From: Matthijs van der Wel <mwe@p...> 
Date: Thu Feb 22, 2001 0:14am
Subject: Information Warfare
  
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The Dutch company "TNO Physics and Electronics Lab" is writing a
report for the Dutch government on the status of The Netherlands
electronic infrastructure in
case of an 'Information War' (cyberwar) .

Although the report isn't finished yet, the first indications are not
at all too positive (...). On their website, TNO offers a collection
of links to websites and articles about Information Warfare:
http://www.tno.nl/instit/fel/intern/wkiwar5.html.

TNO also has a page with links about the subject "Information
Operations": http://www.tno.nl/instit/fel/intern/wkinfdef.html and
"Information Security":
http://www.tno.nl/instit/fel/intern/wkinfsec.html

All pages are in English and worth a visit.


Yours sincerely,

Matthijs van der Wel
e-Consultant

(and in no way affiliated with TNO, just someone who got curious
after a lecture TNO gave on the subject)

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2553

From: A Grudko <agrudko@i...> 
Date: Thu Feb 22, 2001 9:07am
Subject: Re: FBI agent
  
----- Original Message -----
> It's a shame that someone would sell out his own country for the love of
money.

Here in southern Africa there is a trend which you might look out for.
Zimbabwe President Robert Mgabe has uncovered a plot to overthrow his 23
year government, and in reply has fired the judiciary, seized all foreign
currency, bombed the press and encouraged the occupation of private land by
mobs.

This subversive process is described as a 'democratic election'. Watch out
in case one comes your way.

Andy Grudko
Johannesburg
2554

From: Bob Washburne <rcwash@c...> 
Date: Thu Feb 22, 2001 2:32pm
Subject: Re: Darwin Awards Update!!
  
Fiction (can't call them "Urban Legends" until everyone has heard them
and knows them to be true) has crept into the Awards in the past, but
all entries appear to be tentative until verified. Ideally,
verification comes from the actual hospital or corinor's report. But in
some cases, e.g. a story from Poland, you only have a story from one of
the major news wires. Even so, this lends some measure of credibility.

This is a good lesson for all of us: healthy skeptisism without summary
dismissal until the story can be confirmed one way or the other. All
filtered through the understanding that we are not in an ideal world.

Bob Washburne

David Miller wrote:
> 
> Personally I think they all were a little contrived. Not your usual Darwin
> fare.
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Robert G. Ferrell [mailto:rferrell@r...]
> Sent: Wednesday, February 21, 2001 2:42 PM
> To: TSCM-L@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] Darwin Awards Update!!
> 
> > Nothing was found of the technicians, but the
> >lighter was virtually untouched by the explosion. The technician
> >suspected of causing the blast had never been thought of as 'bright'
> >by his peers.
> 
> I don't believe this one. Too Warner Brothers.
> 
> RGF
> 
> 
> ========================================================
> TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List
> "In a multitude of counselors there is strength"
> 
> To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit:
> http://www.onelist.com/community/TSCM-L
> 
> or email your subscription request to:
> subTSCM-L@t...
> =================================================== TSKS
> 
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
2555

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Thu Feb 22, 2001 7:47pm
Subject: USA v. Robert Philip Hanssen: Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint, Arrest Warrant and Search Warrant
  
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
)
v.)
)CRIMINAL NO.
ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN,)
a/k/a "B")
a/k/a "Ramon Garcia")
a/k/a "Jim Baker")
a/k/a "G. Robertson")

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, ARREST WARRANT AND SEARCH WARRANTS

I, Stefan A. Pluta, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:

1. I am presently employed as a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) and am assigned to the Washington Field Office 
in the District of Columbia. I have been employed as an FBI Special 
Agent for approximately 13 years. I have completed FBI training in 
foreign counterintelligence matters. As a result of my training and 
experience, I am familiar with the tactics, methods, and techniques 
of foreign intelligence services and their agents.

2. This affidavit is in support of applications for the following:

A) A warrant for the arrest of ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN (DOB 4/18/44) 
for violations of Title 18 United States Code, Sections 794 (a) 
(Transmitting National Defense Information) and 794 (c) (Conspiracy 
to Commit Espionage); and
B) Search warrants for:

1) The residence of ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN, such premises known and 
described as a single family residence located at:
9414 Talisman Drive
Vienna, Virginia 22182

as more fully described in Attachment B, and which is within the 
Eastern District of Virginia;

2) One silver 1997 Ford Taurus, bearing VIN IFALP52U9VG211742 and 
Virginia license plate number ZCW9538, which is owned by ROBERT 
PHILIP HANSSEN and anticipated to be within the Eastern District of 
Virginia;

3) One 1993 Volkswagen van, bearing VIN WV2KC0706PH080424 and 
Virginia license plate number ZCW9537, which is owned by ROBERT 
PHILIP HANSSEN and anticipated to be within the Eastern District of 
Virginia;

4) One 1992 Isuzu Trooper, bearing VIN JACDH58W7N7903937 and Virginia 
license plate YRP3849, which is owned by ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN and 
anticipated to be within the Eastern District of Virginia.

3. In my capacity as case agent assigned to this matter, I have 
examined documents and other records pertinent to this investigation 
from numerous sources. Searches and various forms of surveillance 
have also been conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) and orders of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC).

I. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION

4. The results of this investigation to date indicate that there is 
probable cause to believe that, beginning in 1985 and continuing to 
the present, ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN (hereinafter "HANSSEN"), a United 
States citizen, has conspired with officers and agents of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter "USSR" or "Soviet Union") 
and with its principal successor state, the Russian Federation 
(hereinafter "Russia") to commit espionage against the United States 
on behalf of a foreign government, specifically the Soviet Union or 
Russia, and has in fact engaged in such espionage.

5. The evidence establishes that between 1985 and the present, 
HANSSEN ­ who the KGB/SVR referred to as "B" ­ has engaged in the 
following conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§794 (a) and (c):

(a) He compromised numerous human sources of the United States 
Intelligence Community. Three of these sources were compromised by 
both HANSSEN and former CIA officer Aldrich Ames, resulting in their 
arrest, imprisonment and, as to two individuals, execution. HANSSEN 
compromised these three individuals expressly in order to enhance his 
own security and enable him to continue spying against the United 
States.
(b) He compromised dozens of United States Government classified 
documents, including documents concerning the National MASINT 
(Measurement and Signature Intelligence) Program (classified TOP 
SECRET/SCI), the United States Double Agent Program (classified 
SECRET), the FBI Double Agent Program (classified TOP SECRET), the 
United States Intelligence Community's Comprehensive Compendium of 
Future Intelligence Requirements (classified TOP SECRET), a study 
concerning KGB recruitment operations against the CIA (classified 
SECRET), an assessment of the KGB's effort to gather information 
concerning certain United States nuclear programs (classified TOP 
SECRET), a CIA analysis of the KGB's First Chief Directorate 
(classified SECRET), a highly classified and tightly restricted 
analysis of the foreign threat to a specific named highly 
compartmented classified United States Government program (classified 
TOP SECRET/SCI), and other classified documents of exceptional 
sensitivity.

(c) He compromised United States Intelligence Community technical 
operations of extraordinary importance and value. This included 
specific electronic surveillance and monitoring techniques and 
precise targets of the United States Intelligence Community. In one 
case, he compromised an entire technical program of enormous value, 
expense and importance to the United States Government. In several 
other cases, he compromised the United States Intelligence 
Community's specific communications intelligence capabilities, as 
well as several specific targets.

(d) He compromised numerous FBI counterintelligence investigative 
techniques, sources, methods and operations, and FBI operational 
practices and activities targeted against the KGB/SVR. He also 
advised the KGB/SVR as to specific methods of operation that were 
secure from FBI surveillance and warned the KGB/SVR as to certain 
methods of operation which were subject to FBI surveillance.

(e) He disclosed to the KGB the FBI's secret investigation of Felix 
Bloch, a Foreign Service Officer, for espionage, which led the KGB to 
warn Bloch that he was under investigation, and completely 
compromised the investigation.

(f) HANSSEN's conspiratorial activities continue to the present. 
HANSSEN continues to monitor a particular SVR signal site, doing so 
on numerous occasions in December 2000, January 2001 and February 
2001. A recent search of HANSSEN's personal vehicle, pursuant to 
court authorization, disclosed a number of classified SECRET 
documents, entries in a personal journal concerning matters related 
to the instant investigation, and items typically used to mark signal 
sites. It has also been determined that HANSSEN continues to attempt 
to ascertain whether he has become the subject of FBI investigative 
interest, including checking FBI records to determine whether there 
have been recent entries as to his own name, his home address, or the 
signal site.

(g) Over the course of HANSSEN's espionage activities, he 
communicated on numerous occasions with KGB/SVR personnel. This 
Affidavit cites 27 letters he sent to the KGB/SVR, and it describes 
33 packages the KGB/SVR left for HANSSEN at secret locations, and 22 
packages HANSSEN left for the KGB/SVR at secret locations. The 
Affidavit also describes two telephone conversations HANSSEN had with 
KGB personnel. The Affidavit describes 26 computer diskettes that 
HANSSEN passed to the KGB/SVR, containing additional disclosures of 
information, and 12 diskettes that the KGB/SVR passed to "B". HANSSEN 
provided the KGB/SVR more than 6,000 pages of documentary material.

(h) For his services to the KGB/SVR, HANSSEN was paid over $600,000 
in cash and diamonds. In addition, the KGB/SVR placed funds in escrow 
in a Moscow bank on HANSSEN's behalf. Some time in the last two 
years, the KGB/SVR informed HANSSEN that the escrowed funds are now 
worth at least $800,000.

II. KEY TERMS AND ENTITIES

6. The term counterintelligence means information gathered and 
activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence 
activities, sabotage, or assassination conducted for or on behalf of 
foreign powers, organizations or persons.

7. The KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvenoy Bezopasnosti, or Committee for 
State Security) was the intelligence service of the former Soviet 
Union. The KGB's First Chief Directorate (FCD) was responsible for 
foreign intelligence, active measures, and counterintelligence. KGB 
FCD intelligence officers assigned to Soviet diplomatic missions 
could be assigned to Line KR (Foreign Counterintelligence), Line N 
(Illegals Operations), Line PR (Political), or Line X (Science and 
Technology), among others. The KGB's Second Chief Directorate (SCD) 
was responsible, among other things, for domestic 
counterintelligence, that is, counterintelligence activities within 
the Soviet Union. The KGB's Moscow headquarters was referred to as 
the Moscow Center.

8. Since December 1991, the SVR (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki Rossii, or 
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service) has been the Russian 
Federation's successor agency to the KGB's foreign intelligence arm.

9. The GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvateinoye Upravlenie, or Chief 
Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff) was the military 
intelligence agency of the former Soviet Union, and continues to 
serve that function for the Russian Federation.

10. The Soviet/Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., is located at 
1125 16th Street, N.W.; the Soviet/Russian Diplomatic-Compound is 
located at 2650 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W. The KGB/SVR presence in a 
Soviet/Russian diplomatic mission is called the Rezidentura. headed 
by the KGB/SVR Rezident.

11. An agent-in-place is a person who remains in a position while 
acting under the direction of a hostile intelligence service, so as 
to obtain current intelligence information. It is also called a 
recruitment-in-place.

12. An illegal is an intelligence officer or a recruited agent who 
operates in a foreign country in the guise of a private person, and 
is often present under false identity.

13. A double agent is an agent engaged in clandestine activity for 
two or more intelligence services who provides information about one 
service to another.

14. A dead drop is a prearranged hidden location used for the 
clandestine exchange of packages, messages, and payments, which 
avoids the necessity of an intelligence officer and an agent being 
present at the same time.

15. A signal site is a prearranged fixed location, usually in a 
public place, on which an agent or intelligence officer can place a 
predetermined mark in order to alert the other to operational 
activity. Such a mark may be made by, for example, chalk or a piece 
of tape. The operational activity signaled may be the fact that a 
dead drop has been "loaded" and is ready to be "cleared." A call-out 
signal may be used to trigger a contact between an agent and an 
intelligence officer.

16. An accommodation address is a "safe" address, not overtly 
associated with intelligence activity, used by an agent to 
communicate with the intelligence service for whom he working.

17. The FBI has documented the use by the KGB/SVR of agents-in-place, 
illegals, double agents, dead drops, signal sites, call-out signals, 
and accommodation addresses, including their use in the Northern 
Virginia area, in the Eastern District of Virginia.

18. The United States Intelligence Community is the aggregation of 
those Executive Branch entities and programs that, in accordance with 
applicable United States law and the provisions of Executive Order 
12333, conduct intelligence activities that are necessary for the 
conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national 
security of the United States, and that make up the total national 
intelligence effort. It includes the FBI's National Security 
Division, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National 
Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Organization 
(NRO), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research of the Department of State (DOS/INR), and 
the intelligence elements of the military service branches, among 
other entities.

19. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Title 50, 
United States Code, Sections 1801-1811 and 1821-1829, provides for 
electronic surveillance and searches within the United States 
directed at persons for whom there is probable cause to believe they 
are knowingly engaged in clandestine intelligence gathering 
activities for or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities 
involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the 
United States, as authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC).

20. Aldrich Hazen Ames is a former CIA officer who in 1994 was 
arrested and subsequently pled guilty to having committed espionage 
as an agent of the KGB and SVR. Ames volunteered to the KGB in April 
1985, and provided information to the KGB and the SVR until the date 
of his arrest in February 1994.

21. Classified information is defined by Executive Order 12958 and 
its predecessor orders (including E.O. 12356), as follows: 
information in any form that (1) is owned by, produced by or for, or 
under the control of the United States Government; (2) falls within 
one or more of the categories set forth in Section 1.5 of the Order 
(including intelligence sources or methods, cryptology, military 
plans, and vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, 
projects, or plans relating to the national security), and (3) is 
classified by an original classification authority who determines 
that its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to 
result in damage to the national security. Where such unauthorized 
release could reasonably result in "serious" damage, the information 
may be classified as SECRET. Where such damage is "exceptionally 
grave," the information may be classified TOP SECRET. Access to 
classified information at any level may be further restricted through 
compartmentation in SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI) 
categories. Dissemination of classified information at any level may 
also be restricted through caveats such as: NOFORN (Not Releasable to 
Foreign Nationals), NOCONTRACT (Not Releasable to Contractors or 
Contractor/Consultants), WNINTEL (Warning Notice: Intelligence 
Sources and Methods Involved), and ORCON (Dissemination and 
Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator).

III. BACKGROUND OF ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN

22. ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN was born on April 18, 1944, in Chicago, 
Illinois, where he was raised. He is a United States citizen.

23. HANSSEN received an AB degree in Chemistry from Knox College, in 
Illinois, in 1966. He studied dentistry at Northwestern University, 
in Chicago, Illinois, from 1966 to 1968, and received an MBA degree 
in Accounting and Information Systems from Northwestern University in 
1971. He became a Certified Public Accountant in 1973.

24. From 1971 to 1972, HANSSEN was employed as a junior accountant at 
an accounting firm in Chicago, Illinois. In 1972, HANSSEN joined the 
Chicago Police Department as an investigator in the Financial Section 
of the Inspection Services Division.

25. HANSSEN studied the Russian language during college.

A. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION EMPLOYMENT AND DUTIES
26. On January 12, 1976, HANSSEN entered on duty as a Special Agent 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He has served as an FBI 
Special Agent continuously since that date.

27. After initial training, HANSSEN was assigned to the FBI Field 
Office in Indianapolis, Indiana, and served on a White Collar Crime 
squad at the Resident Agency in Gary, Indiana, until August 1, 1978.

28. From August 2, 1978 to January 10, 1981, HANSSEN was assigned to 
the FBI Field Office in New York, New York, initially working on 
accounting matters in the Field Office's criminal division.

29. In March 1979, HANSSEN was detailed to the New York Field 
Office's intelligence division to help establish the FBI's automated 
counterintelligence data base in that office. At that time, this was 
a new automated database of information about foreign officials, 
including intelligence officers, assigned to the United States. Its 
contents were classified up to the SECRET level.

30. From January 12, 1981, to September 22, 1985, HANSSEN was 
assigned to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., as a Supervisory 
Special Agent in the Intelligence Division. From January 1981 to 
August 1983, HANSSEN was assigned to the Budget Unit, which managed 
the FBI's portion of the United States Intelligence Community' s 
National Foreign Intelligence Program, and prepared budget 
justifications to Congress. This office had access to the full range 
of information concerning intelligence and counterintelligence 
activities involving FBI resources. From August 1983 until September 
1985, HANSSEN was assigned to the Soviet Analytical Unit, which 
supported FBI FCI operations and investigations involving Soviet 
intelligence services, and provided analytical support to senior FBI 
management and the Intelligence Community.

While at FBI Headquarters, HANSSEN was assigned to the intelligence 
component of a particular highly-compartmented classified United 
States Government program. He also served on the FBI's FCI Technical 
Committee, which was responsible for coordinating technical projects 
relating to FCI operations.

31. From September 23, 1985, to August 2, 1987, HANSSEN was assigned 
to the intelligence division of the FBI Field Office in New York, New 
York, as supervisor of an FCI squad.

32. From August 3, 1987, to June 24, 1990, HANSSEN was reassigned to 
FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., where he again served as a 
Supervisory Special Agent in the Intelligence Division's Soviet 
Analytical Unit.

33. From June 25, 1990, to June 30, 1991, HANSSEN was assigned to the 
FBI Headquarter' s Inspections Staff as an Inspector's Aide. In this 
assignment he traveled to FBI Field Offices, Resident Agencies, and 
FBI Legal Attache offices in United States Embassies abroad.

34. On July 1, 1991, HANSSEN returned to the Intelligence Division at 
FBI Headquarters, where he served for six months in the Soviet 
Operations Section as a program manager in the unit responsible for 
countering efforts by the Soviets (and particularly the KGB's Line X) 
to acquire United States scientific and technical intelligence.

35. From January 6, 1992, to April 11, 1994, HANSSEN served as Chief 
of the National Security Threat List (NSTL) Unit in the Intelligence 
Division (renamed the National Security Division, or NSD, in 1993) at 
FBI Headquarters. There he focused the Unit's efforts on economic 
espionage.

36. In April 1994, HANSSEN was temporarily assigned to the FBI's 
Washington Metropolitan Field Office (now called Washington Field 
Office).

37. In December 1994, HANSSEN was reassigned to FBI Headquarters, in 
the Office of the Assistant Director for NSD.

38. From February 12, 1995, to January 12, 2001, HANSSEN was detailed 
to serve as the FBI's senior representative to the Office of Foreign 
Missions of the United States Department of State (DOS/OFM). In that 
position he functioned as the head of an interagency 
counterintelligence group within DOS/OFM, and as FBI's liaison to the 
State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (DOS/INR). His 
office was in an area designated Suites 106, 107 and 108 of Room 
2510C of the State Department building at 2201 C Street, N.W., 
Washington, D.C.

39. Effective January 13, 2001, HANSSEN was assigned to a 
newly-created position in the Information Resources Division, at FBI 
Headquarters, in order that the FBI could more effectively monitor 
his daily activities without alerting him to the ongoing 
investigation of his activities. His current office is Room 9930 of 
FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

40. At no time during his employment with the FBI was HANSSEN ever 
authorized, directly or indirectly, to deliver, communicate, or 
transmit the classified information and documents described in this 
Affidavit to agents, officers, or employees of the KGB, SVR, or any 
other hostile foreign intelligence service.

B. OATHS OF OFFICE
41. On January 12, 1976, upon entering service with the FBI, HANSSEN 
signed an Oath of Office in which he swore that:

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States 
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true 
faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, 
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will 
well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am 
about to enter. So help me God.
42. On January 12, 1976, HANSSEN also signed the FBI Pledge for Law 
Enforcement Officers, in which he pledged, in part, as follows:

Humbly recognizing the responsibilities entrusted to me, . . . . I 
accept the obligation in connection with my assignments to . . . 
consider the information, coming into my knowledge by virtue of my 
position as a sacred trust, to be used solely for official purposes. 
. . . In the performance of my duties and assignments, I shall not 
engage in unlawful and unethical practices .. .. While occupying the 
status of a law enforcement officer or at any other time subsequent 
thereto, I shall not seek to benefit personally because of my 
knowledge of any confidential matter which has come to my attention. 
I am aware of the serious responsibilities of my office and in the 
performance of my duties . . . I shall wage vigorous warfare against 
the enemies of my country, of its laws, and of its principles; . . . 
I shall always be loyal to my duty, my organization, and my country.
43. On January 12, 1976, HANSSEN also signed an Employment Agreement 
in which he stated, in part:

I hereby declare that I intend to be governed by and I will comply 
with the following provisions:
(1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such 
as Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of 
the President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and 
regulations issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 
Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit 
loss, misuse, or unauthorized disclosure or production of national 
security information, other classified information and other 
nonclassified information in the files of the FBI;

(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the 
files of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the 
FBI could result in impairment of national security, place human life 
in jeopardy, or result in the denial of due process to a person or 
persons who are subjects of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI 
from effectively discharging its responsibilities. I understand the 
need for this secrecy agreement; therefore, as consideration for 
employment I agree that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal 
either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to any 
unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the 
Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the 
investigatory files of the FBI or any information relating to 
material contained in the files, or disclose any information or 
produce any material acquired as part of the performance of my 
official duties or because of my official status. . . .

(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of 
Federal law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to 
this agreement may be enforced by means of an injunction or other 
civil remedy.

C. SECURITY CLEARANCES AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
44. HANSSEN received his initial TOP SECRET security clearance on 
January 12, 1976, and has held various SCI accesses since his initial 
SCI indoctrination on June 23, 1980.

45. On June 23, 1980, HANSSEN signed a Nondisclosure Agreement for 
Sensitive Compartmented Information, in which he acknowledged 
receiving a security indoctrination for a particular SCI program, and 
further acknowledged, among other things:

3. I have been advised that direct or indirect unauthorized 
disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of the 
designated Sensitive Compartmented Information by me could cause 
irreparable injury to the United States, and be used to advantage by 
a foreign nation. . . .
4. In consideration of being granted access to the designated 
Sensitive Compartmented Information, I pledge that I will never 
divulge such information, in any form or any manner, to anyone who is 
not authorized to receive it, without prior written authorization 
from an appropriate official of the United States Government.

5. I have been advised that any unauthorized disclosure of the 
designated Sensitive Compartmented Information by me may be a 
substantial violation of this agreement, and may result in the 
termination of my employment. In addition, I have been advised that 
any such unauthorized disclosure by me may constitute violations of 
United States civil or criminal laws, including, as to the latter, 
the provisions of Sections 793, 794, and 798, Title 18, United States 
Code, and of Section 783, Title 50, United States Code. . . . I 
acknowledge that the briefing officer has made available Sections 
793, 794, 798, and 1001 of Title 18, United States Code, Section 783 
of Title 50, United States Code, Executive Order 12065, as amended 
and the Information Security Oversight Office Directive of 2 October 
1978, as amended, which implements this Executive Order, so that I 
may read them at any time, if I so choose. . . .

I make this agreement without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

HANSSEN signed further iterations of this SCI Nondisclosure 
Agreement, in order to have access to additional SCI program 
information, on the following dates: October 1, 1981; March 1, 1982; 
September 9, 1983; April 10, 1985; and May 31, 1991.

46. On October 15, 1984, HANSSEN signed a Classified Information 
Nondisclosure Agreement in which he stated, in part:

1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligations 
contained in this Agreement in consideration of my being granted 
access to classified information. . . .
2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security 
indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of classified 
information . . . .

3. I have been advised and am aware that direct or indirect 
unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent 
handling of classified information by me could cause irreparable 
injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a 
foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge such 
information unless I have officially verified that the recipient has 
been properly authorized by the United States Government to receive 
it or I have been given prior written notice of authorization from 
the United States Government Department or Agency . . . last granting 
me a security clearance that such disclosure is permitted. I further 
understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations 
that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

4. . . . I have been advised and am aware that any unauthorized 
disclosure of classified information by me may constitute a violation 
or violations of United States criminal laws, including the 
provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952, Title 18, United 
States Code, the provisions of Section 783(b), Title 50, United 
States Code, and the provisions of the Intelligence Identities 
Protection Act of 1982. I recognize that nothing in this Agreement 
constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute 
me for any statutory violation. . . .

10. I have read this Agreement carefully and my questions, if any, 
have been answered to my satisfaction. I acknowledge that the 
briefing officer has made available to me Sections 641, 793, 794, 
798, and 952 of Title 18, United States Code, Section 783(b) of Title 
50, United States Code, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 
1982, and Executive Order 12356, so that I may read them at this 
time, if I so choose.

D. RESIDENCES
47. From 1981 until 1985, HANSSEN owned a house and resided with his 
family on Whitecedar Court in Vienna, Virginia.

48. In approximately August 1987, after returning from his tour of 
duty in New York City, HANSSEN purchased a residence at 9414 Talisman 
Drive in Vienna, Virginia, where he and his family have lived 
continuously since.

IV. BASIS FOR THE INFORMATION IN THIS AFFIDAVIT

49. This Affidavit is based on numerous different types and sources 
of information, including the following:

A. Letters, and other forms of communications from "B" to the 
KGB/SVR, and from the KGB/SVR to "B";

B. A recording of a telephone conversation between "B" and a KGB/SVR officer;

C. Computer media, including hard drives and storage devices;

D. The actual plastic material that constituted the inner wrapping of 
a package that "B" passed to the KGB/SVR;

E. Information provided by former KGB/SVR personnel;

F. Records of the FBI, the CIA, and other agencies of the United 
States Intelligence Community;

G. The contents of an actual package that the KGB/SVR passed to "B";

H. Forensic testing and examination;

I. Interviews;

J. Physical searches and electronic surveillance conducted by the FBI 
pursuant to FISC authority;

K. Public records;

L. Other law enforcement and intelligence techniques, sources and methods; and

M. KGB/SVR operational and production files.

V. THE KGB's "B" OPERATION

50. The sources of information described in the foregoing section 
have established the following regarding "B":

51. On or about October 4, 1985, a KGB Line PR officer in Washington, 
D.C., named Viktor M. Degtyar, received an envelope by mail, at his 
residence in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District of 
Virginia. The envelope was postmarked "Prince George's Co, MD" on 
October 1, 1985. Inside was an inner envelope, marked: "DO NOT OPEN. 
TAKE THIS ENVELOPE UNOPENED TO VICTOR I. CHERKASHIN." At that time, 
Viktor Ivanovich Cherkashin was the Line KR Chief at the Soviet 
Embassy in Washington, D.C. Inside the inner envelope was an unsigned 
typed letter from the person whom the KGB came to call "B." The 
letter read in part as follows:

DEAR MR. CHERKASHIN:
SOON, I WILL SEND A BOX OF DOCUMENTS TO MR. DEGTYAR. THEY ARE FROM 
CERTAIN OF THE MOST SENSITIVE AND HIGHLY COMPARTMENTED PROJECTS OF 
THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. ALL ARE ORIGINALS TO AID IN 
VERIFYING THEIR AUTHENTICITY. PLEASE RECOGNIZE FOR OUR LONG-TERM 
INTERESTS THAT THERE ARE A LIMITED NUMBER OF PERSONS WITH THIS ARRAY 
OF CLEARANCES. AS A COLLECTION THEY POINT TO ME. I TRUST THAT AN 
OFFICER OF YOUR EXPERIENCE WILL HANDLE THEM APPROPRIATELY. I BELIEVE 
THEY ARE SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A $100,000 PAYMENT TO ME.
I MUST WARN OF CERTAIN RISKS TO MY SECURITY OF WHICH YOU MAY NOT BE 
AWARE. YOUR SERVICE HAS RECENTLY SUFFERED SOME SETBACKS. I WARN THAT 
MR. BORIS YUZHIN (LINE PR, SF), MR. SERGEY MOTORIN, (LINE PR, WASH.) 
AND MR. VALERIY MARTYNOV (LINE X, WASH.) HAVE BEEN RECRUITED BY OUR 
"SPECIAL SERVICES."
"B" proceeded to describe in detail a particular highly sensitive and 
classified information collection technique. In addition, "TO FURTHER 
SUPPORT MY BONA FIDES" he provided specific closely-held items of 
information regarding then-recent Soviet detectors. "B" added:

DETAILS REGARDING PAYMENT AND FUTURE CONTACT WILL BE SENT TO YOU 
PERSONALLY. . . . MY IDENTITY AND ACTUAL POSITION IN THE COMMUNITY 
MUST BE LEFT UNSTATED TO ENSURE MY SECURITY. I AM OPEN TO COMMO 
SUGGESTIONS BUT WANT NO SPECIALIZED TRADECRAFT. I WILL ADD 6, (YOU 
SUBTRACT 6) FROM STATED MONTHS, DAYS AND TIMES IN BOTH DIRECTIONS OF 
OUR FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS.
The information concerning the FBI's recruitment of Yuzhin, Motorin, 
and Martynov was classified at least at the SECRET level, as was the 
defector information. The sensitive information collection technique 
described above was classified at the TOP SECRET level.

52. Valeriy Fedorovich Martynov was a KGB Line X officer assigned to 
the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., from October 1980 to November 
1985. In April 1982, the FBI recruited Martynov to serve as an 
agent-in-place, and he was debriefed jointly by the FBI and the CIA. 
Martynov was compromised to the KGB by Ames in June 1985 and by "B" 
in October 1985, as described above. Based in part on the information 
provided by "B", the KGB directed Martynov to return to Moscow in 
November 1985, ostensibly to accompany KGB officer Vitaliy Yurchenko, 
who was returning to the Soviet Union after his August 1985 defection 
to the United States. Upon arriving in Moscow on or about November 7, 
1985, Martynov was arrested, and he was subsequently tried on 
espionage charges. Martynov was convicted and executed.

53. Sergey Mikhailovich Motorin was a KGB Line PR officer assigned to 
the Soviet Embassy in Washington D.C., from June 1980 to January 
1985. In January 1983, the FBI recruited Motorin to serve as an 
agent-in-place, and he was debriefed by the FBI. Motorin returned to 
Moscow at the end of his tour of duty in January 1985. Motorin, like 
Martynov, was compromised to the KGB by Ames in June 1985 and by "B" 
in October 1985, as described above. Based in part on the information 
"B" gave the KGB, Motorin was arrested in November or December 1985, 
tried and convicted on espionage charges during the period of 
October-November 1986, and executed in February 1987.

