From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Mar 5, 2001 8:06am Subject: U.S. Thinks FBI Spy Revealed Tunnel Under Soviet Embassy U.S. Thinks FBI Spy Revealed Tunnel Under Soviet Embassy http://www.iht.com/articles/12430.html James Risen and Lowell Bergman New York Times Service The U.S. government constructed a secret tunnel under the Soviet Union's new embassy in Washington to eavesdrop, but federal investigators now believe the operation was betrayed by the FBI agent who was arrested last month on charges of spying for Moscow, current and former U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials say. . The secret tunnel operation, which officials indicated was run jointly by the FBI and the National Security Agency, was part of a broad U.S. effort to eavesdrop on and track Soviet - later Russian - facilities and personnel operating in the United States. Spokesmen at the FBI and the White House declined to comment on the operation. . Current and former U.S. officials estimated that the tunnel construction and related intelligence-gathering activities cost several hundred million dollars, apparently making it the most expensive clandestine intelligence operation that the agent, Robert Hanssen, is accused of betraying. The tunnel was designed to aid in a sophisticated operation to eavesdrop on communications and conversations in the Soviet Embassy complex, which was built in the 1970s and 1980s but was not fully occupied until the 1990s. . In the 1980s, at about the time the tunnel operation was under way, the United States and the Soviet Union argued bitterly over their respective embassies in Moscow and Washington, with the United States accusing Moscow of spying at both locations. The government has never publicly disclosed the existence of the tunnel operation. But in an FBI affidavit in the Hanssen case, the government stated that Mr. Hanssen "compromised an entire technical program of enormous value, expense and importance to the United States government." Officials said that was a reference to the tunnel operation and related intelligence activities. . The government charges that Mr. Hanssen, a 25-year veteran of the FBI and a counterintelligence expert, volunteered to spy for Moscow in October 1985. He was arrested on Feb. 18 in a Virginia park after leaving a package containing classified documents for his Russian handlers, the affidavit says. . It could not be determined when the government believes Mr. Hanssen betrayed the tunnel operation and related intelligence-gathering activities targeting the embassy complex. Nor are many details known about how and when the operation was mounted, or whether it ever succeeded in collecting useful intelligence. But the emerging belief that the tunnel program had been compromised was a factor in the government's decision to keep looking for additional spies after the 1994 arrest of the CIA officer Aldrich Ames, the current and former officials said. . A secret investigative team was established to identify the source of a series of damaging intelligence losses, including the tunnel and related activities against the embassy, that could not be explained by Mr. Ames's activities. Other unexplained intelligence losses, including technical intelligence programs, as well as the 1989 disclosure to Moscow that the FBI was conducting an espionage investigation of a State Department official, Felix Bloch, also prompted officials to begin a new mole hunt, the officials added. That mole-hunt team played a critical role in the counterespionage inquiry that led to Mr. Hanssen's arrest, the officials said. It was a successor to an earlier CIA mole-hunt team that helped uncover Mr. Ames. . The tunnel was built under Moscow's new embassy complex on Wisconsin Avenue, a hilltop location known as Mount Alto, the officials said. . Soviet officials were prevented for years from fully occupying the embassy complex as a result of a long-running dispute with the United States about charges that the American Embassy in Moscow had been thoroughly bugged. Soviet diplomats occupied apartments there in 1979, and congressional critics charged that they were using those buildings as espionage outposts. In the mid-1980s, some American lawmakers claimed that the hilltop location would give the Soviets an edge in intelligence gathering against U.S. government buildings in Washington. The new embassy complex was not fully occupied until after the collapse of the Soviet Union. . Meanwhile, the U.S. intelligence offensive against the embassy remained hidden from public view even as the United States publicly protested a Soviet campaign to lace its new embassy in Moscow with listening devices. . For the operation against the Soviet Embassy, FBI agents were placed in critical jobs in some of the key contractors hired by the Soviet Union, said an individual knowledgeable about the operation. That individual said the effort involved the use of secret technology to pick up sounds inside a large building. . The record on the value of intelligence gleaned from many of the high-cost U.S. technical programs is mixed, current and former officials said. In fact, a former U.S. intelligence official said he was not certain that the Soviet Embassy tunnel operation ever actually produced any intelligence. Another official suggested that technical problems prevented the operation from becoming productive. The official suggested that the tunnel was both compromised by a spy, and also failed on technical grounds. -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2643 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Mar 5, 2001 8:09am Subject: Spy Case Prompts Computer Search Spy Case Prompts Computer Search http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22451-2001Mar4.html Hanssen's Access Brings Systems Probe By Vernon Loeb Washington Post Staff Writer Monday, March 5, 2001; Page A01 Experts are combing government computer systems to try to ensure that Robert P. Hanssen, the veteran FBI agent accused of spying for Moscow, did not sabotage them or create software vulnerabilities that could allow Russian intelligence agencies to steal information while Hanssen is in jail, senior U.S. officials said. Because Hanssen is a "highly skilled" computer programmer, the officials said, government experts are checking all the systems to which he had access at the FBI and State Department. These include classified and unclassified computers. At the FBI, systems administrators already have "scrubbed" the bureau's classified computer system, which is not attached to the Internet. They found no evidence that Hanssen planted malicious software codes either to damage the network or expand his access to secrets, the officials said. One senior official said no conclusions have been reached about Hanssen's computer activities at the State Department, where he had been assigned since 1995 to an office that monitors foreign diplomats. "The jury is still out as to what he was able to do," the official said. "Because of the possibilities, we've got to take a look." Meanwhile, a group of FBI experts, which the bureau calls a computer analysis response team (CART), is trying to recover the data on numerous hard drives, memory cards and diskettes of computers confiscated from Hanssen. They included desktop models, several laptops and even a server at his home in Vienna. Hanssen, 56, was arrested on Feb. 18 on charges of spying for Moscow over the past 15 years in exchange for $1.4 million in cash, diamonds and Russian bank deposits. A 109-page FBI affidavit filed in court alleges that Hanssen encrypted letters to his Russian handlers using computers; passed secrets on memory diskettes; stole dozens of documents from the FBI's computer network; and regularly trolled that network looking for clues that he might be under surveillance. U.S. counterintelligence officials say Hanssen's use of computers greatly exceeds that encountered in any other major U.S. espionage case, presenting new levels of complexity -- and potential damage -- as officials attempt to retrace his moves in cyberspace. "There are a large number of ways that you can infiltrate a system," said Fred Cohen, a computer security expert at Sandia National Laboratory. And, he added, "If you are an insider, the number increases dramatically." As a counterintelligence officer, Hanssen had the highest level of security clearance. Government officials declined to say, however, whether he ever had access to Intelink, a highly secure network used by the CIA, National Security Agency and other parts of the U.S. intelligence community to share information. If Hanssen used Intelink -- a system that did not exist at the time of the arrest of CIA spy Aldrich H. Ames in 1994 -- the damage could be deep and difficult to assess, intelligence officials said. In any event, it is clear from the FBI's affidavit that Hanssen was a regular user of the FBI's internal network, the Automated Case Support System, which contains classified records of investigations. "The fact that a spy for Russia had access to that is very troubling," said Dion Stempfley, a former Defense Department computer expert. Hanssen's mastery of computer hacking methods was well known inside the FBI. In 1992, he warned two senior officials -- Raymond A. Mislock Jr., then chief of the Soviet section of the FBI's Intelligence Division, and Roger P. Watson, the division's deputy assistant director for operations -- that an internal computer system was not secure, according to former officials. Mislock and Watson were skeptical that the system, then new, could easily be penetrated. So, to prove his point, Hanssen hacked into Mislock's own computer, downloaded a document and brought a copy into Mislock's office, the former officials said. Hanssen, who allegedly began spying for the KGB seven years earlier, was not disciplined because his action was seen at the time as having been carried out for the good of FBI security. But one former official with direct knowledge of the incident now wonders whether Hanssen used the security concern as a cover story so that he could search Mislock's computer for any indication that he was under suspicion as a KGB mole. "Given what he's been charged with," the former official said, "I think you'd have to say he did it to try to find out if we were looking at him." Five years later, after the Automated Case Support System linked FBI offices around the world, Hanssen began regularly searching through it for his name and home address as well as the terms "dead drop," "Russia" and "espionage" to pick up any sign that he was under investigation, the affidavit says. The FBI reconstructed those searches using retrieval logs. But, unlike the CIA, the bureau does not have a mechanism that monitors employees' computer use and