From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Sun Feb 25, 2001 4:31pm Subject: U.S. Looks To Address Spy Problem U.S. Looks To Address Spy Problem http://www.guardianunlimited.co.uk/breakingnews/US/0,3560,754659,00.html Sunday February 25, 2001 8:20 pm WASHINGTON (AP) - Senators worried about America's compromised secrets are pitching a variety of ideas to keep intelligence out of the wrong hands. They are not sure any single one will do the job. Random lie-detector tests, audits of FBI agents' personal finances, and rotations to ensure people do not stay in top-secret positions too long are among proposals in play as the Senate Intelligence Committee prepares for hearings this week on the case of accused spy Robert Hanssen. As hungry as they are for answers, intelligence experts in and out of government expressed a measure of humility Sunday from the knowledge that solutions are as elusive as the spying trade itself. Higher salaries to discourage turncoats? That might help, said the committee chairman, Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala. ``But I guess if somebody's really motivated to spy for money, they're going to do it.'' Would random polygraphs like those used by the CIA have caught Hanssen, an FBI counterintelligence specialist, sooner? ``Maybe, maybe not,'' Shelby said. ``But I believe that they ought to use that.'' William S. Cohen, defense secretary in the Clinton administration and a spy novelist on the side, was struck by the cleverness of the techniques attributed to Hanssen in allegedly giving Moscow secrets over 15 years without drawing attention to himself. ``You can never fully stop spying,'' Cohen said. ``What you can do is to try to take every reasonable precaution to catch spies in your midst.'' Senators and Cohen, a former senator who organized a 1990 counterintelligence review, poked through a list of stepped-up precautions in appearances on the Sunday talk shows, including NBC's ``Meet the Press,'' ``Fox News Sunday,'' CBS' ``Face the Nation'' and CNN's ``Late Edition.'' FBI Director Louis Freeh, among those scheduled to testify before the committee Wednesday, has drawn only guarded criticism so far for having a mole go undetected for so long. President Bush has expressed confidence in him. But without using Freeh's name, Massachusetts Sen. John Kerry, a Democrat, said he could not understand why tougher procedures were not in place at the FBI along the lines of those instituted at the CIA after Aldrich Ames, one of their own, pleaded guilty to spying for Moscow in 1994. ``Somebody has to be held accountable,'' Kerry said. ``People would resign in the past over something like this.'' Florida Sen. Bob Graham, top Democrat on the committee, said people in sensitive intelligence jobs should be expected to give up greater privacy and submit to more polygraphs, and perhaps audits to detect unusual personal wealth. He also questioned why someone would be left for years in a highly sensitive job. ``Sometimes you gain complacency and people get in trouble,'' he said. Whether audits would have raised suspicion about Hanssen is an open question. He did not have an obviously lavish lifestyle, living in a modest suburban home in Virginia and driving a Taurus and minivan. He was, however, putting six children through Catholic schools and university, Graham noted. In a letter Hanssen is alleged to have written to his Russian handlers in 1985, the beginning of his alleged moonlighting for the KGB and its successor agency, he noted that a large reward could cause complications because ``I can not spend it, store it, or invest it easily without (tripping) ... warning bells.'' But payments in cash and diamonds added up, exceeding $600,000, the government says. The government says Hanssen passed some 6,000 documents and 26 computer disks to his handlers, detailing eavesdropping techniques, helping to confirm the identity of Russian double agents, and spilling other secrets. Using sophisticated computer techniques to gather information, and parks to drop off and retrieve packages, he operated without ever meeting his handlers or telling them where he worked, authorities say. Hanssen ``hid himself very well and ... by virtue of his training, knew all of the trade craft that would protect him from discovery,'' Cohen said. Sen. Chuck Hagel, R-Neb., said the United States let down its guard after the Soviet Union collapsed, despite the continuing demand for American secrets from foe and friend alike. ``We've become way too complacent and sanguine here over the last few years,'' he said. Even while pondering the alleged betrayal from within the FBI, Shelby could not say with certainty that his committee's own staff, which is let in on intelligence secrets, is free from moles of its own. ``We hope so,'' he said. ``You know, there's always surprises.'' -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2583 From: Doug Ellsworth Date: Sun Feb 25, 2001 11:57pm Subject: Lou Scherma Hi group, This is an unusual request, but a collegue, Mick Atteberry, asked me recently if I knew how to contact Lou Scherma. Mick describes Lou as his former mentor (now retired) and formerly a TSCM'er of high esteem. Since I don't know Lou, I thought some of you may be able to help. So, if any of you are familiar with Lou, or might have a tel number or some other info, please reply. Alternatively, If any of you have contact with Lou, please refer him to Mick at ConAgra Foods in Omaha at 402.595.4725. Happy days, -Doug [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 2584 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Feb 26, 2001 7:31am Subject: 'A Moral and Ethical Man': Colleagues Recall Their Time Spent With Agent Accused of Spying 'A Moral and Ethical Man': Colleagues Recall Their Time Spent With Agent Accused of Spying http://www.iht.com/articles/11732.html Carol Morello and William Claiborne Washington Post Service Why Would He Do It? WASHINGTON In the fall of 1985, agents were leaving the FBI's Manhattan office at the rate of seven a month, complaining they could not afford to live in New York on a government salary. With beginning agents making less than a city sanitation worker, and salaries no better in New York than in El Paso, Texas, or Boise, Idaho, many quit the bureau rather than be sent there. . The money squeeze was so bad that Thomas Sheer, an assistant director of the bureau who headed the Manhattan office, publicly warned that his agents were vulnerable to recruitment by hostile powers. Some joked blackly about spies in their ranks. . Into this cauldron of malcontent came a new transfer from FBI headquarters in Washington. . Robert Philip Hanssen, a nine-year bureau veteran known for being cerebral and standoffish, was assigned to head a foreign counterintelligence squad, an unglamorous but important job in a city where one-third of the 2,800 Soviet-bloc diplomats were thought to be spies. . For the Hanssen family - Bob, his wife, Bonnie, and their six children, the youngest just an infant - the new posting meant sacrifice. They sold their four-bedroom, 2- bath house in Fairfax County, Virginia, for $175,000, then turned around and spent almost as much for a cramped three-bedroom, 1-bath ranch house in Yorktown Heights, 90 minutes north of New York City. By early 1987, Mr. Sheer had quit the FBI, saying flatly that his $72,500 salary left him broke. Mr. Hanssen, who was earning about $46,000, would make a different choice. . While his motive remains unexplained, within nine days of joining the New York office Mr. Hanssen mailed the first of his letters to the KGB, the FBI alleges, offering stolen secret documents in return for $100,000. . Today, Joe Valiquette, a spokesman for the FBI in New York, says, "Tom Sheer looks like the smartest man in America." Those who thought they knew Robert Hanssen well are shocked and mystified by the 15 years of betrayal and lies laid out in clinical detail in a 109-page federal affidavit last week. To them, his alleged career as a wily but crass double agent is all but impossible to reconcile with the seemingly pious, Chicago police lieutenant's son who kept a crucifix on the wall behind his office desk. . Mr. Hanssen, arrested on espionage charges at a drop site in a Fairfax park on Feb. 18, stands accused of taking more than $600,000 in cash and diamonds from the Russians, with $800,000 more allegedly waiting for him in a Moscow bank. . His attorney has said that Mr. Hanssen, 56, will plead not guilty. A COMPLEX and often contradictory portrait emerges from the pages of the FBI's charges and interviews with dozens of Mr. Hanssen's friends, relatives, colleagues and neighbors. . To be sure, the financial pressures he faced with six children in private school were substantial for a man on a government salary. In one of his earliest communications with the KGB, the would-be spy allegedly asked for payment in diamonds, "as security to my children." He later returned two gems to the Russians, asking for cash instead, according to the FBI. . Some who worked with Mr. Hanssen through the years cannot believe he is the man who wrote those letters and sold out his country for money. . They describe a man who seemed to shun all displays of ostentation. He favored hamburgers for lunch, owned three older vehicles and drove his family to Florida on vacation to visit their grandmother. . If Mr. Hanssen stood out, it was as a brainy guy who had little interest in standing around the water cooler talking about football. David Major, a former FBI counterintelligence official who has known Mr. Hanssen for more than two decades and was once his boss, remembers Mr. Hanssen as "the kind of person who would walk into your office and have a very philosophical discussion about anything from computers and counterintelligence tradecraft to philosophy, ethics and classical music." . "He was a moral and ethical man," added Mr. Major, recalling that Mr. Hanssen characterized communism as "godless." . "Not that many people talk like that, but he did." . Mr. Hanssen, some suspect, must have been energized by the intellectual rush of outsmarting an opponent - even if that opponent was his agency and the cause he served for 25 years. . "It's not a story about gain. It's a story about game," said Mr. Major, who now trains CIA officers. . The public Mr. Hanssen railed in 1950s terms against Marxist-Leninist infiltrators. Raised as a Lutheran, he converted to Catholicism after he married and later became deeply involved with Opus Dei, a conservative Catholic organization. . His politics, too, were conservative and family-oriented. He attended anti-abortion demonstrations and gun shows, decried communism for being "godless" and referred reverentially to the FBI's first director as "Mr. Hoover." . By contrast, the double agent who operated under the code names B, Ramon and Garcia was routinely profane and dismissive of his employer and country. He contemptuously compared the United States to an idiot savant and referred to his KGB handlers as "dear friends" to whom he was "insanely loyal," in letters quoted in the affidavit. His disdain for the FBI only seemed to increase as he continued to elude discovery. . Boasting degrees in chemistry and accounting, Mr. Hanssen was known within the bureau as an intellectual for his mastery of arcane details. INITIALLY, some acquaintances said he had the nickname of Dr. Death because he dressed as properly and somberly as a mortician. But his good friends say it was because he sometimes was so deadly boring that he could induce sleep in colleagues. He delved into computers in the early 1980s, when everyone else was still using electric typewriters, and taught himself two computer programming languages, C and Pascal. . James Bamford, an author of books about intelligence-gathering, met Mr. Hanssen through a mutual acquaintance seven or eight years ago. The two became friends - Mr. Hanssen attended Mr. Bamford's wedding - but Mr. Bamford said that he now believes there was another, darker side to the man. "He had an extremely secret life," Mr. Bamford said. . "It was almost to the point where he had a split personality right down the middle. It's the most complete alter ego I've ever seen." . David Charney, a psychiatrist who has studied spies and was a defense expert in the case of Earl Pitts, an FBI agent charged with espionage in 1996, said Mr. Hanssen may have privately been frustrated with how his life was turning out. "Everyone is their own worst critic," Mr. Charney said. "If they're not satisfied with these ideals, it creates a disease within them." . A target is needed to release the frustration, he said, and often it is the workplace. . "To anybody in espionage, what's the worst thing you can do to sabotage someone who didn't appreciate you, who didn't promote or support you? Give away their secrets," Mr. Charney said. "But here's the crux: Once you've stepped over the line, there's no turning back." He continued: "You're trapped. There are no credible exits. So you resign yourself to living this life." James Kallstrom, who met often with Mr. Hanssen in the 1980s as head of the FBI's special operations division, now wonders whether Mr. Hanssen was as smart as he seemed. . "He had to know the Russians were keeping a record of every contact they had with him," Mr. Kallstrom said. "And it's obvious once the FBI got hold of his Russian file, they were able to figure out who he was. The guy may have been smart and cunning, but he was dumb." -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2585 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Feb 26, 2001 7:32am Subject: Congress to Grill Intelligence Chiefs Over Russian Spy Scandal Congress to Grill Intelligence Chiefs Over Russian Spy Scandal http://www.russiatoday.com/news.php3?id=297384 WASHINGTON, Feb 26, 2001 -- (Agence France Presse) Members of Congress vowed Sunday to grill Bush administration and top intelligence officials at a special Senate hearing to determine the extent of the damage inflicted by the latest Russian spy scandal. In the wake of last week's dramatic arrest of FBI counterintelligence agent Robert Hanssen, the Senate Intelligence Committee, led by Republican Richard Shelby, plans to put the Washington intelligence community on the witness stand starting Wednesday. Shelby said that after questioning Attorney General John Ashcroft, the director of the FBI Louis Freeh, CIA chief George Tenet as well as other key players, "we will know a lot more," about