54. Boris Nikolayevich Yuzhin was a KGB Line PR officer assigned to 
San Francisco under cover as a student from 1975 to 1976, and then as 
a TASS correspondent from 1978 to 1982. The FBI recruited him to 
serve as an agent-in-place, and debriefed him. After returning to the 
Soviet Union, Yuzhin became the subject of an internal KGB 
investigation. Yuzhin was compromised to the KGB by Ames in June 1985 
and by "B" in October 1985. Based in part on the information "B" gave 
the KGB, Yuzhin was arrested in December 1986, convicted of 
espionage, and sentenced to serve 15 years in prison. In 1992, he was 
released under a general grant of amnesty to political prisoners, and 
subsequently emigrated to the United States.

55. On or about October 15, 1985, Degtyar received by mail, at his 
residence in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District of 
Virginia, a package from "B" containing a large number of classified 
documents, including some original documents, of the United States 
Intelligence Community.

56. At 8:35 am on October 16, 1985, FBI surveillance personnel 
observed Degtyar arriving at the Soviet Embassy carrying a large 
black canvas bag which he did not typically carry.

57. Thereafter, Degtyar received by mail, at his residence in 
Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia, a typed 
message from "B," in an envelope bearing a handwritten address and 
postmarked "New York, NY" on October 24, 1985. The message included 
the following text:

DROP LOCATION
Please leave your package for me under the corner (nearest the 
street) of the wooden foot bridge located just west of the entrance 
to Nottoway Park. (ADC Northern Virginia Street Map, #14, D3)

PACKAGE PREPARATION

Use a green or brown plastic trash bag and trash to cover a 
waterproofed package.

SIGNAL LOCATION

Signal site will be the pictorial "pedestrian-crossing" signpost just 
west of the main Nottoway Park entrance on Old Courthouse Road. (The 
sign is the one nearest the bridge just mentioned.)

SIGNALS

My signal to you: One vertical mark of white adhesive tape meaning I 
am ready to receive your package.

Your signal to me: One horizontal mark of white adhesive tape meaning 
drop filled.

My signal to you: One vertical mark of white adhesive tape meaning I 
have received your package.

(Remove old tape before leaving signal.)

The message established a date and times for the signals and drops, 
and concluded: "I will acknowledge amount with my next package."

The KGB designated this dead drop site by the codename "PARK". It is 
located in Fairfax County, Virginia, in the Eastern District of 
Virginia.

58. On Saturday, November 2, 1985, the KGB loaded the "PARK" dead 
drop site with $50,000 in cash and a message proposing procedures for 
future contacts with "B".

59. On or about November 8, 1985, Deglyar and Cherkashin received a 
typed letter from "B", which read in part as follows:

Thank you for the 50,000.
I also appreciate your courage and perseverance in the face of 
generically reported bureaucratic obstacles. I would not have 
contacted you if it were not reported that you were held in esteem 
within your organization, an organization I have studied for years. I 
did expect some communication plan in your response. I viewed the 
postal delivery as a necessary risk and do not wish to trust again 
that channel with valuable material. I did this only because I had to 
so you would take my offer seriously, that there be no 
misunderstanding as to my long-term value, and to obtain appropriate 
security for our relationship from the start.

"B" then rejected the contact plans proposed by the KGB, and 
suggested a particular communications scheme based on "a 
microcomputer 'bulletin board'" at a designated location, with 
"appropriate encryption." Meanwhile, he wrote: "Let us use the same 
site again. Same timing. Same signals." "B" proposed that the next 
dead drop occur on "September 9" which, according to the "6" 
coefficient that he established with the KGB in his first letter, 
actually meant that the dead drop operation would take place on March 
3, 1986.

"B" also wrote:

As far as the funds are concerned, I have little need or utility for 
more than the 100,000. It merely provides a difficulty since I can 
not spend it, store it or invest it easily without triping [sic] 
"drug money" warning bells. Perhaps some diamonds as security to my 
children and some good will so that when the time comes, you will 
accept by [sic] senior services as a guest lecturer. Eventually, I 
would appreciate an escape plan. (Nothing lasts forever.)
Referring to Yuzhin, Motorin, and Martynov, whom he had identified in 
his first letter as United States intelligence recruitments, "B" 
wrote:

I can not provide documentary substantiating evidence without 
arousing suspicion at this time. Never-the-less, it is from my own 
knowledge as a member of the community effort to capitalize on the 
information from which I speak. I have seen video tapes of 
debriefings and physically saw the last, though we were not 
introduced. The names were provided to me as part of my duties as one 
of the few who needed to know. You have some avenues of inquiry. 
Substantial funds were provided in excess of what could have been 
skimmed from their agents. The active one has always (in the past) 
used a concealment device -- a bag with bank notes sewn in the base 
during home leaves.
In conclusion, "B" warned of a "new technique" used by NSA, which he described.

60. On March 3, 1986, the KGB loaded dead drop site "PARK", but "B" 
did not appear and the KGB removed its package from the dead drop 
site the same day.

61. On or about June 30, 1986, Deglyar received a typed letter from 
"B" at his residence in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District 
of Virginia. The letter read in part as follows:

I apologize for the delay since our break in communications. I wanted 
to determine if there was any cause for concern over security. I have 
only seen one item which has given me pause. When the FBI was first 
given access to Victor Petrovich Gandarev, they asked . . . if 
Gundarev knew Viktor Cherkashin. I thought this unusual. I had seen 
no report indicating that Viktor Cherkashin was handling an important 
agent, and here-to-fore he was looked at with the usual lethargy 
awarded Line Chiefs. The question came to mind, are they somehow able 
to monitor funds, ie., to know that Viktor Cherkashin received a 
large amount of money for an agent? I am unaware of any such ability, 
but I might not know that type of source reporting.
"B" then described a United States Intelligence Community technical 
surveillance technique. He concluded:

If you wish to continue our discussions, please have someone run an 
advertisement in the Washington Times during the week of 1/12/87 or 
1/19/87, for sale, "Dodge Diplomat, 1971, needs engine work, $1000." 
Give a phone number and time-of-day in the advertisement where I can 
call. I will call and leave a phone number where a recorded message 
can be left for me in one hour. I will say, "Hello, my name is Ramon. 
I am calling about the car you offered for sale in the Times." You 
will respond, "I'm sorry, but the man with the car is not here, can I 
get your number." The number will be in Area Code 212. I will not 
specify that Area Code on the line.
"B" signed the letter: "Ramon".

According to the established "6" coefficient, the weeks the 
advertisement was actually to run were July 6, 1986, or July 13, 1986.

62. Viktor Gundarev was a KGB Line KR officer who defected to the 
United States on February 14, 1986. A classified FBI debriefing 
report, dated March 4, 1986, reports that FBI debrief ers showed 
Gundarev a photo of Cherkashin and asked if he knew Cherkashin.

63. The following advertisement appeared in the Washington Times from 
July 14, 1986, to July 18, 1986:

DODGE - '71, DIPLOMAT, NEEDS ENGINE WORK, $1000. Phone (703) 451-9780 
(CALL NEXT Mon., Wed., Fri. 1 p.m.)
64. The number 703/451-9780 at that time belonged to a public 
telephone located in the vicinity of the Old Keene Mill Shopping 
Center, in Fairfax County, Virginia, in the Eastern District of 
Virginia. On Monday, July 21, 1986, "B" called that number and gave 
the number 628-8047. The call was taken by Aleksandr Kirillovich 
Fefelov, a KGB officer assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, 
D.C.

65. One hour later, Fefelov telephoned 212/628-8047 and told "B" that 
the KGB had loaded the "PARK" dead drop site. The KGB mistakenly 
placed the package under the wrong corner of the wooden footbridge at 
the "PARK" site.

66. On or about August 7, 1986, Degtyar received a letter from "B" 
slating that he had not found the package at the dead drop site, and 
indicating that he would phone 703/451-9780 on August 18, 20, or 22. 
The KGB then retrieved its package from the "PARK" dead drop site.

67. On Monday, August 18, 1986, "B" telephoned 703/451-9780, and 
spoke with Fefelov. The latter portion of the conversation was 
recorded as follows: ([UI] = unintelligible)

"B": Tomorrow morning?
FEFELOV: Uh, yeah, and the car is still available for you and as we 
have agreed last time, I prepared all the papers and I left them on 
the same table. You didn't find them because I put them in another 
corner of the table.

"B": I see.

FEFELOV: You shouldn't worry, everything is okay. The papers are with me now.

"B": Good.

FEFELOV: I believe under these circumstances, mmmm, it's not 
necessary to make any changes concerning the place and the time. Our 
company is reliable, and we are ready to give you a substantial 
discount which will be enclosed in the papers. Now, about the date of 
our meeting. I suggest that our meeting will be, will take place 
without delay on February thirteenth, one three, one p.m. Okay? 
February thirteenth.

"B": [UI] February second?

FEFELOV: Thirteenth. One three.

"B": One three.

FEFELOV: Yes. Thirteenth. One p.m.

"B": Let me see if I can do that. Hold on.

FEFELOV: Okay. Yeah.

[pause]

"B": [whispering] [UI]

FEFELOV: Hello? Okay.

[pause]

"B": [whispering] Six .... Six ....

[pause]

"B": That should be fine.

FEFELOV: Okay. We will confirm you, that the papers are waiting for 
you with the same horizontal tape in the same place as we did it at 
the first time.

"B": Very good.

FEFELOV: You see. After you receive the papers, you will send the 
letter confirming it and signing it, as usual. Okay?

"B": Excellent.

FEFELOV: I hope you remember the address. Is . . . if everything is okay?

"B": I believe it should be fine and thank you very much.

FEFELOV: Heh-heh. Not at all. Not at all. Nice job. For both of us. 
Uh, have a nice evening, sir.

"B": Do svidaniya.

FEFELOV: Bye-bye.

According to the established "6" coefficient, the operation discussed 
in this conversation was actually scheduled to occur on August 19, 
1986, at 7:00 am.

The KGB then loaded the "PARK" dead drop site with $10,000 in cash, 
as well as: proposals for two additional dead drop sites to be used 
by "B" and the KGB; a new accommodation address codenamed "NANCY"; 
and emergency communications plans for "B" to personally contact KGB 
personnel in Vienna, Austria. The "NANCY" address was the residence 
of KGB Line PR officer Boris M. Malakhov in Alexandria, Virginia, in 
the Eastern District of Virginia, who was to become Degtyar's 
replacement as the Soviet Embassy press secretary. "B" was instructed 
to mis-spell Malakhov's name as "Malkow." "B" subsequently cleared 
the dead drop.

68. Thereafter, Degtyar received an envelope at his residence in 
Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia. The 
envelope bore a handwritten address and return address: "Ramon 
Garcia, 125 Main St, Falls Church VA." It was postmarked from "NO VA 
MSC 22081" on August 19, 1986. MSC designates the Merrifield Service 
Center, located in the Eastern District of Virginia. Inside the 
envelope was a handwritten note: "RECEIVED $10,000. RAMON."

69. On or about September II, 1987, Malakhov received an envelope at 
his residence in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope bore 
a handwritten address to "B.N. MALKOW" at the "NANCY" address, and a 
handwritten return address of "R. GARCIA, 125 MAIN ST, ALEXANDRIA, 
VA", and was postmarked September 8, 1987. Inside was the following 
typed letter:

Dear Friends:
No, I have decided. It must be on my original terms or not at all. I 
will not meet abroad or here. I will not maintain lists of sites or 
modified equipment. I will help you when I can, and in time we will 
develop methods of efficient communication. Unless a [sic] see an 
abort signal on our post from you by 3/16, I will mail my contact a 
valuable package timed to arrive on 3/18. I will await your signal 
and package to be in place before 1:00 pm on 3/22 or alternately the 
following three weeks, same day and time. If my terms are 
unacceptable then place no signals and withdraw my contact. Excellent 
work by him has ensured this channel is secure for now. My regards to 
him and to the professional way you have handled this matter.
sincerely,
Ramon
According to the established "6" coefficient, the dates referred to 
in this letter were actually September 10, 12, and 16.

70. On Monday, September 14, 1987, the KGB received in the mail a 
package of documents including TOP SECRET National Security Council 
documents.

71. On Tuesday, September 15, 1987, the KGB loaded the "PARK" dead 
drop site with $10,000 cash. The KGB also proposed two additional 
dead drop sites, one codenamed "AN" located in Ellanor C. Lawrence 
Park in Western Fairfax County, in the Eastern District of Virginia, 
and another codenamed "DEN" at a different location farther away. The 
KGB proposed that "B" load the dead drop at "PARK" or "AN" on 
September 26, 1987, and that the KGB respond by loading "DEN".

72. On Wednesday, September 16, 1987, the KGB determined that "B" had 
cleared the "PARK" dead drop and removed the signal 73. On September 
26, 1987, the KGB recovered from the "PARK" dead drop site a package 
from "B". The package contained a handwritten letter reading as 
follows:

My Friends:
Thank you for the $10,000.
I am not a young man, and the commitments on my time prevent using 
distant drops such as you suggest. I know in this I am moving you out 
of your set modes of doing business, but my experience tells me the 
[sic] we can be actually more secure in easier modes.
"B" then suggested an exchange procedure involving a parked car 
instead of a dead drop site, and a related communications procedure, 
but stated: "If you cannot do this I will clear this once ‘AN' on 
your scheduled date (rather than the other)." He then asked the KGB 
to "Find a comfortable Vienna VA signal site to call me to an 
exchange any following Monday." He closed the letter, "Good luck with 
your work", and signed it "Ramon."

The package also contained a document which the KGB described as 
having the title which roughly translates into English as: "National 
Intelligence Program for 87".

74. Thereafter, the KGB proposed to "B" a signal site in Vienna, 
Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia, on the post of a stop 
sign on the shoulder of Courthouse Road near its junction with Locust 
Street. This signal site was referred to as "V".

75. On September 29, 1987, the KGB deposited $100,000 into an escrow 
account established for "B" in a Soviet bank in Moscow.

76. On November 10, 1987, Malakhov received a letter from "B" at his 
residence in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope bore a 
return address of "J. Baker" in "Chicago" and was postmarked on 
November 7, 1987. In the letter, "B" advised that Saturday for "AN" 
was not suitable, and he postponed the operation for two days, until 
Monday, November 16. He advised that he had an urgent package for the 
KGB, and asked the KGB to place a signal confirming receipt of the 
letter. That same day, the KGB placed a signal at the "PARK" signal 
site.

Thereafter, whenever "B" used the word "Chicago" in a return address, 
it was to signal that he intended for a dead drop exchange to occur 
the following Monday.

77. On Sunday, November 15, 1987, the KGB loaded the "AN" dead drop 
site with a package. It was not cleared by "B" and, on November 17, 
the KGB removed the package.

78. On Thursday, November 19, 1987, the KGB received a handwritten 
letter from "B". The envelope bore a return address of "G. Robertson" 
in "Houston" and was postmarked on November 17, 1987. The letter read 
as follows:

Unable to locate AN based on your description at night. Recognize 
that I am dressed in business suit and can not slog around in inch 
deep mud. I suggest we use once again original site. I will place my 
urgent material there at next AN times. Replace it with your package. 
I will select some few sites good for me and pass them to you. Please 
give new constant conditions of recontact as address to write. Will 
not put substantive material through it. Only instructions as usual 
format.
Ramon
79. On Monday, November 23, 1987, "B" and the KGB carried out an 
exchange operation at the "PARK" dead drop site. The package from "B" 
to the KGB contained: a cable-type report about a meeting in October 
1987 with a valuable source, whom the KGB referred to as "M"; a 
survey of information provided by Vitaliy Yurchenko; and an official 
technical document describing COINS-II.

In 1987, COINS-II was the then-current version of the United States 
Intelligence Community's "Community On-Line Intelligence System," 
which constituted a classified Community-wide intranet.

The package from the KGB to "B" contained $20,000 cash and a letter 
conveying "regards" from the KGB Director and advising that $100,000 
had been deposited in a bank at 6-7% interest. The letter also asked 
"B" for a variety of specific classified information. The KGB gave 
"B" two new accommodation addresses and asked "B" to propose new dead 
drop sites.

80. On February 4, 1988, the KGB received a note from "B" at one of 
the new accommodation addresses it had given to "B" in the November 
23, 1987, dead drop. The address was the residence of a Soviet 
diplomatic official known to the FBI as a KGB co-optee, located in 
the Eastern of Virginia. The note read simply: "OK". It was in an 
envelope bearing a return address of "Jim Baker" in "Langley" and 
postmarked in Washington, D.C., on February 3, 1988.

81. On Monday, February 8, 1988, "B" and the KGB carried out an 
exchange operation at the "PARK" dead drop site in Nottoway Park, 
which the KGB had now renamed "PRIME". The package from "B" to the 
KGB contained a typed, unsigned letter. In the letter, "B" 
acknowledged receipt of $20,000 and identified two additional drop 
sites. He then went on to provide detailed information concerning a 
Soviet detector, and advised the KGB that he had arranged time to 
review the detector's file. "A full report will follow as soon as 
possible." He then disclosed to the KGB certain specific information 
concerning the United States Intelligence Community's communication 
intelligence capabilities.

Enclosed with the letter was the first computer diskette "B" passed 
to the KGB. Also in the package from "B" were classified documents.

The package from the KGB to "B" contained $25,000 cash, and a letter 
conveying thanks of the KGB Chairman, Vladimir Kryuchkov, for the 
information about the valuable source "M". The KGB also asked "B" for 
more information about "M" and the "agent network" in New York City, 
and about a particular KGB officer.

On the next day, February 9, 1988, the KGB observed that the signal 
at "PARK/PRIME" had been removed, indicating that "B" had cleared the 
dead drop.

82. On March 16, 1988, the KGB received a second computer diskette 
from "B" at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of 
Virginia. The envelope bore a return address of "Jim Baker" in 
"Chicago" and was postmarked in Washington, D.C., on March 15, 1988.

83. On March 17, 1988, the KGB received a letter from "B" at an 
accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. The 
envelope bore a return address of "Jim Baker" in "Chicago" and was 
postmarked in Northern Virginia on March 16, 1988. In the letter, "B" 
instructed the KGB to use the "PARK/PRIME" dead drop site until the 
KGB approved the other sites.

84. On Monday, March 21, 1988, the KGB observed a signal from "B" at 
the "PARK/PRIME" site, but was unable to check the dead drop site 
because strangers were present in the park.

85. On March 26, 1988, the KGB received a third computer diskette 
from "B" at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of 
Virginia. The envelope bore a return address of "Jim Baker" in 
"Chicago" and was postmarked in Washington, D.C., on March 24, 1988. 
The KGB found no text on the diskette, which it referred to as "D-3".

86. On Monday, March 28, 1988, "B" and the KGB carried out an 
exchange operation at the "PARK/PRIME" dead drop site.

The package from "B" to the KGB included his fourth computer diskette 
("D-4"), a TOP SECRET document entitled "The FBI's Double Agent 
Program" and a document that the KGB described as a Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI) document entitled "Stealth Orientation."

The package from the KGB to "B" included $25,000 cash and a letter 
explaining why the KGB had not been able to check the "PARK/PRIME" 
dead drop site on March 21. In the letter, the KGB also advised it 
had been unable to read the diskettes "B" had passed to the KGB. The 
KGB asked "B" for information about codes and cryptograms, 
intelligence support for the Strategic Defense Initiative, 
submarines, and other classified material.

The next day, the KGB observed that "B" had removed the signal from 
the "PARK/PRIME" site, indicating he had removed the package.

87. On April 4, 1988, the KGB received an envelope from "B" at an 
accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. The 
envelope bore a return address of "Jim Baker" in "Alexandria" and was 
postmarked in Northern Virginia, on March 31, 1988. The envelope 
contained a note from "B" reading: "use 40 TRACK MODE. this letter is 
not a signal."

The term "use 40-track mode" refers to a technical process for 
re-formatting a computer diskette in order to conceal data by putting 
the data onto specific tracks on the diskette. Unless a person uses 
the correct codes to decrypt such a diskette, the diskette would 
appear to be blank.

88. On April 6, 1988, the KGB received a package from "B" at an 
accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. The 
envelope bore a return address of "Jim Baker" in "Fairfax" and a 
postmark of "MSC NO VA" (Merrifield Service Center, Northern 
Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia) on April 5. The 
package contained a fifth diskette ("D-5"). On the diskette, "B" 
provided what the KGB characterized as "everything" about a 
particular KGB officer, additional information about a KGB defector 
named Victor Sheymov, and information about two specific Soviet FBI 
recruitments. "B" also explained why the KGB had been unable to read 
his diskettes. "B" also asked the KGB for diamonds. The KGB 
subsequently purchased several diamonds for use in the "B" operation.

89. On May 24, 1988, the KGB received a letter from "B" at an 
accommodation address in the District of Columbia. The envelope bore 
a return address of "Jim Baker" in "Chicago" and was postmarked in 
"MSC NO VA" on May 17, 1988. With the letter was "B"'s sixth diskette 
("D-6"), which contained information about a number of matters. The 
diskette also contained information about a specific recent FBI 
Soviet recruitment operation.

90. On Monday, May 30, 1988, a KGB officer arrived at the 
"PARK/PRIME" dead drop site at 9:03 pm, three minutes after the end 
of the prearranged dead drop exchange period. The KGB officer saw a 
man who apparently removed the signal, got into hi; car, and drove 
away.

91. On July 15, 1988, the KGB received a letter from "B" a an 
accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. The 
envelope bore a return address "Chicago" and was postmarked "WDC 200" 
on July 13, 1988. The zip codes for Washington, D.C., begin "200". 
The typed letter read as follows:

I found the site empty. Possibly I had the time wrong. I work from 
memory. My recollection was for you to fill before 1:00 a.m. I 
believe Viktor Degtyar was in the church driveway off Rt. 123, but I 
did not know how he would react to an approach. My schedule was tight 
to make this at all. Because of my work, I had to synchronize 
explanations and flights while not leaving a pattern of absence or 
travel that could later be correlated with communication times. This 
is difficult and expensive.
I will call the number you gave me on 2/24, 2/26 or 2/28 at 1:00 
a.m., EDST. Please plan filled signals. Empty sites bother me. I like 
to know before I commit myself as I'm sure you do also. Let's not use 
the original site so early at least until the seasons change. Some 
type of call-out signal to you when .1 have a package or when I can 
receive one would be useful. Also, please be specific about dates, 
e.g., 2/24. Scheduling is not simple for me because of frequent 
travel and wife. Any ambiguity multiplies the problems.
My security concerns may seem excessive. I believe experience has 
shown them to be necessary. I am much safer if you know little about 
me. Neither of us are children about these things. Over time, I can 
cut your losses rather than become one.
Ramon
P.S. Your "thank you" was deeply appreciated.
92. On Monday, July 18, 1988, "B" and the KGB carried out an exchange 
operation at the "PARK/PRIME" dead drop site.

The package from "B" contained over 530 pages of material, including:

(A) A CIA document concerning certain nuclear programs, dated 
approximately November 1987 classified TOP SECRET and with the 
caveats NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON.
(B) A DCI document entitled "Compendium of Future Intelligence 
Requirements: Volume II", dated September 1987, prepared by the Staff 
of the Intelligence Producers Council and classified TOP SECRET/SCI 
with the caveat NOFORN.

(C) A CIA Counterintelligence Staff Study entitled "The Soviet 
Counterintelligence Offensive: KGB Recruitment Operations Against 
CIA," dated March 1988 and classified SECRET with the caveats NOFORN 
NOCONTRACT ORCON. This document contains the following preface:



Warning NoticeIntelligence Sources
or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)

National SecurityUnauthorized Disclosure
InformationSubject to Criminal Sanctions

and also specifically defining "NOFORN" as "Not Releasable to Foreign 
Nationals."

(D) A TOP SECRET comprehensive historical FBI review of allegations 
from recruitments and detectors over a period of years that the 
Soviet intelligence services had penetrated the United States 
Intelligence Community. It identified Soviet recruitments and 
detectors with specificity, and describes particular information they 
provided. It contained the following warning:

IN VIEW OF THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF THIS DOCUMENT. THE UTMOST 
CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN ITS HANDLING. THE CONTENTS INCLUDE A 
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF SENSITIVE SOURCE ALLEGATIONS AND 
INVESTIGATIONS OF PENETRATION OF THE FBI BY THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE 
SERVICES. THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD COMPROMISE HIGHLY SENSITIVE 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND METHODS. ACCESS SHOULD BE LIMITED 
TO A STRICT NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

The package from the KGB to "B" contained $25,000 cash and a letter 
asking for information about surveillance systems, the agent network 
in New York City, illegal intelligence, and several specific FBI 
recruitment operations. The KGB proposed two new dead drop and 
related signal sites. One, named "BOB", was under a footbridge in 
Idylwood Park, between Vienna and Falls Church, in the Eastern 
District of Virginia. The other, named "CHARLIE", was under a 
footbridge in Eakin Community Park, south of Vienna, in the Eastern 
District of Virginia. For these dead drop sites, the KGB instructed 
"B" to load the dead drops by 9:00 pm on the designated day; the KGB 
would clear it by 10:00 pm and load it with a package which "B" was 
to clear after 10:00 pm.

93. On July 31, 1988, the KGB received an envelope from "B" at an 
accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. The 
envelope bore a return address of Alexandria and contained a letter 
dated July 29 and "B"'s seventh diskette ("D-7"), which contained 
information on technical surveillance systems, a new recruitment in 
New York City, illegal intelligence, and several other specific 
Soviet recruitment targets.

94. On August 22, 1988, the KGB deposited $50,000 in an escrow 
account for "B" at a Moscow bank.

95. On September 21, 1988, the KGB received an envelope from "B" at 
an accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. The 
envelope bore a return address of "Chicago" and was postmarked "WDC" 
on September 20. The envelope contained "B"'s eighth diskette ("D-8") 
and a note that read: "At BOB". The diskette contained information 
about particular Soviet recruitment targets of the FBI.

96. On Monday, September 26, 1988, "B" and the KGB carried out an 
exchange operation at the "BOB" dead drop site.

The package from "B" contained approximately 300 pages of material, 
including an FBI memo about a particular individual believed at the 
time to be a KGB Line KR officer in New York City, information on 
technical means of Soviet intelligence, a transcript of a 
Counterintelligence Group meeting, and information on several other 
matters.

The package from the KGB contained a diamond valued at $24,720, and a 
letter advising "B" that $50,000 had been deposited in his account. 
The letter also expressed gratitude to "B" from the KGB Chairman 
(Vladimir A. Kryuchov). The letter also discussed communications 
procedures, security measures, a personal meeting, and passports. It 
also asked "B" to provide information about classified technical 
operations in the Soviet Union, agent network details, allies' 
sources, FBI programs, past cases, and a certain missile technology.

97. On December 1, 1988, the KGB received a package from "B" at an 
accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. It bore a 
return address of "G. Robertson, Baker's Photo" and was postmarked 
"WDC" on November 30, 1988. The package contained a letter and his 
ninth diskette ("D-9"), which contained information about a number of 
classified matters.

98. On Monday, December 26, 1988, "B" and the KGB carried out an 
exchange operation at the "CHARLIE" dead drop site in the Eastern 
District of Virginia.

The package from "B" contained his tenth diskette ("D-IO") and 
approximately 356 pages of material. On the diskette, "B" provided 
additional classified information. He also provided six recent 
National HUMINT Collection Plan (NHCP) documents, and a document 
whose title the KGB noted as "Soviet Armed Forces and Capabilities 
for Conducting Strategic Nuclear War Until the End of the 1990s."

The package from the KGB to "B" contained $10,000 cash, a second 
diamond, valued at $17,748, and a message in which the KGB asked "B" 
for additional specific information about a wide variety of 
classified technical and recruitment matters.

The next day, the KGB observed that the signal at the "CHARLIE" site 
had been removed, indicating "B" had removed the KGB's package.

99. On Tuesday, January 31, 1989, the KGB observed an emergency 
call-out signal at a signal site that it had issued to "B", located 
at the intersection of Q Street and Connecticut Avenue, N.W., 
Washington, D.C. By prearrangement, the KGB immediately unloaded a 
package from "B" at the "BOB" dead drop site. The package contained a 
cable, with a note reading: "Send to the Center right away. This 
might be useful." Also in the package was "B"'s eleventh diskette 
("D-ll"), which contained comments on the cable, as well as 
information on several specific individuals about whom the KGB had 
asked for information.

100. On Thursday, March 16, 1989, "B" marked a call-out signal site 
that the KGB has issued to him, located at the Taft Bridge in 
Northwest Washington, D.C.

101. On Monday, March 20, 1989, "B" and the KGB carried out an 
exchange operation at the "CHARLIE" dead drop site in the Eastern 
District of Virginia.

"B" passed two packages to the KGB. One contained a TOP SECRET SCI 
document entitled "DCI Guidance for the National MASINT Intelligence 
Program (FY 1991-FY 2000)," prepared by the Measurement and Signature 
Intelligence (MASINT) Committee and dated November 1988. The document 
bears the caveats NOFORN and NOCONTRACT, and contains the following 
preface:

Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

According to its Introduction, this document contains the MASINT 
Committee's recommendations to the DCI for the collection, 
processing, and reporting of MASINT, and represents the Intelligence 
Community's consensus on specific MASINT objectives and studies 
leading to needed capabilities. Its contents are highly specific and 
technical. In passing this document to the KGB, "B" requested that it 
be returned.

The second package from "B" to the KGB contained his twelfth computer 
diskette ("D-12") and approximately 539 pages of materials including 
classified information on a variety of matters.

The KGB package to "B" contained $18,000 cash and a third diamond, 
valued at $11,700. It also-contained a letter that confirmed the KGB 
had received "B"'s packages on December 26 and January 31, discussed 
a personal meeting, requested new dead drop sites, and asked how to 
increase operational security. The KGB also asked "B" about his 
security precautions for the diamonds. ("B" told the KGB that he 
would say the diamonds came from his grandmother.) The KGB also asked 
for information about a wide variety of technical and operational 
subjects. The KGB thanked "B" for the information he provided on 
January 31, and asked him "for everything else that's possible."

