From: A Grudko Date: Fri Mar 9, 2001 3:14pm Subject: Mains audio Sorry guys, this is a long one - you might want to scroll to the end to see if the premise and request are of interest. During a sweep today my CPM-700 demodulated a very feint audio signal - just above the noise floor - when plugged into either of two adjacent wall sockets (nominal 220v, 50 Hz give or take 10%) in a corporate Board Room. Adjacent sockets are supposed to be on different phases because of load sharing but are frequently not, because of lazy electricians. These are in parallel. At first it sounded like a woman speaking to a man - unfortunately not in a language I understood (we have 11 official languages in SA). The woman was slightly more audible because of frequency not amplitude. I called the client to listen in case the voices could be identified, but the signal was too weak for identification by an untuned ear. It's possible that the voices were followed by music, implying a commercial station, but not clear enough to confirm. Situation is: Client's premises have been swept almost every month for the past 3 - 4 years. The same CPM-700 was used at each sweep. These sockets were tested on every occasion with no signal being detected. Client insists that no changes were made to power cabling in the Board Room since the last sweep but cannot be sure of other parts of the building. Requested changes had been made to the 'phone system, so Telco technicians have been on the premises. The client rents the whole building, which is fed from a 3 phase power distribution board in the basement, which was searched and found to be uncompromised with no detectable hostile audio or RF present (some modulation is expected for non-hostile control functions and occasional communication). All other locatable power sockets in the building was checked and found clean. The 3 phase transformer feeding the street block could not be checked. No cordless 'phone, wireless LAN, mains-modulation intercom/speaker or similar equipment is used in the building, but we cannot speak for the neighbours. 3 voice lines are actually permanent GSM cellular links. No equipment was plugged into the 2 sockets but a full search of equipment on the phase was impractical (we would have had to shut down the office for 2 days - if client OKs we'll go back and 'plug and play' every electrical item whilst monitoring the 2 sockets. Both sockets were opened and no foreign devices or curled wires were found (coiling wire to give 'stretch' like a 'phone cord can easily and unintentionally create a crude LC tuned circuit). A second scan was carried out with a Scanlock and Audiotronics (UK) LF converter with the antenna parallel to the conduiting at surface level, so about 3" (75mm) from the cable. No signal was heard*. General RF level is medium for a suburban business park but with constant growth in 900 Meg GSM cellular use to the point of RF flooding. The client is involved in major mergers and acquisitions, inevitably with political implications. This client has been illegally 'phone tapped on 3 known previous occasions (spies caught, equipment confiscated and their client identified). Security in the building is minimal, with access to the power and telco rooms guarded by 2 lever locks. Manual 'honour system' access control, no CCTV, limited alarm coverage (one floor of 4.....cutting costs!). So, to the point of my long post: For the past 3 years my long suffering partner has been receiving 'skills transfer' (Yes - I want him to eventually do all the work and send me money for the privilege as I get fat and old... ;-) ). This 'find' is another chance to give him a few other peoples' opinions on a common enigma that faces TSCMers. To plagiarise the Chrysler ad. (I think it's OK 'cos my wife drives one).....'WHAT THE ?'. My thoughts: 1) Something added to the mains circuit may have 'tuned' it to a radio station (usually AM, medium wave, minus many db slope detection on the CPM-700?). 2) Something added to the RF environment may have mixed to produce a harmonic which the old circuit now 'receives'. 3) * From above. I feel the signal containing audio was received rather than transmitted, therefore is non-hostile. Am I right - am I wrong - have we missed something - is there something else we should do? (short of demolishing the building; which is outside our budget by about 2 000%, like a government project.). Andy Grudko. D.P.M., Grad I.S, (S.A.) CEO - Grudko Wilson Associates (SA) (Pty) Ltd - Crime investigation & intelligence Johannesburg - Cape Town - Durban - Pretoria - UK - US - Canada - Australia - Israel - Bosnia. Agents in 41 countries - www.grudko.com - (+27 11) 465 9673 - 465 1487 (Fax) - Est. 1981 GIN (Charter), SACI (Pres), WAD, CALI, SASFed, SASA, SAMLF, SCIP (Past SA Chairman), UKPIN, AFIO (OS), IWWA, PRETrust, IPA, AmChamCom "When you need it done right - first time" 2703 From: Miguel Puchol Date: Sat Mar 10, 2001 6:04am Subject: RE: Mains audio Andy, Have you checked the local radio stations & TV repeaters? We had a case here, where a local radio station raised it's TX power without permission, and this caused major havoc at a nearby trunked repeater station, noise, interference, etc. The cause was traced back to the station, heavy fine, all back to normal. Maybe a new station has been setup, legal or pirate, or a TV repeater added around the client's building - just a thought. Good luck, Mike > -----Mensaje original----- > De: A Grudko [mailto:agrudko@i...] > Enviado el: viernes, 09 de marzo de 2001 22:14 > Para: TSCM-L Mailing List ' > CC: Dave Wilson > Asunto: [TSCM-L] Mains audio > > > Sorry guys, this is a long one - you might want to scroll to the > end to see > if the premise and request are of interest. > > > During a sweep today my CPM-700 demodulated a very feint audio > signal - just > above the noise floor - when plugged into either of two adjacent wall > sockets (nominal 220v, 50 Hz give or take 10%) in a corporate Board Room. > Adjacent sockets are supposed to be on different phases because of load > sharing but are frequently not, because of lazy electricians. These are in > parallel. 2704 From: Charles P Date: Sat Mar 10, 2001 11:23am Subject: Re: Mains audio > > 1) Something added to the mains circuit may have 'tuned' it to a radio > station (usually AM, medium wave, minus many db slope detection on the > CPM-700?). > 2) Something added to the RF environment may have mixed to produce a > harmonic which the old circuit now 'receives'. > 3) * From above. I feel the signal containing audio was received rather than > transmitted, therefore is non-hostile. > > Am I right - am I wrong - have we missed something - is there something else > we should do? (short of demolishing the building; which is outside our > budget by about 2 000%, like a government project.). > > I would most likely suspect a combination of number 1 and 2, since there are so many uncontrollable factors with radio or shortwave stations, propagation, power feed lines, etc. It would be fun to watch them demolish the building though. charles 2705 From: Date: Sat Mar 10, 2001 11:58am Subject: ZDNet UK News: Surveillance HAVE A GREAT DAY !!! ---------- http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/specials/1999/09/surveillance/ [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 2706 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Sat Mar 10, 2001 0:36pm Subject: Temptation for Surveillance on Rise Temptation for Surveillance on Rise http://www.latimes.com/business/cutting/techwr/20010310/tCB00V0795.html By ANICK JESDANUN, AP Internet Writer CAMBRIDGE, Mass.--What if your cable TV converter box can report to marketers the movies, sports and steamy adult shows you like to watch? What if a portable device that measures how far you've run or walked can phone a Web site about your fitness level, and perhaps suggest exercise products for purchase? What if any time you visit an airport or attend a sporting event, you must walk past video cameras that can analyze your face and instantly identify you to authorities? Some of these scenarios are already possible and even happening. Privacy advocates and civil libertarians say the technology is getting so good and cheap that we could be entering an era of surveillance everywhere, privacy nowhere. Privacy erosion on the Internet over the past year offers just a preview. As gadgets beyond the desktop become a part of our everyday lives, the temptation increases for governments and businesses to use them for surveillance. "'1984' was simply a bit premature in estimating when technology would be online," said Barry Steinhardt, associate director of the American Civil Liberties Union. "This may not be as oppressive as what George Orwell had in mind, but nevertheless, it will be very much still a surveillance society." Orwell wrote, back in 1940s, of a futuristic totalitarian society in 1984 where citizens are under the round-the-clock surveillance. Big Brother technology was a main topic this past week at the 11th annual Computers, Freedom and Privacy conference, a gathering of academics, technologists and policymakers. As it happened, this year's conference was held just a few blocks from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where the basics of facial character recognition, a branch of biometrics, were developed. Unlike the video security cameras at banks and convenience stores that merely record, biometrics seek to identify. The technology has been used for years in casinos to catch cheaters. It got widespread attention during January's Super Bowl in Tampa, Fla., when law officers matched photos against a computerized police lineup of known criminals. Governments aren't the only spies, of course. Other gadgets spy on behalf of marketers, warned Richard M. Smith, chief technology officer for the Privacy Foundation. "Technology is making it a lot cheaper to build these devices," Smith said. "Five, 10 years from now, where is it going to be used?" He held up for an audience a round, portable gadget that counts your paces as you exercise. When you finish, you attach it to a larger cradle, which plugs into a phone line. You then visit a Web site for your fitness assessment and ads. The gadget, he said, could have been designed to plug directly into a personal computer -and not to report data to a Web site. But the trend among vendors "is to try to get it on the Internet and get a poke at it." And what about the emerging Bluetooth wireless standard, which promises to let devices such as pens and headphones automatically connect to networks? "Are we going to walk into a room and have our pens start talking to somebody?" Smith asked. Smith also showed Web sites that promote services such as a wireless Webcam to monitor children, and a camera that trucking companies can install to record the minutes leading up to accidents, along with data such as brake and turn signal use. He predicted lawyers would try to get such video to show juries. Even the fitness device can be used for surveillance, said Smith. His daughter suggested their dog be outfitted with one so Smith can no longer fib about walking the dog. Meanwhile, companies are gaining the ability to track customers through wireless devices. Imagine being able to e-mail a coupon for coffee as someone walks by a Starbucks. That will soon be possible using