the scandal that has stunned Washington. Asked on "Fox News Sunday" to say how damaging Hanssen's betrayal really was, Shelby declined to characterize the spy case as the worst ever. "But I would agree from what I know with Louis Freeh, that it's grave, it's very serious," he said. Hanssen, 56, was charged Tuesday with selling information that damaged U.S. security and compromised three Russian double agents working for the United States. A preliminary court hearing is scheduled for March 5 for the former deputy director of FBI Intelligence Division's Soviet Section. Hanssen allegedly began to pass highly sensitive information to Moscow in 1985 and continued in the activity even after the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Experts estimate that Hanssen, a 27-year FBI veteran with virtually unlimited access to state secrets, may have seriously compromised U.S. national security. Shelby credited the FBI with doing a good job in unmasking the alleged spy but asked "what took so long?" and questioned security practices at the agency which unlike the CIA does not routinely use polygraph testing on its staff. "The polygraph has got to be a tool," he said. Bob Graham, the senior Democrat on the committee, also advocated regular lie detector testing at the FBI. "In other agencies, such as the CIA, the use of polygraph has been felt to have been an important means by which to discourage people from engaging in this kind of activity," he told Fox. FBI chief Freeh has called on former FBI and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William Webster to carry out a broad review of security measures. Questions about the motives of Hanssen, who was allegedly paid more than a million dollars by Moscow, have yet to be answered, but low pay at the FBI may be a factor, Shelby acknowledged. "Well, I think pay is always a factor. Our agents, CIA, our people in the Justice Department ought to be paid well. But I guess if somebody's really motivated to spy for money, they're going to do it," he said. Former defense secretary William Cohen, speaking on the CBS talk show "Face the Nation," said traitors will always emerge but suggested a number of steps needed to be taken to limit the damage. These would include reducing individual access to information, so no one agent has "access to virtually everything." Also computers should be programmed to alert officials if an agent is carrying out unauthorized searches, as Hanssen allegedly did. "And then finally, consider the possibility of the polygraph. That's something that I think would be important," he said. ((c) 2001 Agence France Presse) -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2586 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Feb 26, 2001 7:33am Subject: CIA reacted, but FBI didn't, to earlier spy case CIA reacted, but FBI didn't, to earlier spy case http://orlandosentinel.com/news/orl-asec-hd-spy-022501.story?coll=orl%2Dhome%2Dheadlines Associated Press Posted February 25, 2001 WASHINGTON -- The CIA tightened security dramatically after one of its own, Aldrich Ames, pleaded guilty to espionage in 1994 so that random lie-detector tests could hit any employee at any time. The FBI, by contrast, tiptoed into internal lie-detector, or polygraph, exams of employees. Now that agent Robert Philip Hanssen has been charged with spying for the Soviet Union and then Russia for more than 15 years, some are calling for the bureau to match the CIA’s earlier response. "When the Ames case hit, Congress came down very hard on the agency, and the agency did a lot to change the culture so people were more supportive of counterintelligence and understanding counterintelligence," said Cindy Kwitchoff, who left the CIA last year. The CIA has conducted lie-detector tests on employees since its inception. Even before the Ames case, all employees were given polygraphs before hiring, after a three-year probationary period and every five years thereafter. Former CIA official Vincent Cannistraro said the discovery that Ames had been able to access a message-delivery system of overseas operational traffic prompted the CIA to clamp down on such trespassing. "There’s better access controls at the CIA in the wake of Ames . . . but they were not implemented within the counterintelligence directorate of the FBI," Cannistraro said Friday. The CIA also started having counterespionage experts train its security investigators, required all employees to file detailed annual financial disclosures and established databases that looked at employees’ personal foreign travel, foreign contacts and outside activities. If you want to moonlight, you need the agency’s permission. If you travel to Cancun, you have to tell the CIA. At the FBI, annual financial disclosure forms are required only of people in specified positions, bureau employees must disclose travel plans and agents are banned from taking second jobs, agent Jay Spadafore said. The FBI started requiring polygraphs before employment only in 1994 -- long after Hanssen was hired. Hanssen never took an FBI polygraph. A critical 1997 report by the Justice Department’s inspector general prompted numerous changes at the FBI. Copyright © 2001, Orlando Sentinel -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2587 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Feb 26, 2001 7:34am Subject: U.S. Charges Pose Paradox of Pious Spy for Godless Foe Sunday February 25 05:00 PM EST U.S. Charges Pose Paradox of Pious Spy for Godless Foe http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nyt/20010225/ts/u_s_charges_pose_paradox_of_pious_spy_for_godless_foe_1.html By PHILIP SHENON The New York Times Robert Philip Hanssen, the F.B.I. official accused of spying for Russia, gave every appearance of living a pious life, often telling his friends that the teachings of Lenin were incompatible with those of Jesus Christ. WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 ­ For a man accused of betraying his country to the godless leadership of the Soviet Communist Party, Robert Philip Hanssen could not have seemed a more devout follower of the Roman Catholic Church ­ or a more committed anti-Communist. He often told his friends in the counterintelligence division of the F.B.I., where he worked for most of his 25-year career with the bureau, that he loathed Communism and that the teachings of Lenin were incompatible with those of Jesus Christ. "Bob would walk into my office and tell me that without religion, man is lost," said his former F.B.I. supervisor, David Major, "and that the Soviet Union would ultimately fail because it was run by the godless Communists. And I believe he was sincere." The bureau's former chief China analyst, Paul D. Moore, recalled that when F.B.I. agents held going-away parties at strip clubs near the bureau's headquarters in Washington, Mr. Hanssen refused to attend, saying his faith would not permit it. "He said, you shouldn't do that because it's an occasion of sin," said Mr. Moore, who used to car-pool to work with Mr. Hanssen, a friend of 20 years. He recalled Mr. Hanssen's snapping off the car radio one day during a talk-show conversation about morality ­ and whether morality was based on social contracts. "He leaned over and turned off the radio and said, `That's enough of that,' " Mr. Moore said. "He said the foundation for morality is not an implied social contract; it's God's law." If Mr. Hanssen's piety and staunch anti-Communism were simply a front for his treachery, if they were a cover for a long career in espionage, they were remarkably convincing to the professional spy catchers who worked day in and day out with the shy, socially awkward, highly intelligent agent. Mr. Hanssen, who could face the death penalty, was arrested last Sunday on charges of spying since 1985, initially for the Soviet Union and then, after its collapse, for Russia. He was apprehended after he supposedly dropped off secret documents at a park near his home in Vienna, Va. The case is described by officials as potentially the worst intelligence breach in the bureau's history, given Mr. Hanssen's access to some of the most highly classified information in the computer banks of the F.B.I. The bureau has said that at least two Russian double agents who were executed may have been exposed because of his disclosures. In his quarter-century at the F.B.I. ­ at the time of his arrest, he was only a few months from retirement ­ Mr. Hanssen gave every appearance of living the life of a God-fearing Christian. When he worked in the fourth-floor offices of the counterintelligence division at F.B.I. headquarters in the 1980's, colleagues remembered that he would sometimes leave his cubicle for an hour to attend Mass at a downtown church. Every Sunday for years, Mr. Hanssen and his wife, Bonnie, a teacher, were found in the same left-side pew near the altar of St. Catherine of Siena Catholic Church in Great Falls, Va. The Hanssens told friends they had selected the church because it was one of the few in the region that still conducted a Latin Mass, and they preferred a traditional service. Among the church's other regular parishioners: Louis J. Freeh, the director of the F.B.I., and Justice Antonin Scalia of the Supreme Court. (Mr. Freeh said through a spokesman that he had known the Hanssens through a handful of contacts at the church but was never a "social friend" of the couple's.) The Hanssens were adherents of Opus Dei, an elite conservative Catholic order. Opus Dei urges its members to attend daily Mass, and Mr. Hanssen also regularly appeared for evening prayer-and-confession sessions known as recollections. While the Hanssens lived in a suburb of Washington known for the quality of its public schools, they chose instead to send their six children ­ three boys and three girls ­ to expensive private schools affiliated with Opus Dei. Former colleagues said they would be shocked if Mr. Hanssen turned out to have spent the money he is accused of having received from his handlers in Moscow ­ at least $600,000 in cash, the F.B.I. says ­ on alcohol or fancy automobiles or women. Instead, they suspect, he probably used much of the proceeds from his spying to pay tuition at his children's schools. The Heights School of Potomac, Md., which his youngest son, a junior, attends, charges annual tuition and fees of nearly $11,000, which alone would make a large dent in Mr. Hanssen's F.B.I. salary of about $100,000 a year. His older sons also graduated from the school, which will not say if any of the boys received financial aid. Calls for comment to his daughters' school, Oakcrest, in McLean, Va., were not returned. In interviews since his arrest, many of Mr. Hanssen's closest friends and colleagues, dumbfounded by the spying accusations, have said they can only offer a guess as to why a man so committed to his faith might have volunteered for espionage on behalf of the political system that was long considered organized religion's greatest enemy. Several suggest that Mr. Hanssen must have been able to completely compartmentalize his life, deluding himself into thinking that espionage was simply an exciting intellectual challenge that had nothing to do with leading a good, moral Christian life. "I think Bob was able to bifurcate his life," said Mr. Major, his former supervisor. "He somehow made the intellectual leap, which I just cannot rationalize, that the compromise of information was somehow O.K., and that it was just a game. It's too simple to say thrill, but I do believe that he was in for the game, not the gain." Rusty Capps, a retired counterintelligence agent who worked with Mr. Hanssen at F.B.I. headquarters in the early 1990's, agreed that Mr. Hanssen was a "brilliant guy" who may have needed "the thrill ­ this is a guy who needs stimulation, who liked to walk on the razor's edge." "I probably recruited 50 or 60 people over the years to provide information to the United States, and the vast majority of them did it because their lives weren't all that exciting," Mr. Capps said. "Certainly money is always there, revenge, disgruntlement, ego gratification. But it's also excitement." The theory is supported by F.B.I. documents showing that Mr. Hanssen insisted on several so-called dead drops in the Washington area ­ risky secret exchanges of packages with his Moscow handlers ­ at short intervals. Common espionage doctrine holds that it is far less dangerous to exchange more material at fewer dead drops. F.B.I. officials say that Mr. Hanssen's career stalled years ago, and that resentment over his failure to rise higher in management despite his obvious intelligence could be a factor in his decision to spy. But many who know Mr. Hanssen say it was clearly not the full explanation, and that he complained far less than other agents about troubles with his career. "I never had the impression that he felt that he was thwarted," said John J. Gaskill, a retired agent who considered Mr. Hanssen a friend. "There's a very high percentage of special agents who are not necessarily looking to climb the ladder." Evidence released by the F.B.I. seems to suggest that greed would not have been the sole motivation, either. In one letter supposedly written by Mr. Hanssen to his Soviet handlers in November 1985, the letter writer, known to the Russians by the code name B, asked them to stop sending money beyond an initial $100,000. "I have little need or utility for more," the letter said. "It merely provides a difficulty since I cannot spend it, store it or invest it easily." Neighbors who live near the Hanssens' brick and wood home in Vienna remember a quiet, reclusive man who seemed little interested in money or material goods, apart from computers, which were a passion. F.B.I. colleagues say that he did not drink or swear, certainly never in their presence. He made clear that clothes were not important to him. He wore dark, fraying, unstylish business suits, often the same one for two or three days in a row. His wardrobe and timid, dour personality earned him nicknames among colleagues like Dr. Death, the Mortician and Digger, short for gravedigger. Richard McPherson, a fellow member of Opus Dei and the headmaster of the Heights School, said he continued to believe that Mr. Hanssen's shows of piety and his lack of interest in material goods "were not some sort of cover." He remembered Mr. Hanssen's devotion to his children, and how he volunteered for school dances, where he served as a chaperon, and attended his sons' sporting events. "I