From: Matthew Paulsen Date: Thu Apr 4, 2002 5:53pm Subject: Paranoia paradise Had a recent converstation with someone about this sort of stuff... Lots of laughs were involved from start to finish. I do feel truly sorry for others that have to deal with these whacko's on a daily basis. I normally only get to deal with people that are sane, but don't understand technology that think it's easy to do. Guess I can live with my frustrating teaching moments when I look at the alternatives that are available. Hmm... I guess a conspiracy theorist would say that this article was posted by the BBC as a disinformation dismeination plot against the UK citizenry by the established media mafia... hehe :) -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newsid_1909000/1909378.stm Thursday, 4 April, 2002, 11:24 GMT 12:24 UK Paranoia paradise By Chris Horrie BBC News Online What makes a good conspiracy theory? What is it about some stories that, however unlikely, convince people that they are true? French author Thierry Meyssan's book L'Effroyable Imposture (The Appalling Fraud) - which claims that the US government may have "staged" the 11 September attack on the Pentagon - has been condemned for lack of taste. The book has found thousands of readers in France But it is merely the latest contribution to the mushrooming media "conspiracy industry" - based on the premise that whatever anybody in authority says, the exact opposite is almost certainly the truth. In an age of The X-Files and a lack of trust in the scientific, political and military establishment, there are millions apparently prepared to believe that what they see on the TV news is a complete con and that "the truth" is being suppressed by mysterious and unidentifiable Powers That Be. Who controls the British Crown... who keeps the metric system down... we do! we do! Anthem of the Stone Cutters, from The Simpsons In short, the world seems to be coming down with a bad case of mass paranoia. The Grassy Knoll There are those, for example, who believe that the Titanic was not sunk but captured by Albanian pirates (why Albanians?), its cargo of gold bullion stolen, its crew and passengers sold to white slave traders and a "fake" wreck created to cover up for this near-perfect super crime. Less obscure are the numerous theories surrounding the death of John F Kennedy - the most outrageous (and recent) that he was somehow shot by his wife, Jackie. Then there is the persistent campaign to convince everyone that the moon landing was faked in a TV studio and on location in an Arizona desert in order to boost the popularity of Richard Nixon. There are entire interest groups with names like The Grassy Knoll and The Conspiracy Continues devoted to "researching" ever more convoluted versions of the Kennedy assassination, many now finessed to entire alternative secret histories of the world dating back to the Garden of Eden. Twilight Zone Conspiracy Planet links to all the familiar conspiracy theories - Elvis is not dead; UFO abductions; tireless efforts of drug companies to suppress cures for diseases, and car companies to prevent the development of the electric car. Homespun UK conspiracies of recent vintage include the idea that MI6 killed Diana, Princess of Wales, to prevent her marrying a Muslim and endless stuff about British intelligence services being under the thumb of the Russians, the French and - strangely enough - the Swiss. The alien in Roswell, New Mexico, centre of strange events If all of this seems to be like the script for a particularly duff edition of The Twilight Zone, remember that ex-BBC presenter and Coventry City goalkeeper David Icke preaches that the world is being secretly run by super-intelligent lizards from another planet. Modern day conspiracy theorising like this may seem harmless to some. But belief in a sinister group of super-secret political puppet masters controlling world events is an old idea, pre-dating even modern science fiction. Nazi paranoia Fortunately, the more nutty global conspiracy theories have generally been confined to the fringe. But not always. The Nazi regime in Germany based its persecution of Jews on the idea that leaders of the religion acted as a secret governing council of the world, waging a secret war against Germany by cooking up communism, capitalism, jazz, pornography and modern art. This nonsense had its roots in 19th century France, where Jews were blamed for both the French revolution and the defeat of Napoleon. Anti-Semitic A best-selling French "non fiction" book, The French Jews, maintained a Jewish world council based in Gibraltar controlled the world banking system and was plotting the destruction of European civilisation. David Icke: "World is run by lizards" The book went through 114 editions in a single year, sold millions across Europe and made its author, Edouard Drumont, a leading player in French politics. Drumont's most extreme followers even believed that Jews had infiltrated the Catholic Church and placed a "Jewish Pope" on the throne of St Peter. Later, Drumont's ravings were perfected by the Russian secret police who faked a complete set of documents "proving" the existence of a "world Jewish conspiracy" and published in millions of copies around the world under the title of the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion". Spy mania Almost as horrific - on the political left - was the Communist conspiracy theory in 1930s Russia that famines caused by economic mismanagement were being deliberately manufactured by richer, conservative "Kulak" farmers - working conspiratorially with undercover German and British spies. "Spy mania", together with the wild idea that the Kulaks were deliberately starving themselves to death, led to countless executions and further intensification of famine, claiming the lives of millions. In the 1930s the controversial German psychologist Wilhelm Reich diagnosed belief in conspiracy theories as a form of mass hysteria and as a type of contagious "emotional plague". The problem is that once the basic idea is accepted that an endlessly devious, super-secret cabal is running events, everything that happens can be seen as further and ever more convincing evidence of conspiracy. 