixville, PA 19460 (888) 990-6265 Telephone E-mail: 1RCM@M... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Washington DC and Baltimore Metropolitan Area (also, Virginia, Delaware, and Pennsylvania) Steve Uhrig SWS Security 1300 Boyd Road Street, MD 21154-1836 (410) 879-4035 Telephone URL: http://www.swssec.com/ E-mail: steve@s... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Houston, Dallas, Austin, and Galveston (also, Gulf Coast of Texas and Louisiana) Rick Udovich Communication Security, Inc. 2 Shadow Lane Bay City, TX 77414 (979) 244-4920 Telephone URL: http://www.bugsweep.com/ E-mail: rjudo@s... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Atlanta Metropolitan Area, Southeastern US (also, AL, FL, GA, NC, SC, TN) Buzz Benson Executive World Services, Inc. P.O. Box 33 Braselton, Georgia 30517-0033 (678) 316-7002 Telephone URL: http://www.executiveworldservices.com/ E-mail: sales@e... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Lexington KY Metropolitan Area (also, Louisville, Cincinnati, and Central Midwest) Bill G. Rhoads Intelcom, Inc. 121 Prosperous Place, Suite 4B Lexington, KY 40509 (859) 263-9425 Telephone E-mail: bgr101@a... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Michigan and Surrounding Area (also, Indiana, Ohio, and Northern Midwest Region) Chad Margita Off Duty Security 18301 Eight Mile Rd, Suite 214 Eastpointe, MI 48021 (586) 774-1675 Telephone E-mail: offdutysecurity@c... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Washington State and Seattle WA Metropolitan Area (also, Oregon, and the Pacific North West) Gordon Mitchell Future Focus, Inc. P.O. Box 2547 Woodinville, WA 98072 (888) BUG-KILR Telephone URL: http://www.bug-killer.com/ E-mail: enquiries@b... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ San Francisco and all of Northern California (also, Silicon Valley Area) William Bennett Walsingham Associates, Inc. P.O. Box 4264 San Rafael, CA 94913 (415) 492-1594 Telephone E-mail: walsingham@c... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 6920 From: Date: Sun Feb 16, 2003 6:25am Subject: File - mission.txt TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List Dedicated to TSCM specialists engaging in expert technical and analytical research for the detection, nullification, and isolation of eavesdropping devices, wiretaps, bugging devices, technical surveillance penetrations, technical surveillance hazards, and physical security weaknesses. This also includes bug detection, bug sweep, and wiretap detection services. Special emphasis is given to detecting and countering espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign intelligence services against the United States Government, United States corporations, establishments, and citizens. The list includes technical discussion regarding the design and construction of SCIF facilities, Black Chambers, and Screen Rooms. This list is also for discussing DIAM 50-3, NSA-65, and DCID 1/21, 1/22 compliance. The primary goal and mission of this list is to "raise the bar" and increase the level of professionalism present within the TSCM business. The secondary goal of this list is to increase the quality and effectiveness of our efforts so that we give spies and eavesdroppers no quarter, and to neutralize all of their espionage efforts. This mailing list is moderated by James M. Atkinson and sponsored by Granite Island Group as a public service to the TSCM, Counter Intelligence, and technical security community. 6921 From: Ocean Group - MU TSD Date: Wed Feb 12, 2003 8:39pm Subject: Laser countermeasures... http://www.beltronics.com/lp904.html We have been considering sticking one if these units on one of our vans to see if they really do work. We're going to import one from the US and I reckon it should be a standard wavelenght for the European LIDAR but wasn't sure. (904nm?) Does anyone have any experience of these gizmo's? I'm told they are not illegal in the US as there is no FCC restriction on laser?? Here in Ireland there is no precedence so it's pretty much free reign however you might be snatched on an obstructing justice rule...I've checked with the DOE here in Ireland and they said they had no ruling on it so technically you can use them, however the DOJ said that should they catch you interfering with one of their speed units they would drag you out of your car and beat you with a stick! This is of course is for purely educational purposes, a learning experiment for laser countermeasures.... :) Thanking you, Oisin Ocean Group, Technical Security Division, Ireland. 6922 From: Bergstrom, Dennis Date: Wed Feb 12, 2003 8:21am Subject: RE: Fwd: [ISN] Taking byte from Baghdad Hi guys (girls?), I must admit that I seldom, if never!, have contributed to this list before, apart from introducing myself quite some time ago, but this I just *have* to comment on... :o) For those of you that don't know me (that should be most of you actually...