thought he was a great father, a good husband and a good professional," Mr. McPherson said. "Of course, if he did what he is purported to have done, then he was living a lie as a Christian and a citizen. But I'm still hoping there's an explanation." The roots of Mr. Hanssen's commitment to the church and to law enforcement are found in Chicago, where he was born in April 1944 to a Catholic family. "When people from Chicago meet, they ask what parish are you from," said Mr. Moore, who also grew up in the city. Mr. Hanssen's father was a Navy petty officer who later joined the Chicago Police Department. Robert graduated with a degree in chemistry from Knox College, outside Chicago, in 1966. His F.B.I. records show he also studied Russian there. F.B.I. investigators are trying to determine whether Mr. Hanssen developed another interest ­ espionage ­ in his youth in Chicago. The bureau said in its court papers this week that Mr. Hanssen wrote to his Russian handlers last year to say that "I decided on this course when I was 14 years old ­ I'd read Philby's book." The reference was to Kim Philby, the dashing British traitor who defected to Moscow in 1963, when his involvement in a Soviet spy ring was about to be revealed. (F.B.I. colleagues point out that Mr. Philby's memoirs were not published until the late 1960's, when Mr. Hanssen was well into his 20's, not 14, and that the statement was probably a lie meant to win over his Russian counterparts.) Mr. Hanssen had trouble settling on a career after college. He dropped out of Northwestern University's dental school after two years to enter its business school, where he received an M.B.A. In 1972, he followed his father into the Chicago Police Department, where he was quickly assigned to undercover work. He arrived at the F.B.I. in 1976, hired to work initially on a white- collar crime squad in Gary, Ind. Colleagues say that from the earliest days of his career at the bureau, Mr. Hanssen impressed everyone with his intelligence; some called him brilliant. Mr. Hanssen distinguished himself early in his career for his mastery of computer technology, which he helped introduce to the counterintelligence division ­ a fact that alarms F.B.I. investigators who are now trying to figure out what damage he may have done. "He was always on the leading edge of computers," Mr. Gaskill said. "He had access to pretty much anything that we were involved in." But while his superiors were excited about his technical skills, they were put off by his awkwardness in social settings, his indifference to his wardrobe, his slouching posture. A tall man, he always seemed to be hunched over, his head perched on his neck at an odd, birdlike angle, colleagues said. In an organization that had always prided itself on a military-style esprit de corps and tended to prefer managers with booming voices who looked good on camera, friends in the bureau say that Mr. Hanssen should have known he was never going to rise very far in the F.B.I. Mr. Capps, the retired counterintelligence agent, recalled organizing a seminar in the early 1990's at which Mr. Hanssen was asked to lecture on counterintelligence techniques. "And people would stop listening to him after one or two sentences," he said. "He had no ability to modulate his voice, no ability to entertain. It was just awful." "`There is a full package of talents necessary to convince management that you could handle yourself at the next level," Mr. Capps said. "He didn't possess that package." -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2588 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Feb 26, 2001 7:35am Subject: Newsweek Cover: 'The Mind of a Spy' Newsweek Cover: 'The Mind of a Spy' http://news.excite.com/news/pr/010225/ny-newsweek-spys Updated 1:23 PM ET February 25, 2001 FBI Director Freeh Gave Speech at Son's School and Was Greeted by Fellow Agent And Suspected Spy Robert Hanssen Hanssen's Children Assume Allegations Are True, Says In-Law; Dental School Classmate Says Hanssen Would 'Show Off' at Mental Facility, Interrogating Patients NEW YORK, Feb. 25 /PRNewswire/ -- FBI Director Louis Freeh showed up to give a speech at his son's school and was greeted by another school parent, fellow FBI agent Robert Hanssen, who was at that moment under surveillance for turning traitor as a Russian spy, Newsweek reports in the current issue. When Freeh returned to his office the next day, he told a colleague how difficult it had been to give a speech on ethics and morality, all the while knowing that Hanssen -- a 27-year bureau veteran, father of six and member of the righteous and anti-communist Opus Dei -- had betrayed everything that Freeh held dear. (Photo: http://www.newscom.com/cgi-bin/prnh/20010224/NEWSWEEK ) The Newsweek report details the life of Hanssen before and after he became a spy, based on the affidavit released by the FBI and interviews with friends and colleagues. Hanssen's children are assuming the allegations against their father are true, his sister-in-law Liz Rahimi told Newsweek. "They just think there was something wrong with their dad, and they didn't know," she said in the March 5 cover story, "The Mind of a Spy," (on newsstands Monday, February 26). Hanssen's mother-in-law Fran Wauck told Newsweek, "The family is devastated. We don't even know who he is." When he was 21, Hanssen went to dental school. He worked at a state mental facility on the weekends and enjoyed interviewing the patients, as if he were a real psychiatrist, and occasionally would invite a friend to the hospital to watch him perform. "He loved showing people the control he had over the patients, who were mostly bonkers," said John Sullivan, a classmate. "He liked to show off for his friends, putting these people through their paces. He wasn't mean to the inmates; he just quietly interrogated them." Sullivan said Hanssen had another quirk: he repeatedly described a dream, in which he was sitting on a throne, "like Emperor Ming in Flash Gordon," passing final judgment on his enemies. "Guard!" Hanssen would imagine himself commanding. "Take them away!" -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2589 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Feb 26, 2001 7:36am Subject: Diamonds Are a Spy's Best Friend Sunday, February 25, 2001 Diamonds Are a Spy's Best Friend http://www.latimes.com/news/comment/20010225/t000016876.html By DAVID WISE WASHINGTON--Perhaps the most startling aspect of the espionage firestorm that broke over Washington last week was that for many years neither the KGB nor the FBI knew the identity of the spy. Senior officials of the KGB and its successor, Russia's SVR, were doubtless ecstatic to have another incredibly valuable mole planted somewhere inside the U.S. intelligence establishment. But the spy had refused to reveal his name, to meet face to face with the Russians or even to say where he worked. He was known to them only as "Ramon." The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in turn, had for several years suspected that a mole was burrowing away inside its ranks, but only within the past few months was it able to narrow the search to Robert Philip Hanssen. Last Sunday evening, the FBI arrested Hanssen, a veteran FBI counterintelligence agent, as he emerged from a "dead drop," a hiding place in a park in Northern Virginia, where officials said he had left a bag of classified documents. A package containing $50,000 was waiting for him in another hiding place nearby, the FBI said. As far as is known, the Russian spy agency did not learn the name Robert Hanssen until just after 7 o'clock Tuesday morning, when Matt Lauer, co-host of NBC's "Today" show, and correspondent Pete Williams broke the news of the arrest hours before it was officially revealed. According to the FBI, for more than 15 years, Hanssen, who has pleaded not guilty to espionage charges, provided highly sensitive classified documents and information to the KGB and the SVR. The damage, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh said, was "exceptionally grave." Hanssen's spying, he added, "represents the most traitorous actions imaginable." The 56-year-old FBI man had worked for the bureau for 25 years, most of that time in counterintelligence. In a long and detailed affidavit, the FBI charged that its trusted counterintelligence agent had been paid or promised $1.4 million. He was earning $114,000 a year at the FBI. Hanssen, the FBI said, had received $600,000 in cash and diamonds and was told that another $800,000 had been placed in an escrow account for him in Moscow. The existence of a suspected deep-cover mole in the most sensitive area of the FBI's operations, its National Security Division, was a devastating blow to the bureau, whose counterintelligence agents have in the past been regarded as highly effective at catching foreign spies. Now, it is alleged, one of their own turned his training and counterespionage skills against his agency and his country. If so, it means that the FBI harbored its own Aldrich H. Ames for more than 15 years. Hanssen is said to have begun his double life on Oct. 1, 1985, less than six months after Ames volunteered his services to Moscow. Ames, a trusted CIA officer, was arrested in 1994 after betraying the names of countless Russians, most of them intelligence agents working for the Central Intelligence Agency. Ten were executed; many others imprisoned. Hanssen stands accused of confirming to the KGB the names of two of those agents who were subsequently shot, and a third, who was imprisoned by the Soviets but later pardoned by former President Boris N. Yeltsin. Ames pleaded guilty and received a life sentence. After the Ames case, Congress passed a law restoring the death penalty for espionage in certain situations. Because Hanssen is accused of contributing to the deaths of two agents, Valery F. Martinov and Sergei M. Motorin, KGB officers who were stationed in the Soviet Embassy in Washington, he could face the death penalty for that or other alleged acts. As his lawyer, Hanssen has hired the wily and formidable Plato Cacheris, who also represented Ames. Hanssen is married with a wife and six children--he attends the same Catholic church as Freeh and the two know each other--and to all outward appearances, he was a dedicated, straight-arrow FBI man living within his means. Although the government might choose to put him on trial, the greater likelihood is that Cacheris, if his client agrees, will seek a plea bargain. Under such a deal, Hanssen would be expected to reveal the full extent of his alleged treachery in exchange for something less than the death penalty. In his alleged spying for Moscow, Hanssen himself appeared well aware of the danger. In one letter to his Russian handlers, the FBI said he wrote: "Recent changes in U.S. law now attach the death penalty to my help to you as you know, so I do take some risk." When an intelligence disaster is uncovered, spy agencies embark on a "damage assessment," now underway in the Hanssen case. Mark Hulkower, the former assistant U.S. attorney who successfully prosecuted Ames, has said that Hanssen's prosecutors must figure out a way to get a plea bargain. Without it, the government may never know the full extent of the alleged damage done. But the FBI has already claimed that Hanssen provided the Russians with 6,000 pages of documents and compromised a huge amount of highly classified programs and intelligence methods, including "technical operations," a euphemism for bugging, wiretapping and other exotic means of listening in on Russian installations and operatives in this country. If there is any comfort for the FBI in all this, it is that U.S. spies, in what Freeh called a "counterintelligence coup," apparently succeeded in obtaining a rare treasure: the actual KGB file on Ramon. The file includes letters between an unidentified American spy and his Russian handlers. Some of those same letters, the FBI said, were found on a computer card in Hanssen's office at bureau headquarters in Washington. The FBI has not said how it obtained the KGB file, although one possibility is that a Russian defector brought it out as his ticket to a generous amount of money from the CIA or the FBI and a new life in America. The FBI isn't saying. Under the CIA's "resettlement program," a defector who came over with a jewel of that magnitude would be guaranteed red-carpet treatment, a large stipend for life, a new identity and personal security. There are many unresolved questions about the case, including not only the extent of the damage, Hanssen's alleged motives, how he was caught and how he managed, if the charges are true, to get away with his spying for so long. The last question is, in some ways, the easiest to answer. As a trained counterintelligence agent, and a good one by all accounts, Hanssen's job was to catch Soviet, then Russian spies. That would have provided him with unexcelled cover if he betrayed his trust. Moreover, someone in Hanssen's position would have known exactly how to maintain contact with the Russians in a way to avoid detection by his counterintelligence colleagues. He knew all the tricks of the trade--that was his job. He refused to meet any Russians, either here or abroad. Typically, Russian spies meet their American agents in Vienna, Mexico or other overseas locations for a simple reason: They assume the FBI will not be watching. Hanssen, according to the FBI affidavit, set the terms by refusing to reveal his true identity or in what government agency he worked. William H. Webster, the respected former director of both the FBI and the CIA, has been enlisted to review the bureau's internal procedures to see whether they can be improved in the wake of the Hanssen case. He will no doubt take a close look at the bureau's lie-detector policy. Although new FBI employees are polygraphed, only selected agents involved in highly sensitive cases are given lie-detector tests, and not routinely. The CIA, which has much greater faith in lie detectors, polygraphs its officers at set intervals. On the other hand, Ames sailed through his polygraph tests with no great difficulty; the KGB had advised him to just relax and get a good night's sleep before facing the machine. Hanssen apparently knew that life on the edge might one day lead to his undoing. "Eventually, I would appreciate an escape plan," he allegedly wrote to his Soviet handlers in 1985. "Nothing lasts forever." - - - David Wise Writes Frequently About Intelligence. he Is