On Tuesday, March 21, 1989, the KGB observed that the signal at 
"CHARLIE" had been removed, indicating that "B" had removed the KGB's 
package.

102. On March 24, 1989, the KGB marked the "V" signal site on 
Courthouse Road in Vienna, in the Eastern District of Virginia, 
indicating that "B" should pick up a package at the "PARK/PRIME" dead 
drop site the following Monday. On Monday, March 27, 1989, the KGB 
loaded the dead drop with the MASINT document, for return to "B", but 
"B" did not clear the drop.

103. In April 1989, the KGB presented several awards to KGB officers 
involved in the "B" operation, including the highly- coveted Order of 
the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Star, and the Medal for 
Excellent Service.

104. On Monday, May 22, 1989, after a call-out signal from "B", he 
and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "BOB" dead drop 
site, in the Eastern District of Virginia.

The package "B" passed to the KGB contained the first and third 
diamonds the KGB had given to him and which "B" returned for cash, 
and his thirteenth diskette ("D-13") in which he suggested an account 
in Switzerland and bonds to be transferred to it. The package also 
contained approximately 80 pages of material, including a document 
whose title the KGB noted as "National Intelligence Program 90-91." 
The diskette contained classified information about a variety of 
technical and operational matters.

"B" also provided information about United States Foreign Officer 
Felix Bloch and an illegal in Vienna, Austria. This disclosure 
compromised the FBI's then-ongoing espionage investigation of Bloch, 
as described below.

The package that the KGB passed to "B" on May 22, 1989, did not 
contain a payment, but in a letter the KGB promised to do so the next 
time. The KGB also returned the MASINT Committee document, and 
described its two prior failed efforts to return it.

The next day, the KGB observed that the signal associated with the 
"BOB" dead drop site had been removed, indicating that "B" had 
retrieved the KGB's package.

105. Felix Bloch had been identified as an associate of Austria-based 
known Soviet illegal Reino Gikman on the basis of a telephone call 
between them on April 27, 1989. One day later, the FBI opened a 
classified investigation of Bloch, who at the time was assigned to 
the State Department in Washington, D.C. Meetings between Bloch and 
Gikman were observed in Paris on May 14, 1989, and Brussels on May 
28, 1989. In early June 1989, after "B" had compromised the Bloch 
investigation, Gikman suddenly left for Moscow. Early on the morning 
of June 22, 1989, Bloch received a telephone call at his home in 
Washington, D.C., from a man identifying himself as "Ferdinand Paul". 
According to a recording of that call, "Ferdinand Paul" told Bloch 
that he was calling "in behalf of Pierre" who "cannot see you in the 
near future" because "he is sick", and that "a contagious disease is 
suspected." (Bloch knew Gikman as "Pierre".) "Paul" then told Bloch: 
"I am worried about you. You have to take care of yourself." Having 
concluded that this call alerted Bloch that his association with 
Gikman had been compromised, the FBI interviewed Bloch on June 22 and 
23, 1989. Bloch denied he had engaged in espionage and ultimately 
declined to answer any further questions. The FBI was unable further 
to develop its investigation of Bloch.

106. On Monday, August 7, 1989, after two call-out signals from "B", 
he and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "CHARLIE" 
dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

In the package from "B" were five rolls of film containing a 
highly-restricted TOP SECRET/SCI analysis of the foreign threat to a 
specific and named highly-compartmented United States Government 
program, dated May 1987.

Also in the package from "B" was his fourteenth diskette ("D-14"), 
which contained information from the Bloch-Gikman file, and several 
FBI recruitment attempts. "B" approved a new dead drop site the KGB 
had proposed, codenamed "DORIS", located under a footbridge in 
Canterbury Park in Springfield, Virginia, in the Eastern District of 
Virginia.

The KGB's package to "B" contained $30,000 cash and a letter 
promising to compensate him for the returned diamonds. The KGB 
rejected his suggestions for an account in Switzerland. The KGB 
discussed communications plans, and proposed a new dead drop site, 
codenamed "ELLIS", under a footbridge over Wolftrap Creek near Creek 
Crossing Road at Foxstone Park, near Vienna, Virginia, in the Eastern 
District of Virginia, with a signal site on the "Foxstone Park" sign.

The next day, the KGB observed that the signal associated with the 
"CHARLIE" dead drop site had been removed, indicating that "B" had 
retrieved the KGB's package.

107. On August 17, 1989, the KGB deposited $50,000 into an escrow 
account established for "B" in a Soviet bank in Moscow.

108. On Monday, September 25, 1989, "B" and the KGB carried out an 
exchange operation at the "DORIS" dead drop site in the Eastern 
District of Virginia.

The package from "B" to the KGB contained approximately 80 pages of 
material including part of a document concerning a highly-sensitive 
United States technical operation classified at the TOP SECRET/SCI 
level. In passing this document, "B" compromised a program of 
enormous value, expense, and importance to the United States. Also in 
the package was his fifteenth diskette ("D-15"), containing 
additional classified information.

The package from the KGB to "B" contained $30,000 cash, a letter, 
and, for the first time from the KGB, a computer diskette.

The next day, the KGB observed that the signal associated with the 
"CHARLIE" dead drop site had been removed, indicating that "B" had 
retrieved the KGB's package.

109. On October 2, 1989, the KGB received a letter from "B" at an 
accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. It bore a 
return address of "G. Robertson, 1408 Ingeborg Ct., McLean VA" and 
was postmarked "NO VA" on October 28, 1989. The letter reported that: 
"The disk is clean. I tried all methods -- completely demagnetized."

110. On October 17, 1989, the KGB received an envelope from "B" at an 
accommodation address, in the Eastern District of Virginia. It bore a 
return address of "G. Robertson, 1101 Kingston Ct., Houston, TX" and 
was postmarked "NO VA MSC 220" on October 16, 1989. The envelope 
contained "B"'s sixteenth diskette ("D-16").

111. On Monday, October 23, 1989, "B" and the KGB carried out an 
exchange operation at the "ELLIS" dead drop site in the Eastern 
District of Virginia.

The package from "B" to the KGB contained an exact duplicate of the 
sixteenth diskette ("D-16"), which "B" had sent by mail the week 
before. The diskette contained additional classified information 
about technical and recruitment matters. "B" requested the KGB to 
load the "ELLIS" dead drop site at any time, and advised that he 
would check the signal site periodically about the loading.

The package from the KGB t.o "B" contained $55,000 cash and a letter 
advising "B" that $50,000 had been deposited into his escrow account 
in Moscow. "B" never signaled that he had cleared this dead drop, and 
on October 26 the KGB retrieved its package.

112. On Tuesday, October 31, 1989, the KGB loaded the "ELLIS" dead 
drop site with a package containing the $55,000 cash and a second KGB 
diskette. The diskette provided a new accommodation address, and 
instructions to "B" on how to inform the KGB which materials should 
be opened by the KGB in Washington, D.C., and which should go to the 
Center. It conveyed regards from the KGB Chairman and made extensive 
requests for additional information concerning particular United 
States intelligence activities targeting the Soviet Union. On 
November 11, 1989, the KGB observed that the "ELLIS" signal site was 
removed, indicating that "B" had removed the KGB's package.

113. On Monday, December 25, 1989, after a call-out signal from "B", 
he and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "BOB" dead 
drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

The package from "B" to the KGB contained his seventeenth diskette 
("D-17") and several documents including a DCI National Intelligence 
Estimate entitled "The Soviet System in Crisis: Prospects for the 
Next Two Years" and dated November 1989. This document was classified 
SECRET, bore the caveats NOFORN NOCONTRACT WNINTEL, and contained the 
notice: "Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions." He 
also provided additional documents on the highly sensitive technical 
operation referred to above.

The diskette contained a message in which "B" complimented the KGB's 
efficient actions, and provided current information about: several 
ongoing FBI recruitment operations against Soviet intelligence 
officers; three new tightly-protected FBI sources within the KGB and 
other Soviet entities; and four detectors. He also provided updated 
information on the Bloch-Gikman matter.

The package from the KGB to "B" contained $38,000 cash as payment for 
the October 16-23 period plus compensation for the two returned 
diamonds, and two KGB diskettes. The diskettes contained Christmas 
greetings from the KGB, discussed communications plans, and asked "B" 
for specific information about a variety of classified technical 
operations.

114. On Monday, March 5, 1990, after a call-out signal from "B", he 
and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "CHARLIE" dead 
drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

The package from "B" to the KGB contained his eighteenth diskette 
("D-18"), on which "B" provided classified information on a wide 
variety of topics, including: four Soviet nationals, a KGB officer, a 
Soviet illegal, and two KGB detectors, who were all serving as 
FBI-CIA sources; communications intelligence operations; and the 
identification of a particular named NSA employee and the sensitive 
office in which the employee worked. The package also contained a 
120-page document whose title, according to KGB records, was "Soviet 
Armed Forces and Strategic Nuclear Capabilities for the 1990s," dated 
February 1990.

The package from the KGB contained $40,000 cash and a KGB diskette. 
The diskette discussed communications plans and asked "B" to provide 
information on a wide variety of classified technical, operational, 
and recruitment matters. The KGB also asked "B" what the Soviets 
could use of the certain highly classified and sensitive program 
information he had previously disclosed.

115. On Monday, May 7, 1990, after a call-out signal from "B", he and 
the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "DORIS" dead drop 
site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

The package from "B" to the KGB contained his nineteenth diskette 
("D-19") and approximately 232 pages of material, including another 
document on the tightly-compartmented classified program that was the 
subject of the document "B" passed to the KGB on August 7, 1989. "B" 
also gave the KGB permission to use the certain highly classified and 
sensitive program information he had previously disclosed.

"B" also advised that because of a promotion he would be traveling 
for one year, and he discussed communications plans and a method of 
renewing contact.

The package from the KGB to "B" contained $35,000 cash and a KGB 
diskette. The diskette contained communications plans, and identified 
a new dead drop site, codenamed "FLO", located under a footbridge in 
Lewinsville Park near the intersection of Warner Avenue and Westbury 
Road in McLean, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia, and a 
nearby signal site. The diskette also contained specific requests for 
information, including operational leads and materials on 
recruitments of Soviets. It read, in part, as follows:

Dear Friend:
. . . . We attach some information requests which we ask Your kind 
assistance for. We are very cautious about using Your info and 
materials so that none of our actions in no way causes [sic] no harm 
to Your security. With this on our mind we are asking that sensitive 
materials and information (especially hot and demanding some actions) 
be accompanied by some sort of Your comments or some guidance on how 
we may or may not use it with regard to Your security.
We wish You good luck and enclose $35,000.
Thank you.

Sincerely,
Your friends.
116. On or about May 17, 1990, the KGB received a letter and a 
diskette from "B" at an accommodation address in the Eastern District 
of Virginia.

117. On Monday, May 21, 1990, the KGB loaded the "ELLIS" dead drop 
site with a package containing two KGB diskettes, and marked a 
call-out signal for "B." "B" picked up the KGB's package, but did not 
leave one for the KGB.

The KGB diskettes contained a letter that discussed in detail 
communications plans and recontact procedures. It read, in part:

Dear Friend:
Congratulations on Your promotion. We wish You all the very best in 
Your life and career.

We appreciate Your sympathy for some difficulties our people face - 
Your friendship and understanding are very important to us. Of course 
You are right, no system is perfect and we do understand this.

Speaking about the systems. We don't see any problem for the system 
of our future communications in regard to this new circumstances of 
Yours. Though we can't but regret that our contacts may be not so 
regular as before, like You said.

We believe our current commo plan - though neither perfect - covers 
ruther [sic] flexibly Your needs: You may have a contact with us 
anytime You want after staying away as long as You have to. So, do 
Your new job, make Your trips, take Your time. The commo plan we have 
will still be working. We'll keep covering the active call out signal 
site no matter how long it's needed. And we'll be in a ready-to-go 
mode to come over to the drop next in turn whenever You are ready: 
that is when You are back home and decide to communicate. All You'll 
have to do is to put Your call out signal, just as now. And You have 
two addresses to use to recontact us only if the signal sites for 
some reason don't work or can't be used. . . . But in any case be 
sure: You may have a contact anytime because the active call out site 
is always covered according to the schedule no matter how long you've 
been away. . . .

Thank You and good luck.
Sincerely,
Your friends.
The KGB particularly asked "B" to "give us some good leads to 
possible recruitments" among "interesting people in the right 
places." The KGB also asked for information about a Soviet Embassy 
employee who "B" had previously identified as an FBI 
recruitment-in-place, and who the KGB believed was about to defect.

118. On August 20, 1990, the KGB received from "B" an envelope, 
containing his twentieth diskette ("D-20"), at an accommodation 
address in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope bore the 
return address "J. Baker, Box 1101, Alexandria VA". The diskette 
contained classified information about several matters. "B" 
instructed the KGB to load the "FLO" dead drop site on September 3, 
1990.

119. On Monday, September 3, 1990, the KGB loaded the "FLO" dead drop 
site with a package containing $40,000 cash, and a KGB diskette 
containing a letter which identified more call-out signal sites and 
contained numerous specific requests for classified information. The 
letter noted that some of the materials "B" had provided about 
"political issues of interest . . . were reported to the very top." 
"B" subsequently picked up the KGB's package.

120. On Saturday, February 2, 1991, in response to an emergency 
call-out signal from "B", the KGB retrieved a package from "B" at the 
"CHARLIE" dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia. The 
package contained "B"'s twenty-first diskette ("D-21"), which 
included a letter in which "B" acknowledged receipt of the $40,000, 
which he characterized as "too generous." He disclosed to the KGB 
that the FBI's chief of counterintelligence in the New York Field 
Office had told him that the FBI had recruited a specific number of 
sources at a particular Soviet establishment. "B" also advised that 
he would be ready for an operation on February 18, 1991.

In exchange, the KGB left a package for "B" but he did not pick it up 
and the KGB later retrieved it.

121. On Monday, February 18, 1991, the KGB loaded the "CHARLIE" dead 
drop site with a package containing $10,000 cash and a KGB diskette. 
The diskette established two new dead drop sites, one of which was 
codenamed "GRACE" and located under a footbridge in Rock Creek Park 
in Washington, D.C. It also asked "B" to provide specific classified 
technical and operational information, and instructed that the next 
contact would be at the "DORIS" dead drop site.

122. On Monday, April 15, 1991, in response to a call-out signal from 
"B", he and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "DORIS" 
dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

The package from "B" to the KGB contained his twenty-second diskette 
("D-22") in which he confirmed receipt of cash. "B" also provided 
classified FBI material about a specific recruitment operation about 
which the KGB had previously asked. The package from the KGB to "B" 
contained $10,000 and a KGB diskette which read, in part, as follows:

Dear Friend:
Time is flying. As a poet said:
"What's our life,
If full of care
You have no time
To stop and stare?"
You've managed to slow down the speed of Your running life to send us 
a message. And we appreciate it.
We hope You're O'K and Your family is fine too. We are sure You're 
doing great at Your job. As before, we'll keep staying alert to 
respond to any call from You whenever You need it.

We acknowledge receiving one disk through CHARLIE. One disk of 
mystery and intrigue. Thank you.

Not much a business letter this time. Just formalities. We consider 
Site-9 cancelled. And we are sure You remember: our next contact is 
due at ELLIS.

Frankly, we are looking forward to JUNE. Every new season brings new 
expectations.

Enclosed in our today's package please find $10,000. Thank You for 
Your friendship and help.

We attach some information requests. We hope You'll be able to assist 
us on them.

Take care and good luck.
Sincerely,
Your friends.
The KGB asked "B" for information about several specific classified 
matters, including United States Intelligence Community plans to 
respond to domestic turmoil in the Soviet Union and new United States 
communications intelligence efforts.

123. On Monday, July 15, 1991, after a call-out signal from "B", he 
and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "ELLIS" dead 
drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

The package from "B" to the KGB contained his twenty-third diskette 
("D-23") and approximately 284 pages of material. The diskette read, 
in part: "I returned, grabbed the first thing I could lay my hands 
on" and " I was in a hurry so that you would not worry, because June 
has passed, they held me there longer." He also noted that he had at 
least five years until retirement, and remarked: "Maybe I will hang 
in there for that long." "B" also reported on a particular FBI-CIA 
operation. The classified documents passed by "B" included FBI 
documents, human intelligence plans, and documents concerning nuclear 
and missile weapons proliferation.

The package from the KGB to "B" contained $12,000 cash and a KGB 
diskette reading, in part, as follows:

Dear friend:
Acknowledging the disk and materials . . . received through "DORIS" 
we also acknowledge again Your superb sense of humor and Your 
sharp-as-a-razor mind. We highly appreciate both.

Don't worry. We will not steam out incorrect conclusions from Your 
materials. Actually, Your information grately [sic] assisted us in 
seeing more clearly many issues and we are not ashamed to correct our 
notions if we have some. So, thank You for Your help. But if some of 
our requests seem a bit strange to You, please try to believe us 
there were sufficient reasons to put them and that what we wanted was 
to sort them out with Your help.

In regard to our "memo" on Your security. Just one more remark. If 
our natural wish to capitalize on Your information confronts in any 
way Your security interests we definitely cut down our thirst for 
profit and choose Your security. The same goes with any other aspect 
of Your case. That's why we say Your security goes first. . . .

We are sure You remember our next contact is due at "FLO".

As always we attach some information requests, which are of current 
interest to us.

We thank You and wish You the very best.

Sincerely,
Your friends.
Enclosed in the package please find $12,000.

The KGB gave "B" new communications plans, and numerous specific 
requests for classified technical, operational, and recruitment 
matters. The KGB also asked follow-up questions about information "B" 
had previously provided, and requested specific United States 
Intelligence Community activity towards the Soviet Union.

124. On Monday, August 19, 1991, after a call-out signal from "B", he 
and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "FLO" dead drop 
site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

The package from "B" to the KGB contained a recent FBI memorandum 
concerning specific methods of surveillance of a particular Soviet 
intelligence officer. It also contained "B"'s twenty-fourth diskette 
("D-24") on which he discussed communications plans and provided 
information about classified technical and operational matters. On 
this diskette, he also discussed how the Soviet Union could benefit 
from a thorough study of the period of Chicago' s history when the 
city was governed by Mayor Richard J. Daley.

The package from the KGB to "B" contained $20,000 cash and a message 
welcoming "B" back and advising that the next exchange would be at 
the "GRACE" dead drop site.

125. On Monday, October 7, 1991, after a call-out signal from "B", he 
and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "GRACE" dead 
drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

The package from "B" to the KGB contained his twenty-fifth diskette 
("D-25") and a classified document entitled "The US Double-Agent 
Program Management Review and Policy Recommendations" dated September 
10, 1991. On the diskette, "B" provided information about various 
classified recruitment operations. "B" also identified by name a 
particular "old friend" whom he suggested the KGB try to recruit; he 
explained that the man was a military officer who had recently been 
told he would not be promoted.

The package from the KGB to "B" contained $12,000 cash and a KGB 
diskette reading, in part, as follows:

Dear friend:
Thanks for the package of 02.13. [The] materials are very promising, 
we intend to work on the scenario so wisely suggested by You. And the 
magical history tour to Chicago was mysteriously well timed. Have You 
ever thought of foretelling the things? After Your retirement for 
instance in some sort of Your own "Cristall [sic] Ball and 
Intelligence Agency" (CBIA)? There are always so many people in this 
world eager to get a glimpse of the future.

But now back to where we belong. There have been many important 
developments in our country lately. So many that we'd like to 
reassure You once again. Like we said: we've done all in order that 
none of those events ever affects Your security and our ability to 
maintain the operation with You. And of course there can be no doubt 
of our commitment to Your friendship and cooperation which are too 
important to us to loose [sic]....

Please note: our next contact is due at HELEN.

Enclosed in the package please find $12,000 and attached as always 
are some information requests which we'd ask Your kind attention to.

Thank You and good luck.

Sincerely,
Your friends.
The KGB provided new communications plans and asked "B" for specific 
information about a variety of classified technical, operational, and 
analytical matters. The KGB also asked for the current 1991 issue of 
a particular document reporting on Soviet knowledge of United States 
satellite reconnaissance systems, commenting that: "It's fun to read 
about the life in the Universe to understand better what's going on 
on our own planet." Asking about some pages that appeared to be 
missing from "B"'s July package, the KGB noted: "Sometimes it 
happens, we understand. Life is becoming too fast."

126. On December 12, 1991, the KGB received an envelope from "B" at 
an accommodation address in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern 
District of Virginia. The envelope, which was addressed by hand, bore 
a handwritten return address of "J. Baker, Box 1101, Houston, TX" and 
was postmarked Washington, D.C. The envelope contained a handwritten 
note reading: "­ @ BOB on 6/22; T. DEVICE APPROVED 6/16, COMING 
SOON". Using the established "6" coefficient, the reference to "6/22" 
actually refers to December 16. The reference to "T. DEVICE" related 
to information "B" had previously passed to the KGB regarding a 
classified technical operation.

127. On Monday, December 16, 1991, "B" and the KGB carried out an 
exchange operation at the "BOB" dead drop site in the Eastern 
District of Virginia.

The package from "B" to the KGB contained several documents, including:

(A) A DCI Counterintelligence Center research paper entitled "The 
KGB's First Chief Directorate: Structure, Functions, and Methods," 
dated November 1990. The document was classified SECRET with the 
caveats NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON. It also bore the following notices:
WARNING NOTICE

This document should be disseminated only to persons having both the 
requisite clearances and a need to have access to its contents for 
performance of their duties. No further distribution or reproduction 
is authorized without the approval of the Associate Deputy Director 
for Operations for Counterintelligence, CIA.
and


National SecurityUnauthorized Disclosure
InformationSubject to Criminal Sanctions

(B) A current volume of the DCI Congressional Budget Justification 
that detailed the programs and resource needs of the FBI's Foreign 
Counterintelligence Program. The document was classified SECRET with 
the caveats NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON, and the warning: "Unauthorized 
Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions."
The package from "B" also contained his twenty-sixth diskette 
("D-26") in which he expressed embarrassment over the pages missing 
from his earlier package, and advised that he had been promoted to a 
position of increased salary and authority that had moved him 
temporarily out of direct responsibility for Soviet matters. He noted 
that a new mission for his new group had not yet been defined, and he 
quoted a particular remark by General Patton about the Japanese. "B" 
discussed communications plans, and provided information about 
various classified technical and operational matters. He also 
proposed a new communications system, in which he would set up an 
office at a location in town not subject to electronic surveillance, 
where he and the KGB could communicate directly using a computer that 
would be specially-equipped with certain advanced technology.

The package from the KGB to "B" contained $12,000 cash and a KGB 
diskette discussing communications plans and asking for specific 
information about various classified matters.

128. In one message to "B" the KGB warned him to: "Examine from the 
point of security Your practice of copying materials."

129. On or before October 6, 1999, "B" received the following letter 
from the SVR:

Dear friend: welcome!
It's good to know you are here. Acknowledging your letter to V. K. we 
express our sincere joy on the occasion of resumption of contact with 
you. We firmly guarantee you for a necessary financial help. Note, 
please, that since our last contact a sum set aside for you has risen 
and presents now about 800.000 dollars. This time you will find in a 
package 50.000 dollars. Now it is up to you to give a secure 
explanation of it.

As to communication plan, we may have need of some time to work out a 
secure and reliable one. This why we suggest to carry on the 13th of 
November at the same drop which you have proposed in your letter to 
V. K. We shall be ready to retrieve your package from DD since 20:00 
to 21:00 hours on the 12th of November after we would read you [sic] 
signal (a vertical mark of white adhesive tape of 6-8 cm length) on 
the post closest to Wolf trap Creek of the "Foxstone Park" sign. We 
shall fill our package in and make up our signal (a horizontal mark 
of white adhesive tape).

After you will clear the drop don't forget to remove our tape that 
will mean for us - exchange is over.

We propose a new place where you can put a signal for us when in need 
of an urgent DD operation. LOCATION: the closest to Whithaven [sic] 
Parkway wooden electricity utility pole at the south-west corner of 
T- shaped intersection of Foxhall Road and Whitehaven Parkway (map of 
Washington, DC, page 9, grid Bll). At any working day put a white 
thumb tack (I cm in diameter, colored sets are sold at CVS) into the 
Northern side of the pole at the height of about 1.2 yards. The tack 
must be seen from a car going down Foxhall Road. This will mean for 
us that we shall retrieve your package from the DD Foxstone Park at 
the evening of the nex [sic] week's Tuesday (when it's getting dark).

In case of a threatening situation of any kind put a yellow tack at 
the same place. This will mean that we shall refrain from any 
communication with you until further notice from your side (the white 
tack).

We also propose for your consideration a new DD site "Lewis". DD 
LOCATION: wooden podium in the amphitheatre of Long-branch Nature 
Center (map of N.Virginia, page 16, grid G8). The package should be 
put under the FAR-LEFT corner of the podium (when facing the podium). 
Entter [sic] Longbranch Nature Center at the sign from Carlin Springs 
Road (near 6th Road south) and after parking your car in the lot 
follow the sign "To Amphitheatre." LOCATION OF THE DD SIGNAL: a 
wooden electricity utility pole at the north- west corner of the 
intersection of 3d Street and Carlin Springs Road neaqr [sic] the 
Metrobus stop (the same map, grid F7). The signals are the same as in 
the "Foxstone Park" DD. The white adhesive tape should be placed on 
the NORTHERN side of the pole, so that it could be noticed fro [sic] 
a car moving along Carlin Springs Road in the southern direction from 
Route 50.

Please, let us know during the November operation of your opinion on 
the proposed places (the new signal and DD "Lewis").

We are intending to pass you a permanent communications plan using 
drops you know as well a new portion of money. For our part we are 
very interested to get from you any information about possible 
actions which may threaten us.

Thank you. Good luck to you. Sincerely,

Your friends.
The initials "V. K." are those of a known SVR Line KR senior officer 
in Washington, D.C.

130. On or before March 14, 2000, "B" wrote a letter to the SVR, 
reading, in part, as follows:

.... I have come about as close as I ever want to come to sacrificing 
myself to help you, and I get silence. I hate silence. . . .
Conclusion: One might propose that I am either insanely brave or 
quite insane. I'd answer neither. I'd say, insanely loyal. Take your 
pick. There is insanity in all the answers.

I have, however, come as close to the edge as I can without being 
truly insane. My security concerns have proven reality-based. I'd 
say, pin your hopes on 'insanely loyal' and go for it. Only I can 
lose.

I decided on this course when I was 14 years old. I'd read Philby's 
book. Now that is insane, eh! My only hesitations were my security 
concerns under uncertainty. I hate uncertainty. So far I have judged 
the edge correctly. Give me credit for that.

Set the signal at my site any Tuesday evening. I will read your 
answer. Please, at least say goodbye. It's been a long time my dear 
friends, a long and lonely time.

Ramon Garcia

131. On or before June 8, 2000, "B" wrote a letter to the SVR which 
read, in part, as follows:

Dear Friends:
Administrative Issues:

Enclosed, once again, is my rudimentary cipher. Obviously it is weak 
in the manner I used it last -- reusing key on multiple messages, but 
I wanted to give you a chance if you had lost the algorythm [sic].

Thank you for your note. It brought me great joy to see the signal at 
last. As you implied and I have said, we do need a better form of 
secure communication -- faster. In this vein, I propose (without 
being attached to it) the following:

One of the commercial products currently available is the Palm VII 
organizer. I have a Palm III, which is actually a fairly capable 
computer. The VII version comes with wireless internet capability 
built in. It can allow the rapid transmission of encrypted messages, 
which if used on an infrequent basis, could be quite effective in 
preventing confusions if the existance [sic] of the accounts could be 
appropriately hidden as well as the existance [sic] of the devices 
themselves. Such a device might even serve for rapid transmittal of 
substantial material in digital form. Your FAPSI could review what 
would be needed, its advisability, etc., obviously -- particularly 
safe rules of use. While FAPSI may move with the rapidity of the 
Chinese army, they can be quite effective, in juggernaut fashion, 
that is to say thorough. . . .

New topics:

If you are wise, you will reign [sic] in the GRU. They are causing no 
end of grief. But for the large number of double-agents they run, 
there would be almost no ability to cite activity warranting current 
foreign counterintelligence outlays. Of course the Gusev affair 
didn't help you any. If I'd had better communications I could have 
prevented that. I was aware of the fact that microphones had been 
detected at the State Department. (Such matters are why I need rapid 
communications. It can save you much grief.) Many such things are 
closely held, but that closeness fails when the need for action 
comes. Then the compartments grow of necessity. I had knowledge weeks 
before of the existence of devices, but not the country placing them. 
. . . I only found out the gruesome details too late to warn you 
through available means including the colored stick-pin call. (Which 
by the way I doubted would work because of your ominous silence.) 
Very frustrating. This is one reason I say 'you waste me' in the 
note. . . .

The U.S. can be errantly likened to a powerfully built but retarded 
child, potentially dangerous, but young, immature and easily 
manipulated. But don't be fooled by that appearance. It is also one 
which can turn ingenius [sic] quickly, like an idiot savant, once 
convinced of a goal. The [ ] Japanese (to quote General Patten [sic] 
once again) learned this to their dismay....

I will not be able to clear TOM on the first back-up date so don't be 
surprised if we default to that and you find this then. Just place 
yours again the following week, same protocol.

I greatly appreciate your highly professional inclusion of old 
references to things known to you in messages resulting from the mail 
interaction to assure me that the channel remains unpirated. This is 
not lost on me.

On Swiss money laudering [sic], you and I both know it is possible 
but not simple. And we do both know that money is not really 'put 
away for you' except in some vague accounting sense. Never patronize 
at this level It offends me, but then you are easily forgiven. But 
perhaps I shouldn't tease you. It just gets me in trouble.

thank you again,

Ramon

132. On or before July 31, 2000, "B" received the following letter 
from the KGB/SVR:

Dear Ramon:
We are glad to use this possibility to thank You for Your striving 
for going on contact with us.

We received Your message. The truth is that we expended a lot of 
efforts to decipher it.

First of all we would like to emphasize that all well known events 
wich [sic] had taken place in this country and in our homeland had 
not affected our resources and we reaffirm our strong intentions to 
maintain and ensure safely our long-term cooperation with You.

We perceive Your actions as a manifestation of Your confidence in our 
service and from our part we assure You that we shall take all 
necessary measures to ensure Your personal security as much as 
possible.