5134 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Thu Apr 4, 2002 7:41pm Subject: Webster Report The Webster report on espionage inside the FBI is now online. http://www.tscm.com/websterreport.pdf -jma -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPh: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island GroupFax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "...three shall be the number to count, and the number to be counted shall be three.....four shall thou not count......five is right out". - M. Python -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5135 From: Dragos Ruiu Date: Thu Apr 4, 2002 9:09am Subject: cryptome How interesting. I post to this list in response to the 0day discussion. I never see the post go out on the list. The next day I find my post anonymized and posted on cryptome.org Quite an interesting information ecosystem we live in indeed. amused, --dr -- --dr pgpkey: http://dragos.com/dr-dursec.asc CanSecWest/core02 - May 1-3 2002 - Vancouver B.C. - http://cansecwest.com 5136 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Fri Apr 5, 2002 3:09pm Subject: Re: cryptome Actually, your post actually did make it to (and was posted on) the list, but you may not have gotten a copy yourself. -jma At 3:09 PM +0000 4/4/02, Dragos Ruiu wrote: >How interesting. > >I post to this list in response to the 0day discussion. > >I never see the post go out on the list. > >The next day I find my post anonymized and posted on cryptome.org > >Quite an interesting information ecosystem we live in indeed. > >amused, >--dr > >-- >--dr pgpkey: http://dragos.com/dr-dursec.asc > CanSecWest/core02 - May 1-3 2002 - Vancouver B.C. - >http://cansecwest.com -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPh: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island GroupFax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "...three shall be the number to count, and the number to be counted shall be three.....four shall thou not count......five is right out". - M. Python -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5137 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Fri Apr 5, 2002 5:30pm Subject: Seven F.B.I. Employees Fail Polygraph Tests for Security http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/04/national/04HANS.html?todaysheadlines April 4, 2002 Seven F.B.I. Employees Fail Polygraph Tests for Security By DAVID JOHNSTON WASHINGTON, April 3 - About seven F.B.I. employees with access to highly classified information have been unable to pass polygraph examinations administered as part of the bureau's stepped-up security program after the arrest last year of a senior agent as a Russian spy, F.B.I. officials said today. At a meeting with reporters at Federal Bureau of Investigation headquarters, Robert S. Mueller III, the director, said that about 700 bureau employees had been given polygraph exams in the aftermath of the arrest of Robert P. Hanssen, who has pleaded guilty to spying for Moscow. Mr. Mueller said, "We are heartened that less than 1 percent of the 700 raised issues that require further investigation." Mr. Mueller and other bureau officials discussed expanded use of polygraphs and other measures adopted as a result of embarrassing security lapses found after the Hanssen case. Mr. Mueller spoke today before the release of a report by a commission that is expected to conclude that the lack of controls on employees made it much easier for Mr. Hanssen to pilfer secret bureau documents without being caught. The yearlong review of security procedures was conducted by a commission led by William H. Webster, former director of central intelligence and the F.B.I. Mr. Webster will testify next week about his findings to the Senate Judiciary Committee. "Every employee should recognize that in the wake of Hanssen, we have to emphasize security more than we have," Mr. Mueller said. "Anybody who looks at our organization realizes that security was not a priority. We've moved to address that." In other steps to tighten security, the bureau has created a security division, limited the number of people who have access to classified material and tightened controls on employees who use classified computer systems. In addition, Kenneth H. Senser, a C.I.A. officer who is in charge of the security overhaul at the F.B.I., said the bureau will expand its use of public records, like property sale documents, to check agents' financial disclosure reports. He said that the bureau is considering whether to use psychological profiles to uncover behavior that might lead to spying. "Our goal is to deter those people, if they're thinking rationally," Mr. Senser said. "In some cases they don't. If we can't deter them, to try to minimize that time between when they make the decision to go bad and when they actually get detected, and along that way, minimize the damage that's done." As for employees who were unable to pass polygraphs, Mr. Mueller said that the results did not automatically mean they were suspected of espionage. He said that a follow-up investigation could exonerate all of the employees. Other officials said polygraph tests may be extended to several thousand more employees. Mr. Hanssen, an F.B.I. counterintelligence expert for 25 years, is awaiting sentencing next month. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPh: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island GroupFax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "...three shall be the number to count, and the number to be counted shall be three.....four shall thou not count......five is right out". - M. Python -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 5138 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Fri Apr 5, 2002 5:36pm Subject: FBI Report: Lax Technology Security Aided Hanssen http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,49430,00.html FBI Report: Lax Technology Security Aided Hanssen Thursday, April 04, 2002 By Carl Cameron WASHINGTON - The FBI is expected this week to issue a scathing report on security problems discovered during an internal review of the Robert Hanssen spy case. The report, to be delivered to Attorney General John Ashcroft by Friday, concludes after extensive debriefings with Hanssen that the FBI suffers from lax attention to technology and document security and has numerous management problems, sources familiar with the report told Fox News. Former CIA Director William Webster, who is also a former head of the FBI, conducted the far-reaching review, and is expected to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee next Tuesday. Robert Hanssen was an FBI agent for 25 years, at times highly involved in counterintelligence operations, before being arrested as a spy for the Soviet Union and Russia. Last July, he pleaded guilty to nearly two dozen charges of selling U.S. secrets to the Moscow over 20 years. Hanssen has nonetheless been sparring with his debriefers for months, and transcripts of the interviews reveal that his knowledge of top-secret FBI and CIA operations went well beyond his own "need to know" status, sources said. Sources said Hanssen appeared to "play with his debriefers" and often sought to impress them with the vast amount of intelligence he claims to have compromised. Hanssen met with Webster's team four times over the last year. Sources familiar with the Webster report say it will state that: - the FBI has failed to resolve long standing internal security concerns; - FBI computers, networks and encryption standards are outdated and vulnerable to compromise; - FBI records storage and security is inadequate and vulnerable to compromise; - FBI management and command and control operations are outdated and malfunctioning; and - FBI morale in the field and management communications are faltering. In October, Fox News was first to report that Hanssen had stolen top-secret U.S. law-enforcement software applications, as well as handbooks for the Community Online Intelligence Network, used by investigators to access various law-enforcement databases. Hanssen sold the COIN applications to the Russians, and U.S. intelligence believes that the software was in turn provided to Al Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden by Russian organized-crime figures. Government officials say the software may enable bin Laden to track the international investigation of terror assets and keep his money from being seized. The United States is not the only nation to use the COIN software. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPh: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island GroupFax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "...three shall be the number to count, and the number to be counted shall be three.....four shall thou not count......five is right out". - M. Python -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5139 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Fri Apr 5, 2002 7:26pm Subject: Report: FBI Failed to Track Agent http://library.northernlight.com/ED20020404900000068.html?cb=0&dx=1006&sc=0#doc Report: FBI Failed to Track Agent Story Filed: Thursday, April 04, 2002 8:49 PM EST WASHINGTON (AP) -- The FBI has failed to comply with a presidential order that requires agents who work with the nation's most closely guarded secrets to disclose details of their finances, according to a report that quotes spy Robert Hanssen as saying the lapse helped him elude capture. The report, harshly critical of security within the FBI, said it found serious problems years ago and as recently as October. As quoted in the report, Hanssen outlined how the security shortcomings aided his 22-year spying career for Moscow. ``The only thing that possibly could have uncovered my espionage activities was a complete investigation of my financial positions and deposits to bank accounts,'' Hanssen told investigators, according to the report from a commission led by William H. Webster, a former CIA and FBI director. Hanssen has pleaded guilty to selling secrets in exchange for $1.4 million over the two decades. The Webster report, released Thursday, also disclosed that one month after the Sept. 11 terror attacks, FBI officials deliberately lifted restrictions on internal investigative files and widely exposed within the bureau sensitive information from secret wiretaps and searches granted under the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Such FISA information -- traditionally used for tracking down spies -- cannot be used in criminal cases under U.S. law. Some critics questioned whether the FBI may have accidentally revealed the identities of its clandestine agents overseas or the targets of its U.S. spy-hunting cases. FBI Director Robert Mueller ``is committed to ensuring that's not going to happen again,'' said Kenneth Senser, the bureau's new security chief. He said the move would have allowed any current spies in the FBI to read those files, ``but there would be a record that the agent tried to get into the file,'' Senser said. The FBI defended its hurried decision in light of the extraordinary events of Sept. 11. ``There was so much concern about the possibility of another impending attack, we wanted to make sure we didn't possess some piece of information that would be predictive of that,'' Assistant Director John Collingwood said. ``We didn't know any other way to do it, other than making everything available.'' The Webster report, which focused largely on the Hanssen case, agrees with Hanssen that the FBI could have detected his espionage earlier with better checks of his family's finances. He paid cash for a large addition to his home in Vienna, Va, which could have tipped off FBI spy-hunters. Any business transactions in excess of $10,000 cash must be reported to the Internal Revenue Service on a specific form. Under IRS rules, the FBI can review the forms freely. IRS spokesman Don Roberts said the agency could not answer whether the FBI ever has sought the information, because it does not track requests. Attorney General John Ashcroft said the Webster report ``demonstrates how a trusted insider, through repeated acts of betrayal and treachery over more than 20 years, was able to exploit deficiencies in FBI internal security systems and procedures to cause grievous harm.'' Ashcroft said he was pleased with FBI reforms being put in place. ``While we can never completely eliminate the possibility of a trusted person betraying his country, we can, we must and we are making these changes part of our everyday way of doing business,'' FBI Director Robert Mueller said. Citing Hanssen's own interviews with some members of the commission, the report said Hanssen's motivation for spying was money. His family was financially strapped after his transfer by the FBI in 1979 to New York, and he wanted to ``get a little money'' from espionage and then ``get out of it.'' By 1999, near the peak of Hanssen's most recent spying activities, he complained to the Russians of high credit-card debt, and said that college tuition for some of his six children and two mortgages on his home were creating an ``atmosphere of desperation.'' A year later, he boasted to the Russians: ``Generally speaking, you overestimate the FBI's capacity to interdict you.'' The Webster report accuses the FBI of failing to comply with instructions from President Clinton in August 1995, in response to the arrest of Aldrich Ames, a veteran CIA agent who pleaded guilty in 1994 to selling secrets to Moscow for $1.3 million during nine years. The new report says Hanssen started spying in 1979, roughly six years earlier than previously believed. Clinton's executive order required U.S. employees who worked with classified information to file written disclosure reports about their finances, including information about holdings by their spouse and dependent children. The order also permits intelligence agencies to ask the Treasury Department to search bank records and other financial databases to verify that FBI employees, for example, do not have unusually large bank accounts they are unable to explain. But the FBI ``does not require employees or contractors to complete a financial disclosure form'' except for a few senior officials, according to the Webster report. It said financial information provided by others at the FBI ``is in response to a limited series of questions on a standard form, which has little adjudicative value.'' The report recommends a new system that would ``compare employee-generated data with external sources to determine whether the employee has unreported or unexplained wealth of excessive indebtedness.'' The FBI's new head of security, Kenneth H. Senser of the CIA, this week described plans to use commercial database and other records to verify the financial disclosures that FBI employees make. Records of property sales, car purchases or other transactions could alert spy-hunters that an FBI agent is spending too freely. ``We've got to be a little more innovative in vetting people,'' Senser said. When the CIA began using a similar system, some employees complained that these checks invaded their privacy, but the CIA defended their use because of the Ames case. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPh: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island GroupFax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "...three shall be the number to count, and the number to be counted shall be three.....four shall thou not count......five is right out". - M. Python -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 5140 From: Matthew Paulsen Date: Fri Apr 5, 2002 9:18pm Subject: Intelligence Key to Anti-terrorism in Africa, Former Ambassador Says http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/security/a2020401.htm Intelligence Key to Anti-terrorism in Africa, Former Ambassador Says Shinn discusses possible U.S. involvement in Somalia By Aly Lakhaney Washington File Staff Writer Washington -- Terming U.S. monitoring of potential terrorist sites in Africa a correct course, former Ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn called recently for "continued collection of intelligence and surveillance of the waters off shore and the airspace above Somalia." While many American officials have been tight-lipped about possible military action in Africa, "leave no doubt that Somalia is being looked at carefully," said Shinn, who made his comments January 29 at George Washington University in Washington, in a speech titled "The Horn of Africa and International Terrorism." Shinn, who served as the deputy director of the Somalia Task Force and coordinator for Somalia in 1992 and 1993, recognized that "there has been a major effort to improve our intelligence on Somalia." The United States has also "solicited the cooperation of Somalia's neighbors...both on the intelligence front and on a contingency basis for use of their territory in a future action in Somalia." He identified intelligence as a major obstacle in action against Somalia because "there has been no on-the-ground American presence and precious few visitors to the southern two-thirds of Somalia since 1994." Shinn added, "U.S. understanding of events and intelligence on Somalia has been abysmal -- at least until recently." In the U.S. effort to cut off funding of terrorist organizations, "the U.S. seized the assets and shut down the U.S. offices of al-Barakat, the leading Somali money transfer company that the U.S. says has links to al-Qaeda. Al-Barakat also ran a long-distance telephone company using AT&T services. That is no longer in operation," said Shinn. The United States has also had some international support for its efforts in Somalia as "German, French, [and] American planes and ships have significantly increased surveillance of the 1,900-mile-long [3040-kilometer long] Somali coast and Somali airspace, with the goal of preventing al-Qaeda members from entering Somalia from Afghanistan," said Shinn. "These are all appropriate measures," said the former ambassador. Shinn also recommended taking action against al-Ittihad, a Somali-based terrorist organization that "evolved in the aftermath of the collapse of the Somali national government." Al-Ittihad's goals include the creation of "an Islamic state in Somalia and either to incorporate the Ogaden [the huge eastern region of Ethiopia peopled mostly by Somalis] into that state or at least free it of Ethiopian control," according to the former ambassador. Al-Ittihad is also allegedly connected to al-Qaeda, he said. Putting "pressure on factions in Somalia to remove al-Ittihad and al-Qaeda" and "work[ing] closely with Somalia's neighbors and encourag[ing] them to crack down on al-Ittihad supporters" were among the suggestions made by Shinn for U.S. action. The former ambassador also discussed the possibility of a "snatch and grab" operation against members of al-Ittihad, a strategy that was used by the United States in its 1993 campaign in Somalia. "If an opportunity based on incontrovertible intelligence arises for the snatch of a major terrorist, grab it," he said. Shinn voiced concern about taking military action in Somalia similar to that taken in Afghanistan. "It is unlikely there are any terrorist training camps left," and "any al-Ittihad follower with any brains has long since tried to blend in with other Somalis. One can seriously ask if there are any targets to bomb," said Shinn. As for the "snatch and grab" strategy, Shinn pointed to the U.S. record in Mogadishu from 1993, which "was not very good, even when the U.S. had thousands of troops on the ground." Shinn concluded, "There was just too much bad intelligence." "The military options are not very inviting, especially when the threat to the United States from Somalia seems questionable," said Shinn, and he recommended that "the U.S. avoid significant military action in Somalia" until "intelligence indicates there is a greater threat than appears to be the case now." The former ambassador added, "If the international community wants to deal meaningfully with the long-term problem of Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia, it should consider steps that help lead to the establishment of a viable national government." 5141 From: Date: Sun Apr 7, 2002 0:49pm Subject: US Spy Plane Expected Back in Service US Spy Plane Expected Back in Service By KYLE WINGFIELD .c The Associated Press MARIETTA, Ga. (AP) - A year after a collision with a fighter jet forced it to make an emergency landing in China, a U.S spy plane that was picked over and cut apart is being put back together and could be back in the air next month. The Navy EP-3 electronic surveillance plane is undergoing repairs at Lockheed-Martin in Marietta. That work should be completed in May, when the plane is to be flown to a Raytheon Co. plant at Waco, Texas, for electronic updates, Navy spokesman Bob Coble said. After that, the four-engine plane is scheduled to return to Navy service by the end of the year. ``The inventory of EP-3 aircraft is 11, so it's not like there's tons and tons of these things around,'' Coble said. ``It's a surveillance and reconnaissance airplane, and we've got lots of missions for that kind of airplane.'' The plane was flying over the South China Sea on April 1, 2001, when it collided with a Chinese fighter. The EP-3, with a crew of 24, made an emergency landing on China's Hainan island, where the crew members were detained for 11 days. The Chinese pilot was lost. Each side blamed the other for the collision. China accused the U.S. plane of violating international law by landing without permission, and it refused to let American technicians fix it and fly it out. The U.S. crew destroyed much of the plane's sensitive eavesdropping devices, but China is believed to have removed some equipment when it seized the plane and may have gleaned some useful information. Three months after the crash, the U.S. spy plane was released to the United States and, with its wings and tail cut off, loaded onto a cargo plane for the flight home. The incident further strained relations between China and the United States which were already tense over issues including Taiwan, arms proliferation and human rights. China also has demanded $1 million to compensate for expenses related to housing the spy plane and its crew. It rejected a U.S. offer of $34,000 as unacceptable. Coble said that because of security he couldn't discuss the repairs now being made or what the Chinese