the Author of "Cassidy's Run: the Secret Spy War Over Nerve Gas." -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2590 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Feb 26, 2001 7:37am Subject: Senators call for changes at FBI to prevent spying Senators call for changes at FBI to prevent spying http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/02/25/spy.fallout/index.html February 25, 2001 Web posted at: 2:19 PM EST (1919 GMT) WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The chairman of a Senate committee that will investigate the case of a 25-year veteran of the FBI charged with espionage said Sunday he wants to find out why it took investigators so long to uncover the alleged misdeeds, and he called for reforms within the agency to guard against the possibility of having moles within its ranks. "The question is, what took so long?" said Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Alabama, speaking on "Fox News Sunday." "Why did they not have some leads? Or, if they had them, did they ignore them?" Sen. John Kerry, D-Massachusetts, also expressed frustration that an apparent mole went undetected for 15 years. Robert Philip Hanssen was arrested a week ago on charges that he spied for the Soviet Union and later Russia over a period of 15 years. "I don't understand, I really don't understand, how in the most sensitive areas of your counterespionage, et cetera, you don't have better procedures in place to be making certain that people are living up to the highest standards and that this has gone on as long as it has," he said on CNN's "Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer." "I'm shocked. I'm really surprised by it. I think most Americans are ... I think somebody has to be held accountable." Kerry suggested that somebody ought to step down because of the disclosures, but he did not elaborate. "We don't seem to hold people accountable the way one used to," Kerry said. "People would resign over something like this in the past." Shelby, the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said there have to be changes within the FBI to guard against any spy activity. The committee is scheduled to hold a closed-door hearing Wednesday at which CIA Director George Tenet, FBI Director Louis Freeh and Attorney General John Ashcroft are expected to testify. Shelby noted that Hanssen had been involved with counterintelligence operations for most of his career and suggested that kind of tenure might be unhealthy. "What do you gain by leaving someone in a very sensitive position for so many years?" Shelby asked on "Fox News Sunday." "Sometimes you gain complacency and people get in trouble. I think the FBI, in my opinion, is going to have to change some management practices there, but we're waiting to hear from Louis Freeh." If convicted, Hanssen could face the death penalty or life in prison. He is scheduled to appear in federal court March 5 in Alexandria, Va., for a preliminary hearing. Sen. Bob Graham, a Florida Democrat who sits on the intelligence panel, said the FBI should have picked up warning signs sooner. "There were some lifestyle issues of Hanssen that raised questions," Graham told Fox. "Apparently he had six children, several, if not all, of whom were attending expensive private schools. And the question is, how did he afford to pay that? Those would have been questions raised if the FBI had had regulation financial audits of its sensitive personnel." Graham said the FBI needs to conduct periodic polygraph tests and scrutinize the financial records of those employees in sensitive positions. The FBI and CIA are determining the scope of the security damage allegedly caused by Hanssen, but have described it as serious and extensive. Sen. Chuck Hagel, R-Nebraska, said a thorough review of domestic intelligence operations is needed. "I think we're going to have to open up all the windows and the doors, and take a new look at our entire intelligence apparatus -- the people, the process, the procedures," he said on CNN. "We've become way too complacent and sanguine here over the last few years ... That cannot stand." -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2591 From: Date: Mon Feb 26, 2001 11:53am Subject: Someone I'm sure can use this... Click here: Forensex Laboratories Corp 2592 From: Shawn Hughes Date: Tue Feb 27, 2001 5:42am Subject: How to please the IS dept. Subject: How to please your IS Department HOW TO PLEASE YOUR I.S. DEPARTMENT (A quick check list for those who need to make contact.) 1. When you call us to have your computer moved, be sure to leave it buried under half a ton of postcards, baby pictures, stuffed animals, dried flowers, bowling trophies and children's art. We don't have a life, and we find it deeply moving to catch a fleeting glimpse of yours. 2. Don't write anything down. Ever. We can play back the error messages from here. 3. When an I.S. person says he's coming right over, go for coffee. That way you won't be there when we need your password. It's nothing for us to remember 700 screen saver passwords. 4. When you call the help desk, state what you want, not what's keeping you from getting it. We don't need to know that you can't get into your mail because your computer won't power on at all. 5. When I.S. support sends you an E-Mail with high importance, delete it at once. We're just testing. 6. When an I.S. person is eating lunch at his desk, walk right in and spill your guts right out. We exist only to serve. 7. Send urgent email all in uppercase. The mail server picks it up and flags it as a rush delivery. 8. When the photocopier doesn't work, call computer support. There's electronics in it. 9. When you're getting a NO DIAL TONE message at home, call computer support. We can fix your telephone line from here. 10. When you have a dozen old computer screens to get rid of, call computer support. We're collectors. 11. When something's wrong with your home PC, dump it on an I.T. person's chair with no name, no phone number and no description of the problem. We love a puzzle. 12. When an I.S. person tells you that computer screens don't have cartridges in them, argue. We love a good argument. 13. When an I.S. person tells you that he'll be there shortly, reply in a scathing tone of voice: "And just how many weeks do you mean by shortly?" That motivates us. 14. When the printer won't print, re-send the job at least 20 times. Print jobs frequently get sucked into black holes. 15. When the printer still won't print after 20 tries, send the job to all 68 printers in the company. One of them is bound to work. 2593 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Tue Feb 27, 2001 8:25pm Subject: Humor At The Bad Guy's Expense C L U M S Y C R O O K S - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Get Your Daily Dose Of Humor At The Bad Guy's Expense! 02-20-01 * Humor - Funny Pictures - Jokes * Issue #121 http://www.clumsycrooks.com ------------------------------------------------------------ IN THIS ISSUE ------------------------------------------------------------ => Clumsy Crook Of The Week => The Funnies => Cool Site Of The Day (Very COOL) => Another Clumsy Crook - Hey send us your funny crook stories & jokes! email to: dave@c... ------------------------------------------------------------ CLUMSY CROOK OF THE WEEK: TRUE STORY ------------------------------------------------------------ Pierce County, Washington A parole went before the judge for violating the drug use section of his parole. The judge fined the parole and gave him another chance. Upon exiting the court room he went to the clerk to make arrangements to pay the fine. He pulled out his wallet, removed a bag of marijuana, set it on the counter and began counting out hundred dollar bills to pay the fine. He was promptly re-arrested. ------------------------------------------------------------ THE FUNNIES ------------------------------------------------------------ A cop pulls a guy over for weaving across two lanes of traffic. He walks up to the drivers window and asks, "You drinkin'?" The driver said, - "You buyin'?" - - - - A sargeant bawled out a rookie. "Did you watch all of the exits like I told you?" "Yep," the rookie answered. "I think he must have left by one of the entrances!" ------------------------------------------------------------ COOL SITE OF THE DAY ------------------------------------------------------------ Twisted Humor: Funny Jokes, pictures & images, funny audio and video files - World's largest site. http://www.linkcounter.com/go.php?linkid=96114 ------------------------------------------------------------ ANOTHER CLUMSY CROOK ------------------------------------------------------------ A Knoxville Police Department Investigator sent two officers to a local motel. A maintenance man had discovered a 19 year old man sleeping in a room that he had not paid for. The officers found the young man hiding behind the bed in the room. When confronted with the police the young man offered to pay for the room in quarters. That was when the police decided to take a look around. Down a hallway, the officers found a snack machine that had been smashed open and all its money missing. The 19 year old was charged with criminal trespassing, theft, and vandalism. ( I guess there is no charge for "just plain stupid"). Submitted By: Noel Holley-Bell Knoxville, TN -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2594 From: A.Lizard Date: Tue Feb 27, 2001 1:41pm Subject: user-friendly spyware Now that Hannsen has joined the colorful past of spying. . . Would you believe that someone is marketing a Windows computer cracking tool as a Napster alternative? ["ShareSniffer Inc.'s newly-launched software, also called ShareSniffer, allows people to hunt for exposed Windows file systems with the ease of a Napster-user searching for a favorite track. "Right now... there are tens of thousands of computers worldwide that have their files deliberately shared with the Internet with no password required," reads the ShareSniffer web site. The site goes on to encourage netizens to rummage through strangers' music files, digital movies, Microsoft Word documents and spreadsheets. The company motto: "Because it's there."] In other words, it's a user friendly Windows cracking tool marketed to the general public. This class of tool isn't exactly new, this kind of tool can be of great legitimate use to sysadmins and of great illegitimate use for crackers. It's making this kind of tool usable even for novices and marketing it that's the innovation. Handing this kind of tool out to people too unsophisticated to know that snooping through the hard drives of others is bad manners at best, likely to get their ISP accounts terminated, and even get put them in jail and encouraging them to use it is one of the most irresponsible things I've ever heard of. http://www.securityfocus.com/news/159 news.admin.net-abuse.email http://groups.google.com/groups?q=alt.sharesniffer&hl=en&lr=&safe=off&rnum=10&seld=922054339&ic=1 And the site URL, which for some reason isn't in the article is: http://www.sharesniffer.com . I'd say security by obscurity about this isn't working, when I searched on sharesniffer earlier at google, I turned up hits on alt.hacker.malicious and alt.fan.cult-dead-cow . I've also seen a lot more hits on port 137 (Windoze file sharing) than usual. I immediately checked my Windows network permissions to make *sure* I hadn't inadvertently turned "file sharing ON"... and I'm running dialup behind the ZoneAlarm firewall. :-) Of course, people who don't have their network permissions turned on to share files are immune, as are people with decent firewalls. Presumably, Hannsen would have eschewed the use of this tool as too "scriptkiddieish"... but for anybody working at a company unsophisticated about securing workstations (probably *most*), this is a dream come true. I think that this is something we're all going to have to keep our eyes out for. While I strongly suspect that this site is going to disappear very soon, the program is going to be showing up at a great many places in the future, among them your clients' employee hard drives. A.Lizard ************************************************************************ Personal Web site http://www.ecis.com/~alizard Disaster prep info: http://www.ecis.com/~alizard/y2k.html Littleton Killings: http://www.ecis.com/~alizard/littleto.html backup address (if ALL else fails) alizard@o... IF YOU USE PGP, UPGRADE NOW! A major bug has been discovered in PGP, the new version with the bug fixed is available NOW. PGP 6.5.8 key available by request,keyserver,or on my Web site For e-mail privacy, download PGP from http://www.pgpi.org PGPfone v1.02 and v2.1 available for secure voice conferencing, get your own (W9x,NT,Mac) at http://www.pgpi.org/products/nai/pgpfone/ ************************************************************************ 2595 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Feb 26, 2001 7:46pm Subject: Transcript of a news conference held by FBI Director Louis Freeh and Attorney General John D. Ashcroft regarding charges against FBI agent Robert Philip Hanssen Tuesday, February 20, 2001 Following is the transcript of a news conference held by FBI Director Louis Freeh and Attorney General John D. Ashcroft regarding charges against FBI agent Robert Philip Hanssen. DIRECTOR FREEH: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I'm Louis Freeh, the FBI director. I'd like to begin by introducing on the platform with me, of course, Attorney General John Ashcroft, seated next to George Tenet, director of central intelligence, Helen Fahey, the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, which has jurisdiction over this case, and Judge William Webster. My pleasure to introduce the attorney general. ATTORNEY GENERAL ASHCROFT: Thank you, Director Freeh. Sunday, the FBI successfully concluded an investigation to end a very serious breach in the security of the United States. The arrest of Robert Hanssen for espionage should remind us all, every American should know that our nation, our free society is an international target in a dangerous world. In fact, the espionage operations designed to steal vital secrets of the United States are as intense today as they have ever been. As an agency responsible for protecting our national security, this is a difficult day for the FBI. It is especially difficult because the person who was investigated, arrested and charged is one of our own. The FBI has done an exemplary