Just because proceeding from our golden rule - to ensure Your 
personal security in the first place - we have proposed to carry out 
our next exchange operation at the place which had been used in last 
august [sic]. We did not like to give You any occasion to charge us 
with an inadequate attention to problems of Your security. We are 
happy that, according to the version You have proposed in Your last 
letter, our suggestions about DD, known as "Ellis", coincided 
completely. However a situation around our collegues [sic] at the end 
of passed [sic] year made us to refuse this operation at set day.

1. We thank You for information, wnich [sic] is of a great interest 
for us and highly evaluated in our service.

We hope that during future exchanges we shall receive Your materials, 
which will deal with a [sic] work of IC, the FBI and CIA in the first 
place, against our representatives and officers. We do mean its 
human, electronic and technical penetrations in our residencies here 
and in other countries. We are very interested in getting of the 
objective information on the work of a special group which serches 
[sic] "mole" in CIA and FBI. We need this information especially to 
take necessary additional steps to ensure Your personal security....

2. Before staling a communication plan that we propose for a next 
future, we would like to precise [sic] a following problem. Do You 
have any possibility to meet our collegues [sic] or to undertake the 
exchange ops in other countries? If yes, what are these countries? 
Until we receive Your answer at this [sic] questions and set up a new 
communication plan, we propose to use for the exchange ops DD 
according to the following schedule:

= DD "LEWIS" on 27 of may 2001 (with a coefficient it will mean on 21 
of november 2000). We draw Your attention on the fact that we used a 
former coefficient - 6 (sender adds, addressee subtracts). A time 
will be shown at real sense. We will be ready to withdraw Your 
package beginning by 8 PM on 27 may 2001 after we shall read Your 
signal. After that we put DD our package for You. Remove Your signal 
and place our signal by 9 PM of the same day. After that You will 
withdraw our package and remove our signal. That will mean an 
exchange operation is over. We shall check signal site (i.e., its 
absence) the next day (28 of May) till 9 PM. If by this time a signal 
had not been removed we shall withdraw our package and shall put it 
in for You repeatedly dates with DD "ELLIS" ­ in each seven days 
after 28 May till 19 of June 2001 (i.e., 13 of December 2000).

= We propose to carry out our next operation on 16 of October 2001 
(i.e., 10 of April) at the DD "LINDA" in "Round Tree park" (if this 
place suits for Your [sic] we would like to receive Your oppinion 
[sic] about that during exchange in may). A time of operation from 8 
pm to 9 pm, signals and schedule of alternate dates are the same. In 
the course of exchange ops we shall pass to You descriptions of new 
DD and SS that You can check them before. You will find with this 
letter descriptions of two new DD "LINDA" and "TOM". Hope to have 
Your opinion about them.

In case of break off in our contacts we propose to use DD "ELLIS", 
that you indicated in your first message. Your note about a second 
bridge across the street from the 'F' sign, as back up, is approved. 
We propose to use "ELLIS" once a year on 12 August (i.e., with coeff. 
it will be 18 February) at the same time as it was in August 1999. On 
that day we can carry out a full exchange operation -- You will 
enload your package and put a signal, we shall withdraw it, load our 
package and put our signal. You will remove our package and put your 
signal. Alternate dates - in seven days 'til next month.

= As it appears from your message, you continue to use post channel 
as a means of communication with us. You know very well our negative 
attitude toward this method. However if you send by post a short note 
where date (i.e., with coefficient), time and name of DD for urgent 
exchange are mentioned, you could do it by using address you had used 
in September (i.e., with coeff.) putting in a sealed envelope for V. 
K.

In future, it is inexpedient to use a V. K. name as a sender. It will 
be better to choose any well known name in this country as you did it 
before.

3. We shall continue work up [sic] new variants of exchanging 
messages including PC disks. Of course we shall submit them to your 
approval in advance. If you use a PC disk for next time, please give 
us key numbers and program you have used.

4. We would like to tell you that an insignificant number of persons 
know about you, your information and our relationship.

5. We assess as very risky to transfer money in Zurich because now it 
is impossible to hide its origin...

133. On or before November 17, 2000, "B" wrote a letter to the 
KGB/SVR, reading, in part, as follows:

Dear Friends:
Bear with me. It was I who sent the message trying to use TOM to 
communicate material to you. On reflection, I can understand why you 
did not respond. I see that I failed to furnish you sufficient 
information for you to recognize that the message you left for me in 
ELLIS did not go astray. You do this often (communicate such 
assurances through the mention of items like the old date offset we 
used), and believe me, it is not lost on me as a sign of 
professionalism. I say bear with me on this because you must realize 
I do not have a staff with whom to knock around all the potential 
difficulties. (For me breaks in communications are most difficult and 
stressful.) Recent changes in U.S. law now attach the death penalty 
to my help to you as you know, so I do take some risk. On the other 
hand, I know far better than most what minefields are laid and the 
risks. Generally speaking you overestimate the FBI's capacity to 
interdict you, but on the other hand, cocksure officers, (those with 
real guts and not as much knowledge as they think) can, as we say, 
step in an occasional cowpie. (Message to the translator: Got a good 
word for cowpie in Russian?? Clue, don't blindly walk behind cows.). 
. . .

I have drawn together material for you now over a lengthy period. It 
is somewhat variable in import. Some were selected as being merely 
instructive rather than urgently important. I think such instructive 
insights often can be quite as valuable or even more valuable 
long-term because they are widely applicable rather than narrow. 
Others are of definite value immediately.

My position has been most frustrating. I knew Mr. Gusev was in 
eminent [sic] danger and had no effective way of communicating in 
time. I knew microphones of an unknown origin were detected even 
earlier and had no regular way of communicating even that. This needs 
to be rectified if I am to be as effective as I can be.

No one answered my signal at Foxhall. Perhaps you occasionally give 
up on me. Giving up on me is a mistake. I have proven inveterately 
loyal and willing to take grave risks which even could cause my 
death, only remaining quiet in times of extreme uncertainty. So far 
my ship has successfully navigated the slings and arrows of 
outrageous fortune.

I ask you to help me survive. . . .

On meeting out of the country, it simply is not practical for me. I 
must answer too many questions from family, friends, and government 
plus it is a cardinal sign of a spy. You have made it that way 
because of your policy. Policies are constraints, constraints breed 
patterns. Patterns are noticed. Meeting in this country is not really 
that hard to manage, but I am loath to do so not because it is risky 
but because it involves revealing my identity. That insulation has 
been my best protection against betrayal by someone like me working 
from whatever motivation, a Bloch or a Philby. (Bloch was such a 
shnook. . . . I almost hated protecting him, but then he was your 
friend, and there was your illegal I wanted to protect. If our guy 
sent to Paris had balls or brains both would have been dead meat. 
Fortunately for you he had neither. He was your good luck of the 
draw. He was the kind who progressed by always checking with those 
above and tying them to his mistakes. The French said, "Should we 
take them down?" He went all wet. He'd never made a decision before, 
why start then. It was that close. His kindred spirits promoted him. 
Things are the same the world over, eh?)

On funds transfers through Switzerland, I agree that Switzerland 
itself has no real security, but insulated by laundering on both the 
in and out sides, mine ultimately through say a corporation I control 
loaning mortgage money to me for which (re) payments are made.... It 
certainly could be done. Cash is hard to handle here because little 
business is ever really done in cash and repeated cash transactions 
into the banking system are more dangerous because of the difficulty 
in explaining them. That doesn't mean it isn't welcome enough to let 
that problem devolve on me. (We should all have such problems, eh?) 
How do you propose I get this money put away for me when I retire? 
(Come on; I can joke with you about it. I know money is not really 
put into an account at MOST Bank, and that you are speaking 
figuratively of an accounting notation at best to be made real at 
some uncertain future. We do the same. Want me to lecture in your 101 
course in my old age? My college level Russian has sunk low through 
inattention all these years; I would be a novelty attraction, but I 
don't think a practical one except in extremis.)

So good luck. Wish me luck. OK, on all sites detailed to date, but 
TOM'S signal is unstable. See you in 'July' as you say constant 
conditions.

yours truly,

Ramon

134. On the evening of Tuesday, December 12, 2000, FBI surveillance 
personnel observed HANSSEN driving four times past the Foxstone Park 
sign on Creek Crossing Road in Vienna, Virginia. As described above, 
the Foxstone Park sign is the signal site associated with the "ELLIS" 
dead drop site, which was used from early on in the KGB's "B" 
operation.

135. Also on the evening of Tuesday, December 12, 2000, FBI 
surveillance personnel observed HANSSEN walking into a particular 
store at a shopping center near Foxstone Park at the same time as a 
known SVR officer was in front of the store.

136. On Tuesday, December 26, 2000, FBI surveillance personnel 
observed HANSSEN three times at the Foxstone Park signal site:

a) At approximately 5:42 pm, HANSSEN stopped his vehicle in front of 
the Foxstone Park sign for approximately ten to fifteen seconds.
b) At approximately 8:53 pm, HANSSEN parked his car on a street off 
Creek Crossing Road and walked to the Foxstone Park signal site. 
HANSSEN stopped in front of the Foxstone Park sign, holding a lit 
flashlight, and swept the flashlight beam in a vertical motion over 
some wooden pylons located near the sign, between the road and the 
sign. He appeared to the FBI surveillance personnel to focus his 
flashlight beam on one of the pylons. He then turned and walked away, 
shrugging his shoulders and raising his arms in a gesture of apparent 
disgust or exasperation. HANSSEN returned to his vehicle, and drove 
away to a nearby Tower Records store.

c) At approximately 9:32 pm, HANSSEN drove back past the Foxstone 
Park signal site, stopped his vehicle in front of it for 
approximately two to three seconds, and then drove away.

137. During January 2001, FBI surveillance personnel observed HANSSEN 
drive past the Foxstone Park signal site, and either slowing or 
stopping at the site, on three occasions. At approximately 8:18 pm on 
Tuesday, January 9, 2001, HANSSEN drove past the Foxstone Park signal 
site, came to a complete stop in front of it for approximately 10 
seconds, then drove away. Shortly before 6:00 pm on Tuesday, January 
23, 2001, HANSSEN drove past the Foxstone Park signal site, came to a 
rolling stop near it, and then drove away. After 5:00 pm on Friday, 
January 26, 2001, HANSSEN drove past the Foxstone Park signal site, 
slowing down near it.

138. On the evening of Monday, February 5, 2001, FBI surveillance 
personnel observed HANSSEN driving past the Foxstone Park signal site 
three times between approximately 5:37 pm and approximately 7:44 pm.

139. On Monday, February 12, 2001, FBI surveillance personnel 
checking the "LEWIS" dead drop site found a package concealed at the 
site. FBI personnel removed the package and transported it to the FBI 
Laboratory, where it was opened, its contents were examined and 
photocopied, and it was restored to an apparently intact condition. 
The package was then replaced at the dead drop site. The package 
contained $50,000 in used $100 bills and a typed note reading: "Next 
10/31/01 TOM alt. 20,27". These were wrapped in white paper, which 
was taped, and which in turn was wrapped in a taped-up black plastic 
trash bag inside a second black plastic trash bag.

VI. FACTS ESTABLISHING THAT "B" IS ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN

There is overwhelming evidence that "B" is ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN.

A. FORENSIC EVIDENCE

140. When "B" made dead drops to the KGB/SVR, he would place the 
contents of the drop in a plastic garbage bag, which he would wrap 
with tape. The plastic bag would then be placed inside a second 
garbage bag. The FBI has come into possession of the inner plastic 
bag used by "B" on one occasion to wrap the contents of a package to 
the KGB.

141. An FBI fingerprint examiner has conducted an examination of the 
plastic bag and ascertained that it contains two latent fingerprints 
of comparison value. The examiner determined that these two 
fingerprints are those of ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN.

B. MATERIAL OBTAINED FROM HANSSEN'S FBI OFFICE AND VEHICLE

142. On February 5, 2001, pursuant to court authorization, the FBI 
searched HANSSEN's current personal office within Room 9930 at FBI 
Headquarters. HANSSEN's briefcase, located in the office, contained 
(1) HANSSEN's current valid United States tourist passport; (2) a 
personal address book; (3) several personal checkbooks; (4) multiple 
sets of financial statements; (5) one computer floppy disk; (6) one 
8MB Versa Card Flash Memory Adapter, which is a memory storage card 
for a computer; (7) one cell phone. These items were photographed, 
duplicated, or otherwise recorded, but not removed or altered. Upon 
examination, the FBI determined that the memory storage card 
contained several letters associated with the "B" operation, which 
are further described elsewhere in this Affidavit. That these letters 
were found in HANSSEN's possession is clear and unequivocal evidence 
that HANSSEN is "B".

143. On January 30, 2001, pursuant to court authorization, the FBI 
searched HANSSEN's Ford Taurus automobile, and found the following:

(1) In the glove compartment were a roll of white Johnson & Johnson 
medical adhesive tape, and a box of Crayola colored chalk containing 
12 pieces of chalk.
(2) In one of four cardboard boxes in the trunk were seven classified 
documents printed from the FBI's Automated Case Support (ACS) system. 
Several pertained to ongoing FBI foreign counterintelligence 
investigations and were classified SECRET.

(3) In another cardboard box in the trunk were six green 
fabric-covered United States government ledger notebooks, containing 
classified information.

(4) Also in the trunk were a roll of Superior Performance Scotch 
clear mailing tape, and dark-colored Hefty garbage bags.

These items were not removed, although small samples were taken, and 
they were photographed.

144. On February 12, 2001, pursuant to court authorization, the FBI 
again searched HANSSEN's Ford Taurus automobile. In addition to the 
items described in part (1) of the foregoing paragraph, the glove 
compartment contained a small plastic box containing thumbtacks of 
various colors, including yellow and white. It was further 
ascertained that at least one of the pieces of chalk was pink. These 
items were not removed, although small samples were taken, and they 
were photographed. During this search, HANSSEN's briefcase was 
observed in the vehicle, but it was not removed.

C. RECORDING OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

145. On August 18, 1986, KGB Officer Aleksander Fefelov spoke by 
telephone with "B". A portion of that telephone call, lasting 
approximately two minutes, was recorded. Two FBI analysts, who have 
worked closely and routinely with HANSSEN for at least five years, 
have listened to both the recording and an FBI-enhanced version of 
the recording in which background noise has been minimized. They have 
both concluded without reservation that the voice of "B" is that of 
HANSSEN.

D. DEAD DROP SITES

146. There is a particularly clear correlation between HANSSEN's 
personal residence in Northern Virginia and two dead drop sites used 
frequently in the "B" operation.

147. In 1985, when "B" volunteered to the KGB, HANSSEN lived on 
Whitecedar Court, in Vienna, Virginia. The first dead drop site 
selected by "B" was Nottoway Park, which was less than a five minute 
walk from Whitecedar Court. Between 1985 and 1989, the Nottoway Park 
site was used for dead drops so frequently - 17 times - that it was 
designated by the KGB as the "PARK/PRIME" dead drop site.

148. In November 1985, the Whitecedar Court house was sold and 
HANSSEN moved to New York to undertake his new assignment in the New 
York Field Office. He returned to FBI Headquarters in August 1987, 
and moved into a home at 9414 Talisman Drive, Vienna, Virginia, which 
he had bought in July 1987.

149. In August 1989, the KGB designated drop site "ELLIS," located 
near Foxstone Park in Vienna, Virginia. The frequent use of this site 
-- at least seven times -- suggests that "B" lived very close to the 
site or passed it routinely. A further indication of this is that "B" 
told the KGB in October 1989 that the KGB could use the "ELLIS" site 
at any time. In fact, the "ELLIS" site is an approximately one-mile 
walk from HANSSEN's Talisman Drive residence.

E. PALM III

150. HANSSEN owns a Palm III device which is a hand-held personal 
digital assistant. The FBI has determined that HANSSEN's Palm III 
contains a reference to "ELLIS" and the date February 18, and the 
time 8:00. The term "ELLIS" is the KGB/SVR codename for the dead drop 
site located in the area of Foxstone Park that was used seven times 
by either "B", the KGB/SVR, or both.

F. CORRELATION OF HANSSEN'S WORK ASSIGNMENTS TO "B"'s DISCLOSURES TO 
THE KGB/SVR

151. "B"'s first letter to the KGB was postmarked in Prince George's 
County, Maryland, on Tuesday, October 1, 1985. Although at that time 
HANSSEN had recently been re-assigned to New York City, FBI records 
show that on that particular day he was in Washington, D.C., on 
administrative matters. Prince George's County is located on the 
route between Washington, D.C., and New York City.

152. In May 1990, "B" told the KGB that, due to a promotion, he would 
be traveling more and his access to materials would be limited. In 
May 1990, HANSSEN was reassigned from the Soviet Analytical Unit in 
the Intelligence Division to the Inspection Division at FBI 
Headquarters. An Inspection Division assignment is a typical feature 
of an FBI supervisory agent's career path and requires frequent 
travel to FBI field offices for inspections. While serving in this 
assignment, HANSSEN traveled frequently from June 1990 through June 
1991 to conduct inspections in various FBI offices.

153. On July 15, 1991, "B" indicated to the KGB that he had 
"returned" from a trip. The KGB responded on August 15, 1991 with a 
message welcoming him back and noting that "it's great for you to 
touch the green, green grass o£ home." HANSSEN returned on May 24, 
1991 from a lengthy overseas inspection tour.

154. On December 16, 1991, "B" told the KGB that he had "an increase 
in salary and authority [which] moved him temporarily out of direct 
responsibility, but a new mission for my new group has not been fully 
defined" and that "I hope to adjust to that . . . . As General Patton 
said . . . 'let's get this over with so we can go kick the [ ] out of 
the [ ] Japanese." (He quoted the same reference to Japanese in the 
letter he wrote to the SVR on or before June 8, 2000.) At that time, 
HANSSEN was preparing to assume new duties as Chief of the new 
National Security Threat List Unit at FBI Headquarters, where he 
focused the Unit's counterintelligence efforts on economic espionage. 
This new assignment resulted in an increase in salary (from GS-14 to 
GS- 15) and authority (Unit Chief). Several FBI employees recall that 
HANSSEN frequently quoted General Patton, and one employee who worked 
closely with HANSSEN specifically remembers HANSSEN once using the 
above-mentioned Patton quote in a discussion with him.

155. In February 1988, "B" told the KGB that he could read the Viktor 
Sheymov file because a special project relating to Sheyrnov was about 
to begin. At that time, HANSSEN was reviewing the Sheyrnov file in 
preparation for his participation in upcoming Intelligence Community 
debriefings of Sheymov.

156. Throughout the "B" operation, "B" reported on Sheymov's 
defection. HANSSEN took particular interest in the Sheymov case and 
developed a personal friendship with Sheymov. Recently, in fact, 
HANSSEN told FBI co-workers that he was considering an offer of 
lucrative employment by Sheymov after retirement in April 2001.

157. On August 19, 1991, "B" passed detailed information to the KGB 
on FBI coverage of a particular suspected Soviet intelligence 
officer. On July 1, 1991, HANSSEN returned to the Intelligence 
Division at FBI Headquarters (after his tour of duty on the 
Inspection Staff) and became the Headquarters Supervisor responsible 
for FBI coverage of this suspected Soviet intelligence officer.

158. In his assignment to CI-3A, the FBI's Soviet Analytical Unit, 
HANSSEN had access to an extremely broad array of highly classified 
material. The FBI has determined that HANSSEN's access to classified 
material is consistent with "B"'s disclosure of classified material 
to the KGB/SVR.

159. During two extended periods when "B" was inactive, from November 
1985 to June 1986, and August 1986 to August 1987, HANSSEN was 
assigned to the FBI's Field Office in New York City.

160. In July 1991, "B" told the KGB that he had at least five more 
years until retirement. HANSSEN was eligible for retirement from the 
FBI in 1996.

G. HANSSEN'S USE OF THE FBI AUTOMATED CASE SUPPORT SYSTEM

161. The Automated Case Support System (ACS) is the FBI's collected 
computerized databases of investigative files and indices. ACS came 
online in October 1995.

The main, and most extensive ACS database, is the Electronic Case 
File (ECF), which contains electronic communications and certain 
other documents related to ongoing FBI investigations, programs, and 
issues, and the indices to those documents. It is the equivalent of a 
closed FBI intranet. ACS users can access individual files by making 
full-text search requests for particular words or terms.

162. FBI personnel who are "approved users" of ACS, including 
HANSSEN, must log on with a user identification number and password 
unique to each user. Retrieval logs make it possible to conduct 
audits of individuals' use of ACS.

163. An audit of HANSSEN's use of ACS shows that he has been a 
consistent user of ECF in particular, and that he periodically 
conducted searches of the ECF database using a wide variety of very 
specific search terms. Although some of HANSSEN's ACS use appears to 
have been related to his official responsibilities, he made a 
substantial number of ACS searches apparently directly related to his 
own espionage activities. Through these searches, HANSSEN could 
retrieve certain FBI records that would indicate whether HANSSEN or 
his KGB/SVR associates, or their activities or operational locations, 
were known to or suspected by the FBI, and thus whether he was 
exposed to danger.

For example, on the following dates HANSSEN searched the ECF for the 
following terms, limiting some of the searches to a specified period 
of time as indicated:



July 25, 1997:HANSSEN

March 30, 1998:DEAD DROP AND KGB

May 18, 1998:DEAD DROP
DEAD DROP AND RUSSIA

July 6, 1998:DEAD DROP
DEAD DROP AND WASHINGTON
FISA AND CELL PHONE
HANSSEN

July 30, 1998:9414 TALISMAN
DEAD
DEAD DROP
DEAD DROP AND WASHINGTON
DOUBLE D
HANSSEN
ROBERT P. HANSSEN

September 3, 1998:ROBERT HANSSEN
ROBERT P HANSSEN
ROBERT P. HANSSEN

September 21, 1998:'DEAD DROP'
'DEAD DROP' AND RUSSIA

October 13, 1998:DEAD DROP
DEAD DROP [Dates=08/01/1998-10/13/1998

October 27, 1998:'DEAD DROP'
'DEAD DROP' AND WASHINGTON
'DEAD DROP' WASHINGTON

December 14, 1998:DEAD DROP
DEAD DROP AND WASHINGTON

April 7, 1999:DROP SITE
DROP SITE AND RUSSIA

April 12, 1999:ROBERT HANSSEN
TALISMAN
TALISMAN DRIVE
WHITE CEDAR
WHITECEDAR COURT

August 11, 1999:CCTV AND VIRGINIA
CCTV AND VIRGINIA[Dates=01/01/1999-
08/11/1999
FOXSTONE

August 17, 1999:DEAD DROP[Dates=01/01/1999-08/17/1999

August 30, 1999:DEAD DROP
DEAD DROP[Dates=07/01/1999-08/30/1999

September 2, 1999:CCTV
CCTV AND SVR
'DEAD DROP' AND SVR
'DEAD DROP' SVR

September 28, 1999:DROP SITE
DROP SITE[Dates=10/01/1999-10/21/1999
TALISMAN

October 21, 1999:DEAD DROP[Dates=10/01/1999-10/21/1999

October 26, 1999:VIENNA AND VIRGINIA
VIENNA AND VIRGINIA AND FCI [Dates=
01/01/1999-10/27/1999]

October 27, 1999:DEAD DROP [Dates=1/09/1999-1/28/1999

November 3, 1999:FOXSTONE
FOXSTONE AND VIENNA
VIENNA AND DROP
VIENNA AND DROP AND FCI
[Dates=01/01/1999-ll/4/1999
VIENNA AND DROP[Dates=01/06/1999-
03/11/1999]

November 15, 1999:DEAD DROP AND VIRGINIA
FOXSTONE

January 13, 2000:DEAD DROP[Dates=01/01/2000-01/13/2000
DEAD DROP [Dates=10/01/1999-12/31/1999

January 18, 2000:DROP SITE AND VIRGINIA
SVR AND DEAD DROP NOT GRU

March 14, 2000:DEAD DROP AND SVR

March 31, 2000:DEAD DROP
DEAD DROP AND RUSSIA

May 22, 2000:TALISMAN DRIVE

September 28, 2000:DEAD DROP AND WASHINGTON

October 4, 2000:DROP SITE[Dates=08/01/2000-10/04/2000

November 13, 2000:DEAD DROP[Dates=10/01/2000-ll/13/2000

December 21, 2000:DEAD DROP [Dates=10/01/2000-12/22/2000
ESPIONAGE [Dates=11/01/2000-12/21/2000

January 3, 2001:ROBERT HANSSEN

January 16, 2001:DEAD DROP[Dates=12/01/2000-01/15/2001
ESPIONAGE [Dates=12/01/2000-01/15/2001

January 19, 2001:DEAD DROP[Dates=12/01/2000-01/18/2001

January 22, 2001:DEAD DROP[Dates=01/01/2000-01/12/2001
DEAD DROP[Dates=12/01/2000-01/22/2001
DEADDROP[Dates=01/01/2000-01/22/2001
FOXSTONE

H. "B"'S "OLD FRIEND"

164. In 1991, "B" proposed that the KGB consider recruiting a 
particular named individual who he described as an "old friend." 
HANSSEN had been friends with this individual since HANSSEN was a 
teenager.

VII. LOCATION OF EVIDENCE, FRUITS, INSTRUMENTALITIES,. AND PROCEEDS

165. Based on my training and experience, and that of other FBI 
personnel with whom I have consulted, and on my participation in this 
investigation, I know that:

166. Persons who have engaged in espionage activities on behalf of 
foreign intelligence services maintain records, notes, bank records, 
financial statements, calendars, journals, maps, instructions, 
classified documents, and other papers or documents relating to the 
transmittal of national defense and classified intelligence 
information to foreign governments and intelligence services. Such 
records, notes, bank records, financial statements, calendars, 
journals, maps, instructions, classified documents, and other papers 
or documents are maintained, albeit often secreted, on their persons, 
in and around their residences, at their places of employment, in 
home and office computers, in their automobiles, and in other remote 
locations such as safe deposit boxes and storage facilities.

167. Persons who have been engaged in espionage activities on behalf 
of foreign intelligence services often utilize espionage 
paraphernalia, including devices designed to conceal and transmit 
national defense and classified intelligence information. These 
paraphernalia and devices include materials used by espionage agents 
to communicate between each other and with a foreign government, to 
wit: coded pads, secret writing paper, chemicals used to develop 
coded and secret messages, microdots, and microfiche, together with 
instructions in the use of these materials; electronic recording and 
transmittal equipment; computers and computer disks; cameras and 
film; books, records, documents, and papers. The information that is 
frequently passed or recorded through such methods often includes: 
(1) national defense and classified intelligence information; (2) the 
identities of other foreign espionage agents and intelligence 
officers; (3) financial transactions, including payments to foreign 
espionage agents and hidden financial accounts; (4) records of 
previous illicit espionage transactions; and (5) the source and 
disposition of national defense and classified information.

168. Persons who have been engaged in espionage activities on behalf 
of foreign intelligence services routinely conceal in their 
residences large amounts of United States and foreign currency, 
financial instruments, precious metals and gems, jewelry, and other 
items of value and/or proceeds of illegal espionage transactions. 
They also conceal records relating to hidden foreign and domestic 
bank and financial records, including accounts in fictitious names.

169. Persons who have been engaged in espionage activities on behalf 
of foreign intelligence services often secrete national defense and 
classified documents and materials, as well as clandestine 
communications devices and instructions, contact instructions, codes, 
telephone numbers, maps, photographs, other papers and materials 
relating to communications procedures, and proceeds and records of 
illegal espionage transactions, in secure hidden locations and 
compartments within their residences, places of employment, safe 
deposit boxes, storage facilities, and/or motor vehicles, including 
hidden compartments within motor vehicles, for ready access and to 
conceal such items from law enforcement authorities.

170. Persons who have been engaged in espionage activities on behalf 
of foreign intelligence services are not unlike any other person in 
our society in that they maintain documents and records, often doing 
so for long periods of time regardless of whether their value to the 
person has diminished. These persons maintain documents and records 
that will identify and corroborate travel both in the United States 
and abroad made in connection with foreign intelligence activity, 
including personal meets with foreign intelligence officers. Such 
documents and records include passports, visas, calendars, journals, 
date books, telephone numbers, credit cards, hotel receipts, airline 
records, correspondence, carbon copies of money orders and cashier's 
checks evidencing large cash expenditures, and accounts and records 
in fictitious names.

171. Persons who have been engaged in espionage activities on behalf 
of foreign intelligence services often maintain identity documents, 
including those utilizing fictitious identities. United States 
foreign currency, instructions, maps, photographs. United States and 
foreign bank accounts' access numbers and instructions, and other 
papers and materials relating to emergency contact procedures and 
escape plans.

172. The above-described results of recent court authorized searches 
of HANSSEN's automobile and office demonstrate that HANSSEN has 
retained evidence of his espionage activity, and that such activity 
is ongoing.

173. Both the location of the dead drop site "ELLIS", and the 
location of the signal site associated with the "ELLIS" dead drop 
site ­ the Foxstone Park sign in the southern part of Foxstone Park 
-- are within an approximately one-mile driving and walking distance 
from HANSSEN's residence at 9414 Talisman Drive, Vienna, Virginia.

174. "B" had substantial communications with the KGB about using 
sophisticated computer techniques for communications, and he sent 
information to the KGB on encrypted computer diskettes. HANSSEN is 
known to be highly skilled in the use of computers and computer 
programming, and to maintain at least one computer with its own 
server in his residence at 9414 Talisman Drive, Vienna, Virginia. 
There is thus probable cause to believe that in continuing espionage 
activities HANSSEN is using one or more computers (in addition to his 
Palm III device) and related disks, diskettes, and other equipment 
now located in his residence at 9414 Talisman Drive, Vienna, Virginia.