flags such suspicious searches, according to Edward J. Curran, a former top FBI counterintelligence official. The FBI says it caught Hanssen immediately after he stashed a plastic trash bag at a clandestine "dead drop" in a park near his home. The bag allegedly contained seven secret documents from the Automated Case Support System about FBI counterintelligence operations against Russian targets. It also held an encrypted letter to Hanssen's handlers in the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, the FBI says. The FBI was able to decrypt the letter quickly, possibly because Hanssen allegedly had sent his handlers an earlier letter that included a copy of his encryption key, and it was obtained in a search of his property. In addition to that package, FBI agents say they found dozens of documents from the bureau's computer system in Hanssen's car and offices at the FBI and State Department. What more he might have taken is a mystery. Although there is no evidence that he did so, "It's theoretically possible that he could have written a program to search the [FBI's Automated Case Support System] again and again and again to download the entire database," said Ira S. Winkler, a former National Security Agency officer and president of Internet Security Advisors Group, a private firm. Because the State Department's unclassified computers are linked to the Internet, Stempfley said, Hanssen could have found or created "back doors" in software that would have enabled Russian intelligence agencies to "tunnel" into U.S. databases in ways not readily apparent to systems administrators. As early as 1991 -- long before most FBI agents had surfed the World Wide Web or opened their first e-mail -- Hanssen wrote a message to his Russian handlers urging them to lease an office in downtown Washington so they could communicate "directly using a computer that would be specially-equipped with certain advanced technology," the affidavit says. Last year, Hanssen allegedly proposed an even more sophisticated system, recommending that the Russians use a Palm VII organizer that "can allow the rapid transmission of encrypted messages" and "might even serve for rapid transmittal of substantial material in digital form." The FBI was so worried about Hanssen's computer programming capabilities that it asked for, and received, the court's permission to take all his computers to a forensics laboratory for examination. "Given Hanssen's computer expertise and concern about detection," the affidavit says, "there is considerable risk that Hanssen has set up self-destruct programs for his computers that could erase vital evidence and files if his system or systems were examined by anyone other than experts." © 2001 The Washington Post Company -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2644 From: Steve Whitehead Date: Mon Mar 5, 2001 6:12am Subject: Be a mate and spy for Oz http://www.news24.co.za/News24/World/Australasia/0,1113,2-10-36_990830,00.html " Sydney, Australia - Wanted: Intelligent, ambitious and - most importantly - discreet young people to work as Australian spies. In an unprecedented move, Australia's foreign spy agency posted an advertisement on its website calling for university graduates to work undercover overseas, it was revealed on Monday. The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) is seeking applicants with Australian citizenship and from "a broad range of disciplines and backgrounds" to work as intelligence officers at home and abroad, the website said. But shy, retiring types need not apply: the agency warns that the recruitment process is "long and intrusive". "Employment in ASIS and in the Australian Intelligence Community generally places high expectations on personal standards of integrity, accountability and commitment," the website said. "The selection process is both long and intrusive ... (and) you do need to consider your own preparedness for questions that will cover ... personal relationships and living circumstances, personal values, financial situation, physical and mental health history including substance use and abuse, and civil record." Candidates would also be put through extensive psychological and medical testing, the website said. ASIS agents are posted around the world and work closely with intelligence services such as Britain's MI6 and the US Central Intelligence Agency. The job advertisement has been prompted by pending federal legislation that would make the spy agency subject to scrutiny by parliament and more transparent in its labour and other practices, The Australian newspaper reported on Monday. Currently, ASIS does not formally report to parliament and has an unspecified budget and number of staff, the newspaper said" Steve Whitehead Managing Member TSCM Services cc Tel (012) 664-3157 Fax (012) 664-3180 International (+2712) URL http://www.tscm.co.za E-mail sceptre@m... P O Box 16063, Lyttelton, 0140, Centurion, South Africa [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 2645 From: Date: Sun Mar 4, 2001 4:04pm Subject: Beginner equipment. My apologies if this was repeated but I was having some trouble with the posting here. After speaking to some very credible and competent people in the TSCM business, I am taking their advice and will continue training and reading about the field. I am also educating myself about the electronics field in general since it's been a long time. Anyway I am taking some advice from one of them and asking if anyone has TSCM equipment suitable for a beginner to learn on for sale at a fair price. Specifically, I'm looking for an AVCOM PSA 65C, and an oscilloscope that someone no longer uses. Not looking for packages right now since cost is a major factor and it's just for hands on training for me, and interfacing it all my reading. This list is excellent and I appreciate being a member. Please E-Mail Quebec100@a... Thanks Harry Kastrinakis 2646 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Mar 5, 2001 9:23am Subject: Re: Beginner equipment. Harry, I know that Steve Uhrig has just such a system that he has listed on his used equipment page at http://www.swssec.com/used.html -jma At 10:04 PM +0000 3/4/01, Quebec100@a... wrote: >My apologies if this was repeated but I was having some >trouble with the posting here. > > After speaking to some very credible and competent people in the >TSCM business, I am taking their advice and will continue >training and reading about the field. I am also educating myself >about the electronics field in general since it's been a long time. >Anyway I am taking some advice from one of them and asking if anyone >has TSCM equipment suitable for a beginner to learn on for sale at a >fair price. Specifically, I'm looking for an AVCOM PSA 65C, and an >oscilloscope that someone no longer uses. > Not looking for packages right now since cost is a major factor >and it's just for hands on training for me, and interfacing it all my >reading. This list is excellent and I appreciate being a member. >Please E-Mail Quebec100@a... > >Thanks > >Harry Kastrinakis -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2647 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Mar 5, 2001 7:30pm Subject: Spy Tunnel Leak Called A Big Loss Spy Tunnel Leak Called A Big Loss http://www.nydailynews.com/2001-03-05/News_and_Views/Beyond_the_City/a-102135.asp NEWS WIRE SERVICES The intelligence community was reeling yesterday from news that accused spy Robert Hanssen may have alerted Moscow to a secret tunnel built under the Soviet Embassy in Washington. One-time CIA official Vincent Cannistraro said that the damage to national security could be considerable. "I think the real fallout from this is going to be looking at how the Soviets used their knowledge of this to feed false information into the American system," he said yesterday. "That's going to be the subject of a long damage assessment." Hanssen, a 25-year FBI veteran and counterintelligence expert arrested last month and charged with spying for Moscow since 1985, "compromised an entire technical program of enormous value, expense and importance to the United States government," according to an FBI affidavit filed in the Hanssen case. That program referred to the tunnel, The New York Times reported yesterday, citing sources as saying it was unclear whether the operation produced any useful intelligence. The tunnel's existence had not been known publicly. The tunnel operation, estimated to have cost several hundred million dollars, was run by the FBI and the National Security Agency as part of a sophisticated eavesdropping operation to track Soviet Union ­ and later Russian ­ facilities and personnel in the U.S., The Times said. The embassy complex was built in the 1970s and 1980s but not fully occupied because of a dispute with the United States over claims that U.S. Embassy buildings in Moscow had been bugged. The complex was not fully occupied until after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The U.S. government arrested CIA officer Aldrich Ames in 1994, and when he was not able to explain a series of damaging intelligence losses, it is believed the investigation intensified and ultimately led to Hanssen. Cannistraro said the decision to build the tunnel "has to be seen not in a vacuum but part of the clandestine efforts that went on between the Soviet Union and U.S. with each using tunneling. It's spy versus spy." Maynard Anderson, who used to oversee counterintelligence programs and security policy at the Department of Defense, said the operation was "innovative. I'm sorry we got caught." Original Publication Date: 3/5/01 -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2648 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Mar 5, 2001 7:31pm Subject: U.S. Lists Allies Trying to Gather Secrets Monday March 05 10:26 AM EST U.S. Lists Allies Trying to Gather Secrets http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/abc/20010305/wl/u_s_lists_allies_trying_to_gather_secrets_1.html By David Ruppe ABCNEWS.com Who says friends don't spy on friends? A report has found some of the United States' closest allies are trying to gather commercial and technology secrets. Meanwhile, Russia has expressed outrage over the existence of a secret tunnel under their embassy in Washington D.C. The United States says some of its closest allies are suspected of attempting to obtain U.S. commercial and technology secrets. Japan, Israel, France, South Korea and Taiwan are highlighted as some of the most aggressive in attempting to obtain U.S. business information, through lawful and/or illegal means. China and India, less closely aligned with the U.S., are also named. The countries were listed in a little-noticed report to Congress published last month on foreign economic and industrial espionage