job of investigating this very sensitive matter and ending this breach of our national security. I want to commend FBI Director Freeh and his agents for taking decisive action once they learned about this risk to our national security. The FBI moved swiftly and discreetly to effect the arrest. Today's announcement is a result of their professionalism, skill, judgment and dedication. I want to thank the FBI, the CIA, the Department of State and the U.S. attorney's office for their productive cooperation in this case. Let me be clear: Individuals who commit treasonous acts against the United States will be held fully accountable. I will devote whatever resources are necessary within the department to ensure that justice is done in this case and any other case like it. FBI Director Freeh and I have agreed to order a comprehensive, independent review of FBI procedures. I look forward to receiving the report from former FBI director and former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Judge William Webster, and I thank him for agreeing to lead this review. FREEH: Thank you, Attorney General, for your remarks. Sunday night, as you heard, the FBI arrested Robert Philip Hanssen who was charged with committing espionage. Hanssen is a special agent of the FBI with a long career in counterintelligence. The investigation that led to these charges is the direct result of the long-standing FBI-CIA efforts, ongoing since the Aldrich Ames case, to identify additional foreign penetrations of the United States intelligence community. The investigation of Hanssen was conducted by the FBI in partnership with the CIA, the Department of the State and, of course, the Justice Department. The successful investigation also is a direct result of a counterintelligence coup by the FBI working with its intelligence partners in this community. The complaint alleges that Hanssen conspired to and did commit espionage for Russia and the former Soviet Union. The actions alleged date back as far as 1985 and, with the possible exception of several years in the 1990s, continued until his arrest on Sunday. He was arrested while in the process of using a Fairfax County dead drop to clandestinely provide classified documents to his Russian handlers. FBI agents also covertly intercepted $50,000 in cash, which the Russian intelligence officers put in a second drop we believe intended for Hanssen. It is alleged that Hanssen provided to the former Soviet Union and subsequently to Russia substantial volumes of highly classified information that he acquired during the course of his job responsibilities in counterintelligence. In return, he received large sums of money and other remuneration, including diamonds. The complaint alleges that he received over $600,000 in cash. The full extent of the damage done is yet unknown, because no accurate damage assessment could be done during the course of the covert investigation without jeopardizing it. We believe, however, that it was exceptionally grave. The criminal conduct alleged represents the most traitorous actions imaginable against a country governed by the rule of law. As difficult as this moment is for the FBI and the country, I am, like the attorney general, immensely proud of the men and women who conducted this investigation. Their actions represent counterintelligence at its very best, and under the most difficult and sensitive of circumstances. Literally, Hanssen's colleagues and coworkers at the FBI conducted this investigation and did so professionally, securely and without hesitation. Much of what these men and women did remains undisclosed. But their success, and that of our CIA friends and counterparts, represent unparalleled expertise and dedication to principle and mission. The complaint alleges that Hanssen, using the code name Ramone, engaged in espionage by providing highly classified information to the KGB and its successor agency, the SVR, using encrypted communications, dead drops and other clandestine techniques. The information he is alleged to have provided compromised numerous human sources, technical operations and FBI counterintelligence techniques, sources and methods, as well as investigations, including the Felix Bloch investigation. The affidavit alleges that Hanssen voluntarily became an agent of the KGB in 1985 while assigned to the intelligence division at the FBI field office in New York City. As supervisor of a foreign counterintelligence squad, Hanssen allegedly began spying for the Soviets in 1985, when in is first letter to the KGB he volunteered information that compromised several sensitive techniques. He also independently disclosed the identity of two KGB officials, first compromised by Ames, who were recruited by the U.S. government to serve as agents in-place at the Soviet Embassy here in Washington. When these two KGB officials returned to Moscow, they were tried and convicted on espionage charges and executed. Hanssen subsequently was assigned to a variety of national security posts that legitimately provided him access to classified information relating to the former Soviet Union and Russia. As a result of these assignments within the FBI, he gained access to some of the most sensitive and highly classified information in the United States government. To be very clear on the issue, at no time was he ever authorized to communicate information to agents of the KGB or SVR, nor can there be any doubt that he was keenly aware of the gravity of his traitorous actions. He later wrote to his KGB handler, speaking about the severity with which U.S. law punishes his alleged actions and acknowledging, quote, ``I know far better than most what mine fields are laid and the risks.'' Hanssen was detailed to the Office of the Foreign Missions at the Department of State from 1995 to 2000. The complaint, however, does not allege any compromises by him at the State Department. In one letter to his Russian handlers, Hanssen complains about lost opportunities to alert them that the FBI had discovered the microphone hidden in the State Department, known then by the FBI, but apparently not by Hanssen, that it was being monitored by a Russian intelligence officer. In this assignment, however, he did continue to have access to sensitive FBI information, and he remained assigned to our national security division and routinely dealt with sensitive and classified matters. For many years, the CIA and FBI have been aggressively engaged in sustained analytical effort to identify foreign penetrations of our country. That effort is complemented by substantial FBI proactive investigation of Foreign Service Intelligence officers here and by critical work done by the CIA. Because of these coordinated efforts, the FBI was able to secure original Russian documentation of an American spy who appeared to be Hanssen, a premise that was soon to be confirmed when Hanssen was identified by the FBI as having clandestinely communicated with Russian intelligence officers. As alleged in the complaint, computer forensic analysis, substantial covert surveillance, court-authorized searches and other sensitive techniques reveal that Hanssen has routinely accessed FBI records and clandestinely provided those records and other classified information to Russian intelligence officers. As alleged, he did so using a variety of sophisticated means of communication, encryption and dead drops. You see before you, on the poster board, pictures of two of the dead drops which he used. The one on the left is called Ellis (ph). It's in Arlington. I'm sorry, it's near Vienna, Virginia. This was the dead drop which he used Sunday night to place his package. He was arrested immediately thereafter. The other dead drop, called Louis (ph), is in Arlington. That was the location where the Russian intelligence officers put down $50,000 in cash, we believe intended for Hanssen. We recovered that money, and of course we covered the Ellis dead drop, both during the arrest and thereafter. The complaint alleges that Hanssen, using his training and experience to protect himself from discovery by the FBI, never met face to face with his Russian handlers, never revealed to them his true identity or even where he worked. He constantly checked FBI records for signs that he and the drop sites he was using were being investigated. He refused any foreign travel to meet with the Russians, and even declined to use any of their trade craft. Hanssen never displayed outward signs that he was receiving large amounts of unexplained cash. He was, after all, a trained counterintelligence specialist. For these reasons, the FBI learned of his true identity long before the Russians. They are learning of it today. Even without knowing who he was or where he worked, his value to the Russians was clear, both by the substantial sums of money paid and the prestigious awards given to their own agents for his operation. While this investigation and arrest represents, for me, a brilliant counterintelligence and investigative success, the complaint alleges that Hanssen located and removed, undetected from the FBI, substantial quantities of information that he was able to access as a result of his assignments. None of the internal information or personnel security measures in place alerted those charged with internal security as to his activities. In short, the trusted insider betrayed his trust without detection. While the risk that an employee of the United States government will betray his country can never be eliminated, there must be more that we can do at the FBI to protect ourselves from such an occurrence. I've asked Judge William Webster, and he has graciously agreed, to examine thoroughly the internal security functions and procedures of the FBI and to recommend improvements. Judge Webster is uniquely qualified, as both a former FBI director, CIA director and director of Central Intelligence, to undertake this review. This is particularly timely as we move to the next generation of automation to support our FBI information infrastructures. Judge Webster and anyone he selects to assist him will have complete access and whatever resources are necessary to complete the task. He will report directly to the attorney general and I, and we will share his report with the National Security Council and the Congress. I intend to act swiftly on any of his recommendations. Before concluding, I'd like to take an opportunity, again, to thank the director of central intelligence, George Tenet, for his leadership, for his cooperation and the assistance of his agency in this and many other investigations. Through our cooperative efforts, the FBI and the CIA were able to learn the true identity of Ramone and the FBI was able to conduct an investigation. Our joint efforts over the last several years, and specifically in this case, should be pause to those contemplating betrayal of the nation's trust. Without the current and unprecedented level of trust and cooperation between the CIA and FBI, making this case would not have been possible, nor would many other intelligence, counterintelligence and counterterrorism matters that we work very closely together. Through Attorney General John Ashcroft, I'd like to thank the Department of Justice, and particularly the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia, their level of support and expertise, and that from Acting Deputy Attorney General Robert Muller (ph), Counsel for Intelligence Policy, Frances Frago Townsend, of course the U.S. Attorney Helen Fahey, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Randy Bellows (ph), has been nothing but superb. We particularly appreciate the unhesitating leadership, judgment and support of Attorney General Ashcroft from the moment he took office. Director Tenet and I have briefed the intelligence committees of Congress because of the clear national security implications. As the director, I am proud of the courageous men and women of the FBI, who each day make enormous sacrifices in serving their country. They have committed their lives to public service and to upholding the high standards of the FBI. Since becoming director, over 7 1/2 years ago, I've ministered the FBI oath of office to over 4,600 special agents at the FBI. Each one of them--and I share with them the pride and sanctity of the words that they repeat--swear to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and to bear true faith and allegiance to the same. Regrettably, I stand here today both saddened and outraged. The FBI agent who raised his hand and spoke those words over 25 years ago has been charged today with violating that oath in the most egregious and reprehensible manner possible. The FBI entrusted him with some of its most sensitive matters, and the U.S. government relied upon him for his service and his integrity. He has, as charged, abused and betrayed that trust. The crimes alleged are an affront not only to his fellow FBI employees, but to the American people, not to mention the pain and suffering he has brought upon his family. I take solace and satisfaction, however, that the FBI succeeded in this investigation with the help of all the people and entities that I've mentioned, and that, as an agency, we've lived up to our responsibility, no matter how painful that may be. I'd like to introduce now Helen Fahey, the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, to make her remarks. HELEN FAHEY: In the past decade it has been the unfortunate duty of the United States Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of Virginia to prosecute a number of espionage cases, including Ames, Pitts, Nicholson, Squillacote, Boone and others. With each case, we hope that it will be the last. Unfortunately today, with the arrest of Robert Hanssen, we begin again the process of bringing to justice another United States government official charged with the most egregious violations of the public trust. The full resources of the Department of Justice will be devoted to ensuring that those who betray their country and the people of the United States are prosecuted and severely punished. I wish to express my appreciation for the outstanding work done by the National Security Division and the Washington field office of the FBI in this investigation. Their superlative work in this extraordinarily sensitive and important investigation is a testament to their professionalism and dedication. I would also like to express my appreciation for the outstanding assistance provided by the Internal