VIII. SPECIAL NEEDS AND JUSTIFICATION TO SEIZE COMPUTERS AND RELATED 
HARDWARE AND ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICES FOUND AT HANSSEN'S RESIDENCE 
FOR OFF-SITE EXAMINATION

175. As noted above, HANSSEN has a high degree of computer technology 
expertise. In addition, there is probable cause to believe that 
HANSSEN is using computers as an instrumentality of his espionage 
activities. This is evidenced by the letters to and from the KGB/SVR 
found on the computer memory card in his briefcase, and by the 
reference "ELLIS" on his Palm III device, as well as HANSSEN's 
extensive accessing of the FBI's ACS system for information relevant 
to his espionage activities. HANSSEN has at least one computer and a 
server in his residence at 9414 Talisman Drive, Vienna, Virginia, and 
a portable laptop computer. Because of the likelihood that HANSSEN 
will have extraordinary amounts of information and files in his 
computers (including laptops) and any computer storage devices and 
that such information may be encrypted, it will be neither practical 
nor reasonable to require the searching agents to examine the 
defendant's computers onsite at his residence. Given HANSSEN's 
computer expertise and concern about detection, there is considerable 
risk that HANSSEN has set up self-destruct programs for his computers 
that could erase vital evidence and files if his system or systems 
were examined by anyone other than experts. Accordingly, the FBI 
intends to seize those components of HANSSEN' s computer hardware and 
related equipment as the FBI determines must be seized in order to be 
examined in an appropriate location by Computer Analysis Response 
Team (CART) personnel. Seizing and disabling the defendant's computer 
hardware will also help prevent HANSSEN or any co-conspirators from 
seeking to erase any data on HANSSEN's computer system (including his 
server) from any remote location and through any special destructive 
program.

176. In addition, it is highly probable that HANSSEN has access to 
and has used the computers (including laptops) of family members 
residing in the same residence. Accordingly, he may be using these 
computers of family members to store or transmit or conceal 
classified information or other evidence of the espionage activity 
set forth in this affidavit. It will therefore be necessary to seize 
and examine the computer hardware and files within of family members. 
Such computers and files therein will be speedily returned to those 
family members if examination discloses that they have in fact no 
evidence or documents connected to the espionage activity described 
in this Affidavit.

IX. REQUEST FOR AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE SEARCH WARRANTS DURING NIGHTTIME HOURS

Based on my experience and the experience of other FBI Special Agents 
known to me, I am aware that persons who have committed serious 
felonies, particularly those felonies with authorized punishments of 
death or incarceration for any term of years or life, will often 
attempt to destroy evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of their 
crimes if alerted prematurely to law enforcement interest. I also 
know that foreign intelligence services, including the SVR, are able 
to communicate prearranged "danger" signals to their agents to alert 
them to destroy evidence, fruits and other instrumentalities of 
crime, as well as to execute emergency escape plans. I am also aware 
that these hostile foreign intelligence services, and in particular 
the SVR, actively seek to penetrate United States intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies by technical and human means to learn about 
FBI counterintelligence activities. As a result, law enforcement 
interest could be detected at any time and it may be necessary to 
execute a search warrant during night time hours to preserve 
evidence, fruits and instrumentalities of espionage from destruction.

In addition, it is noted that as a Special Agent of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, HANSSEN is authorized to carry a service 
weapon at all times, and he is known to have additional weapons in 
his residence, and may in his vehicles, that could pose an immediate 
danger and threat to any searching or arresting agents unless seized 
and secured as quickly as possible.

If the FBI is unsuccessful in apprehending HANSSEN immediately, he 
could return home during evening hours to destroy incriminating 
evidence, obtain a weapon and other items to assist his flight or 
evasion. In an undated letter to the KGB in November 1985, HANSSEN 
wrote: "Eventually I would appreciate an escape plan." HANSSEN 
currently carries his valid tourist passport in his briefcase. As 
noted above, the SVR has instructed HANSSEN to use a yellow tack in 
case of a "threatening situation", which could trigger an 
SVR-assisted escape, and he has recently possessed yellow tacks. It 
is highly likely that HANSSEN would have such an escape plan in place 
by 2001, and that authority to search at any time of the day or night 
would be essential to foil any such escape plan, especially if 
HANSSEN received warning from the SVR.

Finally, as noted above, much of the operational activity of the "B" 
operation occurred at night. Recently, HANSSEN was observed checking 
a known KGB/SVR signal site on several nighttime occasions in 
December 2000 and January and February. Accordingly, there is 
probable cause to believe that HANSSEN would go to the signal site or 
related dead drop site (both designated under the code name "ELLIS") 
at any time, and especially at night to avoid detection. Because an 
arrest of HANSSEN could well occur in the nighttime hours, and the 
searches should be conducted immediately upon his arrest, authority 
is requested to execute search warrants during nighttime hours.

X. CONCLUSION AS TO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH

177. Based on the above facts and circumstances, I believe there is 
probable cause that evidence, fruits, instrumentalities, and proceeds 
of espionage activity by ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN, in violation of Title 
18, United States Code, Section 794 (a) (Transmitting National 
Defense Information) and Section 794 (c) (Conspiracy to Commit 
Espionage), are located in:

1) The residence of ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN, such premises known and 
described as a single family residence located at:
9414 Talisman Drive Vienna, Virginia 22182

as more fully described in Attachment B, and which is within the 
Eastern District of Virginia;

2) One silver 1997 Ford Taurus, bearing VIN IFALP52U9VG211742 and 
Virginia license plate number ZCW9538, which is anticipated to be 
within the Eastern District of Virginia;

3) One 1993 Volkswagen van, bearing VIN WV2KC0706PH080424 and 
Virginia license plate number ZCW9537, which is anticipated to be 
within the Eastern District of Virginia;

4) One 1992 Isuzu Trooper, bearing VIN JACDH58W7N7903937 and Virginia 
license plate YRP3849, which is anticipated to be within the Eastern 
District of Virginia;

XI. WARRANTS REQUESTED

Based on all the foregoing, I respectfully request a warrant for the 
arrest of ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN, and search warrants for the 
locations described in the immediately foregoing Section of this 
Affidavit.

XII. ATTESTATION

The above facts are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

[signed]
Stefan A. Pluta
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Sworn and Subscribed to before me this 16th day of February, 2001.

[signed:] T.R. JOSEPH [?]
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE


ATTACHMENT A

1) Espionage paraphernalia, including devices designed to conceal and 
transmit national defense and classified intelligence information and 
material, and implements used by espionage agents to communicate with 
their handlers and with a foreign government, to wit: white tape, 
mailing tape, colored chalk (all used for signaling purposes), coded 
pads, secret writing paper, microdots, any letters, notes or other 
written communications (including contact instructions) between 
defendant ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN and any agents of the SVR or other 
intelligence service of the Russian Federation; any computers, 
(including laptops), computer disks, cameras, film, codes, telephone 
numbers, maps, photographs and other materials relating to 
communication procedures, correspondence;

2) Records, notes, calendars, journals, maps, instructions, and 
classified documents and other papers and documents relating to the 
transmittal of national defense and classified intelligence 
information (including the identities of foreign espionage agents and 
intelligence officers and other foreign assets or sources providing 
information to the United States Intelligence Community, such as the 
FBI and CIA; United States Government ledger notebooks in which the 
defendant ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN has notes pertaining to FBI foreign 
counterintelligence investigations; records of previous illicit 
espionage transactions, national defense and classified intelligence 
information, including copies of documents copied or downloaded by 
ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN from the FBI's Automated Case Support System 
(ACS), which is the FBI's computerized databases of investigative 
indices and files; FBI investigative serials; records receipts, 
.papers or documents reflecting financial accounts, where ROBERT 
PHILIP HANSSEN received payments from the KGB, SVR, or other agents 
of the Soviet Union or successor Russian Federation, records or 
documents reflecting the source and disposition of national defense 
and classified intelligence and counterintelligence information;

3) Large amounts of United States and foreign currency, financial 
instruments, precious metals, jewelry, and other items of value, 
which are the proceeds of or assets derived from illegal espionage 
transactions; any financial records of foreign and domestic bank 
accounts, including canceled checks, monthly statements, deposit 
slips, withdrawal slips, wire transfer requests and confirmations, 
account numbers, addresses, credit cards and credit card statements, 
financial and investment account records (including dividend records, 
stock transaction records), all reflecting illicit proceeds or wealth 
from multiple years of engaging in espionage for pay from the Soviet 
Union and successor Russian Federation and their intelligence 
services; records of such financial accounts and records in the 
possession or control of defendant ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN but in 
fictitious or alias names;

4) Passports, visas, calendars, date books, address books, credit 
card and hotel receipts, airline records, reflecting travel in 
furtherance of espionage activities, and any documents evidencing 
large cash expenditures derived from espionage activities;

5) Identity documents, including but not limited to passports, 
licenses, visas (including those in fictitious or alias identities), 
U.S. and foreign currency, instructions, maps, photographs, U.S. and 
foreign bank account access numbers and instructions and other papers 
and materials relating to emergency contact procedures and escape 
routes;

6) Safety deposit box records, including signature cards, bills, and 
payment records, safety deposit box keys, whether in the name of the 
defendant or a family member; any records pertaining to any 
commercial storage sites where the defendant may be storing other 
classified intelligence and counter-intelligence documents or other 
records of his espionage activities;

7) Federal, state and local tax returns, work sheets, W-2 forms, 1099 
forms, and any related schedules;

8) Records concerning real property purchases, sales, transfers, both 
within the United States and any foreign countries, including deeds, 
deeds of trust, land contracts, settlement statements, and mortgage 
documents, such records reflecting disposition of proceeds from and 
assets acquired from money paid to the defendant for his espionage on 
behalf of the Soviet Union, successor Russian Federation, and their 
intelligence services;

9) Telephone bills and records, including calling cards and pager records;

10) Photographs, including photographs of co-conspirators; 
correspondence (including envelopes) to and from ROBERT PHILIP 
HANSSEN and handlers, contacts and intelligence agents of the Soviet 
Union and successor Russian Federation;

11) Copies of applications, affidavits, search warrants, and returns 
filed with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), 
concerning current FBI foreign counterintelligence investigations and 
notes, reports and records pertaining to such investigations, 
including FBI requests for FISC authority;

12) Computer hardware, software, and storage media, known to be used 
by the defendant or to which he had access, including, but not 
limited to: any personal computer, laptop computer, modem, and 
server, which have been and are being used to commit the offenses of 
espionage and conspiracy to commit espionage; records, information 
and files contained within such computer hardware containing evidence 
and fruits of defendant's espionage activity between October 1, 1985, 
and the present, including classified documents, in whatever form and 
by whatever means they have been created or stored, including but not 
limited to any electrical, electronic, or magnetic form of storage 
device; floppy diskettes, hard disks, zip disks, CD-ROMs, optical 
discs, backup tapes, printer buffers, smart cards, memory 
calculators, pagers, personal digital assistants such as Palm III 
devices, removable hard drives, memory cards, zip drives, and any 
photographic forms of such records including microfilm, digital 
prints, slides, negatives, microfiche, photocopies, and videotapes, 
computer terminals and printers used by the defendant in said 
espionage activity.

ATTACHMENT B

9414 Talisman Drive, Vienna, Virginia, is the current residence of 
defendant ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN, and his family. This residence is a 
single family detached house, the closet street intersecting 9414 
Talisman Drive is McKinley Street. Talisman Drive ends in a cul de 
sac. It is further described as a wood multi-story building painted 
brown. This residence also includes an attached garage. 9414 Talisman 
Drive includes any appurtenances within the curtilege of this 
property, and any grounds, yard or woods constituting any part of the 
land upon which this residence is located.

ATTACHMENT C

One 1997 Ford Taurus four-door, silver in color, VIN 
#IFALP52U9VG211742, Virginia license tags ZCW9538, which is owned by, 
registered to, and used by ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN. It is anticipated 
that this vehicle will be located in the Eastern District of Virginia 
in the vicinity of 9414 Talisman Drive in Vienna, Virginia, or 
elsewhere in the Eastern District of Virginia.

ATTACHMENT D

One 1993 Volkswagen van, Vin #WV2KC0706PH080424, Virginia license 
tags ZCW9537, owned and used by ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN, and also used 
by his wife. It is anticipated that this vehicle will be located in 
the Eastern District of Virginia in the vicinity of 9414 Talisman 
Drive, Vienna, Virginia.

ATTACHMENT E

One 1992 Isuzu Trooper, VIN #JACDH58W7N7903937, Virginia license tags 
YRP3849. This vehicle is owned by, and possibly operated by ROBERT 
PHILIP HANSSEN. It is anticipated that this vehicle will be located 
in the Eastern District of Virginia in the vicinity of 9414 Talisman 
Drive, Vienna, Virginia.
-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
2556

From: Jordan Ulery <jordan@u...> 
Date: Thu Feb 22, 2001 11:47pm
Subject: Re; 518 #2
  
Andy's warning is almost too late in the US, and I am afraid that the
arrest of Hansen will encourage more restrictions on our open
government. One of the greatest threats to a democratic society is the
action of the government itself to "protect" the state and thus the
people therein. A democratic republic like the US can exist only if the
people support and participate in the operation of the state. Like the
former Speaker said, "all politics is local" and each citizen must be
involved in his town, county and state as well as the federal government
to make this, or any, society work.

A democracy, even a republic, like the US, must remain open. Open
meetings, open records and open government. When the records get
closed, then the government acts in a painfully secret manner and all
sorts of little liberties are taken away, in the name of "security,"
"protection." anti-terrorism," and the like. Eventually we have no
liberty at all. One of the penalties we pay for living in a free
society is that breaches occur. It is our duty to prevent the lapses
and maintain our own defenses.

The Founding Fathers knew this. To often we have heard the quotes of
"He who desire security of liberty deserves neither" and "the price of
liberty is eternal vigilance." Take those quotes into today's world
where you are bodily searched before going to court, before visiting a
federal building and now, in many places, before visiting state
offices. Yes, security is necessary, but it has to be balanced.

President Mgabe is making sure he is secure. Stalin and Hitler both
made sure they were secure. The first victim is access to government
records. The second is access to government. The final victim to
"security" is our very liberty to go and do as we please without undue
government interference, i.e., the definition of liberty offered by the
Supreme Court.

Consider, Washington State attempting to close court records to public
inspection. Maryland narrowly averting closure of court records. New
Hampshire attempting to set up a "Privacy Tzar" (neat phrase for the
Tzar of All the Russias was the head of a totalitarian government) that
would evaluate your request for public records to determine if your
really needed to view the records the government kept. The FTC making
regulations that directly countermand the wording of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act and intent of Congress. The FCRA itself which prevents an
employer from complying with preexisting harassment, equal opportunity
and discrimination laws without enormous effort. When government helps
crooks, thieves, and scam artist to hide, there is something very wrong
with its operation. Please note that I did not mention the more
sensational cases, until the last, which have only lead to even more
violence.

MHO
2557

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sat Feb 24, 2001 1:22am
Subject: Hints to alleged spy's identity reportedly in letters
  
Friday, February 23, 2001, 12:00 a.m. Pacific

Hints to alleged spy's identity reportedly in letters

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/WebObjects/SeattleTimes.woa/wa/gotoArticle?zsection_id=268448413&text_only=0&slug=spy23&document_id=134269364

by Karen Gullo
The Associated Press

WASHINGTON - Veteran FBI figure Robert Philip Hanssen left a trail of clues
that led authorities to arrest him and charge him with spying for Moscow,
say former co-workers and intelligence experts.

Russian documents and letters that Hanssen, a 20-year FBI countintelligence
agent accused of passing top-secret information to the Soviets and Russian
for 15 years, allegedly sent to his Soviet handlers contained hints of his
identity - from his code name "B" (Hanssen went by Bob) to using the name of
his hometown Chicago as a signal, these former associates said in
interviews.

FBI officials would not publicly discuss how they came to pinpoint Hanssen
as the agent whose alleged spying activities were detailed in internal
Russian documents they obtained.

"He increased his chances of getting caught" said Paul Moore, a former FBI
counterintelligence analyst who has known Hanssen for 20 years.

FBI officials have said that Hanssen's identity was not known to the
Soviets. The letters and documents about Hanssen refer to him as "B". But
these documents had details about the information that Hanssen was accused
of leaking, which the FBI could then use to narrow its search.

"They had a lot to work with," said Richard Alu, a retired FBI
counterintelligence agent who worked with Hanssen for several years.

The FBI said yesterday that tighter controls over top-secret documents, and
other improvements recommended after the Aldrich Ames spy case, helped it to
apprehend Hanssen. Ames was a longtime CIA officer convicted of spying for
the former Soviet Union.

Bureau management had been cautioned four years ago by the Justice
Department inspector general to enhance training and communications. The FBI
was criticized at the time by the Justice Department inspector general for
not doing enough to find out how Ames leaked sensitive information to the
Soviet Union. Ames pleaded guilty in 1994.

FBI spokesman John Collingwood said recommendations made in the inspector
general's 1997 report were implemented and had a direct bearing on the
arrest of Hanssen.

"The post-Ames focus on the possibility of additional compromises led
directly to the charges against Hanssen. Substantial resources and expertise
are being afforded to this effort," he said.

Nevertheless, Hanssen's spying went undetected for 15 years.

Moore said Hanssen was never polygraphed, which is done in cases of
suspicious behavior. The FBI has declined to comment on whether Hanssen took
the test. Not only that, Hanssen was meticulous about checking to see
whether the bureau was aware of his activities, FBI officials have said.



-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2558

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sat Feb 24, 2001 1:22am
Subject: Ex-FBI aides say accused spy took chances
  
Ex-FBI aides say accused spy took chances

http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/nation/831056

Associated Press

WASHINGTON -- Veteran FBI figure Robert Philip Hanssen left a trail of clues
that led authorities to arrest him and charge him with spying for Moscow,
say former co-workers and intelligence experts.

Former associates said Russian documents and letters that Hanssen allegedly
sent to his Soviet handlers contained hints of his identity -- from his code
name "B" (Hanssen went by Bob) to using the name of his hometown Chicago as
a signal.

FBI officials would not publicly discuss how they came to pinpoint Hanssen
as the agent whose alleged spying activities were detailed in internal
Russian documents they obtained.

But two former FBI counterintelligence agents who worked with Hanssen said
his letters and other evidence in the 100-page affidavit provided several
clues about what transpired.

"He increased his chances of getting caught" said Paul Moore, a former FBI
counterintelligence analyst who has known Hanssen for 20 years.

Moore said Hanssen was never polygraphed. The FBI has declined to comment on
whether Hanssen took the test. Hanssen also was meticulous about checking to
see whether the bureau was aware of his activities, FBI officials said.

They said Hanssen's identity was not known to the Russians. The letters and
documents about Hanssen refer to him as "B." But the files had details about
the information that Hanssen was accused of leaking, which the FBI could
then use to narrow its search.

"They had a lot to work with," said Richard Alu, a retired FBI
counterintelligence agent who worked with Hanssen.

On Thursday, FBI officials said tighter controls over top-secret files, and
other improvements recommended after the Aldrich Ames spy case, helped
apprehend Hanssen. The 20-year counterintelligence agent is accused of
passing secret information to the former Soviet Union and Russia for 15
years.

Four years ago, the Justice Department's inspector general cautioned FBI
officials to enhance training and communications.

At the time, the inspector general criticized the FBI for not doing enough
to find out how Ames leaked sensitive information to the Soviets. Ames
pleaded guilty in 1994.

FBI spokesman John Collingwood said recommendations made in the inspector
general's 1997 report were implemented and had a bearing on Hanssen's
arrest.

"The IG's recommendations were constructive and incorporated into the FBI's
counterespionage program," Collingwood said. "The post-Ames focus on the
possibility of additional compromises led directly to the charges against
Hanssen.

Despite the improvements, Hanssen's alleged espionage went undetected for 15
years.

Meanwhile, President Bush said he was "deeply concerned" about the case and
said he would wait for an independent review of internal FBI security
procedures to be completed before considering whether FBI agents should be
given routine polygraph tests.

"We ought to be concerned about espionage in America," Bush said at his
first news conference since his inauguration.

============================
AT A GLANCE
============================

ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/nation/831056

AGE-BIRTH DATE -- 56; April 18,1944.

EDUCATION -- M.B.A., accounting and information systems, Northwestern
University (1971); B.A., chemistry, Knox College, Galesburg, Ill. (1966).
Studied dentistry, Northwestern (1966-1968).

EXPERIENCE:
• Information Resources Division, FBI headquarters, January 2001-present.
• FBI's senior representative, Office of Foreign Missions, State Department,
Washington, February 1995-January 2001.
• National Security Division, FBI headquarters, December 1994-February 1995.
• Temporary assignment, Washington field office, April 1994-December 1994.
• Chief, National Security Threat List Unit, Intelligence Division, FBI
headquarters, January 1992-April 1994.
• Soviet Operations Section, Intelligence Division, FBI headquarters, July
1991-January 1992.
• Inspections Staff, FBI headquarters, June 1990-June 1991.
• Supervisory special agent; Soviet Analytical Unit, Intelligence Division,
FBI headquarters, August 1987-June 1990.
• Intelligence Division, New York City, September 1985-August 1987.
• Supervisory special agent, Intelligence Division, FBI headquarters,
January 1981-September 1985;
• Criminal and intelligence divisions, New York City, August 1978-January
1981;
• Joins FBI, assigned to offices in Indianapolis and Gary, Ind., January
1976-August 1978.
FAMILY -- Wife, Bernadette; six children.

Source: Associated Press

-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2559

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sat Feb 24, 2001 1:24am
Subject: It's a mole game to catch a spy
  
Friday February 23, 10:21 PM

It's a mole game to catch a spy

http://uk.news.yahoo.com/010223/80/b6g1y.html

By Tabassum Zakaria

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - It's a mole game -- Russians get secrets from an
American spy who apparently gets caught because of documents United States
obtained from inside Russian intelligence -- and around and around it goes.

The case of Robert Hanssen, a 25-year veteran of the FBI accused of selling
secrets to Russia for money and diamonds over 15 years, illustrates the
circle of treachery that has been played out through the ages.

Hanssen was arrested on Sunday on charges of selling secrets to Moscow,
including names of Soviets who spied for the United States.

His downfall came from original documents and letters of communication
between an American code-named "B" and "Ramon" and Russian handlers, which
were obtained by U.S. authorities.

U.S. officials have been extremely tight-lipped about how they obtained
those letters, which look almost like a case file, but they say those
documents point to Hanssen.

Intelligence experts say the source is obvious -- a Russian mole handed the
letters to the United States.

"This was a highly protected source, to penetrate and get hold of the files
related to this case was extremely difficult," Oleg Kalugin, a former
general in the Soviet spy agency KGB, told Reuters.

But he said it was clear the letters came from "a source inside the Russian
intelligence service, that's too obvious."

Kalugin, who left the KGB in 1990 and moved to the United States in 1995,
said the documents about the American spy could have been handed over by a
Russian defector.

The Russians probably know who the mole is, he said. "With the very narrow
circle of people who had access to the Hanssen files, maybe it would be not
that difficult to find him," he added.

Each side probably patted themselves on the back at various points in this
case -- the Russians at finding out they allegedly penetrated the FBI and
the Americans for apparently catching the spy, Kalugin said.

"The FBI was always considered the toughest target to penetrate," he said.
"The easiest was the Defense Department."

"This is why the penetration of this calibre is really a spectacular feat
for the Soviet, Russian intelligence," Kalugin said. "On the other hand the
fact that he was exposed ... is another spectacular feat for the FBI, CIA."

"THERE WILL ALWAYS BE MOLES"

Former CIA Director Robert Gates said moles were always going to be a fact
of life in governments.

"There will always be a tiny number who betray the trust," he said in an
opinion piece in The New York Times on Friday.

"There will always be moles because governments will always want to know
what other governments are up to," he wrote.

U.S. investigators had been on a mole hunt for a second spy who was leaking
secrets to Moscow after catching Aldrich Ames in 1994. Ames, a CIA officer,
was later convicted of spying for the Soviet Union until its 1991 demise and
then for Russia.

The hunt for the second spy went on for years because investigators were
convinced that Ames could not account for all the information Moscow
appeared to have received.

"When we were looking for Ames, we didn't know we were looking for two
people," said Paul Redmond, a former CIA official who led the hunt that
caught Ames.

Redmond, who left CIA in 1997, had headed the spy agency's
Counterintelligence Centre established in April 1988.

Redmond said some of the signs pointing to a mole were when someone had too
much money, was an outcast, hated the boss, had marital troubles, drank
excessively, was narcissistic, gambled, and was very curious about others'
classified work.

Kalugin said Hanssen's characteristics were those of a "nearly perfect spy"
who would go undetected.

"With his devout Catholicism, with a large family, with the modest ways of
life, with no money spent in a visible way, and keeping a low profile,"
Kalugin said.

Federal law enforcement officials said Hanssen was never given a polygraph,
but neither were most agents who started when he did.

Since the mid-1990s, all prospective FBI employees and agents working on
sensitive cases are given a polygraph.

An investigation by former CIA and FBI Director William Webster into the
security breach will look at whether a more rigorous polygraph policy at the
FBI is necessary.

At the CIA all new employees are given polygraphs before they are hired,
most are again tested after about three years, and again after about a
five-year interval, CIA spokesman Bill Harlow said. There are also random
polygraphs.

"It's a useful tool, it's not a perfect tool, it has a deterrent effect," he
said.
-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2560

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sat Feb 24, 2001 1:25am
Subject: For Hanssen, tips that helped Clinton come in from the cold
  
For Hanssen, tips that helped Clinton come in from the cold

http://cgi.usatoday.com/usatonline/20010223/3091123s.htm

By Walter Shapiro


The fine print first: This column does not condone spying for a foreign
power. This column does not intend to suggest that Bill Clinton or anyone
who ever worked for him condones such espionage. This column recognizes that
the charges against Robert Philip Hanssen have not been proven in a court of
law. This column uses only natural ingredients, though political coloring
has been added. And everything you're about to read has been certified as
100% imaginary.

To: Robert Philip Hanssen

From: A friend, aka Ramon2

Subject: Your public relations problems

For eight years, I served in the upper reaches of the Clinton White House,
helping the president and first lady escape scrapes that make your legal
predicament seem like kiddie-league soccer. Although I am no longer in a
position to help you arrange a presidential pardon, I can offer you some
time-tested PR tricks that will transform your image from front-page felon
facing the death penalty to the sympathetic victim of a witch hunt.

You surely can understand why I prefer to keep my identity secret. I am
sending you this get-acquainted memo as a public good-will offering. If you
find my advice as useful as President Clinton did, we can make payment
arrangements later. I understand you prefer used $100 bills in black garbage
bags.

Your attorney, Plato Cacheris, is a renowned Washington lawyer, but he is
woefully behind the times when it comes to spin. I heard him say on ABC,
''It's a serious matter. An FBI agent was charged with espionage, and we'll
have to see -- we'll have to see what the quality of the case is.'' Do you
really believe that if President Clinton had mounted such a lame ''we'll
have to see'' defense, he would have survived impeachment?

Now, for the patented escape tricks that saved a presidency:

* The war room. Get a half-dozen friends (former FBI colleagues would be
ideal) to hit TV the way Russian troops hit Chechnya. Armed with daily
talking points, they'll mount a defense on shows from Today to Nightline.

* The money trap. Did you notice what the Clintons did when confronted with
reports that Hillary's brother, Hugh Rodham, had received $400,000 to help
arrange two pardons? They made him give the money back. No money, no quid
pro quo. If you eliminate greed as a motive, any conduct can be made to
appear defensible.

Let's assume you still have most of the $600,000 in cash and diamonds that
your Russian paymasters allegedly gave you. Immediately FedEx the loot to
Vladimir Putin with an apologetic note saying that you just discovered it
while renovating an upstairs bathroom.

* The conspiracy. You need one to properly cast yourself as a victim. The
details can be as vague as Hillary's ''vast right-wing conspiracy.''

So whose shadowy hand has been orchestrating these diabolical charges? A
pulp novelist like Robert Ludlum might concoct a band of rogue FBI agents
determined to bring back the Cold War. But a more up-to-date ploy is to have
your TV spokesmen suggest that a cabal of militarists in Beijing is out to
torpedo your selfless efforts to bring about true rapprochement between
Russia and America.

* Everybody does it. This has been the trademark Clinton defense. You
instinctively grasped its possibilities by expressing in your Moscow
missives your boyhood admiration for legendary British double agent Kim
Philby. Have your spin team wax patriotic by reminding viewers that spying
is part of the great American free-enterprise tradition dating back to
Benedict Arnold.

* Make the scandal bipartisan. If the prosecutors are to be believed, you
were politically even-handed in your espionage efforts, spying under
Republican and Democratic presidents. Congratulations on your cleverness.
This means that both parties are likely to tread carefully for fear of being
blamed for not uncovering your double-agent artistry.

* Name-drop shamelessly. Who had just become the Russian leader in 1985,
when you first donated your services to the cause of world peace? Nobel
Prize winner Mikhail Gorbachev, who deserves major credit for ending the
Cold War. So make sure that your defense team mentions Gorbachev and Ronald
Reagan (you've got to get the conservatives on your side) in every
interview.

But we still have the pesky problem of why you reportedly halted your
creative efforts for a few years, only to resume them in 1999. What was your
motivation? Just say that you were inspired by watching the backhand -- and,
let's face it, short skirts -- of Russian tennis phenom Anna Kournikova.

A long shot: Have you, like Marc Rich, ever done anything for Israel?

Finally, a word to the wise: Negative terminology like ''spying'' and
''treason'' can be as fatal (and I don't use that word lightly) as ascribing
the wrong meaning to the verb ''is.'' Use softer, more caring language to
describe your activities. Phrases like ''creating a level playing field''
and ''information sharing'' scored particularly well with focus groups.

That's it for now. Got to run. Saddam Hussein's people are on the other
line.

-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2561

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sat Feb 24, 2001 1:27am
Subject: Spy in FBI rightly alarms officials
  
Spy in FBI rightly alarms officials

http://cgi.usatoday.com/usatonline/20010223/3091099s.htm

The Times-Picayune, New Orleans, in an editorial: ''Tuesday's announcement
by FBI officials that one of their own agents had spied for Russia for 15
years is frightening, because (Robert Phillip Hanssen's) alleged crimes have
the potential to cause great damage to the United States. . . . To be sure,
Hanssen is entitled to fight any charges against him. And as the disastrous
investigation into nuclear scientist Wen Ho Lee showed, government agencies
sometimes do make accusations that turn out to be false. But officials are
correct to be alarmed at Hanssen's arrest and to promise a thorough and
complete investigation.''