(!)) my name is Dennis Bergstrom and I work as a Security Consultant for the company Cap Gemini Ernst & Young (One of the largest consulting companies in Europe btw) in Stockholm, Sweden. In my line of work I have among various other security related things performed Penetration Tests, Secured different systems to prevent breakins, done forensic cases etc. When I read the column "Takin Byte from Bagdad" I note that the columnist - Mr. Gary Pounder - for some reason mentions a couple of things that probably aren't true, or if they - against all odds! - are, the probablility that it happened the way it is described in the column are slim to none. Let me show you what I mean: "...Because of the explosion of computer networks and the Internet, it is now possible to gain access to information systems that support an enemy's economy or military forces. Disrupting these systems can wreak havoc with an adversary's war machine, potentially shortening the war and reducing the number of allied casualties..." Comments: Probably untrue to say the least. I have a hard time believing anyone would connect critical military systems to be accessable for anyone from the Internet. Those times you hear that someone "hacked NASA" or "hacked the US. Military" often this is just defacing of websites, or poor security on the public part of an organisation. Often Intelligence services (at least in Europe, probably elsewhere too) and military have separated networks for critical vs. non-critical systems. --- "...IO experts decided to attack KARI internally and externally. Allied electronic warfare aircraft would jam and bomb KARI components, while specially designed computer viruses would infect the system from within. Agents inserted the virus in a printer shipped to an Iraqi air defense site..." Comments: Probably not true. Very often - if not always!- a virus is written specifically for a certain platform, be it Microsoft based, *Nix or Mac. A Microsoft based virus does not infect a Mac and so on. For Mr. Pounder to be right several things must be true: * The IO Experts (whoever they are..) must know the structure and operating system of the KARI defence system to be able to develop a virus that works. * You really can infect a printer... and frankly, you can't. And if there for some reason - unknown to me and the rest of humanity - could be done, how would the virus in the printer infect the O/S of the defence system? Belive me, this is disinformation big time! The case itself *could* of course be true, but the virus was introduced into the KARI system by some other means than a printer... --- "...The virus also was introduced via a fiber optic cable that connected air defense nodes. A Special Forces unit infiltrated Iraq, dug up the cable and inserted the virus..." Comment: Probably untrue also. You don't just dig up optic cables and "insert a virus". The same as above applies. An optic cable is just a communication link between 2 nodes. If we speculate that the KARI system used TCP/IP (probably) this is the same as you or me trying to infect our office neighbors boxes by just pushing virus code through the NIC. Well, if KARI was based on SQL Server or IIS (evil grin) I *could* buy this, but probably a defence system would be custom build, wouldn't you agree? And while they were busy digging up optic cables, why not just break them so the communication was disrupted? ---- Thanks for bearing with me this far. This was my 50 cents on IT-warfare and security. Best Regards, Dennis in Stockholm, Sweden, Europe. -----Original Message----- From: kondrak [mailto:kondrak@s...] Sent: den 11 februari 2003 20:25 To: TSCM-L@yahoogroups.com Subject: [TSCM-L] Fwd: [ISN] Taking byte from Baghdad > > >http://www.gomemphis.com/mca/opinion_columnists/article/0,1426,MCA_539_1726 690,00.html > >Gary Pounder >February 9, 2003 > >Although President Bush hasn't made a final decision about going to >war with Iraq, preparations for that potential conflict are almost >complete. Thousands of American troops have been deployed to the >Middle East in recent weeks, along with dozens of warships and >hundreds of combat aircraft. > >These preparations have been highly publicized, with daily pictures of >departing aircraft, naval vessels and military personnel, all designed >to convey a final warning to Saddam Hussein. But preparations for war >also are under way in less-visible areas. > >If Bush gives the order to attack Iraq, U.S. forces will initiate >information operations (IO) as part of their overall military >strategy. Aimed at disrupting Iraqi information systems, the expected >"information war" may represent the ultimate technology weapon in what >will be a high-tech campaign. > >Details of this war are almost nonexistent. Although the Pentagon has >spent billions of dollars on IO since the early 1990s, it has said >little about its capabilities in this area. > >What is known is that this investment has fostered the development of >highly specialized IO units, doctrine and tactics. Gen. Tommy Franks, >commander of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf region, has his own team >of IO specialists. > >Although IO is sometimes described in terms of computer attack or >cyber-warfare, it covers a variety of functions related to the use and >protection of information and information systems. The rationale >behind IO is simple: deny the enemy use of the information spectrum, >while protecting our own information assets. > >IO includes several disciplines that are almost as old as warfare >itself: intelligence collection, deception, psychological operations. >It also incorporates newer technologies, exploiting advances from the >information revolution of the past 20 years. > >Cyber-attack is one of the most intriguing and useful new tools of >information warfare. Because of the explosion of computer networks and >the Internet, it is now possible to gain access to information