Security Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, and in particular John Dione and Laura Ingersoll, and also Randy Bellows and Justin Williams of my office for their outstanding work on this case. Thank you. FREEH: We're going to pause just for a moment, and I'm going to be happy to take your questions. And there's some materials that have been prepared for you, including some photographs. They will duplicate the photographs you see on the two boards in front of the room. We also will provide you with the affidavit in support of the arrest warrant, as well as the search warrant. It's about 100 pages. You have a copy of my statement and a copy of a press release. And if there are additional matters that we can release as the process goes forward, we will certainly make those available. I'll take your questions now. QUESTION: When did you first start the investigation of Hanssen? Can you pinpoint the exact time? FREEH: I don't want to pinpoint the exact time. I would say it was the latter part of last year. However, there has been an ongoing initiative, as I mentioned, between the agency and the FBI, going back to the Ames case, to identify additional penetrations. But we focused on it specifically towards the latter part of last year. QUESTION: Dr. Freeh, can you help us put into perspective how this case compares with the Aldrich Ames case, in terms of the damage? I understand that you have just begun your damage assessment, but just help us with the level of importance to U.S. security. FREEH: Yes. I don't want to really characterize it or compare it to another case. These charges, of course, are just charges. If you look at the 100-page affidavit, which is very detailed, including a description of the materials that he is alleged to have transferred to the Soviet officers over a long period of time, and I think you can compare that, certainly, with the public documents in those other cases, but I'd rather not characterize it. I certainly want to wait for a damage assessment, which we've not done, and I certainly will make that available at that point. QUESTION: This is clearly one of the worst that your agency has ever faced, is it not? FREEH: I would clearly characterize it in that fashion. QUESTION: Director Freeh, how difficult was it to make the case, given the fact that this was a man who was well-versed in all the tradecraft? FREEH: Well, I think it was very difficult. And I think, when you look at the affidavit, you will get a sense as to not only his experience, but the deliberate and very consistent methods that he employed to avoid detection. There's about 23 references throughout the 100 pages where, in his conversations, which you will have repeated, to the Russian officers he talks about his security. There's discussions about payments through Swiss bank accounts, taking payments in diamonds. You'll see on pages 88 and 89 of the affidavit that for many years he continuously runs his own name, his address, the drop sites that he's using through FBI indices to see if they are of any interest. There is an occasion reported in the affidavit where, to contact his handlers securely, he asked them to take out a newspaper ad and then will supply them a number where he can be contacted, which is a pay phone number. So this is a very experienced intelligence officer. This was his bread and butter for many, many years. And for that reason, it was an extremely complex investigation, particularly to do it securely and clandestinely. QUESTION: Director, we haven't had the opportunity to read the affidavit, so excuse me if I'm asking something that's written down there. But can you elaborate at all on this counterintelligence feed that you said brought this information to you? FREEH: I really can't at this point. But I will say and emphasize what I did refer to in my remarks, that this case was not an accidental case. We didn't stumble into this investigation. We didn't, as we do in some cases, predicate it on the incidental or even casual find of information. This was a very carefully planned and deliberately directed investigation by our part. And as I mentioned, there are a lot of things that go into that which I can't discuss right now. But it really does testify to the extraordinary work and talent of the people involved and the coordination between the CIA and the FBI. QUESTION: In all due respect, how can you call this a counterintelligence success when you had a spy working inside the FBI for over 15 years without being detected? Why wasn't he detected earlier? And how did he manage to pass, presumably, numerous polygraph examinations for a person in those positions? FREEH: Well, of course, those questions and others that we have will be the subject of Judge Webster's inquiry. The reason I call it a success is that, as an operation and as an investigation, it is an immense success. To conduct this investigation securely, clandestinely, without any leaks and to do it to the point that we could catch, red-handed, an experienced intelligence officer laying down classified documents for his handlers, also intercept $50,000 in cash, which the intelligence officers were providing for him, in the business of counterintelligence I think by any expert would be judged a huge success. That does not, of course, answer the question as to why someone for 15 years can successfully operate. I've indicated a couple of the reasons in the documents why we think he was successful. As I said, the Russians, until they heard the morning reports, did not know his name, did not know where he worked. He is very, very carefully, throughout the affidavit, obsessed with his security. And he was very, very successful in masking and protecting his communications and his activities. FREEH: That doesn't mean we can't do better in terms of our countersecurity measures. We're going to ask Judge Webster to look at that. But you have to separate the operational success from the problem, which indeed is a severe one, of having someone successfully do it, at least until the point that we caught him. (CROSSTALK) QUESTION: Are there any Russian intelligence officers who will be expelled as a result of his contacts? FREEH: I can't comment on that. QUESTION: Mr. Freeh, some past spies were pretty clear that their motive was financial. You say in your statement that he volunteered originally, sent a letter volunteering to spy. Do you have any idea, have you been able to discover why he wanted to spy? FREEH: Well, you'll be able to see the letter in the affidavit. It's a October 1, 1985, letter. It is implied in the letter that he is volunteering, of course, but that he's not volunteering for nothing. The $600,000, which is alleged in the complaint, is a significant amount of money. There is also references to another $800,000, which the Russian intelligence officers indicate, and he confirms, is in an escrow account for him, somewhere outside the United States. As to any other motivations, we just have not had the opportunity to establish those, and I wouldn't want to speculate about them. (CROSSTALK) QUESTION: You say that several people have been executed partly as a possible result of the information passed on, that U.S. sources have been compromised. Do you have a figure on how many people may have been compromised, how many may have died, as a result of this espionage? FREEH: What we've alleged in the complaint is that, on two separate occasions, the defendant provided information after Ames had provided information on two officers, two officers who had been recruited here. And we know from--as we set forth in the affidavit, they were both executed. So it was an accumulation of both types of information. As to other cases, I can't speculate about them. There is nothing alleged in the affidavit. And of course, as we do our damage assessment, we may be able to ascertain others, or we may not, depending on how that analysis goes. QUESTION: Dr. Freeh, two questions: First, was he operating alone or did he have others with whom he worked? And is this an ongoing investigation? And second, is this for you, as the FBI director, the toughest and worst moment since you became director in 1993, given the length of the security breach and the way in which it went undetected for so long on your watch? FREEH: As far as we know, he operated alone, of course in tandem with the Washington intelligence officers. We have no indication that anyone else worked with him or assisted him. But, of course, as we now do a covert investigation, including interviews, we will determine--have not ruled out the possibility that someone else may have assisted him. There's no evidence of that, however, at this time. In terms of the worst case, worst moment: I think probably the worst moment in this job will always be when we have agents killed in the line of duty. Unfortunately, four of them have been killed since I've been here, other agents wounded. In terms of cases and in terms of the integrity of the FBI and the honor of the men and women who serve, this case, as I mentioned, is a great and tragic moment for us. QUESTION: I understand you're going to do a review of what happened, but surely you've asked some tough questions and you have a sense of what some of the biggest loopholes were in the FBI's internal security that allowed him to function for as long as he did as a spy. Do you have a sense of what those loopholes were? And have you made any immediate changes to plug the holes? FREEH: We have not made any immediate changes since the point in time when we focused on this particular case and this particular defendant. One of the advantages of having Judge Webster review everything that we do in terms of security programs, personnel management, records management will give us the benefit of that analysis. We have some ideas. We have some theories. QUESTION: Can you talk about some of them? FREEH: No, I wouldn't want to talk about what I think are the vulnerabilities in our system. What I will say, however, is we don't say, at this stage, certainly, that we have a system that can prevent this type of conduct. At the end of the day, all of our systems probably need to be looked at and maybe improved. But at the end of the day, what we rely upon is honest people, who when they take the oath to defend the Constitution and serve the people, they do that honestly and we can rely on that. That's something that did not happen in this case. QUESTION: How can you be so sure that the Russians didn't know he was an FBI agent? FREEH: Well, as I said, if you look at the complaint, and we have a lot of other bases to conclude that his conversations with them were done purely in an anonymous channel, and that he specifically designed his relationship that way, so if there was to be a compromise on their side, nobody could identify him by name, where he worked or what he looked like, and he was very conscious and very successful at that. QUESTION: One, can you at least identify the Russian handlers? And two, in what way did he compromise the Bloch investigation? FREEH: We have identified some of the handlers. With respect to the compromise of the Bloch investigation, I don't think I want to say more than what's in the affidavit, and there's a fairly definitive description of that compromise in the papers. QUESTION: Can you elaborate on the nature of Sunday evening's apprehension? The events that took place during that time. FREEH: Well, as you'll see in the complaint, because of our investigation and surveillance of the subject, we knew that he had an appointment at the Ellis (ph) site, as he described it in his computer, at 8 p.m. on 2-18-01, which was Sunday. So we had been anticipating from the point that we learned that, which was sometime before Sunday, that something would happen on that site at that time and place. So we were set up by surveillance to monitor it. And he came there. As you'll see in the affidavit, he got out of his car, he marked the park sign with a piece of white tape. The site is called a dead drop. A dead drop is a place where an intelligence officer and his recruited asset can communicate safely and clandestinely without seeing each other or being seen face to face. After he marked the site, he went into the woods and he laid his package down, which is represented in the photograph, at the base of one of the footings on the footbridge. He was in there about nine minutes, he came out to his car. He was arrested at that point by the FBI agents. He was taken out of the area. We maintained our surveillance on that site, as well as the site in Arlington where the $50,000 was put down, the Louis (ph) site. And we were expecting him, as I said, to do something at that site on Sunday evening. QUESTION: Did he comment at that time? FREEH: We gave him his Miranda rights, and I don't want to comment any further on what happened after that. QUESTION: Director Freeh, even if the Russian agents did not know his identify, wouldn't the nature of the information he was providing them indicate that he was a deep source within the FBI, considering what he was providing them? FREEH: No, I don't think so, because in our analysis of the information, both the information which is set forth in the complaint and other information, it would not be very easy to determine where, in fact, he was situated. For instance, the information which is alleged in the complaint, with respect to the three KGB officers that had been recruited, that information was furnished both by Ames and then subsequently by Hanssen as we allege it. So looking at the documentation, which, as you will see in the complaint, was not just FBI documentation, but throughout the community, it would be very hard to make that analysis. QUESTION: Three or two? FREEH: The affidavit refers to three particular officers, two of whom were executed, one who was imprisoned and later released. I'm not sure what page it is on, but it is in your affidavit. QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) FREEH: I don't want to comment on the nature of the surveillance. We had court-authorized orders, which of course authorized us to conduct the most sensitive part of the investigation. QUESTION: What was Hanssen's reaction when you caught him? And have you been able to discuss this with him or question him? FREEH: As I said, he was arrested. The agents who conducted the arrest perceived him to be surprised and shocked by the arrest. And I don't want to comment on any of the subsequent events, except he