The Hartford (Conn.) Courant in an editorial: ''No one should be shocked
that the United States and other countries engage in spying. They do it in
peacetime as well as during wars. Friends spy on friends. Even after the end
of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow and Washington keep
tabs on each other clandestinely. But treason is another matter. . . . If
Hanssen is found guilty, he should spend the rest of his life in prison.''

Brian Jenkins, a senior adviser to the president of Rand Corp., in a column
for the Los Angeles Times: ''Why do spies spy? Research shows that the
motives are mostly personal, tawdry and banal and mainly involve money. What
is interesting is how cheaply spies sell themselves. . . . (Hanssen)
reportedly received $1.4 million during 15 years. If true, he bargained
better than most. . . . Most spies are traitors . . . (but) only a few
betray their country. Many betray the companies they work for. Corporate
loyalties are thin these days.''

Atlanta Journal and Constitution in an editorial: ''The unveiling of
Hanssen's treachery, while disturbing, does not strike the terror it would
have had he been caught soon after he embarked upon it in the mid-1980s.
Then, the Soviet Union had been dubbed the 'evil empire' by the Star
Wars-inspired President Reagan, and the tensions between the two countries
were high. Since then, our relations with Russia have improved greatly, but
these days again seem shaky. Indeed, this episode shows the urgency, not
just of improving FBI security, but also of maintaining a balanced
relationship with Russia that keeps the stakes of our inevitable mutual
espionage low.''

The Courier-Journal, Louisville, in an editorial: ''There's no reason for
Americans to be shocked that Russia still conducts vigorous espionage
operations against the U.S. We do the same to Russia. In fact, the damage
that Hanssen allegedly did . . . was done mostly to our efforts to penetrate
. . . Russian secret services. What is shocking, or at least profoundly
disappointing, is that someone in Hanssen's position could be recruited by
the Russians and could elude detection for 15 years.''

Daniel Schorr, news analyst, All Things Considered, National Public Radio:
''What strikes me about the Hanssen spy case is the banality and the
grandiosity. The banal quality was greed. . . . The spies of the wartime and
early Cold War era . . . were moved less by money than ideology, the
conviction that communism offered a better way. . . . Then there was the
grandiosity, the Walter Mitty quality . . . this quiet, churchgoing,
suburban father of six leading the secret life of a master spy that their
neighbors would marvel at, had they only known, which, of course, they
couldn't because he was so clever. . . . The question is how the
intelligence community will recover from this disaster of almost
unprecedented proportions . . . (and) tighten security without strangling
intelligence.''

Dale McFeatters in a column for Scripps Howard News Service: ''The FBI has
asked William Webster, who has headed both the FBI and CIA, to undertake a
thorough overhaul of its security procedures. . . . Webster will undoubtedly
come up with numerous useful recommendations to repair defects in the FBI's
security. Repairing defects in the human heart will be harder.'' What people
are saying about an alleged spy for Russians
-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2562

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sat Feb 24, 2001 1:34am
Subject: FBI Is Faulted for Failing to Heed Calls for Frequent Polygraph Tests
  
FBI Is Faulted for Failing to Heed Calls for Frequent Polygraph Tests

http://www.iht.com/articles/11533.html

David A. Vise and Dan Eggen Washington Post Service

WASHINGTON The FBI failed to heed a series of blunt warnings to adopt
security measures that might have allowed agents to detect the kind of
espionage that Robert Hanssen allegedly conducted for much of the past 15
years, according to government officials.
.
Congressional panels, interagency task forces and the Justice Department's
inspector general repeatedly warned the FBI that it needed to subject agents
to more frequent lie detector tests, increase their financial disclosure and
impose tighter controls on the dissemination of classified documents.
.
But many of these proposals were rejected by FBI leaders on the grounds that
they could harm the bureau's culture of trust among agents and hamper the
recruitment of talented individuals, according to FBI officials and experts
on espionage.
.
As a result, intelligence experts said, the agency responsible for rooting
out spies in the U.S. government was unable to uncover a high-level mole in
its own midst: Mr. Hanssen himself was not polygraphed as he rose through
the ranks during 25 years at the FBI because the FBI's procedures do not
require it, officials said Wednesday.
.
Until recently, the FBI had largely escaped criticism while other federal
agencies, particularly the Departments of State and Energy, have come under
intense scrutiny from Congress for alleged inattention to security.
.
Now, the Hanssen case has put the focus on the FBI itself, and the bureau
may have to make the kind of changes - such as widespread polygraphing -
that have been adopted by the CIA and other agencies, former bureau
officials said.
.
Many of the suggestions for tightening security at the FBI were made after
1994, in the wake of the Aldrich Ames spy case, which prompted the CIA to
overhaul its procedures after Mr. Ames, a CIA operative, pleaded guilty to
spying for the Soviet Union.
.
The FBI has "a history of being fiercely resistant to change or to any
oversight from outside," a former Justice Department official said. "They
always say they're capable of keeping their own house in order. That was
obviously not the case here."
.
Mr. Hanssen, 56, was arrested Sunday night as he attempted to deliver a
trash bag full of highly classified documents, officials said. He was
charged with spying for Moscow in return for $1.4 million in cash, diamonds
and deposits in a Russian bank.
.
His activities contributed to the execution of two Russian agents who had
been working for U.S. intelligence, officials said.
.
While Mr. Hanssen was so skilled in counterintelligence and other techniques
that it may have been virtually impossible to prevent his determined efforts
to allegedly sell information to the Russians, officials and experts sifting
through the damage are disturbed that it could have gone undetected for so
long.
.
While the FBI's director, Louis Freeh, has said that there are legitimate
arguments in favor of polygraphs, he and other bureau officials have
specifically opposed the widespread use of lie detector tests because they
believe inaccuracies and inconclusive results may create more problems than
they solve.
.
But security experts argue that the mere threat of undergoing lie detector
tests has a valuable deterrent effect against spying and that the results
can be used as one of many tools in a screening process to prevent
betrayal.A former FBI director, William Webster, who will lead an inquiry
into the agency's security measures, said in an interview that the spy case
"highlights very clearly" the debate over whether the FBI needs to use lie
detector tests more aggressively on both a random and routine basis.
.
Under FBI procedures, polygraphs are conducted on all new agents and other
employees. They are also used in certain cases when agents are given access
to sensitive information about a secret program or criminal case.
.
The FBI performs background reinvestigations of all employees every five
years, and uses lie detector tests only in those instances when there is an
unexplained anomaly.
.
Internal security experts at the FBI have been unable to suggest how to
address the problems with polygraph testing in a way that would not force
the bureau to sideline valued supervisors and agents who have polygraph
results that cannot be explained.
.
The CIA, after implementing polygraphs to tighten security, has numerous
employees who essentially have been idled because of inconclusive results.
.
Senator Bob Graham, the Florida Democrat who is a ranking member of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said his panel would hold a hearing
next Wednesday in part to probe how the FBI is monitoring the finances,
lifestyles and truthfulness of its employees. Routine polygraphs may be
necessary, he said, "when you're dealing with this level of sensitiveness."
.
Mr. Webster's panel will examine whether the FBI's antiquated computer
systems and its rules governing access to sensitive information played a
direct role in allowing Mr. Hanssen to turn over state secrets. For years,
in a bid to deter such behavior, the Russians used a strict document control
system that required agents and intelligence officers to identify themselves
whenever they accessed top-secret information.
.
NBC Delayed Broadcasting Spy Report
.
A senior NBC executive said the television network held the story about Mr.
Hannsen's arrest for more than 12 hours at the FBI's request, The Associated
Press reported on Wednesday from New York.
.
The FBI feared that the release of the story would spoil a stakeout Monday
aimed at catching the FBI agent's alleged Russian contacts. As it turned
out, no one attempted to retrieve a parcel at the stakeout. NBC broke the
story Tuesday morning.

-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
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=======================================================================
2563

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sat Feb 24, 2001 1:36am
Subject: When No One Watches the Spooks
  
When No One Watches the Spooks

http://www.iht.com/articles/11445.html

William Safire The New York Times

WASHINGTON "Sorry about the handwriting," my linguistic source at the
Allenwood Federal Penitentiary in White Deer, Pennsylvania, writes. "The
Bureau of Prisons has a dinosaurian paranoia about typewriters, word
processors and just about any writing tools beyond pencils and ballpoints,
universally called 'ink pins.'"
.
My correspondent is Aldrich Ames, the American who spent nine years as a
mole inside the CIA, paid by the Soviet Union to finger American spies in
the Kremlin. His espionage led to the execution of a dozen U.S. sources. Two
of those deadly fingerings, we are now told by the FBI, were confirmed by
information provided to the KGB by Robert Philip Hanssen, who was arrested
this week in what was said to be a secrets-for-cash transaction.
.
As a high-level FBI counterspy, Mr. Hanssen was privy to identities of some
U.S. spies and was in a position to warn a fellow Soviet agent when U.S.
counterintelligence was about to close in on him. But apparently someone
inside the KGB did to him in the United States what Mr. Ames and he had long
done to American agents in Russia - tipped off the other side. The accused
turncoat Hanssen is represented by the Washington superlawyer Plato
Cacheris, whose other famous clients include Mr. Ames and Monica Lewinsky.
(Monica is not a spy.) Through Plato, I wrote to "Rick" Ames in my capacity
of language maven, seeking definitions of spookspeak terms. CIA censorship
delayed his answer, but the recent arrest of a man suspected to be his
fellow mole adds piquancy to his reply.
.
Mr. Ames claims that his confession was coerced by prosecutors who
threatened to jail his wife. "The target often (usually, when the pressure
is sufficient) simply tells his interrogators what they want to hear, true
or false. And of course, that's what I did - most everything the FBI and CIA
wanted to hear from me I told them, a wonderful mixture of fact and mutually
agreed-upon fantasy." The convicted spy adds: "A few government officials -
no one in the FBI or the DOJ [Department of Justice], I think - knew some of
the truth about my relations with the KGB and the SVR [Russian successor to
the Soviet KGB], but they've remained silent." I take this as an attempt by
Mr. Ames to cast suspicion on former CIA colleagues.
.
Mr. Hanssen, like Mr. Ames, may cut a deal with prosecutors leery of
revealing too many secrets in court. He will presumably offer to detail the
extent of damage to U.S. security in return for an escape from the death
penalty, which, if guilty of complicity in the killing of U.S. agents, he
would richly deserve.
.
The FBI cannot be pleased that Mr. Hanssen's prosecutor is Randy Bellows, an
assistant U.S. attorney in Alexandria, Virginia. His still secret 800-page,
four-volume report on the Wen Ho Lee investigation does not absolve the
wrongdoer but, I am told, excoriates Reno Justice's obfuscatory procedures
and the FBI's botching of the case.
.
So now it appears that the Russians have had two moles in place since the
mid-'80s: Mr. Ames inside the CIA, Mr. Hanssen allegedly inside the FBI.
Vladimir Putin can claim a KGB triumph; U.S. counterintelligence failed.
.
That sardonic laughter you hear from on high is that of the late James Jesus
Angleton. America's great counterspy and orchid cultivator of the 1960s and
'70s may have tromped on the toes of colleagues with his unrelenting
suspicions, but he kept the CIA mole-free. He was driven from office by an
intelligence bureaucracy and a miffed media that vilified his vigilance as
"sick think."
.
I had asked my spookspeak source, Rick Ames, about that phrase. "It was
used, and stuck," he writes, "as a description of Jim Angleton's 'monster
plot,' theories which infected the intelligence community for a number of
years. The monster plot was virtually groundless, irrational, and had all
the earmarks of paranoid delusion."
.
The intelligence barn door will now be slammed shut with belated promises of
computer surveillance and self-deluding lie detectors. What is needed
instead is a touch of well-placed paranoia in the minds of the defenders of
national secrets. The real "sick think" is complacency.

-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2564

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sat Feb 24, 2001 1:37am
Subject: Analysis: U.S. may seek accused spy's cooperation
  
Analysis: U.S. may seek accused spy's cooperation

http://www.vny.com/cf/News/upidetail.cfm?QID=162200

Thursday, 22 February 2001 13:40 (ET)


Analysis: U.S. may seek accused spy's cooperation
By MICHAEL KIRKLAND, UPI Legal Affairs Correspondent

WASHINGTON, Feb. 22 (UPI) -- Accused FBI traitor Robert P. Hanssen may not
face the death penalty even if convicted in what officials are calling one
of the most damaging spy cases in U.S. history.

Like CIA traitor Aldrich Ames, Hanssen had access to some of the most
guarded information in the U.S. intelligence community. Also like Ames, U.S.
investigators may be far more interested in repairing the damage allegedly
caused by Hanssen than in seeking his life.

A 32-year veteran of the CIA, Ames was arrested by an FBI team in Northern
Virginia in 1994. He was accused of working for Moscow, beginning in 1985.
In exchange for money, Ames betrayed vital U.S. assets in Russia. At least
10, possibly as many as 15, Russians working covertly for the United States
were executed.

Until his arrest in Northern Virginia Monday night, Hanssen, like Ames,
worked in counter-intelligence and was tasked with defending the United
States from foreign espionage. Like Ames, Hanssen is accused of beginning to
work for the Soviets in 1985. The FBI alleges that Hanssen, a 27-year
veteran of the bureau, supplied information to the Russians that confirmed
Moscow's suspicions of at least three of Ames's victims.

Like Ames, Hanssen allegedly operated for years within the shadowy world
of clandestine operations, selling out his country in a cynical exchange for
money, before he was detected and arrested.

Finally, like Ames, Hanssen is represented by one of the best courtroom
lawyers in Washington, Plato Cacheris, who helped Ames avoid the death
penalty in exchange for a guilty plea and complete cooperation with U.S.
investigators.

The U.S. intelligence community had good reason to seek Ames's
cooperation. Without it, U.S. officials may never have known the extent of
the damage he caused.

In 1995, the CIA assessed the aftermath of the Ames case. The agency
concluded that Ames not only betrayed Russians working for the United
States, he revealed information that made this country more vulnerable to
Russian espionage operations. The CIA found that of more than 900 human
intelligence reports made available to U.S. centers of policy -- including
the Oval Office -- from 1985 to 1994, a "disturbingly high percentage" came
from agents controlled by the KGB and its successor agency, the SVR.

The extent of the damage allegedly caused by Hanssen, if he is indeed
proved to be a traitor, is still to be assessed.

But former associates who have talked to the media in the wake of
Hanssen's arrest have said that his access to secrets was extremely broad.
The news reports have not been well-received at the FBI, where Director
Louis Freeh has clamped down on contacts with the media.

Hanssen is said to have had access to U.S. intelligence secrets across the
board, from the CIA and the National Security Agency as well as the FBI. The
potential for damage, if Hanssen is proven guilty, is even greater than that
posed by Ames's betrayal.

The need to identify, contain and repair that damage may lead U.S.
prosecutors to offer Hanssen the same deal that was offered Ames -- no death
penalty in exchange for life imprisonment and complete honesty about his
operations.

A decision on whether to seek the death penalty for Hanssen may not come
for some time. President George W. Bush still has to name a U.S. attorney
for the Eastern District of Virginia, where the former FBI official is being
detained and would eventually be tried.

The U.S. attorney ultimately must decide whether to seek the death
penalty, a decision that by law must be ratified by Attorney General John
Ashcroft.
--
Copyright 2001 by United Press International.
All rights reserved.
--

-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2565

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sat Feb 24, 2001 1:37am
Subject: Analysis: FBI spy was in Pope task force
  
Analysis: FBI spy was in Pope task force

http://www.vny.com/cf/News/upidetail.cfm?QID=162346

Thursday, 22 February 2001 20:10 (ET)


Analysis: FBI spy was in Pope task force
By UWE SIEMON-NETTO, UPI Religion Correspondent

WASHINGTON, Feb. 22 (UPI) -- Meet the threefold enigmatic man: FBI agent,
alleged Soviet spy, and member of the "pope's taskforce," Opus Dei, a
discreet, wealthy, very conservative and extraordinarily powerful Catholic
prelature.

Was it with ill intent that Robert P. Hanssen had wormed himself into this
tightly structured and growing organization, whose Latin name means Work of
God? Did he believe in its stated goal to "spread the ideal of holiness in
the middle of the world?" Or did he join it as a cover?

Was he professionally curious about some of Opus Dei's alleged activities,
such as supporting Lech Walesa's Solidarity union in an effort to undermine
Poland's communist regime?

Because of its circumspect nature and its discipline, Opus Dei's very name
evokes wild allegations.

At one point the Italian media with its knack for publishing
unsubstantiated charges insinuated its complicity in the sudden death of the
33-day Pope John Paul I in 1978.

Doubtless, among Opus Dei's 84,000 members worldwide are very powerful
personalities. FBI director Louis Freeh, Hanssen's former boss, is
understood to be one, as are members of the political and social
establishment in many Western countries and Latin America, politicians,
professors, journalists, artists and generals.

Left-wing and liberal groups tend to loathe it. In an Internet article,
Catholics for Choice called Opus Dei "one of the most...reactionary
organizations in the Roman Catholic church today."

They singled out its opposition to abortion. "Opus Dei works in
partnership with the Vatican in international events such as the United
Nations conferences on population in Cairo in 1994." On that occasion, the
Vatican teamed up with the Muslims to squash a Clinton administration
attempt to have a woman's right to an abortion declared a global human
right.

In truth, though, Opus Dei is the church's only "floating diocese" to
which some of the world's most committed Catholics belong -- and even some
Protestants, who are not official members. They just work for and pray with
the organization's men and women.

Opus Dei, which has its spectacularly beautiful headquarters in Rome, is a
newcomer to the Vatican's ancient power structure. It was founded in 1928 by
Josemaria Escriva, a Spanish priest who later became its first bishop.

There is no question that Opus Dei's goals are closely related to those of
the Christian renewal ideas Pope John Paul II has been expounding since the
very beginning of his pontificate. Its members commit themselves to leading
an authentically Christian life in the secular world.

"The mission of Opus Dei is to promote among Christians of all social
classes a life in the middle of the world consistent with their faith and to
contribute to the evangelization of every sphere of society," states the
organization's mission description.

"In short, it is to spread the message that all the baptized are called to
seek holiness and make the Gospel known. This same message was the core of
the Second Vatican Council."

"In order to achieve this aim, the Prelature provides for the spiritual,
educational, and pastoral care of its faithful and offers help to many other
persons, each one in his or her own state in life, profession and situation
of the world."

These goals may not be the preferred flavor of postmodernity, but they are
Biblical. In its pronouncements, Opus Dei never ceases to point to the core
of the Gospel as the foundation for a Christian life: Scriptural texts
stressing Christ's promise to make his followers children of God.

The text most frequently quoted by the Prelature reads, "But to all who
received Him, who believed in His name, he gave power to become the children
of God" (John 1:12).

The organization has three kinds of members. There are some 2,000 priests
organized in a brotherhood -- the Holy Cross Society. The lay members
consist of celibates and non-celibates who join not by giving vows but by
signing contracts that can only be broken with the permission of the
prelate-general (bishop), to whom all must promise obedience.

Opus Dei's regulations are strict. Everybody must report his or her
personal and professional activities once a week to a "director." Confessing
once a week to a priest belonging to the organization is mandatory. All
members attend mass daily.

If they are married, they are asked to send their children to Opus Dei
schools, which the organization's detractors accuse of being recruitment
centers. To become a member, a young woman or man must be at least 18.

Opus Dei's determination to have authentic Christians "sanctify the world"
and permeate "all activities and temporal realities with the sprit of the
Gospel" lies, of course, at the root of its hostile reception from groups
with limited interest in holiness.

It is in line with the pope's prayers for the world and out of line with
deconstructionists trying to keep faith out of the public square. Hence,
Opus Dei is a shock force in the front lines of today's culture wars -- and
a target of constant attack.

How and why did the enigmatic Robert Hanssen place himself squarely in
these trenches? This is a fascinating topic to speculate about. But the
answer seems very elusive at this point.


--
Copyright 2001 by United Press International.
All rights reserved.
--
-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2566

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sat Feb 24, 2001 1:39am
Subject: US Department Of State May Declare Some Russian Diplomats "Persona Non Grata"
  
Updated 22.02.2001 at 19:21:16

US Department Of State May Declare Some Russian Diplomats "Persona Non Grata"

http://allnews.ru/english/2001/02/22/deportation/

Richard Boucher, an official spokesman for the US Department of State,
answering a question of a RIA Novosti correspondent at a press conference in
Washington on Wednesday, said some Russian diplomats might be expelled from
the USA in connection with Hanssen's case.
According to Boucher, the issue might be considered in the near future. Some
names of Russian diplomats are mentioned in documents handed over to the
court under Hanssen's case.

FBI agent Robert Philip Hanssen has been arrested in Washington on suspicion
of spying for Russia during the past fifteen years. Hanssen became suspected
of spying for Russia after an internal intelligence audit had revealed the
presence of a mole in the FBI. Later American intelligence obtained some
Russian documents, which confirmed their suspects.

Before the arrest Hanssen had been working in FBI headquarters in
Washington. His task was performing surveillance on Russian Embassy and
Russian government missions in New-York.

Russia refrains from making official comments on Hanssen's arrest and his
possible relation with Russian intelligence.

-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2567

From: Steve Whitehead <sceptre@m...> 
Date: Thu Feb 22, 2001 10:25am
Subject: Liberian 'spy' journalists jailed
  
Monrovia, Liberia - Authorities have jailed four journalists with an independent newspaper seen as critical of President Charles Taylor, accusing them of espionage. 
The men, three top editors and a senior reporter from The News, were arrested late on Wednesday, a few hours after the newspaper published a report saying the government was spending $50 000 on helicopter parts - noting that civil servants had not been paid in more than four months. 

The News report, quoting what it called "authentic documents", gave few details, though the government has at least three helicopters used for military operations. 

While the report did not mention military activity, the writ of arrest said "the intent of the paper was to reveal national defence information to foreign powers", and accused the men of espionage. 

A government statement later linked the report to the stand-off between Liberia and neighbouring Guinea. The two nations have seen their relations disintegrate over the past couple of years and have traded accusations over backing cross-border raids that have turned their frontier area into a combat zone. 

The Press Union of Liberia, the umbrella organisation for Liberian journalists, issued a statement saying it would be closely watching for the proceedings. 

The four arrested men are editor-in-chief Abdulai Dukuly, managing editor Joseph Bartuah, news editor Jerome Dalieh and Bobby Tapson, a senior reporter. Their newspaper is seen in government circles as critical of Taylor. 

Taylor, a powerful warlord in Liberia's 1989-1996 civil war, is highly sensitive to criticism and has long had strained relations with journalists. In August, his government arrested a British television crew and accused its members of spying. The journalists were released after heavy international pressure. - Sapa-AP 



http://www.news24.co.za/News24/Africa/West_Africa/0,1113,2-11-998_985438,00.html


Steve Whitehead Managing Member
TSCM Services cc
Tel (012) 664-3157 Fax (012) 664-3180 International (+2712)
URL http://www.tscm.co.za 
E-mail sceptre@m...
P O Box 16063, Lyttelton, 0140, Centurion, South Africa


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
2568

From: e cummings <bernies@n...> 
Date: Fri Feb 23, 2001 4:55pm
Subject: Accused spy Robert Hanssen web page and usenet postings
  
one can view this (now retired) FBI double-agent's website at:
http://members.home.net/tim.meehan/

hanssen's usenet postings under can be viewed in google's usenet archives 
(currently in beta) at http://groups.google.com
according to google, hanssen@o... posted to the following groups:

comp.sys.laptops
comp.sys.palmtops.pilot
alt.comp.sys.palmtops.pilot

one FBI affidavit alleges he planned to smuggle classified documents out of 
FBI headquarters in his Palm computing device...

-bernieS
2569

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sat Feb 24, 2001 8:40pm
Subject: Contemptuous Philby Laid a Fool's Trail
  
Contemptuous Philby Laid a Fool's Trail

http://www.latimes.com/news/comment/20010222/t000015886.html

By VERNE W. NEWTON

"I decided on this course when I was 14 years old. I'd read Philby's
book. Now that is insane, eh!"
--Robert Philip Hanssen

* * *

If you're 14 and you picked Kim Philby for a role model, you lose. But
according to information filed by the FBI, that is just what Robert Philip
Hanssen, the agent arrested Tuesday, claims he did after reading Philby's
"My Silent War."
Philby, like Hanssen a highly trusted senior intelligence official, was
recruited as a spy by the Soviet Union even before he entered MI6, Britain's
CIA. He had climbed to nearly the pinnacle of MI6 before being brought down
by the defections to Moscow of Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess, both of whom
he knew well at Cambridge University, both of whom worked for the Foreign
Office, and both of whom were also Soviet spies.
That was in 1951. Philby was forced out of MI6 and lived a shadowy life
as a journalist and probably as a retainer to his loyal MI6 friends. But in
1963 the walls were about to close on him, and Philby too escaped to Moscow.
His book, written under the supervision of his Soviet paymasters, was
largely a work of propaganda in which he glamorized the life of a man whose
every waking moment was a lie. He had to manage his lies not only to his
professional colleagues but to his friends and his family.
Philby insisted he did all this because he was an anti-fascist or
because he believed in the redistribution of wealth. But these defenses fall
flat. Between the lines, and drawing on his well-documented life, it is
clear that ideology had nothing to do with his choice. The question, after
all, was never why Philby spied for the Soviets, but why they chose him over
the many alienated Cambridge students in the 1930s who were eager to serve
their idealized notion of the U.S.S.R., rather than the decadent British
society.
What Soviet recruiters saw in Philby was not an ideologue, because he
wasn't one. Nor was he a passionate advocate for social justice, nor did he
recite the Marxist catechism. Rather, they saw a weak man of few convictions
who needed to become a robot in a rigid system with none of the
responsibilities of a pluralistic society.
They also saw in Philby a man who was drawn to conspiratorial
relationships. Cambridge University was well-known for its secret societies,
and a number of Soviet spies were Apostles, the most elite of the secret
societies (almost none came from Oxford, a more open school that thought
Cambridge's secret societies were infantile).
Philby's hunger for conspiratorial relationships was sated by the
Soviet Union, an entity that someone once described as an organized system
of paranoia. Betrayal of his friends and colleagues was an opiate. In his
book he ridicules those who trusted him for being too stupid and naive to
know that he could not be trusted. And his own feelings of inadequacy
disappeared beneath the gush of superiority that came from having secrets
that even those in his super-secret agency never remotely suspected--that
his true loyalty was not to England but to the Soviet dictatorship.
There can be no doubt that Philby's book was calculated to appeal to
the young Hanssens of the West. In his breezy style he posited the notion
that if you believed in world peace and social justice in the 1930s (and
beyond), the logical next step was to transfer your loyalty to the U.S.S.R.
(no one imagined that one day it would crumble).
We have nothing from Hanssen yet. But the FBI claims he wrote the
letters and messages they released. The quoted passages certainly contain
familiar themes. The anger at his government and his agency as a defense
mechanism for justifying his alleged betrayal. The desperate cry of a man
who feels he has been abandoned by his Russian spymasters to whom he
declared his "insane loyalty."
Whoever wrote those messages sounds as if he experienced the bitter
lesson of Philby and so many others: The Soviets had only contempt for those
who served them as spies. Philby, Burgess and MacLean were all isolated,
given no jobs, treated with suspicion. All three died alcoholics.
These are the things Philby did not reveal to his admiring 14-year-old
reader.
- - -

Verne W. Newton Is the Author of "The Cambridge Spies: the American Side of
the Philby, Burgess, Maclean Story" (Madison Books, 1991)

-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2570

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sat Feb 24, 2001 8:41pm
Subject: Hanssen Is Not the Only One’
  
Hanssen Is Not the Only One’

http://www.insightmag.com/archive/200103207.shtml

By Paul M. Rodriguez
rodriguez@i...

The names Robert Philip Hanssen and Aldrich Ames already are notorious. But,
according to intelligence sources, the list of traitors in U.S. security
agencies is likely to grow.

The espionage case involving FBI counterintelligence agent Robert Philip
Hanssen is far from over, according to U.S. law-enforcement and intelligence
sources who tell Insight the alleged FBI traitor is among four to seven
other U.S. agents under scrutiny as possible spies for Russia.
“He’s not the only one. There is at least another significant case in
the works,” says a U.S. intelligence source commenting about the ongoing
damage assessment concerning Hanssen. It involves not only FBI investigators
but agents from the CIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), the State
Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security
Council (NSC) and more.
There has been talk in the years since the arrest of Aldrich Ames in
1994 about a second (or third) mole high in the U.S. government. Ames was a
CIA analyst who turned traitor and revealed some of the most sensitive U.S.
intelligence secrets to the Russians. He began spying around the same time
that Hanssen is alleged to have begun.
In the years since Ames was caught, U.S. intelligence agencies have
continued to receive information pointing to an ongoing and significant
series of security breaches. These activities were of an extremely high
level, very sophisticated, and involved a staggering breadth of information
touching on many agencies. “We had focused on numerous individuals at the
CIA and the FBI, as well as targets at the NSA, but never could put the
pieces together,” says a retired FBI counterintelligence agent familiar with
the multiagency investigations.
The Washington Post reported on Feb. 23 that among those suspected of
spying for Russia was a senior CIA agent who, despite passing numerous
polygraph tests, had been suspended since 1999. Although the suspect was,
like Hanssen, involved in counterintelligence operations affecting Russia, a
national-security official tells Insight, “the details we kept hearing from
the field [about espionage] never fully matched up with his access to
information.”
But, until Hanssen’s arrest Feb. 18 outside a park in Northern
Virginia, the extraordinary post-Ames leaks of classified information had
stymied U.S. intelligence. “There were several people we suspected, but
never was it Hanssen,” says a colleague who worked closely with the accused
FBI traitor.
In fact, says the official story, it was only late last fall that
Hanssen became a suspect as a result of information obtained by the CIA and
developed in cooperation with the FBI’s spy catchers. Based on the 100-page
affidavit filed by prosecutors with a Virginia district court and unsealed
Feb. 20, the pieces then began to fall together. The solved puzzle revealed
an astonishing picture of Hanssen’s alleged espionage going back at least 15
years and resulting in the deaths of at least two double agents working in
Russia for the United States, as well as the imprisonment of a third.
“There is much more to this than the public yet knows,” says a senior
congressional aide briefed on the Hanssen investigation. “It’s more serious
than anyone knows.”
How serious? “That’s all I can tell you, but we believe other
agencies also have been penetrated,” the aide says. Another highly placed
intelligence source tells this magazine: “Hanssen isn’t the only one.”
Making matters worse, say others, including an FBI official who asked
not to be named, is the FBI’s failure to employ either routine polygraph
tests on its senior agents or automatic alarms on classified computers to
identify unusual entries by volume or date. Hanssen routinely checked his
own name and address in classified computers to determine whether he was
under suspicion.
For years rumors have persisted that while Ames was indeed an
important Russian spy, he was not always in a position to have had firsthand
knowledge of many secrets that Russia was known to have obtained
clandestinely from U.S. security agencies. That’s why when Hanssen came
under scrutiny the possibility of his guilt seemed to explain other
extraordinary and ongoing losses of secrets. Hanssen had unique access to
U.S. spy-craft techniques and secrets, as well as to the status of U.S.
counterintelligence and monitoring operations targeting not only the
Russians but Washington-based agents of many other countries.
Insight was told that this is one reason why even the CIA’s
counterintelligence departments were kept in the dark during the four- to
five-month probe of Hanssen. During that time only a select few knew any
details, and even these were quarantined from colleagues.
While the full damage assessment will take months (if not years),
U.S. spy catchers are continuing to troll for spies, Insight has learned, at
the CIA, the FBI and among military personnel assigned to both the NSA and
NSC. “We’re focusing on several people right now,” confirms a senior
intelligence official. “But I can’t tell you for sure we have all the holes
plugged.”