location identification that wireless companies are deploying for emergency 911 calls. And digital video recording technologies like TiVo and ReplayTV may one day let marketers customize ads based on television viewers' habits and preferences, warned David Burke, author of "Spy TV." Digital video recorders now automatically call a central office to get updated program guides. Privacy advocates fear they'll one day send back data on households' viewing habits as well. Privacy advocates are also worried about digital music devices, which could be programmed to create profiles of listening tastes. Whether marketers are actually using all of the capabilities today is another matter, Smith acknowledged. He fears the potential for tomorrow. Supporters of such technologies say the privacy fears are exaggerated, unfounded or outweighed by public safety imperatives. The facial-recognition cameras, for instance, are used to help to identify potential terrorists, law enforcement officials argue. Defending data collection by businesses, Jerry Cerasale of the Direct Marketing Association, a trade group for telemarketers and database companies, said the devices that collect marketing information do just that -and no more. The data collection occurs solely to help marketers customize information and ads for the consumers' benefit, and companies know they risk alienating customers if they trick them, Cerasale said. "There is a misconception that if you are purchasing something remotely, it might be used against you in some places like for approving mortgages and insurance," he said in a phone interview. "That's not the case." But privacy advocates point out past attempts to link and share data. The most widely cited case involves the advertising company DoubleClick, which drew ire for plans to cross-reference its records of consumers' online habits with a database that included names. Under pressure, the company suspended the plans. The FBI, meanwhile, has deployed a surveillance tool called Carnivore to check e-mail going through a network service provider for messages meant for a specific suspect. Critics say their tests show Carnivore can do much more. Some believe the U.S. Congress must pass legislation to protect Americans' privacy. At minimum, they say, the government should create a national data protection office to advise agencies and businesses on new technologies. Simson Garfinkel, author of "Database Nation: The Death of Privacy in the 21st Century," said U.S. companies considering new products and new uses for existing databases should have national guidelines to guide them. "It's hard for a lot of companies to do the right thing," he said. "We can make it easier for them." - - - On the Net: Conference: http://cfp2001.org Direct Marketing Association: http://www.the-dma.org American Civil Liberties Union: http://www.aclu.org Privacy Foundation: http://privacyfoundation.org -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2707 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Sat Mar 10, 2001 1:00pm Subject: Re: Mains audio At 11:14 PM +0200 3/9/01, A Grudko wrote: >Sorry guys, this is a long one - you might want to scroll to the end to see >if the premise and request are of interest. > > >During a sweep today my CPM-700 demodulated a very feint audio signal - just >above the noise floor - when plugged into either of two adjacent wall >sockets (nominal 220v, 50 Hz give or take 10%) in a corporate Board Room. >Adjacent sockets are supposed to be on different phases because of load >sharing but are frequently not, because of lazy electricians. These are in >parallel. How was the CPM-700 connected to the mains, and across which set of wires did the signal appear to be the strongest (Phases-Ground, Phase-Neutral, etc) At what frequency did your search receiver pickup the signal, and where you able to ferret out the signal using your spectrum analyzer hooked up to the power mains. >At first it sounded like a woman speaking to a man - unfortunately not in a >language I understood (we have 11 official languages in SA). The woman was >slightly more audible because of frequency not amplitude. Are we talking about an AM or FM modulated signal here, or some other kind of modulation. I would initially suspect you had a AM signal that was "drifting in and out". >I called the client to listen in case the voices could be identified, but >the signal was too weak for identification by an untuned ear. It's possible >that the voices were followed by music, implying a commercial station, but >not clear enough to confirm. > I would initially suspect a shortwave broadcast radio station that was being picked up by the building wiring. But always suspect the signal until you can absolutely prove that it is not hostile. >Situation is: > >Client's premises have been swept almost every month for the past 3 - 4 >years. Good, the more frequently you get into a building to do sweeps the less likely an eavesdropper will try to use a bug and will instead focus on other methods of espionage that would be able to caught using non-technical means. >The same CPM-700 was used at each sweep. Good, but was an Oscilloscope, Digital Voltmeter, Search Receiver, and Spectrum Analyzer used as well? (cough-cough) >These sockets were tested on every occasion with no signal being detected. Ah, but perhaps due to the time of day the propagation of the signals were favorable. >Client insists that no changes were made to power cabling in the Board Room >since the last sweep but cannot be sure of other parts of the building. > >Requested changes had been made to the 'phone system, so Telco technicians >have been on the premises. Unless you can see the signal on other phone or power wiring don't drift your focus away from the outlet in question. >The client rents the whole building, which is fed from a 3 phase power >distribution board in the basement, which was searched and found to be >uncompromised with no detectable hostile audio or RF present (some >modulation is expected for non-hostile control functions and occasional >communication). > >All other locatable power sockets in the building was checked and found >clean. Ah, clean of what? Clean of that specific signal, clean of any similar signals, clean of energy below 500 kHz, clean of HF, clean of audio...? > >The 3 phase transformer feeding the street block could not be checked. > >No cordless 'phone, wireless LAN, mains-modulation intercom/speaker or >similar equipment is used in the building, but we cannot speak for the >neighbours. > >3 voice lines are actually permanent GSM cellular links. Ah, GSM what? I take it your clients have completely lost their minds? Your client can not achieve any level of security by using "permanent GSM cellular links" instead of hard wired lines (ditto with PCS, etc). Yes, GSM will keep amateurs from listening in, but it will only annoy a professional eavesdropper and not actually prevent them from eavesdropping. >No equipment was plugged into the 2 sockets but a full search of equipment >on the phase was impractical (we would have had to shut down the office for >2 days - if client OKs we'll go back and 'plug and play' every electrical >item whilst monitoring the 2 sockets. Oscilloscope tests should be helpful, but make sure your on the line at the exact time the signal (and weather conditions) as last time. >Both sockets were opened and no foreign devices or curled wires were found >(coiling wire to give 'stretch' like a 'phone cord can easily and >unintentionally create a crude LC tuned circuit). "Coils" are commonly missed when performing a conducted signals analysis so it's good you are checking for them. >A second scan was carried out with a Scanlock and Audiotronics (UK) LF >converter with the antenna parallel to the conduiting at surface level, so >about 3" (75mm) from the cable. No signal was heard*. The CPM-700 is a broadband diode detector, and the Scanlock folds the spectrum. neither is a spectrum analyzer, tuned receiver, or oscilloscope. Both are good for quick checks, but when you have more time on target use other laboratory grade test equipment. >General RF level is medium for a suburban business park but with constant >growth in 900 Meg GSM cellular use to the point of RF flooding. Same problem here in the states with 1.8 GHz PCS band, seriously saturates the TSCM equipment. Same with pager stations, and analog cellular bands. What is really becoming a problem in our area are the HDTV transmitter that are coming on line. The harmonics of the digitally modulated fundamental signals appear right in the middle of several "bug bands" and have cause more them a few minutes of excitement during a bug sweep. >The client is involved in major mergers and acquisitions, inevitably with >political implications. Then your client should should be using should be using ISDN or T-carrier circuits with secure (high end) digital encryption equipment on both ends. >This client has been illegally 'phone tapped on 3 known previous occasions >(spies caught, equipment confiscated and their client identified). Then it's good they are having sweeps done frequently, but even if bugs had not been previously found it is still prudent to have the sweeps performed on a regular basis. > Security in the building is minimal, with access to the power and telco >rooms guarded by 2 lever locks. Manual 'honour system' access control, no >CCTV, limited alarm coverage (one floor of 4.....cutting costs!). Ouch, Ouch, Ouch... you can not have an effective technical counter-intelligence function when the physical security is so poor. > >So, to the point of my long post: > >For the past 3 years my long suffering partner has been receiving 'skills >transfer' (Yes - I want him to eventually do all the work and send me money >for the privilege as I get fat and old... ;-) ). Having him do all the work while you make all the money sounds like an interesting business model, let us know how (or if) it works out. >This 'find' is another chance to give him a few other peoples' opinions on a >common enigma that faces TSCMers. > >To plagiarise the Chrysler ad. (I think it's OK 'cos my wife drives >one).....'WHAT THE ?'. > >My thoughts: > >1) Something added to the mains circuit may have 'tuned' it to a radio >station (usually AM, medium wave, minus many db slope detection on the >CPM-700?). I would lean toward the building wiring picking up a broadcast from a shortwave radio station (which is why it is critical to use a spectrum analyzer to ferret out signals such as this). >2) Something added to the RF environment may have mixed to produce a >harmonic which the old circuit now 'receives'. A non-linear junction could cause such mixing, but then so could any such strong RF signal nearby (hence the value of a good SA) >3) * From above. I feel the signal containing audio was received rather than >transmitted, therefore is non-hostile. Partially correct, but do not discount it until you can absolutely prove otherwise. >Am I right - am I wrong - have we missed something - is there something else >we should do? (short of demolishing the building; which is outside our >budget by about 2 000%, like a government project.). Use a Spectrum Analyses and search receiver coupled into the power lines and carefully inspect EVERY conducted signal present. Examine every power outlet, every breaker box, every meter, every transformer, and every entry or appearance point. Include all Power wiring, all telephone wires, all CCTV/CATV cables, all alarm lines, all utilities, and so on. If it is something that enters of leaves the area in question it must be considered a hostile signal path until proved otherwise. -jma -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2708 From: Date: Sat Mar 10, 2001 11:27am Subject: DAR broadband receivers? Good afternoon everyone.. Still continuing research on TSCM equipment and ran across 'Southern Security'...speaks for itself pretty much from the web site but thank you Steve Uhrig for the advice and information. Everyday provides new insights.. Anyone have experience with the 'DAR-1 or DAR-3'? What are they? Comparable to a CPM-700..? How does a CPM-700 compare to a Scanlock? Are all three so-called broadband receivers? I've seen the CPM referenced in some posts, but rarely the scanlock. Thanks ..Harry K. P.S. Jim, missed your TV appearance..gonna wait for it to come out on video though.. 