was given his Miranda rights and then taken to a facility to be processed. QUESTION: How long had he been under surveillance? And was there any reason why he didn't grab him after he took the money? FREEH: Well, he didn't take the money. The money actually remained in the site in Arlington. QUESTION: I mean, why not wait until he went to get the money, if that's what you've been waiting for him to do? FREEH: Well, we were more interested in what was going to happen at the Ellis (ph) site, because we believed that, at that point, he would put down a package. The package that he put down contains classified information. It has to do with our internal documents and, actually, matters that are presented before the courts. So it was much more important for us to get him placing that package than picking up the money. So we let the money rest for a while and focused on the Sunday Ellis (ph) site. QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) FREEH: No. QUESTION: Can you confirm that he did in fact take polygraph tests? FREEH: I don't want to comment on that. QUESTION: Do you know where he is being held? FREEH: He is being held in a detention facility in Virginia. And he was, of course, presented for the initial appearance in Alexandria this morning. QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) FREEH: It was very, very critical information to have. And as I said, it is original Russian documentation, but I don't want to expand on it right now beyond that. QUESTION: What was his work here? Can you describe more about what he did in '85 and in his career? FREEH: Well, as most of his career, as set forth in the affidavit, has been in the foreign counterintelligence area, particularly dealing with the Soviets and the Soviet intelligence services. He worked in New York as a foreign counterintelligence special agent. He ran one of our foreign counterintelligence squads, at that point. His assignments back at headquarters, except for a brief period on our inspections, had to do primarily with foreign counterintelligence. For the last 5 1/2 years, he's been the FBI representative at the State Department, the Office of Foreign Missions. And he was brought back here in January, so we could isolate him and focus more of our investigation on him. QUESTION: Was he authorized to have contact with Russians? FREEH: No, he was not. (CROSSTALK) QUESTION: Did he work on the Aldrich Ames case or any other major espionage cases? FREEH: He had access to a lot of the information that related to those investigations and others. As I mentioned, the affidavit alleges an overlap between some of his activities and Ames' reporting. QUESTION: Many Americans are going to be surprised that this keeps going on. The Cold War is long over. The attorney general said, ``Yes, well it keeps going.'' This man has his roots in the Cold War. Is that what you are finding the United States is mostly facing, a residual? Or, is it a continuing, ongoing--does recruiting continue? Can you give us some sense of this? FREEH: Well, I think it's both residual and ongoing. I think that, with respect to the matters alleged in the affidavit, you cannot simply say that this was an artifact or a residual of the Cold War. The activity obviously continued beyond that. And as late as Sunday, there was clearly an intent to exchange $50,000 in cash for very highly classified and very damaging information from the FBI. So I think that intelligence and counterintelligence are with us and will be with us for some time. As you know, in 1996, the Congress passed the economic espionage statute because of hearings and testimony that indicated that many countries, in fact 22 or 23 of them, use their security services in the United States to clandestinely gather economic information, which is very valuable and which is done by clandestine means. So I think part of this case has got a foot in the past, but part of it has clearly got a foot in the present. QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) FREEH: No. I don't want to expand beyond that. But no. I'll take one more question. QUESTION: You often talk about the need for accountability within the bureau. Who is accountable in a situation like this? And as director, how much of the responsibility or accountability do you see as your own or the head of the National Security Division? Where does the buck stop? FREEH: Well, the buck stops with me. I'm accountable for it. I'm responsible for it. It clearly happened on my watch and what I have to do, in conjunction with Judge Webster's review, is reexamine, you know, my leadership and my administration to make sure that I didn't let anything go. But I'm the one the responsible and I should be held accountable. I'll take one last question. Yes? QUESTION: Dr. Freeh, you're working closely with the Russians on various international investigations. What does a case like this do to your cooperation with the Russians? FREEH: I don't think it impacts on it at all. You know, we work very closely with the ministry of the interior on criminal matters. We work with their security agency, the internal security agency, on counterterrorism matters. Those will relationships are extremely important to both countries, and I think they will continue and not be affected by this case. Thank you very much. -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2596 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Tue Feb 27, 2001 8:19am Subject: Signs of the Times Signs of the Times On a Plumbers truck: "We repair what your husband fixed." On the trucks of a local plumbing company in NE Pennsylvania: "Don't sleep with a drip. Call your plumber." Pizza shop slogan: "7 days without pizza makes one weak." At a tire shop in Milwaukee: "Invite us to your next blowout." Door of a plastic surgeon's office: "Hello. Can we pick your nose?" At a laundry shop: "How about we refund your money, send you a new one at no charge, close the store and have the manager shot. Would that be satisfactory?" At a towing company: "We don't charge an arm and a leg. We want tows." On an electrician's truck: "Let us remove your shorts." In a non-smoking area: "If we see smoke, we will assume you are on fire and take appropriate action." On a maternity room door: "Push. Push. Push." At an optometrist's office: "If you don't see what you're looking for, you've come to the right place." On a taxidermist's window: "We really know our stuff." In a podiatrist's office: "Time wounds all heels." On a fence: "Salesmen welcome! Dog food is expensive." At a car dealership: "The best way to get back on your feet - miss a car payment." Outside a muffler shop: "No appointment necessary. We hear you coming." In a veterinarian's waiting room: "Be back in 5 minutes. Sit! Stay!" At the electric company: "We would be de-lighted if you send in your bill. However, if you don't, you will be." In a restaurant window: "Don't stand there and be hungry. Come on in and get fed up." In the front yard of a funeral home: "Drive carefully. We'll wait." -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2597 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Tue Feb 27, 2001 8:20am Subject: Laws of Nature * Kauffman's Paradox of the Corporation: The less important you are to the corporation, the more your tardiness or absence is noticed. * Murphy's First Law for Wives: If you ask your husband to pick up five items at the store and then you add one more as an afterthought, he will forget two of the first five. * The Salary Axiom: The pay raise is just large enough to increase your taxes and just small enough to have no effect on your take-home pay. * Miller's Law of Insurance: Insurance covers everything except what happens. * First Law of Living: As soon as you start doing what you always wanted to be doing, you'll want to be doing something else. * Weiner's Law of Libraries: There are no answers, only cross-references. * Isaac's Strange Rule of Staleness: Any food that starts out hard will soften when stale. Any food that starts out soft will harden when stale. * The Grocery Bag Law: The candy bar you planned to eat on the way home from the market is hidden at the bottom of the grocery bag. * Lampner's Law of Employment: When leaving work late, you will go unnoticed. When you leave work early, you will meet the boss in the parking lot. -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2598 From: 1RCM <1RCM@M...> Date: Mon Feb 26, 2001 6:21pm Subject: Used piece wanted Hi List I'm looking for a used Kaiser 1080-H. Anyone having a line on one please contact me off-list at: 1RCM@M... Thanks ... RCM 2599 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Feb 26, 2001 8:30pm Subject: Hanssen holds some cards in his favor Hanssen holds some cards in his favor http://cgi.usatoday.com/usatonline/20010226/3094251s.htm By Pete Earley ''The Justice Department really screwed up,'' CIA traitor Aldrich Ames told me. Prosecutors had seized his bank accounts, expensive house, even his Jaguar sports car, but had overlooked another asset. ''They didn't say a word about the $2 million the Russians are holding for me in Moscow.'' I nearly laughed out loud. Did Ames, who was responsible for the deaths of 10 agents, really believe his Russian pals were going to pay him $2 million now that he had been caught and was sure to spend his life in prison? ''Pete,'' he replied, ''They will pay me. I'm not the only American out there spying for them. There are others and they will be watching to see how the Russians treat me now that I've been caught.'' I had no idea in July 1994 when I interviewed Ames that FBI Agent Robert Philip Hanssen was also allegedly a spy. The FBI claims the Russians have tucked away $800,000 in Moscow for him, too. Based on last week's news reports, it looks like the government has a ''slam dunk'' case. Hanssen is doomed. His fate sealed. He's headed for a death sentence. Don't you believe it. Having done books about America's two most notorious spies, Aldrich Ames and Naval officer John Walker Jr., I can tell you that Hanssen has several aces he still can play -- if he is smart. Swap information for a plea bargain: Despite the public bravado, neither the FBI nor federal prosecutors will want this case to come to trial. Why? Proving espionage is difficult. The Russians aren't going to testify. Even more important, the U.S. intelligence community will not want to discuss its secrets and ''tradecraft'' in public. Add in embarrassment by the FBI. The fact that Hanssen spied for 15 years undetected is as big of a black eye for it as Ames was for the CIA. It will take a lot of television reruns of Efrem Zimbalist Jr., getting his man in The FBI to restore confidence. Moreover, there are practical reasons why the government will want to negotiate a plea bargain. It wants to debrief him and quickly assess how much damage he has done. What documents did he sell, what does he know about his Russian contacts? What information did the Russians ask him to steal? (Knowing what documents the Russians didn't want him to steal will be useful because that might mean they already are getting them from someone else.) Finally, who better than a veteran Russian spy to tell the FBI what is wrong with its security? Use media to put out his side of the story. Television bigshots are hounding his Washington, D.C., attorney, Plato Cacheris, in hopes of nailing a ratings-grabbing ''exclusive interview.'' They can't pay Hanssen, but they will promise to tell ''your side of the story.'' I remember hearing Ames plot how he was going to offer Diane Sawyer an exclusive interview, but only if she first broadcast a sympathetic interview with his bratty wife, Rosario, who the government had jailed as his co-conspirator. Ames urged Rosario to portray herself as an abused spouse who was helplessly manipulated by her vicious CIA-trained husband. I wasn't surprised when Sawyer took that approach in her ''exclusive'' with Rosario. Nor was I shocked when Ames later granted his first interview to someone else. With spies, there is no honor. Cacheris will try to spin stories that will give Hanssen a human face. Offer cooperation in exchange for leniency for family. Hanssen would be wise to look at how Walker and Ames negotiated pleas. Walker, who was a KGB mole for 18 years, pulled a coup, Ames blew it. The difference was attitude. Walker despised the media, hated the government, and never felt regret, embarrassment, or remorse. He had a street punk's attitude. It worked. The government agreed to go soft on his son, Michael, in return for Walker's full cooperation. Michael was lured into the spy ring by his father and was arrested on the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz, where he'd stolen secret documents that he was supposed to destroy. Michael was paroled after serving 15 years, a relatively light sentence for a major spy. Ames immediately gave prosecutors whatever they wanted, naively thinking his cooperation would free his wife. It didn't. She spent nearly four years in prison on charges that many legal scholars believe could have been easily rebuffed. Don't get me wrong. Hanssen is not walking away from all this. The government will threaten the death penalty (unlikely) and a life sentence (almost certain.) He's a lost cause, but if he hangs tough, he might be able to save his family. You can bet Hanssen didn't report the $1.4 million in alleged KGB payoffs on his income tax. Everything he owns will be seized. His wife and children will be put out in the street. That's where a deal will be struck: Hanssen's help in return for his family being spared bankruptcy. If that fails, then Hanssen might want to take a more dramatic step: ask the Russians to transfer the $800,000 into a Swiss account. Think I'm joking? After interviewing Ames, I flew to Moscow and met with a Russian general who had ''handled'' the CIA spy. The first thing he told me was, ''Please tell Mr. Ames we will keep his money drawing interest in a bank and will be searching for ways to get it to him.'' As I was preparing to leave that night, my Russian host took my arm and said, ''You know, we could give you Ames' two million and you could find a way to get it to him.'' For a brief second, I envisioned myself flying home with my briefcase bulging with $100 bills, but I suspected my host was testing me. I politely declined. I don't know if the Russians ever kept their promise to Ames. But Ames was right about one thing: there was at least one spy watching to see how the Russians