might have learned from the plane. But analysts say equipment left on board could have provided some information. ``What they would get most of all is a very, very powerful sense of what we are capable of listening to and what we are capable of finding out,'' said Bates Gill, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. ``I think they would be very interested to find that out.'' The EP-3 is basically a ``giant electronics signals vacuum cleaner'' that can monitor communications data from telephones, radios and even walkie-talkies, said Gill, head of the institution's Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies. By monitoring radar, infrared and other weapons-tracking systems, it can determine how a country detects and then reacts to aircraft in or near its airspace, former military intelligence officer Roland Schumann said. China would have been very interested to learn how the United States integrates the plane's various pieces of hardware, which can then communicate with submarines, ships and other planes and fuse intelligence gathered in the past with intelligence being gathered in real time, he said. ``The U.S. has spent an enormous amount of time and money to enhance and upgrade their intelligence systems, and any time an opposing force can get their hands on the end result of those years and money, it's in their best interest,'' he said. 5142 From: Rick Hofmann - MICROSEARCH Date: Mon Apr 8, 2002 5:35pm Subject: Warning-Suspicious circumstances L.A. area I received a call from a male identifying himself with a first name only about doing a residential TSCM inspection. The caller had a Russian accent, and was calling from an area of Los Angeles (Hollywood) where there is a significant Russian and Eastern European immigrant population. The caller claimed to be suspicious that one of his clients is conducting a surveillance operation against him. He would not go in to specifics, would not give his last name, and declined to give me his address or phone number. He did give me a pager number as a means of contact. The caller wanted to meet me at a public location before taking me to his residence. I declined his request primarily because I have a policy against doing residential inspections unless by referral from a trusted client or colleague, but there were other reasons. At the risk of sounding paranoid I will explain some of the other reasons why I declined the caller's request. First, the caller would not give me any specifics about his suspicions, or himself. Second, there is a significant organized crime (primarily Russian Mafia) presence in Hollywood. Many of the members of these organized crime groups are former KGB Agents, and they have their own TSCM teams. One of my concerns was that this may have been a scam to obtain some new equipment for one of the "teams". I have some clients in the Hollywood area whose primary adversaries are Russian Mafia and I have seen first hand what they are capable of. I would encourage readers to use caution when dealing with people from the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries now living in Hollywood and West Los Angeles. There are other Russian Mafia cells in other parts of the country where the same cautions are applicable. Very truly yours, Rick Hofmann, CCO, CPP, PI16998 MICROSEARCH, LLC - Electronic Surveillance Detection - Counterespionage Post Office Box 2084 - Cypress, California 90630 714-952-3812 Fax: 714-209-0037 http://home.earthlink.net/~microsearch 5143 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Mon Apr 8, 2002 6:23pm Subject: Re: Warning-Suspicious circumstances L.A. area Good Advice Rick, Mugging a TSCM'er to get access to equipment has long been a problem There have been at least a half dozen cases in as many years where a TSCM'ers equipment vanished when servicing a "questionable client". Two of those mugged are list members (who should have known better) One guy lost all of his equipment when the shipment was "lost" by the freight company when they delivered the cases (the guys client actually ripped him off). One got cleaned out by an ex-employee (an ex-gvt sweeper). The last guy had all his equipment seized and then lost by customs of a foreign government. When the client turns into a squirrel the wisest decision is to walk away. -jma At 3:35 PM -0700 4/8/02, Rick Hofmann - MICROSEARCH wrote: > I received a call from a male identifying himself with a first name only >about doing a residential TSCM inspection. The caller had a Russian >accent, and was calling from an area of Los Angeles (Hollywood) where there >is a significant Russian and Eastern European immigrant population. The >caller claimed to be suspicious that one of his clients is conducting a >surveillance operation against him. He would not go in to specifics, would >not give his last name, and declined to give me his address or phone >number. He did give me a pager number as a means of contact. The caller >wanted to meet me at a public location before taking me to his >residence. I declined his request primarily because I have a policy >against doing residential inspections unless by referral from a trusted >client or colleague, but there were other reasons. > > At the risk of sounding paranoid I will explain some of the other >reasons why I declined the caller's request. First, the caller would not >give me any specifics about his suspicions, or himself. Second, there is a >significant organized crime (primarily Russian Mafia) presence in >Hollywood. Many of the members of these organized crime groups are former >KGB Agents, and they have their own TSCM teams. One of my concerns was >that this may have been a scam to obtain some new equipment for one of the >"teams". I have some clients in the Hollywood area whose primary >adversaries are Russian Mafia and I have seen first hand what they are >capable of. > > I would encourage readers to use caution when dealing with people from >the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries now living in >Hollywood and West Los Angeles. There are other Russian Mafia cells in >other parts of the country where the same cautions are applicable. > > >Very truly yours, > >Rick Hofmann, CCO, CPP, PI16998 > >MICROSEARCH, LLC - Electronic Surveillance Detection - Counterespionage >Post Office Box 2084 - Cypress, California 90630 714-952-3812 Fax: >714-209-0037 >http://home.earthlink.net/~microsearch > > > >======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: >http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, > the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. >=================================================== TSKS > >Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPh: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island GroupFax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "...three shall be the number to count, and the number to be counted shall be three.....four shall thou not count......five is right out". - M. Python -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5144 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Mon Apr 8, 2002 7:58pm Subject: Romanian Daily Publishes List of Securitate Agents Working in