issued by the U.S. National Counter Intelligence Center. The list was based on a survey of about a dozen Fortune 500 companies. The center coordinates government efforts to identify and counter foreign intelligence threats to U.S. national and economic security. It's staffed by the FBI, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, State Department, Energy Department and various Pentagon agencies. "The risks to sensitive business information and advanced technologies have dramatically increased in the post-Cold War era as foreign governments - both former adversaries and allies - have shifted their espionage resources away from military and political targets to commerce," the report said. Previous reports by the center and other U.S. agencies described the level and types of economic spying but did not name specific countries, citing a need to protect intelligence sources and avoid possible foreign policy repercussions. Listing specific countries is an important development in light of the need for companies to be aware of who might be targeting them, says Steve Aftergood, a senior research analyst at the Federation of American Scientists. "I think there is a utility in speaking frankly about the issue and letting people know what the hazards might be," he says. Remi Marechaux, deputy spokesman for the French Embassy in Washington, D.C., says making the list is not necessarily a bad thing. "It depends on what you call economic espionage," he says. "We have a network of consulates, and all the consulates have a trade section which is in charge of looking for information regarding trade with the U.S. So that's the basic job of our trade section, and that's also what exists with regard to the American presence in France." Few Convictions Former President Clinton signed the U.S. Economic Espionage Act in 1996, designed by Congress to strengthen U.S. efforts to identify and counter commercial espionage. But there have been few convictions under the act. The first came in January 2000, when a federal judge sentenced a Taiwanese executive to two years probation along with six months of home detention for stealing adhesive formulas and innovations from an American company. "Successful espionage seldom comes to light, and even when economic espionage is discovered, companies are often reluctant to report to authorities that they have been the victim of such activity because of the embarrassing publicity and legal complications that may follow," the report said. Types of Information Sought Much of the information most desired by foreign information gatherers has military utility, and is restricted from exports by the U.S. government. The most sought-after critical technology categories in 1999 in rank order were information systems, sensors, lasers, electronics and aeronautic systems technologies, according to the report. But the targets of espionage can include everything from information on missile defense technology and pharmaceutical technology to manufacturing processes and encryption. Dumpster Diving, and Other Methods Commercial spies, according to the report, include government and company employees. But people on the periphery like contractors, consultants, and business competitors are also involved. And the report said computers have made it easier to steal secrets. "Using today's technology, information can be downloaded into small disks and readily removed from the premises," it said. Theft of laptops was also identified as a problem area. Foreign intelligence collectors gather U.S. secrets through such legal methods as conversations during social gatherings, and through conferences and symposiums, trade show and by simply requesting technical information. The report identified other techniques for stealing U.S. technology secrets: People breaking away from tour groups; Attempts to steal information after normal working hours; Foreign customs officials holding laptops for extended periods of time; Interception of Internet messages; Dumpster diving - searching through trash and discarded materials. "As long as the United States remains the world's leading industrial power and U.S. industry continues to lead the world in technology development, the United States will remain a prime target of foreign economic collection and industrial espionage," the report concludes. But Aftergood says, while the consequences of espionage can be devastating for a U.S. company, the implications are much less significant for the U.S. economy in general and the U.S. military. "I think it's important to keep in mind the magnitude of the threat. Our economy does not depend on secrets, it depends on [vast resources] and the whole economic infrastructure and our political system and our military," he says. -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2649 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Mar 5, 2001 7:33pm Subject: Embassies With Ears: A chronology of construction and eavesdropping at U.S. and Soviet Embassies With Ears: A chronology of construction and eavesdropping at U.S. and Soviet http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24702-2001Mar5.html 1964: U.S. officials discover 40 eavesdropping devices in the embassy in Moscow. Mid-1960s: U.S. and Soviet officials begin discussing construction of new embassies in Washington and Moscow. 1969: Tentative agreement reached. 1972: Construction agreement signed calling for simultaneous construction and reciprocal occupancy, meaning that neither nation may occupy its new building until the other nation's new embassy is completed. October 1977: George Hyman Construction Co. of Bethesda begins work on the first phase of the Soviet compound on a 12.5-acre site on Mount Alto, bordered by Wisconsin Avenue, Calvert Street, Tunlaw Road and Fulton Street. Whiting and Turner Contracting Co. of Baltimore is to build the second phase. 1978: Secret tunnel packed with Soviet eavesdropping equipment is discovered under the old U.S. Embassy in Moscow. September 1979: Construction begins on new U.S. Embassy on Tchaikovsky Street in Moscow. January 1980: Soviets lodge an official protest after finding eavesdropping devices in apartment buildings in the new compound here. One of the project's designers later says that the Soviets examined every inch of the buildings with X-ray equipment looking for bugs. 1984: Americans discover Soviet transmitters inside typewriters in use since 1982 at the old U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The transmitters picked up the contents of documents typed by embassy secretaries and transmitted them to antennas hidden in the embassy walls, which relayed the signals to a listening post outside. 1985: Work on the Soviet Embassy is completed. August 1985: U.S. workers discover eavesdropping devices in pillars, beams and floors of the new embassy in Moscow. Soviet workers are locked out of the site. Experts say six lower floors of the building, dubbed the Giant Transmitter, can never be fully debugged. December 1986: Marine Sgt. Clayton J. Lonetree turns himself in to the CIA station chief in Vienna for having contact with a KGB agent in Moscow. The entire 28-member embassy guard detachment is recalled from Moscow by the Marine Corps. Charges against Cpl. Arnold Bracy are dropped. Sgt. Robert Stufflebeam is implicated but never charged. Lonetree, convicted of 13 charges of espionage in August 1987, later that year accepts a government offer to cooperate in damage assessment interrogations in return for a five-year reduction of his 25-year sentence. April 11, 1987: Soviet officials, leading reporters and photographers on a tour of the new chancery in Washington, point to where alleged bugs were found in pillars, embedded in marble and in pipes. June 16, 1987: House votes 414 to 0 to prohibit Soviet diplomats from occupying their new embassy unless President Ronald Reagan certifies that the U.S. facility in Moscow is secure. A measure to halt construction on the Moscow building is defeated, 272 to 142. July 1, 1987: A State Department study by James R. Schlesinger, former CIA director and defense secretary, recommends rebuilding the top three floors of the new U.S. chancery in Moscow and construction of a new six-floor annex for top-security functions. 1988: Reagan proposes razing the new building in Moscow and starting over. 1989: Bush administration reconsiders razing the building as the State Department and CIA reportedly squabble over control of security there. 1991: As the Soviet Union disintegrates, Vadim Bakatin, head of the KGB,presents U.S. Ambassador Robert S. Strauss with the blueprints for the embassy bugs in Moscow. 1994: New Russian Embassy opens in Washington. May 2000: U.S. Ambassador James Collins opens the new embassy in Moscow. At a cost of $240 million, it has been taken apart and rebuilt. The top two floors are replaced with four new secure floors built by American workers using U.S. materials. ­ Jo Rector and Nora Tillman © 2001 The Washington Post Company -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2650 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Mar 5, 2001 7:35pm Subject: FBI Spy Suspect Must Stay in Jail Monday March 5 2:45 PM ET FBI Spy Suspect Must Stay in Jail http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20010305/us/spy_case_3.html By KAREN GULLO, Associated Press Writer ALEXANDRIA, Va. (AP) - A federal judge on Monday ordered that veteran FBI (news - web sites) agent Robert Philip Hanssen remain confined to jail, saying she believes the government has an ``extraordinarily strong case'' against the man accused of spying for Moscow since 1985. In issuing the order for continued confinement, U.S. District Judge Theresa Buchanan said the 56-year-old Hanssen may ``pose a severe risk of flight'' because of the nature of the allegations against him and could pose a threat to society. During the brief court appearance, the first since his arrest on Feb. 18, Hanssen sat between two of his attorneys, dressed in a green jumpsuit and plain black tennis shoes. The word ``prisoner'' was printed on the back of his jumpsuit. Hanssen sat quietly and spoke only once, when the judge asked if he knew he was entitled to a full detention hearing. ``I do, your honor,'' he replied. Randy Bellows, an assistant U.S. attorney, told the judge that Hanssen poses a ``grave danger to the U.S.'' and because of his background and expertise in counterintelligence, he poses a grave risk of flight. Plato Cacheris, Hanssen's lawyer, said ``we do not subscribe to the facts Mr. Bellows has presented,'' but added that Hanssen was not contesting detention. Buchanan asked Hanssen if he understood that he was not contesting that arrangement, and the defendant replied, ``Yes, I do.'' The government had filed a proffer of its evidence in support