systems >that support an enemy's economy or military forces. Disrupting these >systems can wreak havoc with an adversary's war machine, potentially >shortening the war and reducing the number of allied casualties. > >The United States displayed the benefits of a computer war in the 1991 >Gulf War, when it conducted its first cyber-attack on Iraq's air >defense system. The highly automated system (nicknamed KARI) linked >Iraqi surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns in a computerized >command-and-control network. > >The KARI system could withstand air attacks reliably and still provide >critical information to Iraqi air defense commanders. Neutralizing >KARI was deemed essential to the allied air campaign. > >IO experts decided to attack KARI internally and externally. Allied >electronic warfare aircraft would jam and bomb KARI components, while >specially designed computer viruses would infect the system from >within. Agents inserted the virus in a printer shipped to an Iraqi air >defense site. > >The virus also was introduced via a fiber optic cable that connected >air defense nodes. A Special Forces unit infiltrated Iraq, dug up the >cable and inserted the virus. It remained dormant until the opening >moments of the air war, when it went active and crippled KARI. The >Iraqi air defense system never recovered, and allied losses in the air >campaign were minimal. > >Since the Gulf War, IO tacticians have added to their target lists >economic and infrastructure systems that support an enemy's ability to >fight: power grids, water supplies, banking networks. There are >unconfirmed reports that cyber-attacks helped shut down the Serb power >grid during the 1999 Balkans War. Information operations also have >been used in the war on terrorism to ferret out al-Qaida bank >accounts, trace financial transactions and identify potential >operatives. > >Officially, the Pentagon won't say what level of IO planning and >preparation is under way, but there are vague hints about what might >be in store for Baghdad. Several media outlets reported last month >that the United States was sending E-mail messages to Iraqi military >commanders, urging them not to fight if war breaks out. > >In a police state such as Iraq, E-mail directories are classified >material, off limits to anyone outside the military and security >establishment. Our ability to send E-mail to Iraqi generals suggest IO >teams have identified key computer networks, earmarking them for >potential disruption or destruction. > >There is a good chance the cyber-battle will spread beyond Iraqi >information systems. If the United States launches military action >against Baghdad, we can expect a vicious "war" between Middle Eastern >and western computer hackers. > >Remember the 2001 "spy plane" incident between the United States and >China? That relatively minor episode prompted a month-long >confrontation between American and Chinese hackers that resulted in >the defacement of thousands of Web sites around the world. > >A hacker war emerging from a new conflict with Iraq would be even more >intense, likely unleashing new computer viruses, denial-of-service >attacks aimed primarily at Internet providers and Web site >defacements. The potential cost of such a war could be staggering. > >The United States is not alone in developing information operations as >a tool of war. Although Iraq's IO capabilities in this area are >rudimentary, other potential adversaries - notably China - are >investing heavily in information warfare. More-sophisticated enemies >would have no qualms about mounting an IO campaign against us. > >As the most "wired" nation on Earth, the United States has the >greatest vulnerability to information attack. Although our government >and private companies have invested heavily in computer security, the >recent virus that disabled thousands of automated teller machines >illustrates the potential impact of even small-scale cyber-attacks. >The forces about to be unleashed on Saddam Hussein may be used against >us in the future. > > >Guest columnist Gary Pounder is a retired U.S. Air Force intelligence >officer who lives in Oxford, Miss. ======================================================== TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. =================================================== TSKS Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ This message contains information that may be privileged or confidential and is the property of the Cap Gemini Ernst & Young Group. It is intended only for the person to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are not authorized to read, print, retain, copy, disseminate, distribute, or use this message or any part thereof. If you receive this message in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete all copies of this message. 