Intelligence Title: Romanian Daily Publishes List of Securitate Agents Working in Intelligence Document Number: FBIS-EEU-2002-0405 Document Type: Daily Report Document Title: FBIS Translated Text Document Region: East Europe Document Date: 28 Mar 2002 Division: Balkan States Subdivision: Romania Sourceline: EUP20020405000259 Bucharest Ziua in Romanian 28 Mar 02 pp I-IV of supplement AFS Number: EUP20020405000259 Citysource: Bucharest Ziua Language: Romanian N/A Subslug: "Armageddon 7" report: "Armageddon of Securitate People" [Romanian text: http://www.ziua.ro/search.php?class=2002&id=16240&kword=Securitate&style=3 ] [FBIS Translated Text] We have received yet another cyber-bomb in the editorial office e-mails. It is the Armageddon 7 report. This time, the text refers to Securitate officers who continued to hold key posts in the intelligence services established by democratic regimes after 1989. The moment chosen to propagate in the media the information included in the appendix to this new Armageddon (which includes approximately 1,600 names) is delicate. The injection of this information is happening at the very time that there is increasingly intense talks about Romania joining NATO and about the fact that it is just a matter of hours before it becomes public that -- willy-nilly -- Romania will be taken into NATO, along with Bulgaria. It is already known that one of the primary requirements of the NATO leaders is that no more "dinosaurs" from the former Securitate should remain in the structures of the Romanian intelligence services. The source of Armageddon 7 is equally unknown to us. Our editorial office got it from the Press Monitoring Agency, which says that, as far as it is concerned, it just got it like you catch a ball when playing sports. Perhaps General Zaharia Toma [of the Interior Ministry, MI] knows more about this, or perhaps it is some secret service chief who has started his own fight with the parallel services. When we asked about Armageddon 7, the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] answered us placidly: "No comment" [preceding two words published in English]. This makes room for the interpretation that anything is possible. We decided to publish the Armageddon 2 report, owing to the gratuitous reaction of the prime minister, but this time we are publishing the entire text of this new Armageddon precisely owing to the opacity of the SRI. We know that the publication of this new Armageddon will start a new storm, an even bigger one than that started by Armageddon 2. However, we hope that, by sending this text to the printing press, we will no longer have a diversion meant to hide the truth, that, instead of witnessing other arrests "in the street" or new abuses by the Prosecuting Magistracy, we will get concrete answers as to whether the information included in this electronic document is real or not. We also mention that there are references to Ziua in the appendix to Armageddon 7 -- namely to revelations published by our daily. They are partly true. Some of these are known facts. Equally, as far as we are concerned, we believe that the information in this Armageddon may be "partly" true, because we have found enough mistakes. This is precisely why the public needs to find out about this list. If officials chose to say "no comment," we prefer to go to the public to find out the truth. The names in this list are not names of ghosts. The persons in question have acquaintances, neighbors, and so forth, who can deny or confirm the facts, over the head of the SRI. We are inviting them to the debate. [Signed] Bogdan Comaroni [Text of "Armageddon 7" report] It has been exactly 12 years since the SRI was established and 12 years since the public has been systematically and shamelessly lied to about the composition of that structure. Both [former SRI Directors] Virgil Magureanu and Costin Georgescu and [current SRI Director] Radu Timofte have been misleading us and are continuing to do so, taking turns to assure us that the SRI is becoming a modern intelligence service, in which he number of former Securitate officers is decreasing continuously. Today we find that, on the contrary, the former Communist body in charge of repression and intelligence is still controlling the game at the SRI, as the number of former Securitate officers always prevails at the SRI management level in Bucharest, in the management of local branches, and in all of its compartments. Retired former Securitate officers are also certainly on the offensive, infiltrated in economic structures, in financial institutions, managing public and private money, in the executive, and in the legislature. They have been and still are present in state or private funds, in financial investment companies, in the Financial Oversight Body, in the customs system, and, not least, in privatization mechanisms. Exactly 54 private security and protection companies are managed by former Securitate officers, and all of them are in permanent conflict with this country's laws. They have been parasites on numerous banks, under the pretext of assuring the internal and external protection of those banks, and the banks protected by them have collapsed, one by one. They established the International Religions Bank [BIR], and they are the ones who led it to bankruptcy when the population's deposits reached a tempting size. Then they got together in all kinds of insurance companies, which have no brilliant future. In fact, our forecast has partly been confirmed. In an extreme situation, they signed up together under the banner of the great robber Sorin Ovidiu Vantu, who is cleverer than them at making money out of corners where they did not have access, either because they did not know the procedure or for other reasons. What can be more significant than the fact that more than 320 reservists from the former Securitate and the SRI, shoulder to shoulder, worked for this profoundly dubious man, cashing in their shares, of course? Equally, what can be more significant than the fact that our vigilant domestic intelligence service pretended not to notice anything when Vantu's clay empire was riding on top of the wave? We are going back to the former Securitate officers that the SRI has kept. When he was director, Magureanu deceived us by claiming that there were only 15 percent of them in the service he managed. A decade later, Timofte is triumphantly giving us the same percentage. What could this mean? That out of the first 15 percent, those who died or retired were replaced with former Securitate people brought from home or from the marketplace? Unlike the SRI directors, the directors of the SIE [Foreign Intelligence Service] at least had the common sense to stay away from playing games with numbers, and, implicitly, from becoming ridiculous. For years we have been told that former Securitate officers in the SIE and the SRI were kept exclusively as specialists. In that case, what was the specialty of General Dumitru Badescu, SRI division chief, if he ended up being mocked by a small-time informer? What was the specialty of General Corneliu Grigoras, SIE directorate chief, if two less-known journalists with modest