2709 From: Date: Sat Mar 10, 2001 7:07pm Subject: FBI officials got Soviet embassy tunnel tours -Post FBI officials got Soviet embassy tunnel tours -Post WASHINGTON, March 10 (Reuters) - FBI officials were so proud of a secret tunnel built beneath the Russian Embassy for electronic surveillance during the final years of the Cold War that they offered tours to senior officials with top security clearances, the Washington Post reported on Sunday. Former FBI agent Robert Hanssen, arrested on Feb. 18 on charges of selling secrets to Moscow for 15 years, is suspected of having disclosed existence of the tunnel to his Soviet handlers. U.S. media first reported the existence of the tunnel earlier this month. The Post quoted current and former government officials as saying Hanssen's suspected report about the tunnel likely nullified the technological advantages the FBI could have gained from such close range access to the then-Soviet embassy. The Post quoted one former U.S. official who said he was offered a tour but declined the invitation because he is claustrophobic. He told the Post the tunnel was accessed from a residence near the Soviet -- now Russian -- compound on Mount Alto, a hilltop north of Washington's swanky Georgetown neighborhood and one of the highest sites in Washington. The former official said the government purchased the home and started digging the tunnel out of its basement. The paper quoted another former official as saying he had toured the passageway but declined to describe it, saying everything about it remains highly classified. One intelligence source with direct knowledge of the technology Hanssen allegedly compromised told the Post the Soviets used the FBI bugs and wiretaps to feed disinformation back to the U.S. government. "They were obviously feeding a very large quantity of data to us of apparent value but no real value," the paper quoted the source as saying. "It was a very delicate game that was played out over several years." 2710 From: A Grudko Date: Sat Mar 10, 2001 4:35pm Subject: One mains audio is another mains propigation... Mains sweeping 101. -- Original Message -- > How was the CPM-700 connected to the mains, and across which set of > wires did the signal appear to be the strongest (Phases-Ground, > Phase-Neutral, etc) The CPM-700 mains modulation detector is a 2 pin, phase-phase ('live to neutral') connection. I have not opened one up but assume it's based on a LF torroid or ferrite coil with a resistive shunt (I used to build 'em with a neon as the resistance and 'connected' indicator), inducting raw RF out - in effect just decoupling the RF from the mains, but maybe the manufacturer changes the turn ratio to suit the receiver, lowering the Q. > At what frequency did your search receiver pickup the signal, and > where you able to ferret out the signal using your spectrum analyzer > hooked up to the power mains. The CPM-700 does not indicate frequency and the signal was not detected by my Scanlock or 7700. As > > Are we talking about an AM or FM modulated signal here, or some other > kind of modulation. As I only picked it up on the CPM-700, which does not have modulation selection but seemes to compromse somehow between AM and FM (FM signals being much more crisp), I can only say, going by WMED (What My Ear Detected), that it sounded like AM. Here in SA we only have a handfull of receivable AM (MW) stations during the day. > I would initially suspect you had a AM signal that was "drifting in and out". Agreed > >The same CPM-700 was used at each sweep. > > > Good, but was an Oscilloscope, Digital Voltmeter, Search Receiver, > and Spectrum Analyzer used as well? (cough-cough) 2 out of 4, but again, see * below > > > >These sockets were tested on every occasion with no signal being detected. > > > Ah, but perhaps due to the time of day the propagation of the signals > were favorable. Thank you - a point I had not considered although our sweeps have been random. Note to Dave...I missed something, grasshopper...:-) > >Client insists that no changes were made to power cabling in the Board Room > >since the last sweep but cannot be sure of other parts of the building. > > > >Requested changes had been made to the 'phone system, so Telco technicians > >have been on the premises. > > > Unless you can see the signal on other phone or power wiring don't > drift your focus away from the outlet in question. As the client's previous 3 surveillance events were illegal 'phone taps, my thought was possably a link to the mains from the PABX (switchboard/cable frame - we have to watch out for international lingo here) sourcing the audio and carrying the 'music-on-hold' as a system charactoristic. > >All other locatable power sockets in the building were checked and found > >clean. > Ah, clean of what? Clean of that specific signal, clean of any > similar signals, clean of energy below 500 kHz, clean of HF, clean of > audio...? Hmm....jma can get picky - which is good if the client has the budget....see the dreaded * below. > >3 voice lines are actually permanent GSM cellular links. > Ah, GSM what? I take it your clients have completely lost their minds? > > Your client can not achieve any level of security by using > "permanent GSM cellular links" instead of hard wired lines (ditto > with PCS, etc). > > Yes, GSM will keep amateurs from listening in, but it will only annoy > a professional eavesdropper and not actually prevent them from > eavesdropping. They may have lost their TSCM minds but not their money minds. We saw a cheque waiting a second signiture which was for 4 times my life goal....a side issue. We are in Africa. My friends in the UK or US can get a new land line 'phone line the same day. We wait up to 3 months, so instant cellular connections are very attractive. Only in the last year have our Telco made ISDN readilly available. > Oscilloscope tests should be helpful, but make sure your on the line > at the exact time the signal (and weather conditions) as last time. JMA - I can organise the time, but not the weather. You don't have a link to god@b... do you? > >A second scan was carried out with a Scanlock and Audiotronics (UK) LF > >converter with the antenna parallel to the conduiting at surface level, so > >about 3" (75mm) from the cable. No signal was heard. > Both are good for quick checks, but when you have more > time on target use other laboratory grade test equipment. Again, see * below. > >The client is involved in major mergers and acquisitions, inevitably with > >political implications. > > > Then your client should should be using should be using ISDN or > T-carrier circuits with secure (high end) digital encryption > equipment on both ends. I have ISDN, as do some of my clients, but I'm not familiar with the term T-carrier. Please enlighten. Problem with encription is as you say, both ends...I encript but do you.... But point taken. > > Security in the building is minimal, > Ouch, Ouch, Ouch... you can not have an effective technical > counter-intelligence function when the physical security is so poor. Yup - agreed and written in silicone Moses only had stone to work with). But to get the clients to listen... > >For the past 3 years my long suffering partner has been receiving 'skills > >transfer' (Yes - I want him to eventually do all the work and send me money > >for the privilege as I get fat and old... ;-) ). > Having him do all the work while you make all the money sounds like > an interesting business model, let us know how (or if) it works out. Not quite. He does a good job and hopefully we'll build a sound business and both make money....but after 20 years I might get an extra stipend. > >My thoughts: > > > >1) Something added to the mains circuit may have 'tuned' it to a radio > >station (usually AM, medium wave, minus many db slope detection on the > >CPM-700?). > I would lean toward the building wiring picking up a broadcast from a > shortwave radio station (which is why it is critical to use a > spectrum analyzer to ferret out signals such as this). Agreed > >2) Something added to the RF environment may have mixed to produce a > >harmonic which the old circuit now 'receives'. > A non-linear junction could cause such mixing, but then so could any > such strong RF signal nearby (hence the value of a good SA) > >3) I feel the signal containing audio was received rather than > >transmitted, therefore is non-hostile. > Use a Spectrum Analyses and search receiver coupled into the power > lines and carefully inspect EVERY conducted signal present. Examine > every power outlet, every breaker box, every meter, every > transformer, and every entry or appearance point. > Include all Power wiring, all telephone wires, all CCTV/CATV cables, > all alarm lines, all utilities, and so on Back to the *s. This client is on a tightly negotiated monthly contract with no room for additional work from our side. So the report to client will be, we think everything is OK but there is what looks like an innocent signal, but might not be and the only way to be sure is a major tech and physical, search, probably maxing out the monthly budget x 10. If they don't pay, they won't know. Andy Jo'burg 2711 From: Bob Washburne Date: Sun Mar 11, 2001 11:52am Subject: Re: more from scout report (spammimic) Mike F wrote: > > Spam Mimic > http://www.spammimic.com/ > > Here is a neat tool for the paranoid or clandestine-minded user. I looked at this system a while back. While being clever and very geeky, it has several major drawbacks: -) The resulting pseudo-spam has too much of a signature. It could easily be searched for by Echalon-esq sniffers. Note: Carnivore-esq sniffers don't care. They grab everything to the targeted address, but only that address. -) The encryption is trivial. Once on the radar it wouldn't take our friends at the NSA a day to crack it. -) You can only use it through the web site. And I believe them when they say that they aren't recording their site usage! For something a bit more useable, perform a web search on "steganographic" which is the art of hiding messages in the low order bits of sound and image files. Some systems, such as StegFS, create an actual file system which can be mounted. Unfortuneatly, this can leave a signature so that the black hats can tell when something is hidden in you file. If I were to design a system, it would propably work something like this: 1) Take the media file and randomly change each word within a range of +/- 15. The low order bits of any recording are usually random anyway. This just guarentees a bit of chaos in the system without noticable changing the quality of the recording. 