6923 From: David Vine Date: Thu Feb 13, 2003 7:26am Subject: Re: Digest Number 1189 There has been some discussion about "Microtel" receivers. I recently became a dealer for Alinco scanner radios which are very affordable and have unique features that make them useful for basic RF sweeps. They cover broadcast to gHz ranges and have "transweeper" function (listening for unit-generated audio on RF as unit sweeps) and frequency counter built-in. In essence, they are roughly equivalent to an AOR with Optoelectronics unit but priced from about $250 to $500. If anyone is interested in more detail let me know. David Vine ===== www.investigativetechnology.net __________________________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Shopping - Send Flowers for Valentine's Day http://shopping.yahoo.com 6924 From: Julie Burger Date: Thu Feb 13, 2003 3:49pm Subject: Interesting Link: Web Controlled Shortwave Receivers http://www.ralabs.com/webradio/ _________________________________________________________________ Add photos to your messages with MSN 8. Get 2 months FREE*. http://join.msn.com/?page=features/featuredemail 6925 From: Ocean Group - MU TSD Date: Fri Feb 14, 2003 5:38am Subject: Laser countermeasures... http://www.beltronics.com/lp904.html We have been considering sticking one if these units on one of our vans to see if they really do work?? We're going to import one from the US and I reckon it should be a standard wavelenght for the European LIDAR but wasn't sure. (904nm?) Does anyone have any experience of these gizmo's? I'm told they are not illegal in the US as there is no FCC restriction on laser?? Here in Ireland there is no precedence so it's pretty much free reign however you might be snatched on an obstructing justice rule...I've checked with the DOE here in Ireland and they said they had no ruling on it so technically you can use them, however the DOJ said that should they catch you interfering with one of their speed units they would drag you out of your car and beat you with a stick! This is of course is for purely educational purposes, a learning experiment for laser countermeasures.... :) Thanking you, Oisin Ocean Group, Technical Security Division, Ireland. 6926 From: George Shaw Date: Sun Feb 16, 2003 9:38am Subject: CCTV line monitoring OK not directly a case of tracking a monitored line but more a quest to understand how it could be accomplished. Situation: I have a client that has around 55 RG59 coax cables in a bundle running through the building. None are marked as to which camera they are coming from or which terminal on the multiplex they are connected to. The multiplex has 32 + 16 inputs (48) and a selector for 48 cameras. If I can not access the coax ends (at the multiplex) how can I test for 1. The presence of a video feed in the coax without breaking the coax and testing for signal? Say from a point within the building but NOT at either end, the test has to be as un-intrusive as possible; (no cutting the coax and rejoining) like a clamp meter for current would do. 2. The detection of a live cable i.e. one that is being used as opposed to a dead coax. Like above no/little intrusion of the coax possible. -- George Shaw MI3GTO " Any Sufficiently Advanced Technology is Indistinguishable from Magic" ---Arthur C. Clarke Mobile: +44 (0) 7740 361 163 Email: george.shaw@u... 6927 From: Ben Pasco Date: Sun Feb 16, 2003 6:26am Subject: Your Email Hello and thank you for your email. I shall be out of my office from the 17th-28th Feb and will be out of normal email contact. If you need to contact PGI then please email my business partner, David Rule at davidr@p... who will be happy to respond. Thanks again, Ben Pasco 6928 From: George Shaw Date: Sun Feb 16, 2003 1:06pm Subject: CCTV Line Monitoring OK not directly a case of tracking a monitored line but more a quest to understand how it could be accomplished. Situation: I have a client that has around 55 RG59 coax cables in a bundle running through the building. None are marked as to which camera they are coming from or which terminal on the multiplex they are connected to. The multiplex has 32 + 16 inputs (48) and a selector for 48 cameras. If I can not access the coax ends (at the multiplex) how can I test for 1. The presence of a video feed in the coax without breaking the coax and testing for signal? Say from a point within the building but NOT at either end, the test has to be as un-intrusive as possible; (no cutting the coax and rejoining) like a clamp meter for current would do. 2. The detection of a live cable i.e. one that is being used as opposed to a dead coax. Like above no/little intrusion of the coax possible. If it is not possable to demodulate the video signal, what could you monitor as to line activity? If you were to try and detect such a "tap" how could you? You may be able to get at the end to attach a TDR but would that show you given a no-intrusive attachment? -- George Shaw MI3GTO " Any Sufficiently Advanced Technology is Indistinguishable from Magic" ---Arthur C. Clarke Mobile: +44 (0) 7740 361 163 Email: george.shaw@u... 6929 From: Kirk Adirim Date: Wed Feb 19, 2003 2:04am Subject: RE: CCTV line monitoring Hi George, You make a TINY slit or nick in the coax with a razor knife, then seperate the braided shielding and foil (if any), expose the dielectric material. Using a homemade needle probe jig, you penetrate the dielectric and make contact with the center conductor while avoiding any shorts to the shield. Another needle is woven slightly into the exposed braided shield to give you your ground. Both needle probes are terminated onto a piece of RG174/U or similar coax and run to your hand held video monitor or other test equipment. In lieu of slitting the coax, you could obtain one of the circular punches from a leather belt hole punch. By chucking it into a handle you can cut out a circular plug of insulation from the side of the coax. Using liquid tape or neoprene glue, you can reseal your intrusion from moisture. Hope this helps, Kirk