of Hanssen's detention, and Hanssen waived his right to challenge the proffer and agreed not to contest his detention. Buchanan said the fact that Hanssen was found carrying his current valid passport when he was arrested, and because of the circumstance of his alleged offenses, there was no way he could be released. Under a previous agreement between his lawyers and prosecutors, a preliminary hearing was moved from Monday to May 21. The agreement calls for Hanssen's lawyers to be able to look at some of the evidence that the government has collected against him. Hanssen, a 25-year veteran FBI agent, has been held at an undisclosed detention facility since shortly after his arrest Feb. 18. Investigators apprehended him at a Virginia park just minutes after he left a package under a wooden foot bridge, which investigators say was a ``dead drop'' site for delivering secret documents to his Russian handlers. In advance of Hanssen's appearance, his attorney, Plato Cacheris, told reporters Monday that while no plea was immediately due, his client ultimately would plead not guilty. ``That's absolutely right,'' Cacheris said, when asked. He also said he thought there were ``a lot of gaps'' in the government's case and said ``we're not discussing a deal. There's no pressure.'' The Washington Post reported Monday that experts were looking closely at government computers at the FBI and the State Department to make sure that Hanssen, a skilled programmer, did not sabotage them or create vulnerabilities that could allow Russian spies to steal sensitive information while Hanssen is jailed. Unidentified authorities said the FBI's classified computer system has been checked and nothing was found to suggest Hanssen had done anything that would allow access or damage the bureau's network. No conclusions had been reached about his computer activities at the State Department, where he had been assigned since 1995 to an office that monitors foreign diplomats, the Post reported. The government alleged that since 1985, Hanssen has passed to Soviet and later Russian contacts 6,000 pages of top-secret documents containing highly sensitive information about how the United States conducts intelligence operations, which foreign agents it has targeted and technical information about communications and surveillance. Hanssen may have alerted Moscow to a secret tunnel built under the Soviet Embassy in Washington, The New York Times reported Sunday. The tunnel operation, estimated to have cost several hundred million dollars, was run by the FBI and the National Security Agency as part of a sophisticated eavesdropping operation to track Soviet and Russian facilities and personnel in the United States, the newspaper said. It said government spokesmen declined comment. Incensed by the report, Russia's Foreign Ministry on Monday demanded that the United States provide details. The Foreign Ministry issued a statement suggesting that Moscow was officially unaware of the tunnel's existence. If the report is true, it said, ``this will be a flagrant violation of the recognized norms of international law that throughout the world govern relations with foreign diplomatic missions.'' Asked about this Monday, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said, ``If the reports are accurate or inaccurate is not a topic that I'm at liberty to discuss, and any conversations between our nations will be private ones.'' Fleischer said Bush is ``still going to approach relations with Moscow in the same way he always has, and he addressed that throughout the campaign, and we're looking forward to having good relations with Russia - straightforward, direct conversations, which is the president's manner and style, and I don't see that changing.'' At the State Department, spokesman Richard Boucher said that ``in terms of any tunnel or lack of tunnel, obviously, all this purports to relate to intelligence activities, and I wouldn't be able to comment one way or the other.'' But he did confirm that the Russian foreign ministry called in the U.S. charge d'affaires in Moscow ``in connection with stories on this subject that have appeared in the press, and all our charge said was that he would report their concerns back to Washington.'' When reporters asked Cacheris about the tunnel report, he said, ``I think it's abominable, and I think you should be skeptical about that.'' In exchange for his alleged espionage, Hanssen received $600,000 in cash and diamonds and $800,000 was deposited in a foreign bank for him, authorities charged. Hanssen could get life in prison or the death penalty if convicted. Assistant U.S. Attorney Randy Bellows filed documents last week outlining evidence the government has collected against Hanssen. They included letters to and from the Russian intelligence agency found in Hanssen's briefcase, a statement from his Swiss bank account and recordings of Hanssen's conversations with the Russians. Hanssen's attorneys will be given access to some of the government's evidence before an indictment is handed down, under an agreement struck last week. Both sides agreed to move a preliminary hearing date and the deadline for indictment to May 21. Both had been scheduled for Monday. -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2651 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Mar 5, 2001 7:38pm Subject: Lawyer for Spy Suspect Slams Secret Tunnel Link Monday March 5 2:29 PM ET Lawyer for Spy Suspect Slams Secret Tunnel Link http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010305/ts/crime_spying_dc_31.html By Tabassum Zakaria ALEXANDRIA, Va. (Reuters) - A lawyer for Robert Hanssen, a former FBI (news - web sites) agent accused of spying for Moscow, on Monday condemned reports saying Hanssen tipped off Russia to an eavesdropping tunnel below the Russian embassy in Washington. Plato Cacheris, speaking to reporters before a hearing at which Hanssen was ordered to be held in jail pending his trial, said the reports were ``abominable.'' He questioned the timing of their disclosure over the weekend. ``This defunct tunnel under the Russian embassy that some unnamed officials are now disclosing, I think is abominable and you should be skeptical about that,'' he said. ``Nobody's ever heard of it before. Why would they be telling that story now?'' Cacheris added. The New York Times reported the existence of the tunnel on Saturday and quoted unnamed officials saying they believed the operation had been betrayed to the Russians by Hanssen. The Washington Post had a similar report on Monday. FBI and White House spokesmen declined to comment on the reports, which said the tunnel was built in the 1970s and 1980s, during the Cold War when both countries were targeting the other's embassy intensively with eavesdropping equipment. Cacheris said no one had openly accused Hanssen of betraying the tunnel plan. ``No one has outright accused him of compromising it,'' he said, adding: ``All there is is speculation.'' Arrested In Park Hanssen was arrested on Feb. 18 at a park in suburban Virginia, close to Washington, after dropping off material for his Russian handlers, an affidavit said. He was accused of spying for Moscow since 1985 in exchange for $1.4 million in money and diamonds. He allegedly sold secrets including names of double agents and U.S. electronic surveillance methods, revelations that severely damaged national security, U.S. officials said. Cacheris repeated earlier statements that Hanssen planned to plead not guilty and said there were no negotiations going on with U.S. authorities on a possible plea deal. ``He will plead not guilty at the appropriate time,'' he said and added, ``We are not discussing a deal.'' Describing his client's state of mind as he faces the charges as ``normal,'' Cacheris said he had been promised early access to the government's evidence. Asked about the affidavit, he said: ``It's got a lot of gaps in it.'' At the detention hearing in federal court in the Washington suburb of Alexandria, Virginia, Judge Theresa Buchanan ruled Hanssen posed a risk of flight, citing the prosecution's case that he had a passport and money available abroad provided by Russia. She said the government's contention Hanssen knew a lot of U.S. secrets ``indicate his release could pose a danger to the United States.'' Hanssen's attorneys did not contest the ruling. ``Given his prior access, his expertise as a counterintelligence specialist, and his clear willingness to betray his position of high trust, Hanssen poses a clear and present danger that he will compromise additional information of a sensitive and classified nature,'' prosecutors said in documents submitted to the court on Thursday. Poses Flight Risk When Hanssen was arrested he had in his briefcase his passport and a statement for his Swiss bank accounts, the prosecutors said. U.S. News & World Report magazine reported in its March 12 issue, out on Monday, that officials now blamed Hanssen for compromising at least two highly sensitive FBI counterintelligence programs. One, called Pocketwatch, involved FBI surveillance of Soviet commercial activities used as fronts for spying. This included a 1985 operation, led by Hanssen, focusing on Amtorg, a Soviet trade organization in New York. Hanssen also allegedly revealed details of Spiderweb, a secret monitoring system used by the FBI to track suspected members of hostile intelligence services, the magazine reported. Agents use Spiderweb to monitor known or suspected areas of espionage activity, like drop sites, signal sites and embassies. The FBI has fired Hanssen, who was an agent for 25 years and was just months away from retirement. -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2652 From: Date: Mon Mar 5, 2001 6:37pm Subject: Beginner equipment Jim, thank you. I am familiar with Steve's setup but it's a little too advanced for me at this point especially since I'm in learn mode. I'm also looking to spend significantly less money than what he is asking, although it is a fantastic deal. I've discussed it with him and he gave me some excellent advice. I've received a couple of responses to my EMail address and I appreciate that certain people are taking the time to get me a good deal for proper equipment through their contacts P.S. Just got Ted Swift's book in the mail..extremely well put together. Harry K. 2653 From: William Knowles Date: Tue Mar 6, 2001 2:05am Subject: CI Project Assistance (fwd) I saw this on the Intelforum list and thought some of the folks on the TCSM list might want to help this fellow out. Cheers! William Knowles wk@c... ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2001 19:04:54 -0500 (EST) From: joe whitney Reply-To: intelforum@h... To: intelforum@h... Subject: CI Project Assistance Good morning Intelligence Forum, I am an MBA student at Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo, Ontario, who is working on a project that requires an exposition on counter-intelligence. While I have found a good amount of background information on counter-intelligence, I have had some difficulty in finding facts that would help me answer the main question of the essay. Specifically, I need to answer: "What are the top 5 multinational companies at counter-intelligence?" Understandably, this is tough subject to research given that the top firms are likely reluctant to divulge the counter-measures they employ to protect their corporate assets. However, any guidance that you could provide is sure to be very helpful considering I am at a loss to even determine the top five firms, let alone figure out their counter-intelligence capabilities. A response at your earliest convenience would be greatly appreciated. Thank you for the time and consideration. Regards, Joe Whitney MBA Candidate 2001 Laurier School of Business & Economics _ Intelligence Forum (http://www.intelforum.org) is sponsored by Intelligence and National Security, a Frank Cass journal (http://www.frankcass.com/jnls/ins.htm) 2654 From: Robert G. Ferrell Date: Tue Mar 6, 2001 6:50am Subject: Re: U.S. Lists Allies Trying to Gather Secrets >The United States says some of its closest allies are suspected of >attempting to obtain U.S. commercial and technology secrets. Of course, _we_ would never think to spy on any of them... ;-) RGF Robert G. Ferrell, CISSP Information Systems Security Officer National Business Center U. S. Dept. of the Interior Robert_G_Ferrell@n... ======================================== Who goeth without humor goeth unarmed. ======================================== 2655 From: A Grudko Date: Tue Mar 6, 2001 8:41am Subject: Re: U.S. Lists Allies Trying to Gather Secrets ----- Original Message ----- > >The United States says some of its closest allies are suspected of > >attempting to obtain U.S. commercial and technology secrets. > Of course, _we_ would never think to spy on any of them... Isn't there a page on the CIA website where employees of overseas countries can submit plans and documents in exchange for Air America air miles? Just kidding guys......we all know Air America only has 2 routes now - Washington to Bogotá and Washington to Baghdad, and who wants to go to Washington? Many thanks to all who sent condolences on my Mother's passing a week ago today. I expect to be back in the mainstream of work by Monday. Andy Grudko. D.P.M., Grad I.S, (S.A.) CEO - Grudko Wilson Associates (SA) (Pty) Ltd - Crime investigation & intelligence Johannesburg - Cape Town - Durban - Pretoria - UK - US - Canada - Australia - Israel - Bosnia. Agents in 41 countries - www.grudko.com - (+27 11) 465 9673 - 465 1487 (Fax) - Est. 1981 GIN (Charter), SACI (Pres), WAD, CALI, SASFed, SASA, SAMLF, SCIP (SA Chairman), UKPIN, AFIO (OS), IWWA, PRETrust, IPA, AmChamCom "When you need it done right - first time" 2656 From: David Alexander Date: Tue Mar 6, 2001 8:21am Subject: Re: U.S. Lists Allies Trying to Gather Secrets The subject of nations trying to gain information - commercial or otherwise, from their allies is as old as the hills. In order to appear aggrieved one has to be innocent of the same charge - and I don't believe that anyone is. The facts are that every nation says the practice is low-down, underhanded and reprehensible - and everyone does it to everyone else, including the CIA to American allies. Just my 2c David Alexander M.INSTIS Bookham Technology plc DDI: 01235 837823 David.Alexander@B... ======================================================================= This e-mail is intended for the person it is addressed to only. The information contained in it may be confidential and/or protected by law. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, you must not make any use of this information, or copy or show it to any person. Please contact us immediately to tell us that you have received this e-mail, and return the original to us. Any use, forwarding, printing or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. No part of this message can be considered a request for goods or services. ======================================================================= Any questions about Bookham's E-Mail service should be directed to postmaster@b.... 2657 From: factfind Date: Tue Mar 6, 2001 0:35pm Subject: Re: CI Project Assistance (fwd) Laudable, to help this person out in their academic studies. And of course we know who he really is having done due diligence of some sort? (he asked rhetorically) ----- Original Message ----- From: William Knowles To: TSCM-L@yahoogroups.com Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2001 3:05 AM Subject: [TSCM-L] CI Project Assistance (fwd) I saw this on the Intelforum list and thought some of the folks on the TCSM list might want to help this fellow out. Cheers! William Knowles wk@c... ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2001 19:04:54 -0500 (EST) From: joe whitney Reply-To: intelforum@h... To: intelforum@h... Subject: CI Project Assistance Good morning Intelligence Forum, I am an MBA student at Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo, Ontario, who is working on a project that requires an exposition on counter-intelligence. While I have found a good amount of background information on counter-intelligence, I have had some difficulty in finding facts that would help me answer the main question of the essay. Specifically, I need to answer: "What are the top 5 multinational companies at counter-intelligence?" Understandably, this is tough subject to research given that the top firms are likely reluctant to divulge the counter-measures they employ to protect their corporate assets. However, any guidance that you could provide is sure to be very helpful considering I am at a loss to even determine the top five firms, let alone figure out their counter-intelligence capabilities. A response at your earliest convenience would be greatly appreciated. Thank you for the time and consideration. Regards, Joe Whitney MBA Candidate 2001 Laurier School of Business & Economics _ Intelligence Forum (http://www.intelforum.org) is sponsored by Intelligence and National Security, a Frank Cass journal (http://www.frankcass.com/jnls/ins.htm) Yahoo! Groups Sponsor Click Here to Find Software Faster ======================================================== TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: http://www.onelist.com/community/TSCM-L or email your subscription request to: subTSCM-L@t... =================================================== TSKS Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 2658 From: Mike Date: Tue Mar 6, 2001 1:59pm Subject: AMPS/DAMPS Test Equipment Will soon have several Smith-Myers and Curtis cellular analysers for sale to Security entities. These cost $1200 plus when new and are "HARD" to find. They were originally sold only to verified Cell Companies, authorized cellular technicians and Federal Agencies. A limited number of Curtis 5200B Nammers also available. (these units are AMPS/DAMPS capable and provide "NAM" info. Need I say more? smiles..) Make offer on one or the whole load? Nuff Said- Bootleg PS These came out of service as working units, but being sold "as-is". Email me for details or to make offers. Also have a variety of "cell capable" Pro and Aor scanners. Several have computer connections/control capabilities. These units are the ones everyone is looking for. bootleg@p... (only 2 left: AN/PPS-6 Military Remote Portable Battlefield Radar Units. COMPLETE!) Finally, Oregons Department of Motor Vehicles Drivers License and Vehicle Registration databases on CD Rom. Millions of DMV records. BRAND NEW DATA! I've been publishing these yearly and this is likely the last one due to recent State and Federal laws. (for marketing purposes only) Also have older Texas and Florida DMV databases for sale. Contact me with your lists of hard to find hardware or software you are searching for. I'm always finding deals on interesting items. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 2659 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Tue Mar 6, 2001 6:50pm Subject: Embassy tunnel angers Russians Embassy tunnel angers Russians http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/03/05/russia.tunnel/index.html March 5, 2001 Web posted at: 6:49 PM EST (2349 GMT) MOSCOW, Russia -- Russia's Foreign Ministry has demanded details of a secret tunnel allegedly built underneath the Soviet Embassy in Washington for eavesdropping. Present and former U.S. officials told CNN the tunnel -- under what is now the Russian Embassy -- was built by American intelligence services and packed with millions of dollars worth of sophisticated equipment. They believe its existence may have been revealed by Robert Hanssen, an FBI agent arrested last month on allegations of spying for Moscow. The Russian Foreign Ministry on Monday summoned the charge d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for an official explanation on the tunnel, said to have been jointly operated by the FBI and the National Security Agency. It said the story, if true, would amount to "a flagrant violation of the recognised norms of international law that throughout the world govern relations with foreign diplomatic missions." A spokeswoman for the Foreign Intelligence Service -- an agency that succeeded the KGB -- said she would not be surprised. "Digging tunnels is a favourite pursuit of American special services," Tatyana Samolis said in remarks carried by NTV television station, recalling a U.S. spy tunnel dug in Berlin in the 1950s. The Soviet Embassy was built in the 1970s and 1980s but was not fully occupied until 1991 because of a dispute over claims that the Soviets bugged a new U.S. Embassy building in Moscow. American officials abandoned that building in 1985 after finding it laced with KGB listening devices. In 1978, U.S. Marines discovered Soviet agents burrowing a tunnel under the U.S. Embassy. The hole was packed with electronic gear -- and a Soviet agent wearing headphones, according to news reports. The embassy denied the incident at the time. A former Russian ambassador to Washington, Vladimir Lukin, said the report of a new tunnel showed both sides were hypocritical in their public statements about the embassy spy scandals of the 1980s. "They dug this channel and later assailed us for bugging their embassy in Moscow. That shows that the level of morality on both sides is the same," he said in an interview on the Echo of Moscow radio station. The Associated Press contributed to this report. -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2660 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Tue Mar 6, 2001 6:51pm Subject: Threat in the Hand of Your