2) Encrypt your plaintext so that it looks like random bits. 3) Split the cyphertext up and place it in the two low order bits of each word of the media file. As long as your encryption scheme doesn't leave a signature, you have plausible deniability. Also, most steganographic systems use at least four bits. With my system you have scrambled four bits, but only used two thus confusing any attempt to find seganographic signatures. Of course, all of this works best if you keep "under the radar". If youv'e done something to get authorities interested in you, then you will probably get caught. Once it's been determined that you are sending secret messages, then the taps and bugs will be brought in and a case built without the need of breaking your encryption. Enjoy, Bob Washburne 2712 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Mar 12, 2001 6:29am Subject: FBI top brass had tours of spy tunnel FBI top brass had tours of spy tunnel http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0,,3-97537,00.html FROM DAMIAN WHITWORTH IN WASHINGTON THE FBI was so pleased with itself when it built a tunnel under the Soviet Embassy that it ran guided tours for senior officials to show off its electronic surveillance operation. As the visitors stooped and shuffled through the dirt to examine how listening devices were deployed, even the hardiest Cold War veterans may have shivered at the thrill of it all. Up above, enemy agents, perfectly aware of what was going on, perhaps allowed themselves a smile as they went about the business of ensuring that none of the information the devices detected was of the least use to the United States. After the arrest last month of Robert Hanssen, a senior FBI official charged with spying for the Soviet Union and then Russia for 15 years, the existence of the tunnel was revealed along with the FBI’s allegation that Hanssen had told Moscow of it many years ago. The disclosure that an unwitting FBI was proudly taking its top brass on tours of a white elephant comes as a fresh embarrassment. The tunnel was built from a house the FBI bought on a hilltop close to the embassy. It is not known when the US realised that the Soviets were aware of their subterranean surveillance work but officials have claimed that they knew long before Hanssen was unmasked as a spy. The tunnel let the FBI tap into telephone wires and power cables and place receivers which picked up signals transmitted by bugs placed throughout the embassy. Intelligence officials believe that Hanssen’s suspected report about the tunnel to his Soviet handlers rendered the hugely expensive operation useless. One intelligence source with direct knowledge of the technology Hanssen allegedly compromised told the Washington Post that the Soviets used the FBI bugs and wiretaps to feed disinformation back to the US Government. There is a new parlour game, too: what did the FBI do with all that soil? -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2713 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Mar 12, 2001 6:31am Subject: FBI scandal leaves CIA gloating FBI scandal leaves CIA gloating http://www.suntimes.com/output/news/spy11.html March 11, 2001 BY LISA HOFFMAN WASHINGTON--When CIA mole Aldrich Ames was unearthed in 1994, Congress and President Bill Clinton punished the spy agency by yanking its control over its own counterintelligence operations and giving it to the FBI. It was a humiliating time for the storied CIA. Not only had the agency missed signs that Ames, chief of the CIA's Soviet counterintelligence, had been selling some of the nation's top secrets to Moscow for years. But the CIA also would lose command over a prime part of its turf to its longtime rival, the FBI. Now the tables have turned. It's the FBI in the hot seat this time, embarrassed by its damaging failure to detect its own alleged Russian mole, 15-year FBI counterintelligence operative Robert Hanssen. "They have their own spy, big time," said one retired high-ranking CIA counterintelligence agent who served during the FBI takeover. "Couldn't happen to a nicer bunch." In some quarters of the U.S. intelligence community these days, there is a mixture of bitterness and glee at the FBI's plight--along with relief that it's not the CIA at fault this time. Resentment over some reforms instituted after Ames was uncovered, along with anger that the FBI had failed to practice what it had preached to the CIA about internal security, also are not hard to find. Unlike the CIA, for instance, the FBI doesn't randomly polygraph its agents or require regular financial disclosures from them as early warning techniques for detecting in-house turncoats. If the FBI had, it might have prevented Hanssen's alleged betrayal, now shaping up to be one of the costliest such breaches in U.S. history. Hanssen, 56, was arrested Feb. 18 on charges he passed 6,000 pages of secret documents to the Soviets and Russians in exchange for $1.4 million in cash, diamonds and an escrow fund. But there also is a recognition, though grudging from some, that those very post-Ames reforms have already gone far in reducing 50 years of mistrust between the two agencies and forcing them to collaborate openly with each other. "The changes have all been to the good," said Jeffrey Smith, who became the CIA's general counsel when the reforms began. Angered that the CIA had failed for several years to share vital information about its investigation of Ames and other suspected spies, Congress and Clinton set up a national counterespionage center and put the FBI in charge. A senior FBI official also was installed at the helm of the CIA's internal counterintelligence operation--which the CIA had considered off-limits to all but its own elite staff--so the FBI would have equal access to the CIA's raw intelligence. And top CIA and FBI officials were directed to meet biweekly. The purpose of all this was to crack the institutionalized antipathy that was forged during World War II, when FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover saw President Franklin D. Roosevelt's establishment of the Office of Strategic Services, the CIA's predecessor, as a threat to the FBI's dominion. Over the years, the agencies traded accusations that the other had lied, withheld vital information or otherwise obstructed operations and investigations. Compounding the animosity were their very different cultures and methods of operation. The CIA, for instance, has long considered itself the province of intellectuals, while viewing the FBI as a rarefied street cops' domain. "The CIA has been regarded as where [its personnel] come from Ivy League colleges and like to go to the opera, and the FBI has the products of whatever college and like to go to NASCAR races," said Smith, now a Washington lawyer. "They're almost adversarial by nature," said Peter Earnest, a 35-year CIA veteran. Even so, the enforced mingling of the agencies has already led to at least two successes. The 1996 nabbing of accused CIA spy Harold Nicholson and accused FBI mole Earl Edwin Pitts are hailed as examples of how, when the agencies work together, cases can be made both quicker and better. "It works well, as in the Nicholson case, which was largely the result of sharing pieces of information back and forth," Smith said. Scripps Howard News Service *** BUREAU VS. AGENCY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY * Established: 1947 * Director: George Tenet, since 1997 * 2001 budget: Classified * Total employees: Classified * Headquarters: Langley, Va. * Web site: www.cia.gov FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION * Established: 1908. Its name dates from 1935 * Director: Louis Freeh, since 1993 * 2001 budget: $3.1 billion * Total employees: 27,300, including 16,000 special agents * Headquarters: Washington. * Web site: www.fbi.gov -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2714 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Mar 12, 2001 6:35am Subject: PROUD FBI OFFERED TOURS OF SECRET TUNNEL BUILT UNDER SOVIET EMBASSY PROUD FBI OFFERED TOURS OF SECRET TUNNEL BUILT UNDER SOVIET EMBASSY http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/printedition/article/0,2669,SAV-0103110209,FF.html By Vernon Loeb The Washington Post March 11, 2001 WASHINGTON -- FBI officials were so proud of a secret tunnel the agency built beneath the Soviet Embassy for electronic surveillance during the final years of the Cold War that they offered tours of the passageway to senior officials with top security clearances, former government officials said last week. One former official acknowledged that he had toured the passageway but declined to describe it, saying everything about it remains highly classified. Another ex-official who was offered a tour but declined the invitation because he is claustrophobic said the tunnel was reached from a residence near the Soviet--now Russian--compound on Mt. Alto, a hilltop north of Georgetown between Wisconsin Avenue and Tunlaw Road NW that is one of the highest sites in Washington. The former official said the government bought the home and started digging the tunnel out of its basement. While much about the tunnel remains a closely held secret, electronic surveillance experts inside and outside the intelligence community said its operation gave the FBI the proximity needed to intercept Soviet communications using a variety of bugs and taps. "The closer the eavesdropper gets to the target, the more he can do," said one former government expert, explaining how tiny bugs planted throughout the embassy could have transmitted signals to the tunnel through fiber-optic and copper lines that are extremely difficult to detect. "Any time you can get physical proximity to a target, it opens up a world of possibilities," said another expert who once worked for the National Security Agency. The NSA provided eavesdropping technology for the tunnel. Beyond "hard-wired" bugs directly connected to receivers in the tunnel, the experts said, the tunnel could have enabled the FBI to tap into telecommunications lines and even power cables, which carry electromagnetic signals that can be reconstructed and deciphered. A one-time law-enforcement official said laser technology was deployed in the tunnel, technology the experts said could have been used to capture sound waves emanating from pipes and structural support beams. One former government electronic surveillance guru said tiny microphones could even have been inserted in toilets through water pipes to monitor conversations in bathrooms. Whatever technologies the NSA deployed to bug the embassy, however, the useful information it obtained was likely negligible, according to current and former government officials. Prosecutors now believe that FBI agent Robert Hanssen tipped off the KGB to the tunnel's existence early in his alleged 15-year career as a spy for the Soviet Union, nullifying the technological advantages the FBI could have gained from such close range. One intelligence source with direct