were going to react. The question now is: Who is out there watching to see how the Russians will treat Hanssen? Pete Earley is the author of Confessions of a Spy: The Real Story of Aldrich Ames and Family of Spies: Inside the John Walker Spy Ring. -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2600 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Feb 26, 2001 8:32pm Subject: Spy case demos insider threat Spy case demos insider threat http://www.computerworld.com/cwi/stories/0,1199,NAV47-68-84-88_STO58062,00.html FBI suspect's system use went undetected By DAN VERTON (February 26, 2001) The career FBI agent charged with spying last week had significant IT experience and access, underscoring the growing threat to corporate data by insiders. The agent, Robert Phillip Hanssen, was charged with spying for Russia since 1985. He allegedly gave Russian intelligence agents highly classified documents and details about U.S. intelligence sources and electronic surveillance, in exchange for an estimated $1.4 million in cash and diamonds. According to a 100-page affidavit filed in the U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Va., Hanssen used his computer access to the FBI's Electronic Case File system, which contains classified information about ongoing FBI investigations, to check whether the FBI had been alerted to his activities. The lesson for corporate America "is that companies tend to gain a false sense of security from strong perimeter security," like firewalls and intrusion-detection systems, said Eric Friedberg, a former computer and telecommunications crime coordinator at the U.S. Attorney's Office in New York. "What goes on behind the firewall can be even more damaging because of the degree of access insiders have." Friedberg is now a computer crime consultant at Stroz Associates LLC in New York. During the past six months, the firm has worked with half a dozen companies that have been victimized by insiders, said Friedberg. Those cases involved everything from deleted files to cases where individuals covertly set up competing businesses on their employers' servers, he said. Because Hanssen was an authorized user, his queries didn't raise any suspicion. However, after Hanssen was arrested while allegedly dropping off classified paper documents for his Russian handlers, the FBI was able to correlate his log activity in the database with his espionage activities. "In short, the trusted insider betrayed his trust without detection," FBI Director Louis Freeh said during a press conference. Freeh has since ordered that a special panel be formed to review all FBI processes and systems and to study the issue of insider abuse. According to a survey of 359 companies by the FBI and the Computer Security Institute in San Francisco, companies lost more than $50 million last year as a result of unauthorized insider access and abuse of IT systems. Some 38% of firms in the survey reported between one and five incidents of insider abuse. Another 37% said they didn't know how many breaches had taken place. Hanssen was assigned to the New York Field Office's intelligence division in 1979 to help establish the FBI's automated counterintelligence database in that office. Investigators characterized Hanssen as having a "high degree of computer technology expertise." Hanssen made extensive use of computer media, such as encrypted floppy disks, removable storage devices and a Palm II handheld computer, to communicate with Russian intelligence officers, according to the affidavit. He provided as many as 26 encrypted floppy disks during the course of his activities, it said. Hanssen used a technique called 40-track mode, in which a floppy disk is made to have slightly less capacity than normal, allowing text to be hidden in what appears to be a blank disk. "Security is not mainly about software or biometrics. First and foremost, it's about people and policies," said Richard Hunter, a security analyst at Stamford, Conn.-based Gartner Group Inc. One way companies can protect themselves from insider abuse is to focus on what their networks can tell them about what's going on inside the company, said Friedberg. He recommended that companies look into artificial intelligence-enabled software that can tip administrators off to anomalous activity on the network. Allen Thomson, a former CIA scientist, suggested that maybe the FBI and companies should consider using the two-person integrity rule for all sensitive database searches and system operations as a means to reduce the chance that information will be deliberately compromised. That means two people would have to agree to the searches and both would bear witness to what was being done and why. The intelligence community routinely uses the two-person integrity rule for things such as handling cryptographic keys and other highly sensitive data. "This would be a pain but might cut down on unauthorized/malicious use," Thomson said. The downside, however, is that this could frighten some users and cause them not to use the tools that are available to them, he said. So, "roaming around and looking for anomalies and patterns is [still] a good thing in many disciplines, counterintelligence among them." -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2601 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Wed Feb 28, 2001 2:55pm Subject: THIS IS VERY, VERY TRUE. THIS IS VERY, VERY TRUE. To realize the value of ten years Ask a newly divorced couple. To realize the value of four years Ask two, now single, high school sweethearts. To realize the value of one year Ask a student who has failed a final exam. To realize the value of nine months Ask a mother who gave birth to a still born. To realize the value of one month Ask a mother who has given birth to a premature baby. To realize the value of one week Ask an editor of a weekly newspaper. To realize the value of one hour Ask the lovers who are waiting to meet. To realize the value of one minute Ask a person who has missed the train, bus or plane. To realize the value of one second Ask a person who has survived an accident. To realize the value of one millisecond Ask the person who has won a silver medal in the Olympics Time waits for no one. Treasure every moment you have. You will treasure it even more when you can share it with someone special. The origin of this letter is unknown. Do not keep this letter to yourself... pass it on. -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2602 From: Date: Wed Feb 28, 2001 10:52am Subject: Fla. Drops Wiretap Charge Vs. Teen Fla. Drops Wiretap Charge Vs. Teen By BILL KACZOR .c The Associated Press PENSACOLA, Fla. (AP) - Wiretapping charges were dropped Wednesday against a high school student who taped a chemistry lecture without the teacher's consent. Prosecutor John Molchan said the wiretapping law applies only when the person being tape-recorded has a reasonable expectation of privacy - and that was not the case in a classroom of 30 students. ``The young lady was recording a lecture, trying to assist her in learning at that particular time. I'm not sure that's an appropriate forum for prosecution,'' the prosecutor said. Asher Zaslaw, 17, a varsity weightlifter, said she recorded the October lecture at Navarre High School because she was having difficulty in the class and wanted to maintain her 3.89 grade-point average. Teacher Shelaine Goss filed a complaint, and the state brought charges Feb. 5. Calls to the teacher's home were not immediately returned on Wednesday. Principal Louise Driggers said taping in the classroom is against school policy. He said the rule is intended to prevent students from listening to tapes or CDs in class. Zaslaw would have faced penalties including community service if convicted. ``The toll it's taken on her up to this point is a shame,'' said Asher's father, Jay Zaslaw. ``That's not the kind of thing that kids on the right track should be subjected to.'' Barbara Peterson, executive director of the First Amendment Foundation in Tallahassee, said the wiretap law was never intended for classroom lectures. ``There's no expectation of privacy in a classroom,'' Peterson said. ``It kind of stuns me.'' Florida's law is similar to one in Maryland that Linda Tripp was accused of violating by recording conversations with Monica Lewinsky about her affair with former President Clinton. The charge was dropped when Lewinksy refused to testify. The most notable Florida case involved a couple who were fined $500 each in 1997 for using a scanner to tape former House Speaker Newt Gingrich's cellular phone discussion of his ethics problems. AP-NY-02-28-01 1634EST 2603 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Thu Mar 1, 2001 9:00am Subject: Guns Found in Alleged Spy's Home Prosecutors Release Spying Details http://www.guardianunlimited.co.uk/breakingnews/US/0,3560,759627,00.html Details Released About Alleged Spy http://www.guardianunlimited.co.uk/breakingnews/US/0,3560,759479,00.html Guns Found in Alleged Spy's Home http://www.guardianunlimited.co.uk/breakingnews/US/0,3560,759524,00.html Wednesday February 28, 2001 12:00 am WASHINGTON (AP) - Federal prosecutors released new details Tuesday of accused spy Robert Philip Hanssen's activities, including a letter in which Hanssen warned his alleged Russian handlers the day of his arrest that ``something has aroused the sleeping tiger.'' According to a new affidavit, the FBI recovered a computer disk from a package that Hanssen dropped at a Virginia park on Feb. 18 that contained a coded letter. In the letter, Hanssen seems to signal that his relationship with the Russians was at an end because he received a new position excluding him from obtaining sensitive documents, the document alleged. ``It seems ... that my greatest utility to you has come to an end, and it is time to seclude myself from active service,'' said the letter, signed ``Ramon Garcia,'' detailed in the affidavit. The FBI has alleged that Hanssen's code name was Ramon Garcia. A search of Hanssen's cars and home turned up ``large amounts of United States and foreign currency ... precious metals, jewelry and other items of value,'' according to a search warrant released Tuesday. Also found: passports, licenses and visas in fictitious or alias identities and records reflecting property sales and purchases both within the United States and foreign countries. The FBI has alleged Hanssen had received more than $600,000 in cash and diamonds, and an additional $800,000 had been set aside for him in an overseas escrow account. The search warrant says the money and valuables are ``illicit proceeds...from multiple years of engaging in espionage for pay from the Soviety Union and successor Russian Federation and their intelligence services.'' Investigators also found records of financial accounts that were Hanssen's but in phony names or aliases. The chairman of the Senate's intelligence committee proposed Tuesday that the FBI rotate spy catchers out of their jobs every few years to guard against complacency and overconfidence. Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala., said a rotation system could make it more difficult for spies to operate. ``Why leave someone in such a sensitive position for so long?'' Shelby asked in an interview. ``Although they have experience, there's also a tendency to become complacent, to become overconfident. Why not rotate them out? The military does that in command situations.'' Hanssen is scheduled for his preliminary appearance at a hearing in federal court in Alexandria, Va. on March 5. The nine-page affidavit was filed in U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia in support of search warrants for Hanssen's downtown offices at the FBI and the State Department. A list of what the FBI has turned up in the search of those offices and of Hanssen's home in Vienna, Va., has been compiled but was not immeediately available. FBI and Justice Department officials said they had not yet seen the list and could not comment on it. Hanssen, a 25-year FBI veteran and counterintelligence expert, was arrested on Feb. 18 and charged with espionage. The government alleged in a 109-page affidavit that he passed top-secret counterintelligence information to Soviet and Russian agents over a 15-year period starting in 1985. Hanssen, 56, the father of six, was only the third FBI agent ever accused of espionage. FBI director Louis Freeh called the case ``the most traitorous actions imaginable.'' The FBI began investigating Hanssen late last year after receiving Russian documents indicating that an FBI agent was passing information to the Russians. Hanssen was assigned to a new job in January at FBI headquarters, so the bureau could monitor his activities, according the affidavit released last week. ``Since communicating last, and one wonders if because of it, I have been promoted to a higher do-nothing Senior Executive job outside the regular access to information within the counterintelligence program,'' the letter said, according to the affidavit. ``It is as if I am being isolated.'' 'Ramon' said he detected radio signal bursts in his car, arousing his suspicions. ``Amusing the games children play... Something has around the sleeping tiger. Perhaps you know better than I,'' said the letter released by prosecutors. ``Life is full of its ups and downs,'' said the letter that prosecutors allege Hanssen wrote. It contained the promise of a contact in a year, ``same time, same place.'' -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2604 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Thu Mar 1, 2001 9:00am Subject: Super Computer Access, Super Problem Super Computer Access, Super Problem Accused Spy's Activities Could Lead to National Security Overhaul http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/hanssen010227.html W A S H I N G T O N, Feb. 27 ­ Accused spy Robert Hanssen's "superuser" computer clearance status gave him almost unlimited access to a broad range of national security secrets, and government officials worry they may have to revamp its counterintelligence system, ABCNEWS has learned. "We may have lost our technological base in far as dealing with counterintelligence, and we'll have to start over," said Sen. Richard Shelby, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Sources told ABCNEWS today that only a small number of FBI agents have the kind of access to confidential information that Hanssen enjoyed and that explains why he may have been able to obtain so much inf