Palm Threat in the Hand of Your Palm http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,42198,00.html by Michelle Delio 10:55 a.m. Mar. 5, 2001 PST Keep your Palm in your pocket. With just a single stroke of a stylus, anyone can launch a program that allows him or her to access, change or make a copy of any data that is stored on any Palm device. Palm acknowledged on Friday that the password-protection feature in Palm Desktop 4.0 software could easily be disabled. Palm spokeswoman Julia Rodriguez that the problem affects only users who believed they could protect sensitive or private data using Palm's password-protection feature. But security firm @Stake has issued a warning that Palm's debugging program, installed on all Palm devices and intended for use only by application developers and technical support people, can be used by anyone who is willing to read Palm's developer manual. The debugging program, when used with a Palm that is connected to a computer, allows an attacker to type in commands such as "coldboot" to wipe all the data off the device, or "export" to copy all of the device's stored data onto another computer. The debugger program can also be used to access a user's Palm password. The debugger program is activated by a graffiti stroke, an uppercase "L," with a period on the lower-left loop. Graffiti is the Palm writing system that allows users to input information by writing specific characters directly onto the Palm's display screen. The debugger's abilities are fully explained in Palm's developer's documentation, so the company has inadvertently provided a manual that allows an attacker to crack any unattended Palm, said Chris Wysopal, director of research and development for @Stake. Wysopal said that an attacker would be able to copy the contents of the average Palm "in about five minutes," and a password could be decrypted in a few seconds. Frank Voden, a consultant with TechSolutions, said that the debugger exploit is a real security risk. "Corporations and government agencies need to quickly implement security measures to cover this issue. They need to let employees know that Palm devices must be carefully protected. They have to be told to think of their Palms as if they are keys to the office's front door, and act accordingly," Voden said. Since Palm devices can freely exchange data with a network, a Palm can also be used to crack into a classified network if the device is compromised, Voden said. Wysopal of @Stake said that Palm users should be aware of the physical security and location of their Palm at all times. "A Palm device should not be left unattended or loaned to a potentially untrustworthy colleague," he said. Rodriguez advised users who require password protection of their data to consider installing Palm Desktop 3.1. "They can also secure their desktop software in some other manner until the updated Palm Desktop 4.0 release is made available," Rodriguez said. An updated release of Palm Desktop 4.0, which fixes the password-protection issue, is expected to be available within the next 4 to 6 weeks. But Wysopal said that his "most immediate recommendation" would be not to use the current family of Palm devices for the storage of sensitive or confidential information. "It is not possible to employ a secure application on top of an insecure foundation. Because Palm OS is inherently insecure, methods to attempt to completely secure data are moot," Wysopal said. Wysopal also suggested that any Palm devices that hold particularly sensitive information could be neutered, so that the machine cannot communicate with a computer via serial port synching. @Stake advises permanently gluing a piece of plastic over the Palm's serial port connector -- leaving the infrared port as the only method of synching -- or disabling the Palm's port by opening the case and cutting the specific RS232 lines. These actions will prevent an attacker from using the debug mode even if it is activated. (It would also void a Palm warranty.) "It would behoove Palm to completely remove all debugging features from future production versions of Palm OS, including OS 4.0," Wysopal said. "If the debugging functionality remains inherent in Palm OS, attackers will find methods to modify the operating system to re-enable the debug mode." Rodriguez did not comment on Palm's future plans for the debugger program. -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2661 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Tue Mar 6, 2001 6:52pm Subject: Accused FBI spy betrayed U.S. countermeasures Accused FBI spy betrayed U.S. countermeasures http://www.vny.com/cf/News/upidetail.cfm?QID=165270 Monday, 5 March 2001 20:30 (ET) Accused FBI spy betrayed U.S. countermeasures BY RICHARD SALE, UPI Terrorism Correspondent WASHINGTON, March 5 (UPI) -- On Monday, the day a federal judge told accused spy Robert Hanssen he would not be allowed out of jail on bail, United Press International learned from former FBI officials that Hanssen allegedly betrayed details of U.S. surveillance and electronic countermeasures used against Soviet diplomatic and intelligence staff in Washington. In addition to revealing the existence of an electronic eavesdropping tunnel under the Soviet Embassy in Washington, these sources say Hanssen tipped the Soviets off about real-time FBI monitoring of the Soviets' interception of top secret telephone traffic. "There was a tremendous volume of calls taking place from the White House to other government agencies, and the Soviets got a lot of it," one source said. This included facsimile and data transmission circuits as well as telephone calls between Air Force One and the White House and between the White House and the National Security Agency, he said. The Soviets also listened in on the Department of Defense and State Department. The Soviets operated their interceptions from the sixth floor of their then embassy on 16th Street in Northwest Washington, and a site in a trade representation building on Connecticut Avenue, U.S. intelligence officials said. A report in the New York Times Sunday said that federal investigators believe Hanssen told Moscow about the secret tunnel operation, run by the FBI and the NSA, which sources told the paper had cost several hundred million dollars. The tunnel reportedly ran under the complex built on Washington's Wisconsin Avenue in the 1970s and 1980s to replace the 16th Street premises. However, owing to a dispute with the United States, the new building was not fully occupied until the 1990s -- by which time the Soviet Union had collapsed. The complex is now the Russian Embassy. The government charges that Hanssen, a 25-year veteran of the FBI and a counterintelligence expert, volunteered to spy for Moscow in 1985. He was arrested on Feb. 18. According to former FBI officials, the Soviets used a sophisticated microwave device shipped to the 16th Street building through the Netherlands to listen in on U.S. electronic traffic. The operation was run by the GRU -- Soviet military intelligence. Using computers, the Soviets set up a "watch list" that would hone interceptions on calls that used words like "CIA" or "strategic defense initiative." They would then transcribe the calls and send them to Moscow. The calls were intercepted to glean sensitive personal information about U.S. government officials who might be having personal, marital or financial problems that would make them vulnerable to an approach to spy for the Soviet Union. To counter this, the FBI began to track what the Soviets were tracking, a U.S. intelligence official told UPI. Hanssen also allegedly told the Soviets about a sophisticated system of street sensors that tracked Soviet diplomatic and embassy staff vehicles. The system was set up at key intersections in the downtown Washington area and was activated by the passage of Soviet vehicles, making surveillance much easier and almost foolproof, according to a former KGB defector interviewed by UPI. Hanssen also alerted the Soviets to Washington downtown hotels and other locations that had become so-called Special Facilities of the National Security Agency. The Madison Hotel, where Soviet visitors often stayed, was one such building whose hallways and doorframes had been modified into huge listening devices, U.S. intelligence officials said. Regarding the FBI-NSA listening tunnel, U.S. government officials said that the NSA was using laser beams directed at glass surfaces of the embassy compound such as windows to monitor conversations, these sources said. The lasers are able to pick up the minute vibrations of window glass caused by conversations, which can then be recorded. "The take we got wasn't all that great. The Russians aren't stupid," said one official. CIA officials at agency headquarters across the river in Virginia, fearing that Soviet operators were using the same technology against them, installed double panes of glass plus screens and meshes, a former senior CIA official told UPI. "The place looked really weird," he said. -- Copyright 2001 by United Press International. All rights reserved. -- -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2662 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Tue Mar 6, 2001 6:54pm Subject: The Spying Game Sometimes a Circle The Spying Game Sometimes a Circle http://www.guardianunlimited.co.uk/breakingnews/US/0,3560,772047,00.html Tuesday March 6, 2001 6:10 am WASHINGTON (AP) - The list of classified information that FBI agent Robert Hanssen is accused of selling to the Russians is long on details about spies spying on spies. As the potential scope of revelations is evaluated, Hanssen's case is a reminder that espionage at times can be as much about finding out what the other side knows about your own intelligence operation as it is about getting nuclear codes or other vital secrets. In a trade dubbed a ``wilderness of mirrors,'' practitioners may not see much more than reflections of each other. ``It has very little to do with a nation's top secrets sometimes,'' said Loch Johnson, a University of Georgia political scientist who worked on intelligence for the Clinton White House and congressional committees. ``It does begin to be a little bit circular - counterintelligence agencies going after one another.'' Even so, former U.S. spymasters say much can be lost, or gained, for national security when an insider betrays how one side's intelligence operation has penetrated the other side's. Hanssen is alleged to have divulged an eye-popping wealth of information about American intelligence-gathering, including extensive detail about how U.S. officials had tapped into Russian spy operations. Among documents the former counterintelligence official is alleged to have stashed in Hefty bags and left in ``dead drops'' for Russian handlers were