-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2571

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sat Feb 24, 2001 8:46pm
Subject: Secret Team Led Search for Mole
  
Moderators Note.... [Sun Tzu said that to be effective spies are 
always used in groups of at least 3, but that a wise general will 
employ groups of at least five. That said, where are the other 
spies???]

-jma


Secret Team Led Search for Mole

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/02/24/MN142463.DTL

Joint operation resulted in arrest of FBI agent

James Risen, New York Times Saturday, February 24, 2001

Washington -- A secret investigative team established in 1994 to identify
the source of a series of damaging intelligence losses played a crucial role
in the counterespionage probe that led to Sunday's arrest of an FBI agent,
Robert Philip Hanssen, officials said yesterday.

The mole-hunting unit -- a joint operation of the FBI and the CIA whose
existence has never before been disclosed -- was created because
investigators could not explain why intelligence operations against Russia
continued to be compromised even after the arrest of Aldrich Ames, a senior
CIA covert officer.

Shortly after Ames' capture, they concluded that it was unlikely he could
have been responsible for all of the intelligence losses of the previous few
years.

Most damaging of the intelligence breaches was the apparent disclosure to
the Russians of an elaborate and costly technical intelligence program
monitoring their activities in the United States, officials said. The
apparent compromise of that program -- which remains highly classified and
which officials refused to describe -- may have cost the United States
hundreds of millions of dollars, according to current and former U.S.
officials.

Other unexplained intelligence problems, including the disclosure to Moscow
in 1989 that the FBI was conducting an espionage investigation of State
Department official Felix S. Bloch, prompted officials to begin a new search
for a spy inside the U.S. government, officials added.

Yet some officials said that the driving force behind the creation of the
new counterespionage unit was the need to find out what had happened to the
costly technical intelligence program. They said they believe Hanssen's
arrest may solve that mystery.

In addition to the KGB officers working for the FBI that he betrayed,
officials charge that the loss of that technical program was the most severe
blow he inflicted on U.S. intelligence during his alleged 15-year career as
a Russian spy.

The special investigative unit, which works within the Counterespionage
Group at the CIA's Counterintelligence Center, was created by Paul Redmond,
the CIA counterintelligence expert who led the effort to apprehend Ames. The
unit was responsible for a series of espionage investigations that
subsequently led to the arrests of other significant spies, officials now
say.

They include both Earl Edwin Pitts, an FBI agent sentenced to 27 years in
prison in 1997 for spying for the Soviet Union, and Harold J. Nicholson, a
former CIA station chief in Romania who was also sentenced to more than 23
years in prison in 1997 for spying for Moscow.

The efforts of the joint mole-hunting operation were finally rewarded late
last year, when a Russian source provided what appears to be virtually the
entire KGB file on the Hanssen case.

The special investigative unit was a successor to an earlier and equally
secretive CIA internal investigative team that helped uncover Ames. It is
still in existence today, even after Hanssen's arrest, because officials
believe it is possible that there are additional foreign agents inside the
U.S. government.

©2001 San Francisco Chronicle
Page C14
-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2572

From: Bullfrog007 <BULLFROG007@N...> 
Date: Sat Feb 24, 2001 2:24pm
Subject: NSA Job Fair
  
February 23, 2001
National Security Agency to host first-ever career fair

By George Cahlink
gcahlink@g...


Seeking a new generation of workers, the National Security Agency will hold
its first-ever job fair Saturday at its headquarters in Ft. Meade, Md.

"The recruitment event is part of a larger strategy to recruit the diverse,
highly skilled work force needed to meet the challenges of the 21st
century," said NSA officials in a statement. The agency says it is seeking
workers with experience or education in computer science, mathematics,
engineering, signal analysis, language, data collection, "cryptanalysis" and
intelligence analysis. Other intelligence agencies will also be represented
at the career fair.

The NSA statement noted that the Defense agency has "a proud history of
recruiting and hiring top talent"--including more than 2,000 employees
annually throughout the 1980s. But, the agency said, recruiting has become
"more difficult" in recent years and old hiring methods must be
"transformed" to meet today's needs.

Other federal agencies are facing similar problems. A tight labor market and
burdensome federal hiring rules have made recruitment a challenge. The
General Accounting Office has repeatedly criticized agencies for failing to
plan for the future workforce, and has warned that if more aggressive hiring
and retention policies are not implemented, there will be a shortage of
federal workers over the next decade.

The career fair also is the latest attempt to put a public face on an agency
that has long had a reputation for secrecy. NSA Director Lt. Gen. Michael
Hayden has advocated a more open approach as the key to winning continued
support from Congress for modernizing the agency's information systems and
convincing the public that NSA doesn't spy on U.S. citizens.
2573

From: Steve Uhrig <steve@s...> 
Date: Sat Feb 24, 2001 9:46pm
Subject: Full Coverage Receivers available
  
Hello list,

Again I have a few unblocked ICOM receivers in excellent 
condition available. Have R8500 base receivers and R100 
portable/mobile receivers.

Many are familiar with the R8500. This is ICOM's newest wideband 
HF/VHF/UHF receiver, quite common with sweepers or for 
surveillance listening posts. The problem is getting them with 
800 megacycle coverage. All the ones sold commercially are 
cellular blocked, with no provision for TSCM practitioners to 
obtain unblocked ones legally. We do not want receivers with 
holes in the coverage. Here are some that don't have the holes. 

These are full coverage receivers originally restricted to and 
purchased by the government, generally used for one weekend in a 
surveillance, then traded in. 

Basic specs are 100kc to 2 gigs, AM, Wide FM, Narrow FM, CW, 
SSB. This is a triple conversion tabletop receiver powered by 
12VDC or 110VAC with included power supply. Can be used portable 
or mobile or fixed station. 

Go here for full specs and a photo:

http://www.icomamerica.com/receivers/tabletop/icr8500.html

This receiver is the best one ICOM has released to date, 
significantly better than the R9000, and a later model in the 
series of R7000/R7100.

Remember this is a full coverage receiver, and covers from 100kc 
(0.1 megacycles) to 2 gigs (2000 megacycles). You do not need an 
additional receiver to cover the HF portion of the spectrum. 

When not sweeping, you will use this as a lab receiver on your 
test bench.

There is an RS232 input port as part of this receiver, so you do 
not need the expensive external level converter to computer 
control it. There are a number of third party software packages 
available to remotely operate the receiver. Rather than one of 
the computer-controlled black box receivers, the R8500 can be 
computer controlled as well as it has a full featured front 
panel for standalone use. There may be times when you do not 
want to drag a laptop around just to run your receiver. 

There also is an IF and discriminator output on the rear panel 
for accessories.

One of the standard internal features will scan and store any 
signals found in a special memory bank for later review. 

ICOM just raised the price on these substantially, and that 
higher price will soon be reflected on dealers' pricing. Even 
then, you can't buy them full coverage without a government 
sponsor willing to give you a blessing.

I only have a few of these, so don't wait if you need a 
portable, decent full coverage receiver. Practically every time 
I list these, every one I have sells within a few days and I 
have to refuse orders from people who come too late.

A wideband receiver is one of the first items in a professional 
sweep kit. When the other equipment sniffs a potentially hostile 
transmitter, you then tune this to the frequency and disassemble 
the signal manually.

Price is $2000 shipped in the U.S. This is less than current 
retail for a blocked receiver and less than unblocked receivers 
imported from Canada or England, with no chance of these being 
seized at the border.

I also have the accessory TV-R7100 AM video demodulator to fit 
the R8500 receiver. This will let you demodulate and display on 
an external video monitor any AM video signals you may pick up, 
whether broadcast, amateur or surveillance. These are extremely 
scarce. Price is $400 with purchase of a receiver only. And I 
have one speech synthesizer board available which will read the 
receiver frequency out in voice when it stops somewhere while 
scanning. This is convenient if you are running an unattended 
tape, so you know what it is that caused the receiver to stop 
scanning.

I take credit cards for payment.

The R100 is a little brother to the R8500 receivers. The 
performance is basically the same as far as frequency coverage 
and modes, but the R100 does not have all the "soft" 
capabilities of the R8500, nor do they have the computer control 
port or ability to display alpha tags on programmed channels. 
These are good if you want a full coverage receiver to install 
in your vehicle or something a bit smaller for a portable sweep 
kit. These can be analog tuned with a knob and also cover the 
restricted 800 meg frequencies blocked on consumer receivers.

Here are basic specs on the R100 mobile/portable receiver:

Frequency Coverage: 100 kHz to 1856 MHz continuous
Mode: AM, FM, Wide FM (WFM) 
Power Supply Requirement: 13.8 V DC +/-15% 
Current Drain (at 13.8 V DC): Less than 1.1 A 

The R100 was discontinued some time ago and unfortunately there 
is no replacement for these friendly and versatile receivers. 
The supply of these is dwindling, especially in the restricted 
unblocked (government) versions. 

Price of R100s is $650.

Anyone buying a receiver is eligible to purchase a wideband 
discone antenna for $75, which is a $50 discount off the normal 
price of $125. This antenna is ideal for this receiver, and is a 
good antenna for sweeping. Mount it on a tripod or microphone 
stand and move the antenna around the area you are sweeping. 
Antenna can be used for transmit also, from 25-2000 megs. 

Holler if interested and your receiver can ship immediately. 
Remember we pay the freight and insurance, which is considerable 
on equipment of this value.

I also will consider trades towards the above, and I purchase 
surveillance, countersurveillance and communications equipment. 
Email me with anything you have to sell or trade.

More equipment is listed on my webpage:

http://www.swssec.com/used.html

Regards ... Steve


*******************************************************************
Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA)
Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip
mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com
tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190
"In God we trust, all others we monitor"
*******************************************************************
2574

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sun Feb 25, 2001 4:09pm
Subject: Spies: Who needs 'em?
  
Spies: Who needs 'em?

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=21830

© 2001 WorldNetDaily.com


Nobody likes to hear about any American knowingly betraying his country, but
this week's espionage revelation suggests that some serious rethinking of
the proper role of espionage and secrets in a post-cold war United States is
in order.

Perhaps keeping secrets and running spies is not as all-fired important to
this country as it used to be. Perhaps, if our desire is to be a beacon of
liberty in the world, it is time to think about putting away such childish
things, or at least changing the way we do them.

Robert Philip Hanssen, the 27-year FBI veteran who is accused of having
spied for the Soviet Union and later for Russia for the past 16 years, is
alleged to have given the Soviets and later the post-Soviet Ruskies tons of
important information. But has it really damaged the United States all that
much -- especially insofar as the real national interest is to be a free
country?

Will anybody raise the question?

Mr. Hanssen, who is reported to have spent most of his career in
counterintelligence against the Russians at the FBI headquarters in
Washington, was in a position to have given the Russians some of the most
sensitive, top-secret data the FBI possessed. FBI director Louis Freeh,
while being somewhat circumspect, said of the suspected damage to U.S.
intelligence that "We believe it was exceptionally grave."

So the Russians, like the Soviets many times before them, seem to have
pulled off an extraordinary long-term espionage coup, this time against the
FBI. A couple of years ago it was the CIA's turn to be embarrassed at
revelations that long-time employee Aldrich Ames had for years spied for the
Soviets and then the Russians. As establishment-oriented an analyst as
intelligence writer David Wise said on television that Hanssen was the FBI's
Aldrich Ames case, a deeply troubling and potentially demoralizing episode.

It's embarrassing, but how deeply should ordinary Americans be concerned
about Russians spying against the U.S.?

Look at the big picture.

The Russians may be better at spying, though Cato Institute defense analyst
Ivan Eland warned me that that's not necessarily a foregone conclusion. It
could be that the U.S. is actually better at catching turned agents and the
Russians are an open book to various agents they haven't discovered.

The actions of the Clinton administration don't suggest that U.S. officials
have had a very good idea of what was really going on in Russia for the past
several years, but maybe that can't be blamed on our intelligence services.
It wouldn't be amazing if the Clinonistas knew all about the corruption and
crony capitalism and kept pumping money in anyway because they didn't know
anything else to do and figured sending good U.S. taxpayers' money after bad
at least wouldn't do major damage.

If it turns out that the Russians really are better at spying -- and given
the culture of secrecy and clandestine activity it's certainly not out of
the question -- we need to wonder just what this superiority has bought
them. Which country has the healthiest economy and the strongest military in
the history of the world and which is an economic and political basket case?

This will seem like heresy to some, but might it be worthwhile to speculate
on the possibility that all those precious secrets allegedly passed on by
Mr. Hanssen to the Russians didn't do the Russians much good or the United
States much real harm.

I would go a little further to raise the possibility that a relatively open
society that is not obsessed with secrecy and values the free flow of
information is not only more stable than a tyranny, but actually has a
long-term strategic advantage over a society whose government is obsessed
with secrecy and control. All through the Cold War Americans worried, often
enough with justification, that the Soviets were more determined, more
ruthless, more persistent and more skilled at various dark political arts
than our guys. But the inherent weaknesses of a centrally-planned socialist
economy, combined with corruption and loss of belief in the holy communist
mission, eventually did the Soviet Union in.

Scholars will debate for decades whether it was Reagan's rearmament, the
threat of Star Wars, blind luck, miscalculations by Gorbachev or a
combination of these and other factors that precipitated the fall of
communism as an armed and dangerous force in the world. But those who
understand the superiority of a free society and the inherent instability of
a command-and-control economy knew the contradictions and inability to
calculate when central planners make all important decisions would
eventually weaken the socialist system. And it happened, fortunately with
very little physical violence.

Since then, with corruption, criminality and bumbling, post-Soviet Russia
has not made much progress; if anything living standards have declined for
the vast majority of Russians who have little aptitude or taste for crony
capitalism and gangsterism. The birthrate is down, life expectancy has
declined, alcoholism -- if anything -- is up. The leadership might still get
things together sufficiently that Russia becomes a real threat to more of
its neighbors, but at this point the country is in pitiful shape.

So how much good did skill at espionage do the Russians? Without justifying
his sleazy actions or misplaced loyalties at all, we have to wonder how much
real harm to U.S. citizens Mr. Hanssen was able to do.

The Bush administration says it is conducting a thoroughgoing reassessment
of military needs and missions in the wake of the Decade of Improvisation.
While it's doing so it should take a cold-eyed second look at just how much
we need the intelligence apparatus we built during the Cold War and which
has been casting about for a mission ever since.

If the United States is not all that committed to "humanitarian" and
"nation-building" military interventions, just how much information do we
need? How much of the information produced by all the paper-shuffling gnomes
in Washington needs to be classified? The United States has no natural
enemies who pose a real military threat except those our leaders choose to
engage -- which is not to say that countries with possible regional
ambitions like Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and even Iraq don't warrant
continued scrutiny. But do we need to spend $30 billion a year -- that's
what the government released as the total intelligence budget a few years
ago when it as in a mood of temporary openness -- to run spies and collect
electronic intelligence?

I have long advocated that the CIA be abolished. No doubt the government
will still have a need for reliable information in the world whose post-Cold
War shape is still evolving, but the CIA is too institutionalized, too
rooted in the Cold War culture, too set in its ways, too bureaucratic to be
reformed to become the leaner, cheaper intelligence service that might be
warranted.

Better to rethink our position in the world and then design an intelligence
service from scratch to fit into our vision of our role in the world.

Similarly, the espionage functions of the FBI deserve a cold-blooded
reassessment. Louis Freeh has been opening up FBI offices all over the
world, but the reasons (beyond the empire-building that is the natural
inclination of any bureaucracy) are pretty murky. And the Hanssen fiasco,
following so closely on the Wen Ho Lee bungle -- not to mention Waco, Ruby
Ridge, the Olympic bombing, the crime lab troubles and other scandals
involving cover-up and obstruction of justice -- suggest that the once-proud
FBI is an agency in need of serious reform.

Cutting back its duties to strictly interstate domestic crime -- eliminating
dozens of functions it doesn't perform well -- might be a good start.

I am really advocating something a little bigger: that we call into question
the importance of espionage to the national interests of a free country in
which most citizens (at least with the end of the Cold War) value freedom
more than global influence. If we want to lead other countries toward
freedom more by example than by brute force, we should understand that open
access to information and an accountable government are more valuable than a
short-term espionage victory that can't even be publicized.

The espionage mentality encourages overclassification as a side effect. All
kinds of trivial information gets a "Top Secret" label that has more to do
with the self-importance of bureaucrats than with any real need. Our
government classifies so much information that foreign governments often
know more about what our government is up to than American citizens are
allowed to know. And this addiction to secrecy impedes the free flow of
information and the incentives to innovate that are the real secret weapon
of a free society in a dangerous world.

Again, I'm the last person to apologize for Mr. Hanssen; though I'll try to
maintain the presumption of innocence until I know more, it seems unlikely
the FBI would blunder so badly as to so publicly go after the wrong guy. If
Mr. Hanssen really spied for the Russians he betrayed the trust of many and
should receive severe punishment, of course.

But his case, in conjunction with the Aldrich Ames case, other blunders and
the changed world we face with the demise of the Soviet Union as an active
threat might suggest to some Americans that it's time for a hard-nosed
reassessment of the place of secrets and espionage in a country that aspires
to the freedom and progress that come from emphasizing the benefits of civil
society over a highly politicized superstructure.

Freedom, not talent in the dark arts, is our heritage and birthright. And it
seems to work better than doing second-rate imitations of relatively closed
societies that emphasize secrecy, authority, state power and dirty tricks.

-----

Alan Bock is author of "Ambush at Ruby Ridge" and "Waiting to Inhale: The
Politics of Medical Marijuana." Senior editorial writer and columnist at the
Orange County Register, he is also senior contributing editor at the
National Educator and a contributing editor at Liberty magazine.

-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2575

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sun Feb 25, 2001 4:14pm
Subject: The spy and the FBI spin doctor
  
The spy and the FBI spin doctor

http://www.theage.com.au/news/2001/02/25/FFX72YC6KJC.html

By ROGER FRANKLIN
Sunday 25 February 2001

Two men, each representing one of Washington's most venerable dark arts,
were drawn together last week in a parallel universe of treachery.

They both worked for the FBI. One, perhaps motivated by nothing more noble
than greed, had turned spy. The other, prompted by a very pressing need, had
turned spin doctor.

Robert Philip Hanssen, a member of the FBI's counter-intelligence unit, hit
the front pages of almost every paper in America when he was arrested after
more than 15 years of allegedly passing some of his country's most sensitive
secrets to Moscow.

The attention the sting received was carefully orchestrated by FBI director
Louis Freeh. He summoned reporters to his agency's Washington headquarters
to announce Hanssen's arrest. And for all the sad and straight-faced candor
he displayed for the cameras as he detailed the damage Hanssen had done to
US security, broadcasting the grim truth was really the last thing on the
embattled lawman's agenda.

What he needed to do was spin, to whirl the story until the most glaring
fact of the case - the FBI's incredible incompetence - became lost in the
general blur of minute details. And twirl it he did, burying the press in a
deluge of details that teams of America's top investigative reporters were
still scrambling to unravel and expand as the week came to an end.

Freeh, you see, had both his own future and his agency's soiled reputation
to consider - and the one question he couldn't afford to be grilled about
was also the most obvious: how could Hanssen, a man who had spent virtually
his entire official career hunting Russian spies, have managed to work so
long and hard for Moscow without being uncovered?

Even Freeh was forced to admit that all the signs were there. All that
should have been required to catch this mole was basic, routine diligence.
That, and perhaps just a bit less institutional arrogance on the part of an
agency that considered itself beyond penetration.

Instead, while the man who has been called the biggest traitor since
Benedict Arnold accumulated a $A2.7 million fortune in cash and diamonds,
the FBI neglected to give him so much as a lie-detector test.

Even more striking was the failure to notice that Hanssen was regularly
trawling the agency's most sensitive computer database to see if his own
name had been added to a list of possible moles. A routine audit of the
computer records would have identified the traitor in minutes.

What made the case so difficult, Freeh stressed, was that Hanssen was
himself a senior counter-intelligence specialist. He knew better than
anybody how to cover his tracks. Not even his Russian handlers knew his real
name, identity or where he worked within the intelligence community.

While the spy catchers remained oblivious to Hanssen's secret life, the
children who played with his six kids on a leafy suburban street in
Washington knew something was up.

Sure, Mr Hanssen went to church with his wife and kids, and barracked for
the local Little League side. But when the neighborhood kids visited his
home, all were given the same stern warning: don't ever go into that room
off the basement. He could be a scary guy when he stared straight into you,
one former playmate recalled last week.

Jam-packed with banks of sophisticated computer equipment, the dark chamber
was where Hanssen transferred sensitive FBI documents to floppy disks that
he would later leave at pre-arranged drop points - taped to the girders of
bridges, tucked under stones, jammed behind road signs - for his Russian
contacts to retrieve. According to Freeh, not even Hanssen's wife suspected
him.

In return for the information Hanssen provided, Moscow showed its gratitude
with packages of $100 notes, sometimes containing as much as $50,000, that
were double-wrapped in black plastic garbage bags and accompanied by what
were often quite long letters of appreciation and concern.

It is obvious from the notes Hanssen penned in return just how the double
life was wearing him down - and how, even with the Russians, he could not
curb a pathological need to deceive.

"I decided on this course when I was 14 years old," he wrote in March last
year, adding by way of explanation, "... I'd read Philby's book!" It was a
minor but instructive slip: When Hanssen was 14, British traitor and double
agent Kim Philby had yet to put pen to paper.


So what of the damage Hanssen inflicted on his country? Of that, Freeh had
less to say. The arresting officer's affidavit mentions how Hanssen provided
the Russians with nuts-and-bolts details of several counter-intelligence
programs, including a high-tech operation intended to eavesdrop on Russia's
electronic communications.

In other letters, he provides the names of potential moles the Russians
might consider trying to recruit. One of them, a military officer whom
Hanssen calls an old friend, was identified as a ripe prospect because he
had been denied promotion and was understandably bitter. Perhaps, Hanssen
suggested, that anger could be cultivated until it blossomed into productive
treason.


If you take Freeh's word for it, Hanssen's greatest gift to the Russians,
however, was his role as a source capable of confirming information they
were receiving from other double agents. When CIA turncoat Aldrich Ames
reported that Moscow was harboring at least three agents who were reporting
to the CIA, Moscow would have been loathe to take action on the strength of
one unconfirmed tip. But when Hanssen was able to confirm two of the names,
the fingered men were arrested, tortured and dispatched with bullets to the
head. The third man - the one Hanssen could neither confirm nor deny - was
merely arrested and held in prison until Boris Yeltsin ordered his release
last year.

Hanssen's own fate is likely to echo that of the two spies he helped turn
in. His chances of being executed would have to be pretty high given George
W. Bush's affection for capital punishment.

As for Freeh, his prospects don't look too good either. Republicans hold him
in no great affection, claiming he did nothing to further their attempts to
investigate White House scandals in the Clinton years.

Meanwhile, Democrats' opinion of him is scarcely any better.

Clearly, the definition of honor and loyalty in Washington's parallel
universe can be a very subjective thing.

Just ask Robert Hanssen.


-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2576

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sun Feb 25, 2001 4:16pm
Subject: Tour of spying landmarks offers a timely reminder
  
Sunday, February 25, 2001, 12:00 a.m. Pacific

Tour of spying landmarks offers a timely reminder

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/WebObjects/SeattleTimes.woa/wa/gotoArticle?zsection_id=268448417&text_only=0&slug=spytour25&document_id=134269586

by Vernon Loeb
The Washington Post

WASHINGTON - Seven blocks on R Street in Georgetown are all that separate
the rise and the fall of American intelligence, from the mansion of World
War II spy master William "Wild Bill" Donovan to the mailbox where CIA
traitor Aldrich Ames left signals in chalk for his Soviet handlers.

David Major calls it "Spy Street," and it's one of the attractions on the
"SpyDrive," a tour of 30 Washington espionage sites that twists and turns
through most of the major spy cases of the past 50 years, with running
commentary by Major and his sidekick, Oleg Kalugin.

Major spent a career chasing foreign spies for the FBI, ultimately becoming
counterintelligence adviser at the Reagan White House. Kalugin was a Soviet
spy in Washington - the youngest major general in KGB history.

"What we're going to show you is buildings and monuments," Major says. But
"you're going to see it through the eyes of a counterintelligence officer
and an intelligence collector."

The SpyDrive is a commercial spinoff of a tour Major started running several
years ago for corporate executives and U.S. government personnel to make the
point that the nation's capital has long been a major playground for all
manner of foreign spies - and still is.

"Since this is the most important city in the world, it is a very, very
viable target," says Major, a stout, bearded man in a black leather jacket.
"This is not something stuck in the past. It faces every single one of us in
the future."

What he's trying to tell his busload of spy tourists, many of whom have a
certain law-enforcement look, is that a little paranoia isn't necessarily a
bad thing, especially if you're an executive steeped in trade secrets or a
government official with a security clearance. If you think you're being
followed on the streets of Washington, maybe you are.

"Russian espionage is now on the rise," says the small, dapper Kalugin, now
a permanent resident alien who works as an instructor at Major's training
firm in suburban Alexandria, Va., the Centre for Counterintelligence and
Security Studies. "The U.S. used to be Enemy No. 1. Now it is Priority No.
1."

There is, of course, no more famous monument to espionage in Washington than
the old Soviet Embassy on 16th Street, now the Russian ambassador's
residence. Kalugin calls it "the hub of intelligence operations in this
country."

Major points to the front door that three of the most damaging American
spies - Ames, Navy warrant officer John Walker and National Security Agency
employee Ronald Pelton - walked through to begin their careers in treason.
Then he directs attention down an alley north of the embassy at the back
door, where the Soviets spirited Walker and Pelton out of the building to
avoid detection by an FBI surveillance team.

On K Street in Georgetown, famous espionage terrain, the tour passes
Chadwick's, the pub where Ames handed over seven pounds of top-secret
material to his KGB handler, including the names of 20 CIA assets in the
Soviet bloc, 10 of whom were subsequently executed. Then there's Martin's
Tavern on Wisconsin Avenue, where Vassar graduate and Soviet courier
Elizabeth Bentley operated in the '30s and '40s.

Just a block up Wisconsin, there's Au Pied de Cochon, the French bistro
where KGB defector Vitaly Yurchenko bolted from his CIA handlers in 1985,
walked to the new Soviet Embassy at the top of the hill and un-defected - a
route retraced by the SpyDrive bus.

There's debate to this day about whether Yurchenko was a legitimate defector
or a KGB plant. But Kalugin - who debriefed Yurchenko upon his return to
Moscow - says the KGB believed he was a genuine defector who simply grew
disenchanted as a ward of the CIA.

Kalugin worked for 12 years as a spy in Washington before returning home to
run the KGB's foreign counterintelligence program. He was elected to the
Russian parliament in 1990 after the fall of the Soviet Union before
returning to the United States as part of a joint venture with AT&T.

"Now I am back to the old trade that I never thought I would resume again,"
says Kalugin, who is still a Russian citizen. "But old habits never die."

On R Street - "one of the spy streets in Washington," Major says - the bus
slows in front of the former home of "Wild Bill" Donovan, director of the
Office of Strategic Services, forerunner of the CIA, during World War II.

Just up the street is Dumbarton Oaks, the 19th-century mansion and
surrounding gardens described on some tours as an important research library
in Byzantine and medieval studies. On the SpyDrive, it's the place where
Navy analyst and convicted spy Jonathan Pollard met his Israeli handler.

Farther down, at 37th and R, is the famous blue mailbox: Ames' "signal
site." The CIA malcontent, who started spying in 1985, would mark the box
with chalk so the KGB would know to check a prearranged "dead drop" for a
new cache of top-secret reports. It's just a plain blue mailbox now.

What makes the SpyDrive an intriguing jaunt is its mix of buildings like
Alger Hiss' row house at 2905 P St. N.W., and monuments like a spot on
Sheridan Circle - "right where that red car is right now," Major says -
where a car bomb planted by Gen. Augusto Pinochet's intelligence service in
1976 killed former Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier and his American
colleague Ronni Moffitt.

There's Mitchell Park, where fired CIA officer Edward Lee Howard sat for
hours in October 1983, pondering whether to betray his country, before
walking to the nearby Soviet Trade Mission and formally becoming a spy.

And at 2800 Wisconsin Ave. is what Major calls the "Jennifer Miles tryst
apartment," named after the South African intelligence officer who spied in
Washington for the Cubans in the late 1960s before the FBI caught her and
kicked her out of the country.

"The Cold War is over," Kalugin says at tour's end. "Some of the old
practices of the Cold War are no longer with us. On the other hand, it would
be naive to believe that since the collapse of the U.S.S.R., espionage has
stopped. In fact, espionage will go on as long as national interest exists."

If you go The SpyDrive runs a couple of times a month. For reservations,
call 866-SPYDRIVE or go to www.spydrive.com. The tour meets in Washington,
D.C., with optional pickup in Virginia; group reservations are available for
up to 50 people. Cost is $35 per person.