knowledge of the technology Hanssen allegedly compromised said the Soviets used the FBI bugs and wiretaps to feed disinformation back to the U.S. government. "They were obviously feeding a very large quantity of data to us of apparent value but no real value," the source said. "It was a very delicate game that was played out over several years." A 109-page affidavit filed in court to support espionage charges against Hanssen never specifically mentions the tunnel. A senior U.S. official said the affidavit refers indirectly to the eavesdropping operation when it alleges that Hanssen "compromised an entire technical program of enormous value, expense and importance to the United States." In any event, U.S. officials realized the tunnel operation had been compromised years before Hanssen was unmasked last month as an alleged spy for Moscow, former FBI and intelligence officials said. Stanislav Lunev, a former colonel in Soviet military intelligence, said U.S. officials might have been alerted by a broadcast on Soviet television in 1987. In the broadcast, Soviet officials revealed numerous listening devices found throughout the embassy, including its basement. "Somebody dug in the basement with a shovel and found electronic devices, brand new," said Lunev, who arrived in Washington under cover as a correspondent for the Soviet news agency Tass in 1988 and defected to the United States in 1992. Lunev said he was never told that a tunnel existed but hardly finds the disclosure remarkable. "To believe there is no tunnel under the embassy would be stupid," Lunev said. "It's real life, a clear practice of intelligence." -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2715 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Mar 12, 2001 8:52am Subject: For the Birds According to the Knight-Ridder News Service, the inscription on the metal bands used by the U.S. Department of the Interior to tag migratory birds has been changed. The bands used to bear the address of the Washington Biological Survey, abbreviated Wash. Biol. Surv. That is, until the agency received the following letter from a camper: Dear Sirs: While camping last week I shot one of your birds. I think it was a crow. I followed the cooking instructions on the leg tag and I want to tell you it was horrible. The bands are now marked Fish and Wildlife Service. -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2716 From: Dawn Star Date: Mon Mar 12, 2001 1:40pm Subject: Mains Audio "I called the client to listen in case the voices could be identified, but the signal was too weak for identification by an untuned ear. It's possible that the voices were followed by music, implying a commercial station, but not clear enough to confirm." A Grudko It sounds like A.M. Radio, Easy way to check is bring along an A.M. radio and match up program material. Comes under the tool box heading, basic stuff: along with the flashlight, screwdriver, and paper clip. Roger, Electronic Security, Los Angeles 2717 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Mon Mar 12, 2001 4:10pm Subject: Re: Cellular and Pager Interception Equipment At 11:05 AM +0200 3/8/01, A Grudko wrote: >Off the list > >----- Original Message ----- >> It's nice that the unit recently listed has various capabilities to >> If you want to use a product such as this to inventory the ESN's you >> encounter during a sweep, or need to interrogate a phone or CDPD >> transponder in a vehicle you are checking fine, but do not post ads >> for this kind of stuff to this list. I have to admit that how a NAM >> programmer is used in a sweep is a bit of a mystery to even me > >> (but then of course I've only done a few hundred sweeps) > >Me too - 2 tomorrow, but, in the spirit of admitting that I don't know >everything, can you expand on the acronyms ESN and CDPD with a brief >description of their relevance to TSCM. I could guess but I'd rather get it >from you. We might have the same here but known by a different name. > >Thanx > >Andy Grudko. D.P.M., Grad I.S, (S.A.) >CEO - Grudko Wilson Associates (SA) (Pty) Ltd - Crime investigation & >intelligence >Johannesburg - Cape Town - Durban - Pretoria - UK - US - Canada - >Australia - Israel - Bosnia. Agents in 41 countries - www.grudko.com - (+27 >11) 465 9673 - 465 1487 (Fax) - Est. 1981 >GIN (Charter), SACI (Pres), WAD, CALI, SASFed, SASA, SAMLF, SCIP (SA >Chairman), UKPIN, AFIO (OS), IWWA, PRETrust, IPA, AmChamCom >"When you need it done right - first time" The "ESN" refers to an Electronic Serial Number that is imbedded inside the communication device which is used to identify a specific device from another device. ESN's are supposed to be, but are not always unique (usually due to mischief). CDPD is a "Packet Data" network which piggybacks a data network on top of a normal cellular telephone network. Since GPS/CDPD transponders are fairly popular as illicit tracking devices there are several methods that can be used to "burp" them. "Burping" a transponder is course done at the tail end of a sweep as it is alerting in nature. It involves creating a very low power signal (generally less then a mW) on a directional antenna which is passed over areas which may contain an illicit tracking device (ie: rear deck). The goal is to cause the transponder to momentarily loose contact with the base station and thereby "burp" trying to regain contact. The TSCM'er then listens for the "burp" with a spectrum analyzer, search receiver, or similar diagnostics equipment. Since the interruption of contact only lasts for a second or so (we hope) the transponder gives up it's hidden location when it burps. If the spy has foolishly instructed the transponder to transmit coordinates in real time (or on a frequent basis) the devices are very easy to find, on the other hand if it is in a "forward and store" mode they can be a real bitch to find and you may have to resort to burping. As always, a rigorous four plus hour physical search of the vehicle is also really helpful. -jma PS: I would STRONGLY warn the list membership that if you have any kind of cellular test equipment that you use during sweeps that you had bloody well be only using it for only legitimate purposes (TSCM'ers do not need pager or cellular interception equipment to perform a bug sweep). . -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2718 From: Samuel Hayes Date: Mon Mar 12, 2001 3:40pm Subject: Aspiring TSCM'er Hello to everyone from Atlanta, Ga. My name is Samuel Hayes. I would like to especially say hello to Jim, (hey Jim). Jim, i dont know if u remember me but we have spoken a number of times on the phone about what path I need to take to find my place amongst the real pro's in the TSCM field, and I would like to say thanks for all of your advice. Everything is working out well so far (even though its alot of work).My question to the group is this... I am currently enrolled in an electronic fundamentals course at my local tech. school and also employed by Bellsouth as a Facility Technician (we build networks-I'm in the fiber optics crew). Is there any thing else anyone can think of that I could do to give me a strong foundation with which to build the necessary skills to be a TSCM tech? Anyone perhaps looking for an enthusiastic apprentice with a strong desire to learn (and carry all the heavy stuff), whose willing to travel? Hey Jim, whats the status on Granite Island Groups classes opening to the public and how do I sign up? Well, I'll start with these few questions for now. Hope someone can help. Ciao' SRH3 __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! Auctions - Buy the things you want at great prices. http://auctions.yahoo.com/ 2719 From: Miguel Puchol Date: Mon Mar 12, 2001 5:45pm Subject: RE: Re: Cellular and Pager Interception Equipment James, There is an easier way to find one, at least in some cases. If your SA is somewhat portable, drive the vehicle around an inoffensive route, but one that would make a planted device to register in various cells, then you can see the 'burps' without having to TX on the cell band, which as I learned on my flesh some weeks ago, seems to be somewhat illegal... :-) I however suppose less than a mW can be considered 'common use' under some legislations. If you have contact with the telcos, and have the location of the cells you are going to be passing, you can map expected coverage from various cells to determine 'handover points', where you can look closer for 'burps'. When you have a high cell traffic in the search area, you can record the traces, then play them back at the office to look for similar strength 'burps' at expected locations. Just a thought, all the best, Mike > -----Mensaje original----- > De: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng [mailto:jmatk@t...] > Enviado el: lunes, 12 de marzo de 2001 23:10 > Para: TSCM-L Mailing List > Asunto: [TSCM-L] Re: Cellular and Pager Interception Equipment > > The "ESN" refers to an Electronic Serial Number that is imbedded > inside the communication device which is used to identify a specific > device from another device. ESN's are supposed to be, but are not > always unique (usually due to mischief). > > CDPD is a "Packet Data" network which piggybacks a data network on > top of a normal cellular telephone network. > > Since GPS/CDPD transponders are fairly popular as illicit tracking > devices there are several methods that can be used to "burp" them. > > "Burping" a transponder is course done at the tail end of a sweep as > it is alerting in nature. It involves creating a very low power > signal (generally less then a mW) on a directional antenna which is > passed over areas which may contain an illicit tracking device (ie: > rear deck). The goal is to cause the transponder to momentarily loose > contact with the base station and thereby "burp" trying to regain > contact. The TSCM'er then listens for the "burp" with a spectrum > analyzer, search receiver, or similar diagnostics equipment. > > Since the interruption of contact only lasts for a second or so (we > hope) the transponder gives up it's hidden location when it burps. > > If the spy has foolishly instructed the transponder to transmit > coordinates in real time (or on a frequent basis) the devices are > very easy to find, on the other hand if it is in a "forward and > store" mode they can be a real bitch to find and you may have to > resort to burping. > > As always, a rigorous four plus hour physical search of the vehicle > is also really helpful. > > -jma > > > PS: I would STRONGLY warn the list membership that if you have any > kind of cellular test equipment that you use during sweeps that you > had bloody well be only using it for only legitimate purposes > (TSCM'ers do not need pager or cellular interception equipment to > perform a bug sweep). > > > > > > . > -- > > ======================================================================= > Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? > "In a time of universal deceit, telling the > truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell > ======================================================================= > James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 > Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 > 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ > Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... > ======================================================================= > The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, > Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. > ======================================================================= > > > > ======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.onelist.com/community/TSCM-L > > or email your subscription request to: > subTSCM-L@t... > =================================================== TSKS > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ > > > 2720 From: Craig Snedden Date: Mon Mar 12, 2001 3:57pm Subject: Re: Mains Audio Ooops! I 'd have difficulty convincing myself that the characteristics of my AM "tranny" antenna is in any way comparable to what is effectively a very long wire (maybe several kilometres) attached to an RF front end......... So we take down the HF150, the ATU and 30 odd metres of copper and we build an antenna on site. And most probably we still wouldn't be able to get the same signal... Know it, tried it. I run 4 LF & HF receivers side by side for about 8/12 hours each day, each has it's own characteristics, even when coupled up to the same antenna one will pull the signal, while another just won't catch it.... :-( ----- Original Message ----- From: "Dawn Star" To: Sent: Monday, March 12, 2001 7:40 PM Subject: [TSCM-L] Mains Audio > "I called the client to listen in case the voices could be identified, but > the signal was too weak for identification by an untuned ear. It's possible > that the voices were followed by music, implying a commercial station, but > not clear enough to confirm." > A Grudko > > It sounds like A.M. Radio, Easy way to check is bring along an A.M. radio > and match up program material. Comes under the tool box heading, basic > stuff: along with the flashlight, screwdriver, and paper clip. > Roger, Electronic Security, Los Angeles > > > > ======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.onelist.com/community/TSCM-L > > or email your subscription request to: > subTSCM-L@t... > =================================================== TSKS > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ The data contained herein is confidential. Unauthorised dissemination of the contents of this e-mail may be in breach of Criminal and Civil law and may lead to prosecution. 2721 From: A Grudko Date: Wed Mar 14, 2001 7:26am Subject: Re: Mains Audio and other signals Thanks Craig, that's another good point. Just as 'There's no replacement for cubic displacement', on AM LW/MW size does count, and the mV/mtr gain over a couple of klicks of solid copper conductor But woah - 4 HF rigs at once; you must have one noisy test bench! I get irritated and confused if more than 3 AM or FM signals pop up at the same time - I often hit the big ALL OFF switch (the PSU). One of my TSCM test rigs is an ancient but still worthwhile Fair Mate HP-100E portable scanner. It has 1000 memories, AM, NBFM or WBFM stored, 8.0 to 999.995 Megs. All I do with it is anytime I discover or read about a new bug frequency (don't you love those detailed spec. catalogues) is I enter the frequency and mode, in no special order. Then during a sweep I let it just run. I sometimes also let it run as I drive through the city and suburbs 'cos you never know when you'll pick up a conventional Cony, Micro or AAA device... Monday I had a Middle East supplier phone me offering unsolicited Micro phone and room bugs, via London at 'unbeatable prices'. Today a rep. from a Far East based company phoned out of the blue. He claims he's been active selling covert surveillance devices in SA for 4 months. I was happy to talk to the guys to find out what's appearing on the local scene - and to try to work out who are buying what and why. ----- Original Message ----- From: Craig Snedden To: Sent: Monday, March 12, 2001 11:57 PM Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] Mains Audio > I 'd have difficulty convincing myself that the characteristics of my AM > "tranny" antenna is in any way comparable to what is effectively a very long > wire (maybe several kilometres) attached to an RF front end......... > So we take down the HF150, the ATU and 30 odd metres of copper and we build > an antenna on site. And most probably we still wouldn't be able to get the > same signal... Know it, tried it. > I run 4 LF & HF receivers side by side for about 8/12 hours each day, each > has it's own characteristics, even when coupled up to the same antenna one > will pull the signal, while another just won't catch it.... 2722 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Wed Mar 14, 2001 9:14am Subject: Re: Mains Audio and other signals At 3:26 PM +0200 3/14/01, A Grudko wrote: [snip] >All I do with it is anytime I discover or read about a new bug frequency >(don't you love those detailed spec. catalogues) is I enter the frequency >and mode, in no special order. Then during a sweep I let it just run. I >sometimes also let it run as I drive through the city and suburbs 'cos you >never know when you'll pick up a conventional Cony, Micro or AAA device... > [snip] Here are a few more for you to keep an eye on, they are all low cost Japanese units that are flooding the consumer and spy shop markets abroad. All frequencies are in MHz, and the devices use NBFM modulation. Very, very heavily used in major US cities, and fairly easy to find at considerable distances with the appropriate equipment. In fact it is tough to perform a bug sweep in major city in the US (ie: NYC, DC, Chicago, Boston, etc) and not pickup on at least one of these frequencies being used for covert eavesdropping. 134.0000 134.9000 139.6000 139.9400 139.9700 139.9800 140.0000 140.0500 140.4500 141.0000 149.0000 149.4500 149.8950 154.0000 154.5850 339.4500 361.8250 396.4300 396.4400 396.8200 397.2400 397.2500 397.5650 398.0100 398.0300 398.0500 398.1100 398.2100 398.2150 398.4600 398.6050 398.6400 398.6450 398.6500 399.0250 399.0300 399.2500 399.4300 399.4550 399.5750 399.6050 399.6150 399.6400 399.7500 399.9100 399.9900 400.0000 413.0000 418.0000 433.9200 442.9000 Of course your mileage may vary, -jma -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2723 From: JAMES M. McGING Date: Wed Mar 14, 2001 9:20am Subject: Re: Digest Number 538 I have a new email address, and would appreciate you amending your records, as I wish to continue to be a member of the list. Thank you, James M. McGing old: sheriff@w... new: Tourmakeady2001@y... 2724 From: Craig Snedden Date: Wed Mar 14, 2001 9:56am Subject: Re: Re: Mains Audio and other signals Hi Andy, Nice to hear someone else out there has a Fairmate. Nice little unit and easy to use, even if you have lost the manual like me....... O.K. I'll come clean, I'm not blessed with 4 arms and several sets of ears (although some of the guys I worked with in the past seemed to be so blessed!). Usually, 2 or 3 of the rigs are set up to rx RTTY under computer control. I have two budget AKD HF-3's, (which actually give a respectable performance), a Lowe HF-150 and an AR7030. Regarding "bugging" equipment from London, there are a couple of suppliers, who to my certain knowledge (having taken thier stuff to bits & compared them), buy cheap units from the far east (xtal controlled UHF & VHF transmitters, recorders, knowles mikes etc.) and stick thier own badges on them, then hike the price by 100% or so. A couple of years ago I bought two recorder/transmitter devices (srictly for training purposes Mr. Atkinson, Sir!) from a supplier for about £120 each. A few months later during a sweep I came across an identical unit in a clients premises, but "badged" by a well known London supplier. I looked up thier catalogue to find them priced at £300 each.... But you're right, it's always worth talking to these people, often a bit of "social engineering", turning the spying game back on them, will reveal who is buying what. Most salesmen are too greedy to make the sale that client ethics go straight out the window! I trust your autumn isn't getting too cold for you down there, the fine weather is just starting here, we're up to 3 degrees centigrade today! Best regards, Craig ----- Original Message ----- From: "A Grudko" To: Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2001 1:26 PM Subject: [TSCM-L] Re: Mains Audio and other signals > Thanks Craig, that's another good point. Just as 'There's no replacement for > cubic displacement', on AM LW/MW size does count, and the mV/mtr gain over a > couple of klicks of solid copper conductor > > But woah - 4 HF rigs at once; you must have one noisy test bench! > > I get irritated and confused if more than 3 AM or FM signals pop up at the > same time - I often hit the big ALL OFF switch (the PSU). > > One of my TSCM test rigs is an ancient but still worthwhile Fair Mate > HP-100E portable scanner. It has 1000 memories, AM, NBFM or WBFM stored, 8.0 > to 999.995 Megs. > > All I do with it is anytime I discover or read about a new bug frequency > (don't you love those detailed spec. catalogues) is I enter the frequency > and mode, in no special order. Then during a sweep I let it just run. I > sometimes also let it run as I drive through the city and suburbs 'cos you > never know when you'll pick up a conventional Cony, Micro or AAA device... > > Monday I had a Middle East supplier phone me offering unsolicited Micro > phone and room bugs, via London at 'unbeatable prices'. > > Today a rep. from a Far East based company phoned out of the blue. He claims > he's been active selling covert surveillance devices in SA for 4 months. > > I was happy to talk to the guys to find out what's appearing on the local > scene - and to try to work out who are buying what and why. > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Craig Snedden > To: > Sent: Monday, March 12, 2001 11:57 PM > Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] Mains Audio > > > I 'd have difficulty convincing myself that the characteristics of my AM > > "tranny" antenna is in any way comparable to what is effectively a very > long > > wire (maybe several kilometres) attached to an RF front end......... > > So we take down the HF150, the ATU and 30 odd metres of copper and we > build > > an antenna on site. And most probably we still wouldn't be able to get the > > same signal... Know it, tried it. > > I run 4 LF & HF receivers side by side for about 8/12 hours each day, each > > has it's own characteristics, even when coupled up to the same antenna one > > will pull the signal, while another just won't catch it.... > > > > > ======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.onelist.com/community/TSCM-L > > or email your subscription request to: > subTSCM-L@t... > =================================================== TSKS > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ The data contained herein is confidential. Unauthorised dissemination of the contents of this e-mail may be in breach of Criminal and Civil law and may lead to prosecution. 