details on the U.S. Double Agent Program, the FBI Double Agent Program and U.S. government studies of future intelligence requirements and KGB recruitment operations. Officials also believe Hanssen tipped off Moscow to a secret tunnel the Americans built under the Soviet Embassy in Washington for eavesdropping. ``He compromised United States Intelligence Community technical operations of extraordinary importance and value,'' the FBI said in an affidavit supporting Hanssen's arrest. A federal judge said Monday the government's case against Hanssen is ``extraordinarily strong'' and ordered him confined to jail. Hanssen has not entered a plea, but his attorney said he would plead innocent. A May 21 preliminary hearing has been scheduled. Steve Aftergood, an intelligence analyst for the Federation of American Scientists, said it appears much of the damage allegedly done by Hanssen ``was to U.S. intelligence, but not necessarily to the United States.'' ``When officials speak of vital secrets that might have been lost, they are really speaking within the framework of intelligence, and not national security as a whole,'' he said. In the Aldrich Ames case, as with Hanssen, the focus was on classified information about U.S. intelligence-gathering. Ames, a CIA official who pleaded guilty to espionage in 1994, is blamed for the deaths of at least nine agents working for the United States in the Soviet Union and for disclosing U.S. counterintelligence techniques. ``A lot of spying is a self-perpetuating game in which each side is simply trying to penetrate the other and to discover intelligence operations that the other side is running,'' Aftergood said. Other notable spy cases, however, have been more directly related to national security. Retired Navy Warrant Officer John A. Walker Jr., for example, pleaded guilty in 1985 to running a spy ring that gave the Soviets secret codes that allowed them to read 1 million classified Navy cables. Robert Gates, CIA director under former President Bush, stressed that the vast majority of U.S. intelligence work is aimed at gathering information about possible threats to American security, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and military modernization around the world. ``Those are the things that preoccupy American intelligence,'' Gates said. At the same time, he said, U.S. officials have to be vigilant against those who can ``give away the means by which we gather the information we need to know on these threats.'' ``These people inside can do serious damage in terms of our ability to accomplish the broader mission,'' Gates said. James Woolsey, CIA director under former President Clinton from 1993 to 1995, said America's open society makes it harder to safeguard secrets. More pervasive polygraph tests of government employees, for example, would help deter foreign espionage but could intrude on workers' civil liberties. Penetrating rival spy networks, he said, does not raise the same problems, which can make counterintelligence ploys ``money well spent.'' Woolsey said striking the right balance between safeguarding secrets and protecting civil liberties means ``you can never be sure that you're completely successful'' at avoiding security breaches. As a result, he added, ``You have to be a bit more paranoid in this business than you do when you're out in the normal world of business or commerce or law.'' -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2663 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Tue Mar 6, 2001 6:55pm Subject: In 'wilderness of mirrors,' spies may spy on spies In 'wilderness of mirrors,' spies may spy on spies http://www.nandotimes.com/nation/story/0,1038,500460379-500701297-503818439-0,00.html By NANCY BENAC, Associated Press WASHINGTON (March 6, 2001 8:30 a.m. EST http://www.nandotimes.com) - The list of classified information FBI agent Robert Hanssen is accused of selling to the Russians is long on details about spies spying on spies. As the potential scope of revelations is evaluated, Hanssen's case is a reminder that espionage at times can be as much about finding out what the other side knows about your own intelligence operation as it is about getting nuclear codes or other vital secrets. In a trade dubbed a "wilderness of mirrors," practitioners may not see much more than reflections of each other. "It has very little to do with a nation's top secrets sometimes," said Loch Johnson, a University of Georgia political scientist who worked on intelligence for the Clinton White House and congressional committees. "It does begin to be a little bit circular - counterintelligence agencies going after one another." Even so, former U.S. spymasters say much can be lost - or gained - for national security when an insider betrays how one side's intelligence operation has penetrated the other side's. Hanssen is alleged to have divulged an eye-popping wealth of information about American intelligence-gathering, including extensive detail about how U.S. officials had tapped into Russian spy operations. Among documents the former counterintelligence official is alleged to have stashed in Hefty bags and left in "dead drops" for Russian handlers were details on the U.S. Double Agent Program, the FBI Double Agent Program and U.S. government studies of future intelligence requirements and KGB recruitment operations. Officials also believe Hanssen tipped off Moscow to a secret tunnel the Americans built under the Soviet Embassy in Washington for eavesdropping. "He compromised United States Intelligence Community technical operations of extraordinary importance and value," the FBI said in an affidavit supporting Hanssen's arrest. A federal judge said Monday the government's case against Hanssen is "extraordinarily strong" and ordered him confined to jail. Hanssen has not entered a plea, but his attorney said he would plead innocent. A May 21 preliminary hearing has been scheduled. Steve Aftergood, an intelligence analyst for the Federation of American Scientists, said it appears much of the damage allegedly done by Hanssen "was to U.S. intelligence, but not necessarily to the United States." "When officials speak of vital secrets that might have been lost, they are really speaking within the framework of intelligence, and not national security as a whole," he said. In the Aldrich Ames case, as with Hanssen, the focus was on classified information about U.S. intelligence-gathering. Ames, a CIA official who pleaded guilty to espionage in 1994, is blamed for the deaths of at least nine agents working for the United States in the Soviet Union and for disclosing U.S. counterintelligence techniques. "A lot of spying is a self-perpetuating game in which each side is simply trying to penetrate the other and to discover intelligence operations that the other side is running," Aftergood said. Other notable spy cases, however, have been more directly related to national security. Retired Navy Warrant Officer John A. Walker Jr., for example, pleaded guilty in 1985 to running a spy ring that gave the Soviets secret codes that allowed them to read 1 million classified Navy cables. Robert Gates, CIA director under former President Bush, stressed that the vast majority of U.S. intelligence work is aimed at gathering information about possible threats to American security, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and military modernization around the world. "Those are the things that preoccupy American intelligence," Gates said. At the same time, he said, U.S. officials have to be vigilant against those who can "give away the means by which we gather the information we need to know on these threats." "These people inside can do serious damage in terms of our ability to accomplish the broader mission," Gates said. James Woolsey, CIA director under former President Clinton from 1993 to 1995, said America's open society makes it harder to safeguard secrets. More pervasive polygraph tests of government employees, for example, would help deter foreign espionage but could intrude on workers' civil liberties. Penetrating rival spy networks, he said, does not raise the same problems, which can make counterintelligence ploys "money well spent." Woolsey said striking the right balance between safeguarding secrets and protecting civil liberties means "you can never be sure that you're completely successful" at avoiding security breaches. As a result, he added, "You have to be a bit more paranoid in this business than you do when you're out in the normal world of business or commerce or law." -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2664 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Tue Mar 6, 2001 7:37pm Subject: Cellular and Pager Interception Equipment Taboo on This List Ah-hem, I really hate to have to repeat myself. Let me AGAIN point out that cellular or pager interception equipment, any other kind of eavesdropping equipment, or anything with any kind or "gray area" has absolutely no business being posted to this list, period. It's nice that the unit recently listed has various capabilities to read ESN's, allows you demodulate audio, but please do not post anything of this nature again. It's also nice that you have equipment to burn NAMS. If you want to use a product such as this to inventory the ESN's you encounter during a sweep, or need to interrogate a phone or CDPD transponder in a vehicle you are checking fine, but do not post ads for this kind of stuff to this list. I have to admit that how a NAM programmer is used in a sweep is a bit of a mystery to even me (but then of course I've only done a few hundred sweeps) Yeah, I know... "your only using it to demonstrate", "your only sniffing your own phone", "your brother is a cop", "you only sell to the FBI", "the law needs to be changed", yadda-yadda-yadda.... I don't care, keep it off this list, period. This list is not for posting "gray area" or fringe materials, rants about how unfair life is, or bitching about how "the man" is harassing you. Also, do not post ads for wireless microphones, covert video cameras, covert tape recorders, lock picks, or any similar devices which are commonly used for surveillance or that is primarily useful for criminal purposes. This list is for STOPPING spies, not how to be one. Have I made myself clear? So speaks the moderator. Thank you, -jma -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2665 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Tue Mar 6, 2001 9:04pm Subject: Woman indicted in campaign spying case Woman indicted in campaign spying case http://www.nandotimes.com/nation/story/0,1038,500460561-500701584-503821198-0,00.html By KAREN GULLO, Associated Press WASHINGTON (March 6, 2001 4:44 p.m. EST http://www.nandotimes.com) - A woman accused of covertly giving Bush campaign materials