reputations managed to lure him into a trap, through which he lost his job? Come to think of it, what was the specialty of General Vasile Lupu, first deputy of the SRI bosses during two parliamentary terms in office, decorated by President Ion Iliescuand former President Emil Constantinescu? Did he specialized in the low blows with which he tried to hit Timofte? Actually, the SIE and the SRI did not keep Securitate officers who distinguished themselves before 1989 by their civilized, measured behavior. Instead, they kept the ones who were not shy about making every possible move to get ahead, polishing the shoes of the right figurehead politicians, hanging around talking and pretending they were good at something, or putting up for bid documents that could be used for blackmail. In this manner, the SRI was filled with people who pull strings behind the scenes and engage in intrigues, and others who are good for nothing. Made up of both active and retired officers, this category of Securitate officers was precisely the one who troubled the waters all the time in our society, because they are ready for any contingency. They have people who support the government, but they also have other shifts that support the opposition. The most certain sign that power in the SIE and the SRI is no longer in the hands of the evanescent directors, but in the hands of former Securitate officers is offered by the two latest major decisions made because these officers exercised pressure. The former has to do with the SIE: from now on, this espionage service can do business for profit. Namely, it can establish firms, and it is certain that auditing bodies will not have access to their management. As they used to do in the old days, a special auditing body will be established, made up of former Securitate people. In connection with this issue, we reiterate a statement made by the distinguished General Iulian Vlad on 31 March1990: "Security work, the prestige of the institution, and even this country's good name have been seriously damaged by the so-called activity to bring in hard currency, conducted primarily by external UM [Military Unit] 0544 and UM 0195, as well as the internal security UM 0650. Apart from the fact that, most of the time, the moneys represented a small fraction of the price of the goods that the state would have cashed in anyway in fair negotiations, Securitate officers had to enter into all kinds of combinations with foreigners, which were often compromising, and there was no definite control of their activity and of the hard currency involved. Equally serious was the fact that the units in question had to a large extent been detoured from the missions for which they had been established and which were useful to the country. Despite all of the efforts we made to exempt the Securitate from this task or at least to reduce it substantially, we were not successful. On the contrary [Securitate chief] Tudor Postelnicu turned it into a priority activity, to which the entire apparatus had to contribute." Obviously, former Securitate officers who used to work for the CIE [Foreign Intelligence Center] or even the DIE [Foreign Intelligence Directorate] feel their palms itch when they think about dollars and euros. But who would have imagined that an intellectual like Ioan Talpes, who supervised the transformation of the SIE into a SA [shareholding company] or even anSRL [limited partnership company], could play Postelnicu's role so happily? The latter decision, made under pressure from former Securitate officers, this time in the SRI, was to dismantle the National Intelligence Agency [ANI]. As pretexts, they invoked the lack of funds and the fact that many graduates do not live up to the commitment they make, not taking jobs in the SRI. That is great! Funds for useless trips around the world in airplanes full of family members, political supporters, and most obedient journalists can be found immediately. But not for a school meant to educate officers who will protect this country's interests. The truth is different: there is better education at the ANI than what they used to get at the Securitate school in Baneasa Forest [near Bucharest], which bothers Securitate people, who were educated at schools where attendance was not required and who have the kind of degrees that everybody knows how they were granted -- and still are. It is also normal that the graduates in question avoid getting jobs with the SRI. Nobody in his right mind and with a solid education would agree to become the servant of the likes of Vasile Lupu, who chases ranks, and Dumitru Badescu, who is a sucker. It was a piece of cake for former Securitate officers to penetrate the legislature. Colonel Stefan David, former chief of the Securitate in Resita, broke the ice. We cannot accuse Colonel Ilie Merce of any wrongdoing, almost all of the writers in Bucharest knew him, and maybe he even got the votes of some of them who were curious to see how a Securitate man is doing in democracy: like fish out of water or like an earthworm in the fish's mouth? However, Ristea Priboi, forgetting to tell people that he was a former Securitate officer, worked like a real crook. More, he associated the SIE with his con job. The SIE did not communicate to the CNSAS [National Council for the Study of Securitate Files] any precise data on him, thus contributing to its own compromising. Indeed, following such an experience, how can anyone trust the service's signals, syntheses, and verdicts? Still, the penetration of former Securitate officers into the executive is much more dangerous. Wearing the masks of advisers, they teem everywhere, like termites. We have identified six or seven such people in the entourage of the prime minister alone, with Priboi as their leader, fretting around. If the name of our prime minister was Vladimir Voronin or Aleksandr Lukashenko, this would be explainable. But it is harder to answer this question: why does highly educated, aloof Adrian Nastase put up with Priboi, who is poor in spirit, whom even his former colleagues hate as a piece of garbage, lovingly calling him "Pig!" What does Nastase learn from Constantin Silinescu, a nobody in his profession? What does he learn from General Mihai Caraman, who engaged in espionage with the posterior part of his body toward the enemy? To say nothing of other people, smaller ones, but cleverer in getting lost in the vegetation of the government savanna, hiding behind various fuzzy landmarks in the landscape. There is an idea floating in the air that, following a personality cult that is exhibited according to all the rules, there is a dictatorship in store for us. For now, Nicolae Ceausescu has strong reasons to be envious: he only spoke on television two hours a day, because that is how long Romanian Television stayed on the air. In comparison, Nastase speaks to the nation from dawn until after midnight, because we now have many more televisions that are on the air around the clock. We will discuss some other time the dictatorship that makes both Nastase and stupid Priboi happy. When it is too late for them. PS: We are publishing fragments of a list that includes more than 1,600 