2725 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Wed Mar 14, 2001 11:09am Subject: Re: Re: Mains Audio and other signals At 3:56 PM +0000 3/14/01, Craig Snedden wrote: >Hi Andy, [snip] >Regarding "bugging" equipment from London, there are a couple of suppliers, >who to my certain knowledge (having taken thier stuff to bits & compared >them), buy cheap units from the far east (xtal controlled UHF & VHF >transmitters, recorders, knowles mikes etc.) and stick thier own badges on >them, then hike the price by 100% or so. A couple of years ago I bought two >recorder/transmitter devices (srictly for training purposes Mr. Atkinson, >Sir!) from a supplier for about £120 each. A few months later during a >sweep I came across an identical unit in a clients premises, but "badged" by >a well known London supplier. I looked up thier catalogue to find them >priced at £300 each.... [snip] A bug which is selling in japan for $85.00 retail in Japan is available wholesale (in Japan) for under $50.00 bucks. Now in London that same exact bug is openly sold for 300 to 500 dollars (US), and illicitly offered in the US via SpyShops for many thousands of dollars (typically a 50:1 markup ratio or more). I have personally seen eavesdropping devices for sale at a popular New York SpyShop for $4,995.00 (yes, five grand) which were readily available in Japan for fifty dollars. Of course if you agree to become a dealer for the NY SpyShop they will give you a special price of half off ($2,500.00), but you have to promise to buy ten units. A few calls to the manufacture and they confirmed that they were selling hundreds of this particular units at a time to that specific SpyShop and that they were well aware of the 100 fold markup. >But you're right, it's always worth talking to these people, often a bit of >"social engineering", turning the spying game back on them, will reveal who >is buying what. Most salesmen are too greedy to make the sale that client >ethics go straight out the window! Heck, a 100 fold markup is a pretty good markup. Your right about turning the spying game back on them with a few phone calls [Grin] >I trust your autumn isn't getting too cold for you down there, the fine >weather is just starting here, we're up to 3 degrees centigrade today! > >Best regards, > >Craig -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2726 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Wed Mar 14, 2001 1:17pm Subject: Capital Q&A: James Woolsey on spies and rogue missiles Capital Q&A: James Woolsey on spies and rogue missiles http://www.vny.com/cf/News/upidetail.cfm?QID=167776 Tuesday, 13 March 2001 18:55 (ET) Capital Q&A: James Woolsey on spies and rogue missiles By CARMEN J. GENTILE WASHINGTON, March 13 (UPI) -- R. James Woolsey is a Washington insider of the first rank, having served as director of central intelligence and in a host of other key roles -- from helping create the first outlines of a missile defense program to forging military bonds with European allies. So when Woolsey talks about spies or missile shields, Washington listens. In an interview with United Press International, Woolsey warned against complacency in the U.S. intelligence community in the wake of the arrest of FBI agent Robert Hanssen for allegedly selling U.S. secrets to the Soviets for 15 years. Woolsey said agencies like the FBI and the CIA -- which had its own notorious spy case involving Aldrich Ames -- may have been lulled "because they couldn't quite believe that one of their career case officers was a Soviet spy. ...That's one of the things you have to be very humble about, in a sense." And Woolsey says missile defense, far from being pie in the sky, is evolving to the point where rogue missiles would be "much easier to shoot down" than earlier plans would have allowed. Currently a partner at the law firm of Shea & Gardner in Washington, Woolsey returned to the private sector in January 1995 after serving two years as director of central intelligence. Woolsey has also served as: ambassador to the negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe; undersecretary of the Navy; general counsel to the Senate Committee on Armed Services and adviser on the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. He was also appointed by President Reagan as delegate-at-large to the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Nuclear and Space Arms Talks. Excerpts of the interview follow. Woolsey put only one restriction on the questions: "No tunnel talk," a reference to the reported multimillion-dollar secret tunnel built next to the Soviet Embassy in Washington that Hanssen's alleged spying may have compromised. Hanssen allegedly divulged its existence to the Soviets as early as 1985. If that scenario is correct, the tunnel would have been useless an information-gathering source during Woolsey's tenure at the CIA. Q. Can you assess the damage caused by the alleged spying activities of Robert P. Hanssen? A. It appears from the affidavit, and that's all any of us can go on, that the damage is quite substantial because it looks as if he got two people killed, though (convicted CIA traitor) Ames got between 10 and 13 killed. Two of the people he fingered were apparently two that Ames had named as well. A third was imprisoned as a result of what he said. Hanssen was apparently exposed to a number of programs in other agencies including technical collection programs. It's hard to know exactly what these were from the affidavit. Q. Could you surmise what the technical collections were? A. No, I probably wouldn't even if I could -- just the context of the way they're presented on the affidavit suggests they were quite important. ... It looks as if he gave (his handlers) documents about intelligence planning and what we were focusing on and probably a lot of material that helped the KGB avoid surveillance by the FBI here and the CIA overseas. And he appears to have had access to material from agencies other that than the FBI. Q. The CIA? A. Some of these documents look like they may be CIA documents, some from the State Department, we don't know. But they do, just from the titles in the affidavit, appear to be of substantial importance. Q. Do you believe there are currently other counterspies infiltrating intelligence agencies in high positions such as Hanssen's? A. Woolsey: It's hard to say. One hopes not, but you always have to act as if there may well be. You have to be a little bit paranoid to be in the counterintelligence business. Hopefully it's paranoia that's somewhat under control because you can't go making wild accusations about people based on flimsy evidence, ruining people's lives and careers. But on the other hand, you have to follow diligently every lead, including looking at your own organization. I think the CIA had a hard time capturing Ames because they couldn't quite believe that one of their career case officers was a Soviet spy. And I think the FBI had a hard time catching Hanssen because of a similar assumption about FBI agents. So that's one of the things you have to be very humble about, in a sense. If you are in the counterintelligence business, you cannot assume your organization is completely able to avoid penetration. No matter how fine the barrel of apples -- a barrel of both the clandestine service in the CIA and FBI special agents, who are wonderful, talented, extraordinarily, able, patriotic people -- any barrel of apples can have a bad one in it. And it has happened now two or three times to both the FBI and the CIA. This ought to put to rest the idea that there is no sector of intelligence that does not need to be serious about counterintelligence because a foreign power would not be able to penetrate it. That just appears to be wrong. Q. In the Ames case, the convicted CIA traitor was living what appeared to be well beyond his means -- he had a nice home and he drove an expensive car. To the general public, these things would automatically arouse suspicion. Why was it that following his conviction the FBI did not appear to improve its security and adopt CIA practices such as the use of polygraph tests and regular checks of agents financial records? A. Ames was able to succeed in spying for nine years in spite of the fact that he was spending money on some things beyond his salary. I believe it happened because back after 1975, the CIA's security and counterintelligence operations were heavily decentralized. Before 1975 they had been in the control of a single individual, James Angleton (legendary former deputy director of counter-intelligence at the CIA), who figures prominently in a lot of spy novels, and in many ways was a very successful and able man who did a lot of positive things for the country and the CIA. But like a number of people, he probably stayed in the job a few years too long, he got a bit paranoid at the end. He did ruin a few people's careers who in fact did nothing wrong. He came to the view, for example, that if you believed in the sign of Soviet split, you may well be suspect. And so after he was fired in 1974, the CIA overreacted to Angleton's centralization of power and authority and very heavily decentralized its counterintelligence and security operations. And as a result, the milieu that Ames came into when he started to spy in 1985 was one in which the people who knew about his spending on his house did not know about his drinking, and the people that knew about his drinking didn't know about his polygraph (results). One of the things the CIA did in the aftermath of the Ames affair, in addition to increasing our level of attention to people's finances, was to consolidate substantially the security and counterintelligence responsibilities out at Langley (CIA headquarters in suburban Virginia) so that things wouldn't fall through the cracks. I don't know how the FBI runs its programs for polygraphs and financial reporting. That's entirely up to them. And I'm sure that as Judge Webster does his review, he will come up with some recommendations for strengthening those procedures. But I am under the impression that they didn't take the types of steps after 1994 that we did at the CIA. I think you have to admit, however, (and) anyone who would be critical of the FBI on this issue would have to admit, that Hanssen, assuming he is guilty as charged, was an extremely clever spy. Not only was he in counterintelligence, so he knew about surveillance techniques and the like, but it's also the case that he was able to figure out which Soviet case officers did not have mail cover, so he could go ahead and contact them. He also generally, except perhaps for some of the private school tuition for his children, appeared to live very much within his means. He did not throw money around the way Ames did, and he convinced everyone that he was a devout religious man, family man and lived that kind of lifestyle. Part of his cleverness was in not showing that he had a lot of extra money that other spies have from time to time. Q. Do you think the bureau will follow suit and step up its security measures? A. I'm sure all of their measures will be up for review and I'd be surprised if there weren't some modifications to them. Q. Why do you think he did it, if in fact he is found guilty? A. That's one of the strangest aspects of this case. He seems to be in part motivated by money, but not exclusively, and in part motivated by a sense of arrogance and the challenge -- this business in the affidavit about bragging how he had wanted to do this since he was 14 years old and his sense of superiority, as well as denigrating the FBI and the U.S. government. He seems to be an individual whose personality and his arrogance had something to do with his decision to try and make this work. Q. A recent article in Washington Post questions the origin of the KGB documents that exposed Hanssen. Do you have any idea where these alleged documents came from? A. If I knew, I wouldn't say. Q. Switching gears, in 1996 you testified in front of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that "ballistic missiles can, and in the future increasingly will, be used by hostile states for blackmail, terror and to drive wedges between us and our friends and allies." It was your judgment then that the Clinton administration was not "giving this vital problem the weight it deserves." Do you see the Bush administration giving it the proper weight it deserves, and how would they going about doing so, if they are not already? A. Well certainly I think their commitment to missile defense suggests more attention. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld chaired a commission in '97-98 I served on that called a lot of attention to this problem. The Clinton administration was in the process of sort of pooh-poohing it when, about six weeks after the report was issued, the North Koreans launched a missile that had a partially successful third stage that then later failed. It flew over Japan into the Pacific, and that suggested that the North Koreans were rather far along in missile development that conceivably would be able to reach the United States, at least at an early stage in Alaska or Hawaii. That appeared to be the event -- the combination of the Rumsfeld Commission report and North Korean test -- that finally more or less woke up the Clinton administration. I think the system that they deployed, or were planning to deploy, or might have been planning to deploy, had a lot of weaknesses. The Bush administration (is) focused on trying to move promptly to do something about this issue. I think this had now spread to the point that it is a serious concern all across the political spectrum. I think this issue is really catching on, and the question is not whether, but how, the U.S. will deploy some type of missile defense. Q. Some European countries and Russia have balked, saying that in varying degrees they were not in support of Bush's proposed missle defense plan. Now Germany has changed its stance on the U.S. missile strategy and even Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that it is important for Russia to ally itself with the West to combat rogue states. A. Our allies, first and foremost, and maybe even Mr. Putin, are responding to American firmness of will. When the United States expresses itself as determined to do something, people tend to take that seriously. The Clinton administration never expressed any sense of determination about this matter. I think it is beginning to seep in that the Bush administration is not planning something similar to its predecessors. The Clinton administration called it National Missile Defense and their system was solely designed to protect the Unites States. The reason it was designed that way was due to what's called a mid-course intercept system that could intercept ballistic missiles long after they are launched into space, where they are hard to pick out against the background of space and moving at several miles per second. The reason the Clinton administration system was designed that way, was that they wanted to make them resemble as close as possible the systems that would have been permitted by the 1972 U.S.-Soviet ABM treaty. If you start from the other end, and ask what is strategically useful, I think you don't end up focusing principally on a mid-course system, but rather on something that would shoot down (a) ballistic missile in what's called boost phase, that is, an early stage of flight when they are large, slow and hot. At those early phases of flight, they are much easier to shoot down. The question is getting the missile that would shoot them or the satellite that would get in their way or laser beam that would destroy them close enough so that it could do the job during the early stage of their trajectory. A system like that (proposed by the Bush administration) has an added advantage of protecting everybody, not just the United States. For example, let's say the United States had a missile site in eastern Turkey and could shoot down shortly after it was launched anything coming out of Iraq. That doesn't just protect the United States, it protects Germany and Russia and essentially everyplace in the world. So I would hope and think that our allies, and maybe even the Russians, would be more favorably disposed toward a system that could protect them as well as us, rather than one such as the Clinton administration was pursuing that could only protect the Unites States. Some of the critics in Europe of the Clinton administration's NMD proposal said it was an expression of ''fortress America,'' and they had a point. As long as you're using a mid-course system based in the United States, you're only protecting the United States, but if you are shooting these things down in boost phase, you're protecting everybody. If I were a German, I would feel more positively about a system protecting me as well as the Unites States, than I would about one that was just protecting the United States. Q. How closely does the Bush missile plan resemble the Strategic Defensive Initiative or "Star Wars" plan proposed by President Reagan? A. President Reagan's initial interest was in directed-energy weapons, satellites in space with lasers or particle beams that would shoot down missiles in boost phase. And that grew to the somewhat derisory term "Star Wars," suggesting that it was a very far-out idea. The Bush administration, the first Bush administration, focused on something called the Global Protection System that they worked on cooperatively with Russians when President Yeltsin expressed interest in it in 1992. That had several components, but one of them was a rather simpler idea which was boost-phase intercepts using small satellites that would not fire lasers, but would be expendable themselves, and move into the path of a ballistic missile as it was coming up in boost phase. That project was called Brilliant Pebbles: The satellites were small, but they had a lot of sophisticated electronics on them for intercepting technologically advanced Russian missiles. There are other ideas for doing this, including one that I support called Burros, which are also small satellites that move into the path of missiles, but aren't as sophisticated. They're designed to deal with missile threats from Iraq, Iran, North Korea and the like. I don't know what this Bush administration is going to do, but whether you are talking about shooting down a ballistic missile in boost phase from the surface from the earth, or these relatively simple satellites, that technology is somewhat simpler than what the Clinton administration was trying to do. They really were trying to hit a bullet with a bullet. Q. There has been speculation that the SDI was more or less a scare tactic than a feasible missile defense system, designed to frighten the Russians to spend on defense into bankruptcy. A. I think it may have had that effect. I think President Reagan thought that something could be deployed relatively quickly, and I think he was committed to it and sincere about it. The Russians, I think, thought we could probably deploy something rather quickly. After all, they went into space first in 1958, and a few years later, President Kennedy said we would put a man on the moon by the end of the decade. And in 8 ? years, you have Americans walking on the moon on live television and by all reports the Soviet Politburo watching it on television were stunned and some of them weeping. So they knew what the Unites States could do if it put their mind to it, in space and in technology. President Reagan's original concept of directed energy in space was a very challenging technology and I think it did have the effect of frightening the Russians into spending a great deal more on their military. It was definitely one of the things that demoralized them and helped bankrupt their system. SDI had a hand in helping end the Cold War successfully. -- Copyright 2001 by United Press International. All rights reserved. -- -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 2727 From: Paolo Sfriso Date: Wed Mar 14, 2001 0:41pm Subject: Digital Radio Transmittion Sound website Dear Collegues. The following link might be of interest for comparing unusual digital radio transmittion sounds. http://www.wunclub.com/sounds/index.html Your Italian Connection Paul Sfriso Director GRUPPO S.I.T. Security, Investigations & Tecnology Quarto d'Altino, Venice ITALY phone +39 0422 828517 fax +39 0422 823224 24hr GSM cellphone +39 335 5257308 paulsfriso@t... www.grupposit.com [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 2728 From: Gerard P. Keenan Date: Wed Mar 14, 2001 8:02pm Subject: New Info Sorry for the cross postings but I wanted to provide some update on my business/company. We are now known as: Executive Assets, Inc. Gerard P. Keenan, Dir. of Operations 1005 Celia St. West Islip, NY 11795-2503 (631) 587-4020 (ph) (516) 768-9602 (cell/mobile) (530) 323-6832 (Jfax) secureops@e... gkeenan@s... http://www.geocities.com/executiveassets GPKeenan Co., Int'l Security Services will remain in operation as a subsidiary of Executive Assets and will serve primarily as the administrative/research/analysis part of the operation handling publishing, the three restricted mailing lists, terrorism database, and other similar operations. Cheers! Jerry Keenan [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 2729 From: Date: Thu Mar 15, 2001 3:13am Subject: An Irish Friendship Wish ! AN IRISH FRIENDSHIP Wish May there always be work for your hands to do; May your purse always hold a coin or two; May the sun always shine on your windowpane; May a rainbow be certain to follow each rain; May the hand of a friend always be near you; May God fill your heart with gladness to cheer you ! Happy Saint Patrick's Day ! ; Mar.17 Top of the Day ! To all ! HAVE A GREAT DAY !!! 2730 From: Edward J. Michaels Date: Wed Mar 14, 2001 9:14pm Subject: REI reply to assistance? I guess this is all 1 each OSCOR, ORION and CPM-700 gets you when dealing with a busy manufacturer? "Hello Edward J. We have received you're request and will respond as soon as possible. Thank You, Research ELectronics Intl. Copyright ©2000 Research ELectronics Intl. All Rights Reserved" [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 2731 From: Charles P Date: Thu Mar 15, 2001 8:59am Subject: Re: REI reply to assistance? Sounds to me like an automated email response- just a courtesy to acknowledge that your message was received. Tom Jones (prez of REI) is usually active on this list so you probably will get a response now! :) ----- Original Message ----- From: "Edward J. Michaels" To: Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2001 10:14 PM Subject: [TSCM-L] REI reply to assistance? > I guess this is all 1 each OSCOR, ORION and CPM-700 gets you when > dealing with a busy manufacturer? > > "Hello Edward J. > > We have received you're request and will respond as soon as possible. > > Thank You, > Research ELectronics Intl. > Copyright ©2000 Research ELectronics Intl. All Rights Reserved"