Copyright © 2001 The Seattle Times Company

-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2577

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sun Feb 25, 2001 4:17pm
Subject: Alleged spy, handlers were on friendly terms, but relationship deteriorated
  
Sunday, February 25, 2001, 12:00 a.m. Pacific

Alleged spy, handlers were on friendly terms, but relationship deteriorated

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/WebObjects/SeattleTimes.woa/wa/gotoArticle?zsection_id=268448413&text_only=0&slug=spy25&document_id=134269808

by Dan Eggen and David A. Vise
The Washington Post

WASHINGTON - The relationship allegedly lasted for years, through letters
written and gifts exchanged, but eventually FBI agent and alleged spy Robert
Hanssen and his friends from Moscow drifted apart. Once defined by regular
communication, their ties had frayed to nothing.

Despite the high-tech surveillance and encryption methods that have
blossomed in the intelligence trade, a spy's success still often depends on
the psychologically complicated relationship with a foreign patron. That
bond is clearly evident in the case of Hanssen, 56, the highly placed FBI
counterintelligence expert whose alleged illicit correspondence is part spy
tale and part Valentine.

The 109-page affidavit against Hanssen filed this week in U.S. District
Court, as well as statements by FBI Director Louis Freeh and other U.S.
officials, portray a tangled and, at times, almost intimate relationship
between Hanssen and his "handlers."

What began as an alliance solely on Hanssen's terms became, over time, a
murkier compact, a dance between two parties united in suspicion and
dependent on trust. There are moments of joy, angry spats, and expressions
of deep gratitude. "Thank you for your friendship and help," one Soviet
official wrote; "Your `thank you' was deeply appreciated," Hanssen
responded.

"His handlers were, in many ways, his lifeline and his refuge," said Robert
Blitzer, former head of the FBI's counterterrorism division. "He was out
there totally, totally alone. He'd already betrayed his country many times,
so they had him, and he wanted to be had. ... There's a very close bond that
can develop, and it was even more intense in this case."

Hanssen was arrested last Sunday and charged with spying for Moscow for much
of the past 15 years in return for $1.4 million in cash, diamonds and
deposits in a Russian bank. His activities severely harmed U.S. intelligence
operations, officials say, and contributed to the execution of two KGB
double agents.

In the early years of the relationship, which allegedly began in 1985, the
flattery and expressions of mutual respect increased. The Moscow agents
called him "friend"; he addressed them as "friends." In 1989, a Dec. 25
package included "Christmas greetings from the KGB." Moscow also regularly
inquired about Hanssen's family, health and happiness. The Soviets massaged
Hanssen's ego in other ways too, trumpeting his importance and the quality
of his information. A 1988 drop included a note of thanks from then KGB
chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov.

"They were very skillful in the way they played him. It is clear he became
quite dependent on them," said former FBI deputy director Larry Potts.

"It wasn't unintentional that the handlers of this guy treated him by
calling him a friend and expressing concern for his family. They were at
least trying to make him think there was a personal relationship."

For Hanssen, money was clearly one benefit, but his correspondence indicates
it was not the only one. He appeared to revel in the attention from Moscow,
and seemed thrilled by the high-wire act of being a double agent.

Larry Torrence, a former FBI counterintelligence official, believes "it's
certainly possible that (Hanssen) felt he was good enough to beat this whole
thing. There could be that challenge there ... to win the chess game. But it
appears he became a little sloppy near the end."

It is possible, of course, that his correspondence was strategic on
Hanssen's part, too, differing little from the flattery of the other side.
William Webster, the former FBI and CIA director who is heading a panel to
investigate the Hanssen affair, said that "what he's telling the handlers
may be for particular purposes of his own.

"He may not be just venting his soul," Webster said. "He may be very
calculating in what he was telling them."

If so, Hanssen seemed to do a convincing job. Near the end the frustration
exhibited in his writing only increased, as he simultaneously lambasted and
pleaded with his handlers.

"Perhaps you occasionally give up on me. Giving up on me is a mistake," he
allegedly wrote. "I have proven inveterately loyal and willing to take grave
risks which even could cause my death. ... I ask you to help me survive."

His final request: "Wish me luck."

Copyright © 2001 The Seattle Times Company

-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2578

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sun Feb 25, 2001 4:17pm
Subject: Spy Suspect Seemed Fervent Catholic - Writer
  
Saturday February 24 9:56 PM ET

Spy Suspect Seemed Fervent Catholic - Writer

http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010224/ts/crime_spying_dc_23.html

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Robert Hanssen, the senior FBI (news - web sites)
official accused of selling secrets to Russia for 15 years, appeared to be a
fervent Roman Catholic and anti-communist, according to a journalist who
befriended him in the 1990s.

James Bamford, the author of a best-selling expose of the National Security
Agency and a former investigative journalist and producer for ABC News, was
struck by Hanssen's ''ostentatiously pious devotion to the Catholic faith''
and his involvement with Opus Dei, a lay organization devoted to promoting
the church and proselytizing, Newsweek reported on Saturday.

Hanssen seemed ``almost obsessed'' with the church and Opus Dei, Bamford is
quoted as saying in an article on the Web site that the magazine shares with
MSNBC (http:/www.msnbc.com).

The author, who is about to publish a sequel to his book on the NSA, ``The
Puzzle Palace,'' told Newsweek that Hanssen regularly wrote anti-communist
papers for the FBI that seemed dogmatic and anachronistic, like ``something
out of the 1950s.''

Bamford recalled ending his relationship with Hanssen in the late 1990s out
of exasperation with his religious and ideological obsessions.

Bamford, who Newsweek said had ``apparently'' used Hanssen as a news source,
remembered that the FBI man had been particularly interested in an interview
he conducted several years ago in Moscow with Viktor Cherkashin, one of the
former Soviet Union's legendary spymasters.

Hanssen wanted to hear every detail of the interview, Bamford said, which
seemed perfectly reasonable at the time since Hanssen was one of the FBI's
most senior counterintelligence agents.

Although they apparently never met, news reports have suggested that
Cherkashin might have been Hanssen's handler in Moscow.

While at ABC News, Bamford broke the story of the FBI's ultimately
unsuccessful espionage investigation of U.S. diplomat Felix Bloch. The probe
fell apart, Newsweek said, because Bloch received a tip from a Soviet mole
inside the U.S. government.

That mole is now suspected to have been Hanssen, it said.

-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2579

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sun Feb 25, 2001 4:19pm
Subject: The Friends of Robert Philip Hanssen
  
The Friends of Robert Philip Hanssen

http://www.msnbc.com/news/535540.asp

Investigative journalist James Bamford knew accused spy for several years

By Mark Hosenball

NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE

Feb. 24 ­ Apart from his clandestine relationship with the Soviet KGB,
accused FBI mole Robert Philip Hanssen had a curious friend in Washington:
investigative author James Bamford.

BAMFORD, WHO IS about to publish “Body of Secrets,” a sequel to “The
Puzzle Palace,” his best-selling expose about the hyper-secret National
Security Agency, told NEWSWEEK he knew Hanssen for several years during the
1990s and was close enough to the disgraced FBI agent that Hanssen attended
Bamford’s wedding.

In retrospect, Bamford is now looking for hidden meanings in his
various contacts with Hanssen. Several years ago, Bamford, then working as a
producer for ABC News, went to Moscow to conduct an on-camera interview with
one of the former Soviet Union’s most legendary spymasters, Viktor
Cherkashin. A colonel in the KGB, the now-defunct Soviet intelligence
service, Cherkashin had been the “handler” of the CIA’s most damaging known
turncoat, Aldrich Ames.

Upon his return to Washington, Bamford told some of his friends in
the intelligence community, including Hanssen, about his interview with
Cherkashin. Hanssen wanted to know every detail of what the ex-Soviet
spymaster told the American reporter. He expressed an interest in seeing a
raw transcript of the interview. Bamford told Hanssen he could not give him
a transcript of the interview but he described to Hanssen much of the
detail. Bamford says he thought nothing more about Hanssen’s interest in the
Cherkashin interview until last week, when he was confronted with the
stunning accusation that for the last 15 years, Hanssen had been acting as a
Soviet mole inside the FBI. More astonishing still was the revelation that
Hanssen’s likely spymaster in Moscow, who he never personally met, was one
Viktor Cherkashin.

A WORRIED MOLE?

At the time, it was perfectly logical for Hanssen to be interested in
the details of an American interview with one of the Russians’ top
spymasters, since Hanssen was one of the FBI’s most experienced Soviet
counterintelligence analysts. But in reality, Bamford now wonders, was
Hanssen worried that Cherkashin had inadvertently, or intentionally, said
something to ABC that could have compromised Hanssen’s activities as a
Russian mole?

Bamford says he never noticed anything that would, on the surface,
have tipped him off to the fact that Hanssen was living a double life as an
FBI Soviet analyst and Russian mole. But in hindsight, Bamford acknowleges
that some of Hanssen’s behavior over the years seemed strange and
conceivably may have reflected the fact that he was leading a secret life.
For a start, Bamford says, Hanssen was regularly writing papers for the FBI
about the evil machinations of Marxism, unclassified versions of which he
occasionally shared with Bamford. Bamford says he found the papers dogmatic
and anachronistic, like “something out of the 1950s,” and eventually threw
them out. He says that to his recollection, Hanssen continued to write these
outdated analyses about the communist menace into the 1990s, well after the
Soviet Union and, by extension, the international communist movement that it
supported, had fallen apart.

Bamford was coy about reflecting on the fact that he apparently was
using Hanssen as a news source, which caused some consternation behind the
scenes last week at ABC News, whose employ he left several years ago.
Bamford says he did not meet Hanssen until long after the FBI gave up its
unsuccessful espionage investigation of State Department diplomat Felix
Bloch, a story that Bamford broke exclusively for ABC News; the FBI alleges
that the investigation fell apart because Bloch got a tip from a Soviet mole
inside the U.S. government, now suspected to have been Hanssen.

RECRUITING FOR OPUS DEI

Bamford says he was also struck by Hanssen’s ostentatiously pious
devotion to the Catholic faith, and his involvement in the society of lay
Catholics called Opus Dei, a worldwide movement devoted to promoting the
religion and converting nonbelievers. A nonpracticing Catholic, Bamford says
that Hanssen was “almost obsessed” with his participation in the church and
the Opus Dei movement and tried to get Bamford involved in his religious
activities. At one point five or six years ago, Bamford said, Hanssen
“dragged me along” to an Opus Dei meeting in Washington, D.C., which
involved religious rituals and prayers. He said he found the event
unremarkable and boring.

A couple of years ago, he decided to end the friendship with
Hanssen. It was too much of a bother, he said, dealing with Hanssen’s
obsessions with religion and communism.

© 2001 Newsweek, Inc.

-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2580

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sun Feb 25, 2001 4:26pm
Subject: Ex-FBI chief sees need for 'electronic librarian'
  
Ex-FBI chief sees need for 'electronic librarian'

http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/02/24/fib.spy.01.reut/index.html

February 24, 2001
Web posted at: 10:09 p.m. EST (0309 GMT)

WASHINGTON (Reuters) -- The FBI needs an "electronic librarian" to signal if
an employee peeks into unauthorized areas after a veteran agent's arrest as
an alleged spy for Moscow, former FBI Director William Webster said in a
TIME.com interview published Saturday.

Webster will lead an inquiry into the FBI's internal security procedures in
the wake of Sunday's arrest of 25-year employee Robert Hanssen on charges of
selling secrets to Moscow over a 15-year period.

"Electronic filings offer a lot more vulnerabilities than was anticipated,"
Webster said.

"Invariably (double agents) are apt to wander into areas where they don't
belong," he said. "We may not always recognize them when they belong -- but
we can when they don't belong."

Hanssen had access to a wide variety of top secret material because of his
position as a counterintelligence officer, and he is accused of selling
secrets about double agents, U.S. electronic surveillance methods and other
sensitive topics.

"In the old days," Webster said, "we'd have a librarian who'd report when
people asked for files they didn't need to see."

"We need to have some kind of electronic librarian. Machines can be taught,
and I think we can build in a level of uncertainty that makes people in this
game hesitate, and that will cut down on their effectiveness," he said.

Webster, who has not begun the inquiry yet, said those ideas were not
necessarily going to end up as recommendations, according to TIME.com.

He is also expected to look at whether to expand the use of lie detectors,
currently used on prospective FBI employees and agents working on the most
sensitive cases.

At the CIA, all new employees are given polygraph tests before they are
hired, and most are tested again after about three years and then after
about five years. There are also random tests at the spy agency.

Webster, who is also a former CIA director, said on the use of lie
detectors, "I don't know how we'll come out, but I expect it'll be somewhere
between what FBI has and what CIA has."

Copyright 2001 Reuters. All rights reserved.
This material may not be published, broadcast,
rewritten, or redistributed.
-- 

=======================================================================
Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the
truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell
=======================================================================
James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803
Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467
127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/
Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t...
=======================================================================
The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM,
Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet.
=======================================================================
2581

From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng <jmatk@t...> 
Date: Sun Feb 25, 2001 4:28pm
Subject: 'A Question of Why' - Contradictory Portrait Emerges of Spying Suspect
  
'A Question of Why' - Contradictory Portrait Emerges of Spying Suspect

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51800-2001Feb24.html

FBI agents remove evidence from the Vienna, Va.,
home of accused spy Robert Philip Hanssen.

In the fall of 1985, agents were leaving the FBI's Manhattan office at the
rate of seven a month, complaining they couldn't afford to live in New York
on a G-man's salary. With beginning agents making less than a city
sanitation worker, and salaries no better in New York than in El Paso or
Boise, many quit the bureau rather than be sent there.

The money squeeze was so bad that Assistant FBI Director Thomas L. Sheer,
who headed the Manhattan office, publicly warned that his agents were
vulnerable to recruitment by hostile powers. Some joked blackly about spies
in their ranks.

Into this cauldron of malcontent came a new transfer from FBI headquarters
in Washington.

Robert Philip Hanssen, a nine-year bureau veteran known for being cerebral
and standoffish, was assigned to head a foreign counterintelligence squad,
an unglamorous but important job in a city where one-third of the 2,800
Soviet-bloc diplomats were thought to be spies.

For the Hanssen family -- Bob, his wife, Bonnie, and their six children, the
youngest just an infant -- the new posting meant sacrifice. They sold their
four-bedroom, 2 1/2-bath house in Fairfax County for $175,000, then turned
around and spent almost as much for a cramped three-bedroom, 1 1/2-bath
ranch house in Yorktown Heights, 90 minutes north of New York City.

By early 1987, Sheer had quit the FBI, saying flatly that his $72,500 salary
left him broke. Hanssen, who was earning about $46,000, would make a
different choice.

While his motive remains unexplained, within nine days of joining the New
York office Hanssen mailed the first of his letters to the KGB, the FBI
alleges, offering stolen secret documents in return for $100,000.

Today, New York FBI spokesman Joe Valiquette says, "Tom Sheer looks like the
smartest man in America."

Diverging Impressions
Those who thought they knew 56-year-old Robert Hanssen well are shocked and
mystified by the 15 years of betrayal and lies laid out in clinical detail
in a 109-page federal affidavit last week. To them, his fruitful career as a
wily but crass double agent is all but impossible to reconcile with the
seemingly pious, Chicago police lieutenant's son who kept a crucifix on the
wall behind his office desk.

Hanssen, arrested on espionage charges at a drop site in a Fairfax park last
Sunday, stands accused of taking more than $600,000 in cash and diamonds
from the Russians, with $800,000 more allegedly waiting for him in a Moscow
bank.

His attorney has said Hanssen will plead not guilty.

A complex and often contradictory portrait emerges from the pages of the
FBI's charges and interviews with dozens of Hanssen's friends, relatives,
colleagues and neighbors.

To be sure, the financial pressures he faced with six children in private
school were substantial for a man on a government salary. In one of his
earliest communications with his KGB handler, the would-be spy asked for
payment in diamonds, "as security to my children." He later returned two
gems to the Russians, asking for cash instead, according to the FBI.

Some who worked with Hanssen through the years cannot believe he is the man
who wrote those letters and sold out his country for money.

They describe a man who seemed to shun all displays of ostentation. He
favored hamburgers for lunch, owned three older vehicles and drove his
family to Florida on vacation to visit their grandmother.

Hanssen, some suspect, must have been energized by the intellectual rush of
outsmarting an opponent -- even if that opponent was his agency and the
cause he served for 25 years.

"It's not a story about gain. It's a story about game," said David G. Major,
a former FBI counterintelligence official who has known Hanssen for more
than two decades and was once his boss.

The public Hanssen railed in 1950s terms against Marxist-Leninist
infiltrators. Raised as a Lutheran, he converted to Catholicism after he
married and later became deeply involved with Opus Dei, a conservative
Catholic organization.

His politics, too, were conservative and family-oriented. He attended
antiabortion demonstrations and gun shows, decried communism for being
"godless" and referred reverentially to the FBI's first director as "Mr.
Hoover."

By contrast, the double agent who operated under the code names B, Ramon and
Garcia was routinely profane and dismissive of his employer and country. He
contemptuously compared the United States to an idiot savant and referred to
his KGB handlers as "dear friends" to whom he was "insanely loyal," in
letters quoted in the affidavit. His disdain for the FBI only seemed to
increase as he continued to elude discovery.

Boasting degrees in chemistry and accounting, Hanssen was known within the
bureau as an intellectual for his mastery of arcane details. Initially, some
acquaintances said he had the nickname of Dr. Death because he dressed as
properly and somberly as a mortician. But his good friends say it was
because he sometimes was so deadly boring that he could induce sleep in
colleagues. He delved into computers in the early 1980s, when everyone else
was still using electric typewriters, and taught himself two computer
programming languages, C and Pascal.

James Bamford, an author of books about intelligence-gathering, met Hanssen
through a mutual acquaintance seven or eight years ago. The two became
friends -- Hanssen attended Bamford's wedding -- but Bamford said he now
believes there was another, darker side to the man. "He had an extremely
secret life," Bamford said. "It was almost to the point where he had a split
personality right down the middle. It's the most complete alter ego I've
ever seen."

David Charney, a psychiatrist who has studied spies and was a defense expert
in the case of Earl E. Pitts, an FBI agent charged with espionage in 1996,
said Hanssen may have privately been frustrated with how his life was
turning out. "Everyone is their own worst critic," Charney said. "If they're
not satisfied with these ideals, it creates a disease within them."

A target is needed to release the frustration, he said, and often it's the
workplace. "To anybody in espionage, what's the worst thing you can do to
sabotage someone who didn't appreciate you, who didn't promote or support
you? Give away their secrets," he said. "But here's the crux: Once you've
stepped over the line, there's no turning back. . . . You're trapped. There
are no credible exits. So you resign yourself to living this life."

James K. Kallstrom, who met often with Hanssen in the 1980s as head of the
FBI's special operations division, now wonders whether Hanssen was as smart
as he seemed.

"He had to know the Russians were keeping a record of every contact they had
with him," Kallstrom said. "And it's obvious once the FBI got hold of his
[Russian] file, they were able to figure out who he was. The guy may have
been smart and cunning, but he was dumb."

Midwestern Roots
Hanssen was born in April 1944, the only child of a Chicago cop. As a young
man, he seemed to be seeking a way out of the blue-collar life represented
by his boyhood neighborhood of modest brick and wooden bungalows on the
city's western edge.

At Taft High School, the 1962 yearbook lists him as an honors student, a
member of the Radio Club and a teaching assistant, and bears this notation
under his photograph: "Science is the light of life."

With a degree in chemistry from Knox College, a private liberal arts campus
in downstate Illinois, he next flirted with dentistry but dropped out of
Northwestern University's dental school after two years.

Paul Moore, a friend and former FBI agent, remembers Hanssen saying he was a
good enough dentist, he could look at a decayed tooth and figure out how to
approach the problem, "but he didn't want his fingers to be stuck in
somebody's wet mouth all day."

Instead, he switched to accounting, receiving a master's in business
administration in 1971.

Hanssen was raised in the Lutheran faith, according to his mother, Vivian,
and attended Lutheran churches through college. Soon after his 1968 marriage
to Bonnie, who comes from a large Catholic family, he converted "because he
wanted to keep his family one religion," Vivian Hanssen said.

After Northwestern, he worked briefly as an accountant, then joined the
Chicago Police Department in October 1972, three months after his father,
Howard, ended his 30-year police career and retired to Florida.

Directly out of the police academy, the younger Hanssen was named to a new
undercover unit called C-5, so cloaked in secrecy that its 30 or so members
had fictional assignments placed in their personnel files. Hanssen was
listed with the vice squad but never worked there, nor did he ever walk a
beat, said Pat Camden, a department spokesman. C-5's job was to ferret out
corrupt police officers, and its members were considered an elite corps.

Even in that rarified group, Hanssen stood out, said Ernie Rizzo, a private
investigator who knew Hanssen when they attended a secret electronics
surveillance school that operated in a Chicago storefront disguised as a
television repair shop.

"He wasn't flashy. He was just a plain, church-going kind of guy, the kind
of guy you get in counterintelligence," Rizzo said. "He was too young in the
business then to have a reputation, but you could tell he was really smart."

Jack Clarke, a security consultant for C-5, thought Hanssen overqualified to
be a police officer: "Finally, one day I took him aside and said, 'Go down
to the federal building and put in an application for the FBI. You shouldn't
be here.' "

Brainy and Philosophical
There was a Walter Mitty quality to the beginning of Hanssen's career in the
FBI.

He joined Jan. 12, 1976, and did stints in Indiana and New York City before
being transferred to headquarters in 1981.

Much of his early work drew on his accounting background. He tracked
white-collar crime. He set up an automated database to monitor foreign
officials assigned to the United States. He worked on budget requests to
Congress and spent two years in the Soviet analytical unit.

If Hanssen stood out, it was as a brainy guy who had little interest in
standing around the water cooler talking about the Redskins.

"The kind of person who would walk into your office and have a very
philosophical discussion about anything from computers and
counterintelligence tradecraft to philosophy, ethics and classical music,"
said Major, who now trains CIA officers in Alexandria.

"He was a moral and ethical man," said Major, recalling that Hanssen
characterized communism as "godless."

"Not that many people talk like that, but he did."

Hanssen was comfortable talking about his faith. Moore recalls driving with
Hanssen when someone on the radio obliquely referred to morality as an
implied social contract. Hanssen reached over, clicked off the station and
said: "That's enough of that. The basis of morality is God's love."

Bamford, the writer, said Hanssen's professed Christianity and
anti-communism defined him. "The two most prominent aspects of his
personality were his religiosity and, ironically, his anti-communist
passion," he said. " . . . And he was extremely conservative in terms of his
political philosophy -- very, very antiabortion, marching in antiabortion
rallies, and very pro-gun."

An incident with a civilian FBI employee in February 1993 gave some the
impression that he had misogynistic tendencies. The employee, Kimberly
Lichtenberg, said she enraged Hanssen by walking out of a meeting. He chased
her, grabbed her by the arm and swung her around so violently she fell, then
started to drag her back into the meeting room, Lichtenberg said. She said
that she had bruises on her arm and face and that Hanssen was suspended for
five days without pay. A government official confirmed the incident.

"He thinks women are beneath him," said Lichtenberg, who filed a lawsuit
against Hanssen that was later dismissed when she failed to appear for a
court hearing. She said she had never been notified. "How dare I disobey
him? That's the worst thing I could've done."

No one remembers Hanssen explicitly criticizing the bureau, at least not at
the time he is alleged to have started spying.

"He seemed to be disappointed in the FBI at the end there," Moore said. "But
not before, and certainly not in 1985."

To his friends, Hanssen sounded resigned to moving from FBI headquarters
back to New York in 1985 as necessary to advance his career.

"You have to get your ticket punched, be a squad supervisor," Moore said.
"And he had a good post up there, as opposed to being in Queens or
someplace. He seemed to be happy about it and reconciled to the idea that it
was going to be expensive."

Neighbors in New York recall that the Hanssens pinched pennies.

"Like any big family, they seemed a little strapped for money," said Mary
Barchetto, who lived across from the family on Mead Street in Westchester
County. "The mother was handy, though. She made the duvet covers herself
from sheets she bought.

"Westchester is a tough place to live if you don't have a lot of money."

The Hanssens did well on real estate transactions, though. They sold their
first Vienna home for $25,000 more than they paid four years earlier; and
their Westchester house, which they owned for 20 months, for $47,000 more.

A Frugal Lifestyle
In the comfortable Vienna neighborhood around Talisman Drive, where the
Hanssens settled in 1987 on their return to Washington, Hanssen was thought
of as an involved father, a religious man, a well-respected FBI agent -- and
arrogant.

"This was no Ward Cleaver," said neighbor Francine Bennett, who recalls
Bonnie Hanssen remarking how much she missed her larger house on the other
side of Vienna and found it tough to squeeze her children into the new one.

Robert Hanssen, she said, "was aloof to the point that most of us just
stopped trying to interact with him. I've lived across the street from him
for over 10 years, and I've never talked to the man. I've repeatedly said
'Good morning,' 'Good evening,' 'How are you?' 'Drop dead,' whatever -- and
no reaction."

For most of last week, the family's $290,000 split-level house sat empty,
surrounded by yellow "Crime Scene" tape. With Hanssen in federal custody and
his wife and two teenagers still living at home temporarily ousted, FBI
agents scoured the four-bedroom house, picking through his belongings and
his past.

Friends and neighbors continue to grapple with the jarring possibility that
one of the most damaging spies in history lived in their midst.

"There's nothing outstanding that would prepare you for something like
this," said Mauro Scappa, 23, a technical recruiter in Washington who was
close to Hanssen's oldest son in high school.

The family lived frugally, neighbors said. The parents attended school
functions, shuttled the kids around and participated in church activities.
They restricted what TV shows their children watched. Their rectangular
dinner table has a chair at each end and a bench on either side for the
kids.

FBI officials have told reporters that Hanssen used computers in a locked,
basement room to record and process his communications with the Russians.
Friends and neighbors, however, say the basement computer room they are
familiar with was neither locked nor off-limits.

"I beat the game Frogger twice on the computer in that room," said neighbor
Hadley Greene, 13, a friend of the youngest Hanssen daughter.

Robert Hanssen irritated some neighbors by letting his dog, a black Lab mix
named Sunday, run unleashed in their yards, prompting at least three visits
by county animal control and police officers.

Hanssen's unwillingness to control his dog despite repeated warnings
antagonized neighbors, said Mike Shotwell, president of the homeowners
association.

"Most of us knew he was an [FBI] agent," said Shotwell, describing Hanssen
as aloof and unfriendly. "That's where we figured the arrogance came from."

One after another, the six Hanssen children trooped off to private schools
affiliated with Opus Dei: the three daughters to Oakcrest, a girls' school
now in McLean; the sons to The Heights, a Potomac school also attended by a
son of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh.

Tuition at The Heights is currently $10,700 a year, while Oakcrest charges
$9,000. One Hanssen son attended the College of William & Mary and is in law
school at the University of Notre Dame. Another son is enrolled at the
University of Dallas, a small Catholic school.

FBI officials place Robert Hanssen's salary at $87,000 to $114,000 a year.
Bonnie Hanssen is a part-time teacher at Oakcrest, friends said.

"He lived like a guy making his salary who has six kids," Moore said. "I
used to kid him, 'They're all insurance policies. They're all going to take
care of you when you're old.' "

Hanssen's attorneys declined to comment for this article. Bonnie Hanssen,
through those attorneys, also declined to comment. One of the couple's grown
daughters said the children still love and support their father, but she
declined to say more.

Hanssen's mother, Vivian, interviewed by telephone from her home in Florida,
said: "It's unbelievable to me, and I can't imagine him doing something like
that. But I love him just the same."

Orthodox Catholics
Religion was central to the family's life. Instead of attending Mass near
home, the family drove eight miles to a more traditional parish, St.
Catherine of Siena, in Great Falls.

Both Hanssens belonged to Opus Dei, an international organization of
Catholics whose members consider themselves orthodox followers of church
doctrine. Members are expected to meditate and attend Mass daily and to
regularly confess to a priest.

The group, founded by a Spanish priest in 1928, has 84,000 adherents
worldwide and has generated controversy over the years. Some Catholics and
others contend that it pressures vulnerable people to join, sometimes urging
alienation from family and friends who don't strictly share its beliefs.

Opus Dei members say the group is about helping people find God in daily
life. Members believe that all people are called to sainthood and that they
get there by following orthodox rules and rituals.

Those who've known the Hanssens through church and school question how
Hanssen the Catholic could have been Hanssen the spy, working on behalf of a
political system that sought to repress religious expression.

"I still think of them as a family with very deep Catholic affections and
roots," said Alvaro DeVicente, college counselor at The Heights. "But I'm
baffled. If this were a single man who had no family connections and no
other passions, I can see it. But how do you go home every night and look at
your wife? How do you go to your parish every Sunday?"

Church leaders say they certainly didn't see the kind of big money Hanssen
is alleged to have taken. His contributions to Opus Dei, according to a
national spokesman, totaled $4,000 from 1988 to 1992; and he gave The
Heights $200 or $300 annually -- not counting tuition -- from 1988 to 1998.

"Everything is alleged," said the Rev. C. John McCloskey, an Opus Dei priest
based in Washington. "But obviously if it is true, he couldn't have done
anything more against what Opus Dei stands for, or for that matter the
church. It's unthinkable."

Examining the Pieces
In the realm of spydom, double agents intrigue the most.

Colleagues and friends alike marvel that, if the allegations are true,
Hanssen could have survived so long, never seeming to crack under the strain
of living two fundamentally different and compartmentalized lives.

They now wonder: What was true and what was the illusion? Was the life they
saw a ruse, no more than clever cover? Or was there truth in both?

John J. Hamre, a former deputy defense secretary, believes he sees clues in
the letters authorities say Hanssen wrote to the KGB. They begin
businesslike, Hamre notes, and degenerate into slavish thanks to his
handlers for their good wishes and pleas for them to respond.

"It sounds like a guy who was living further and further into this
deception," he said, "and was starving for the attention he felt he
deserved."

To Paul Moore, Hanssen's longtime friend, it's a vexing puzzle.

"I can't make all the pieces fit together," Moore said. "I still have the
question of why."


© 2001 The Washington Post Company

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