www.tactronix.com -----Original Message----- From: George Shaw [mailto:george.shaw@u...] Sent: Sunday, February 16, 2003 7:39 AM To: tscm-l@yahoogroups.com Subject: [TSCM-L] CCTV line monitoring OK not directly a case of tracking a monitored line but more a quest to understand how it could be accomplished. Situation: I have a client that has around 55 RG59 coax cables in a bundle running through the building. None are marked as to which camera they are coming from or which terminal on the multiplex they are connected to. The multiplex has 32 + 16 inputs (48) and a selector for 48 cameras. If I can not access the coax ends (at the multiplex) how can I test for 1. The presence of a video feed in the coax without breaking the coax and testing for signal? Say from a point within the building but NOT at either end, the test has to be as un-intrusive as possible; (no cutting the coax and rejoining) like a clamp meter for current would do. 2. The detection of a live cable i.e. one that is being used as opposed to a dead coax. Like above no/little intrusion of the coax possible. -- George Shaw MI3GTO " Any Sufficiently Advanced Technology is Indistinguishable from Magic" ---Arthur C. Clarke Mobile: +44 (0) 7740 361 163 Email: george.shaw@u... ======================================================== TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. =================================================== TSKS Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ 6930 From: Matt Paulsen Date: Wed Feb 19, 2003 9:17am Subject: RE: Your Email Everyone, this is what not to do with email. Hello and thank you for your email. I shall be out of my office from the 17th-28th Feb so please by all means come rob me. In fact, here's my home address and do please feed the cats while you're there.... -----Original Message----- From: Ben Pasco [mailto:benp@p...] Sent: Sunday, February 16, 2003 4:26 AM To: TSCM-L@yahoogroups.com Subject: [TSCM-L] Your Email Hello and thank you for your email. I shall be out of my office from the 17th-28th Feb and will be out of normal email contact. If you need to contact PGI then please email my business partner, David Rule at davidr@p... who will be happy to respond. Thanks again, Ben Pasco ======================================================== TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. =================================================== TSKS Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ 6931 From: Hawkspirit Date: Wed Feb 19, 2003 7:06pm Subject: CCTV line monitoring Ok, I am not getting this, please define the nature of the threat and the object of the threat. Roger At 11:43 AM 2/19/03 +0000, you wrote: >Date: Sun, 16 Feb 2003 15:38:30 -0000 > From: "George Shaw" >Subject: CCTV line monitoring > >OK not directly a case of tracking a monitored line but more a quest to >understand how it could be accomplished. > >Situation: I have a client that has around 55 RG59 coax cables in a >bundle running through the building. None are marked as to which camera >they are coming from or which terminal on the multiplex they are >connected to. The multiplex has 32 + 16 inputs (48) and a selector for >48 cameras. > >If I can not access the coax ends (at the multiplex) how can I test for > >1. The presence of a video feed in the coax without breaking the coax >and testing for signal? Say from a point within the building but NOT at >either end, the test has to be as un-intrusive as possible; (no cutting >the coax and rejoining) like a clamp meter for current would do. > >2. The detection of a live cable i.e. one that is being used as opposed >to a dead coax. Like above no/little intrusion of the coax possible. > > 6932 From: Kutlin, Josh Date: Wed Feb 19, 2003 6:54am Subject: RE: Taking byte from Baghdad Ok ...thanks to this thread I went out and bought my first shortwave (DX-399) this past weekend for $30 on closeout. The first thing I realized is that I need a better antenna. Did some reading (and rigging) and I realized that the 25 feet of co-ax (its all I had and the snow closed radio shack) is just not cutting it. My question is and I apologize if it is off topic for this group, but does any one know where I could find plans to make a cheap active antenna? Thanks Josh -----Original Message----- From: kondrak [mailto:kondrak@s...] Sent: Saturday, February 15, 2003 5:08 PM To: Andre Holmes Cc: TSCM-L@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] Taking byte from Baghdad Wouldn't surprise me at all, 12 mhz is the 25 meter International shortwave band. Actually, it's 11.650-12.050 mhz. Nice chart of allocations: http://www.pacificsites.com/~brooke/FA.shtml Its primarily in usage in Euro/Asia, so hearing a foreign story mentioning Americans isn't unusual. At 15:19 2/15/03 -0500, you wrote: >Hello all > >After reading Steves reply I would like to add that I heard a broadcast from >a foreign country at around 12MHz it was a woman and the language barrier >was in effect I could not piece together what she was saying, but a over >broadcast of hers was present and I did here the words AMERICANS at least >twice it was a male talking in a language I could not interpret. >My message is that the enemys will communicate by simply over broadcasting a >broadcast station. ANDRE HOLMES ======================================================== TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. =================================================== TSKS