to the Al Gore camp last year was indicted by a federal grand jury on Tuesday. Juanita Yvette Lozano, a former employee of Maverick Media - an Austin company that handled ads for President Bush's campaign - was charged with mail fraud, false statements to the FBI and perjury. If convicted, she faces 15 years in prison and a $750,000 fine. The indictment was handed up by a federal grand jury in Texas. The indictment alleged that Lozano secretly copied more than 120 pages of debate preparation documents and a 60-minute videotape of a debate preparation session with Bush and his advisers and sent it to the Gore campaign under a different name. She lied to FBI agents investigating the matter and testified falsely before the grand jury, the indictment said. -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2666 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Tue Mar 6, 2001 11:18pm Subject: Apology to the List Good Evening, I would like to take a moment and apologize to the list about the cellular equipment that appeared earlier today and I felt that it would be wise to once again explain the moderation policy. As a rule, list members are automatically set up in a moderated mode when they first join (unless the list server screws up, which happens at times). Once a subscriber has demonstrated that they have something useful to add to the group, and show that they can behave in a civil manner the list moderator (yours truly) will sometimes toggle them into an un-moderated mode so they can freely post at will. If something naughty appears on the list please privately bring it to my attention so it can be dealt with immediately (usually by banned, moderating, and/or gently rebuking the offender). Do not post contraband stuff to this list, or even anything that is even slightly in the gray area as I have no tolerance for it and promise that being banned from this forum or rebuked will be the least of your concerns. I sorry if i sounds like I am ranting about this, but this forums is for professionals who hunt spies by performing TSCM and related services. If a subscriber refuses to behave themselves they will be removed; so do not try to peddle equipment, devices, or services unless they are appropriate and legitimate TSCM tools. We are not interested in spam about "investigate anyone software", posts about hiring PI's for Pay-per-View events, or other such foolishness. That said, please feel free to post information or news article about spies being caught, posts about new TSCM equipment, TSCM methods, and so on. Also, an occasional posting of G-rated humor is encouraged, as is philosophical reflections, seasons greetings, and so on (but please keep it short and sweet). But always remember, the goal of those gathered here is to hunt down eavesdroppers... not to be one, please remember it. -jma -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2667 From: David Alexander Date: Wed Mar 7, 2001 4:38am Subject: re: Threat in the Hand of Your Pa I nearly died laughing when I read this part of the posting: >Palm acknowledged on Friday that the password-protection feature in Palm >Desktop 4.0 software could easily be disabled. > >Palm spokeswoman Julia Rodriguez that the problem affects only users who >believed they could protect sensitive or private data using Palm's >password-protection feature. In other words, 'we promoted this product as having password protection, and if you believed us you were stupid.' That's really good PR David Alexander M.INSTIS Bookham Technology plc DDI: 01235 837823 David.Alexander@B... ======================================================================= This e-mail is intended for the person it is addressed to only. The information contained in it may be confidential and/or protected by law. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, you must not make any use of this information, or copy or show it to any person. Please contact us immediately to tell us that you have received this e-mail, and return the original to us. Any use, forwarding, printing or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. No part of this message can be considered a request for goods or services. ======================================================================= Any questions about Bookham's E-Mail service should be directed to postmaster@b.... 2668 From: David Alexander Date: Wed Mar 7, 2001 4:49am Subject: re: Accused FBI spy betrayed U.S. countermeasures The posting discusses an admission of using lasers to 'listen at windows': > Regarding the FBI-NSA listening tunnel, U.S. government officials said > that the NSA was using laser beams directed at glass surfaces of the embassy > compound such as windows to monitor conversations, these sources said. The > lasers are able to pick up the minute vibrations of window glass caused by > conversations, which can then be recorded. > > "The take we got wasn't all that great. The Russians aren't stupid," said > one official. If you read 'The Aquarium' by Victor Suvorov (pseudonym of a GRU defector) which came out at least 8 years ago, this was a known technique used by both sides. To counter it, randomly contoured glass was installed in sensitive locations, with a device attached to create vibrations to greatly reduce, if not counter completely, the capability of the laser to pick up sound. This was installed in embassies around the world by the Russians (and probably by everyone else too). The admission sounds like a very poor attempt at disinformation by the US govt. David Alexander M.INSTIS Bookham Technology plc DDI: 01235 837823 David.Alexander@B... ======================================================================= This e-mail is intended for the person it is addressed to only. The information contained in it may be confidential and/or protected by law. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, you must not make any use of this information, or copy or show it to any person. Please contact us immediately to tell us that you have received this e-mail, and return the original to us. Any use, forwarding, printing or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. No part of this message can be considered a request for goods or services. ======================================================================= Any questions about Bookham's E-Mail service should be directed to postmaster@b.... 2669 From: Robert G. Ferrell Date: Wed Mar 7, 2001 11:13am Subject: Re: re: Accused FBI spy betrayed U.S. countermeasures >If you read 'The Aquarium' by Victor Suvorov (pseudonym of a GRU defector) >which came out at least 8 years ago, this was a known technique used by both >sides. To counter it, randomly contoured glass was installed in sensitive >locations, with a device attached to create vibrations to greatly reduce, if >not counter completely, the capability of the laser to pick up sound. This >was installed in embassies around the world by the Russians (and probably by >everyone else too). I used to be a security manager for an unnamed semiconductor manufacturer who was trying to "clean room reverse engineer" the microcode of another unnamed semiconductor manufacturer's best-selling chip. The 'clean room' environment was set up in a rented office with a fictious cover business and fake 'staff.' Only four people in the 8,000+ company had keys to this office; I was one of them. The windows had that glass installed, because the onwers were beyond paranoid. It is rather odd-looking stuff, and doesn't provide much of a view, unless you like funhouse mirrors. Cheers, RGF Robert G. Ferrell, CISSP Information Systems Security Officer National Business Center U. S. Dept. of the Interior Robert_G_Ferrell@n... ======================================== Who goeth without humor goeth unarmed. ======================================== 2670 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Wed Mar 7, 2001 1:02pm Subject: re: Accused FBI spy betrayed U.S. countermeasures At 10:49 AM +0000 3/7/01, David Alexander wrote: >The posting discusses an admission of using lasers to 'listen at windows': > >> Regarding the FBI-NSA listening tunnel, U.S. government officials said >> that the NSA was using laser beams directed at glass surfaces of the >embassy >> compound such as windows to monitor conversations, these sources said. The >> lasers are able to pick up the minute vibrations of window glass caused by >> conversations, which can then be recorded. >> >> "The take we got wasn't all that great. The Russians aren't stupid," said >> one official. > >If you read 'The Aquarium' by Victor Suvorov (pseudonym of a GRU defector) >which came out at least 8 years ago, this was a known technique used by both >sides. To counter it, randomly contoured glass was installed in sensitive >locations, with a device attached to create vibrations to greatly reduce, if >not counter completely, the capability of the laser to pick up sound. This >was installed in embassies around the world by the Russians (and probably by >everyone else too). > >The admission sounds like a very poor attempt at disinformation by the US >govt. > > >David Alexander M.INSTIS >Bookham Technology plc > >DDI: 01235 837823 >David.Alexander@B... Bouncing a laser or any kind of photonic energy against a reflective or quais reflective service in an attempt to obtain intelligence would be fool-hardy. Such activities are easy to detect, easy to defeat, and easy to trace it back to the spy. It was a clever curiosity 20 years ago, but more recently is more of a joke written about in spy novels. That said, passive laser bounce types of systems suffer from all kinds of noise issues. Of course this does not include active photonic systems which tend to be more covert and tend to be less detectable. -jma -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2671 From: Mike F Date: Wed Mar 7, 2001 2:09pm Subject: Do We need Counter Intelligence Czar- Article by Robert G. Ferrell March edition of " INFORMATION SECURITY:" Last night I was Scanning thru One of My Favorite Magazines, INFORMATION SECURITY: I came upon these words "When You Wish Upon A Czar" which caught my limited attention, I then noticed the article author is a frequent contibuter to tscm-L list,Robert G. Ferrell. You may want to go to Information Security's online site,to read the article by "RGF" http://www.infosecuritymag.com/articles/march01/columns_news_views.shtml Later 4,Mike Fiorentino Master Links 4 Master Investigators http://ml4mi.com "CONFIDENTIALITY WARNING" <==== BE AWARE I AM AS SERIOUS AS A HEART ATTACK ABOUT THE WARNING BELOW!!!!!!!!!!!!!! This electronic message contains information which may be privileged and/or confidential. The information is intended for use only by theindividual(s)or entity named/indicated above. 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