names of former Securitate officers who have been going from one place to another in the SRI, the SIE, and other, more civilian structures from 1990 to present. In order to avoid accusations that we publish state secrets, we steered clear of developing our demonstration on the current SRI staffing scheme. In the current circumstances, a possible investigation would not ask what those Securitate people are doing in the staffing scheme,it would ask why observers who were not taken into consideration got hold of that scheme. Appendix Ion Adamescu Former Securitate officer, recuperated by the SRI with the rank of colonel and hired by the Timisoara section. He cooperated in exposing Magureanu's informer file, and this is why he was placed in the reserves on 16 April 1996. Aldea Former officer of the Securitate Fourth Directorate. Currently lieutenant colonel, section chief in the Army General Intelligence Directorate [DGIA]. Aleca Former Securitate officer from Ramnicu Valcea, recuperated by the SRI with the rank of major. Two months after the December 1989 events, he resumed surveillance of the county hospital in town, his objective before the revolution. Constantin Alexa Former Securitate officer, recycled by the SRI. He took the initiative to expose file Z 4848, which revealed that Francisc Baranyi [former health minister] used to be a Securitate informer. He was later dismissed from the service and sued. Stefan Alexie Former Securitate general, chief of the Counterespionage Directorate, and state secretary in the Interior Ministry before December 1989. In the 1990s, for a rather long period of time, he worked as an adviser to controversial businessman Vantu, who made an essential contribution in bankrupting the National Investment Fund [FNI]. Vasile Alexoie Before 1989, he was chief of the Securitate in Roman. After December 1989, he was co-opted in the SRI management in Iasi County. After being placed in the reserves, he became president of the Iasi FNI and director of the local Gelsor company branch, which belonged to Vantu. Valer Andreica Former Securitate officer, taken by the SRI with the rank of major. At first, he worked for the section in Targu Mures. In July 1998, he was transferred to the post of deputy chief of the SRI section in Cluj. Andrei Andronic Former Securitate officer. Taken by the SRI, he was promoted to the rank of colonel and promoted to the post of chief of the SRI section in Iasi. Octavian Stelian Andronic Former colonel in the Securitate espionage service, station chief in The Netherlands and Israel. Because of his precarious professionalism, he was no longer accredited abroad during the last period of the Communist regime, and he worked for the AVP [special hard currency providing] service. Reactivated by the SRI as an economic adviser to Magureanu, he had his headquarters in London Street [Bucharest], under the cover of a ghost company called Eson SRL, where the wife of journalist Octavian Andronic was a shareholder. As an adviser, Octavian Stelian Andronic sold several documents to the SRI that had been in the Securitate archives for a long time on the paintings that were taken out of the country by former King Mihai and his attempts to sell them through Western auction firms. Eson SRL ceased its activity following press reports. Vasile Angelescu Former high-ranking officer in the espionage service of the former Securitate, suspected of ties with the KGB in Romania. After the events of December 1989, he was promoted to the rank of general and promoted to the post of first deputy director of the new SIE. His son, Mircea Angelescu, an important member of the FSN [National Salvation Front] in the 1990s, was involved as shareholder in the dubious business of the SC Macons and Co SA company, registered in Belgium. He then became President Iliescu's chief of staff. Constantin Angelescu Former high-ranking Securitate officer. Before December 1989, he was chief of UM 107/AVS of the CIE, a unit that specialized in state smuggling. In 2000, he was vice president of the Rapid soccer club. Marin Antonie Former Securitate officer. He was one of the first deputies of the SRI section chief in Dolj County. Apavaloaie Former officer of the Securitate Fourth Directorate. Currently a lieutenant colonel, chief of the financial service, in the DGIA. Apostolescu Former Securitate officer, working for the Fifth Directorate, which was in charge of protecting Ceausescu and other Communist dignitaries. Currently, he is chief of the SRI section in Brasov. Petre Arsene Former Securitate officer. As a reservist, he coordinated the establishment of a dubious private investigation agency in Ramnicu Valcea, which got illegally involved in the riot led by miners in September 1991. Later, it was discovered that the so-called ANISE [National Investigation and Economic Security Agency] was established with forged deeds. Gheorghe Atudoroaie Former Securitate officer in Timisoara, involved in the crackdown in December 1989. After being taken away from judiciary bodies, the SRI recuperated him with the rank of colonel. For a while, he was chief of the Protection Division. Costin Georgescu tried to appoint him as chief of the SRI Zonal Operative Center in Oradea, but his appointment was cancelled following protests from civil society. Alexandru Avram Former Securitate colonel in UM 0225, a unit of the CIE in charge of infiltrating the organizations of the anti-Communist emigration and combating programs by foreign radio stations that broadcast in Romanian. After December 1989, he held on for a few years in the espionage service, but then he was placed in the reserves because he could not speak any foreign language. With other former Securitate officers, he managed to steal several confidential documents from the Astra insurance company, which unleashed an intense press campaign against the management of that company through intermediaries. Following that campaign, the Astra management was changed. After that, Avram became deputy director of the Astra branch in Bucharest, although he has received no training in insurance. Baciu Former Securitate officer recuperated by the SRI with the rank of major. He was the first officer of the new intelligence institution to become the object of a public scandal when he tried to reactivate an informer. Vasile Badea Former officer of the Securitate Fourth Directorate. Currently a lieutenant colonel, deputy section chief of the DGIA. Ion Balea Reserve colonel of the former Securitate. In July 1992 several members of the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian Democratic Party] in Arges County accused him of having infiltrated the local PNTCD organization on behalf of the SRI. Alexandru Balogh Former Securitate officer recuperated by the SRI. In 1998, he was chief of the surveillance service of the SRI section in Cluj. Bogdan Baltazar According to Mircea Raceanu, who has recently been decorated by Iliescu, before December 1989, Baltazar was an undercover Securitate officer. After the December 1989 events, he became an important member in the leadership of the PD [Democratic Party]. Now he is president of the Romanian Development Bank [BRD-Groupe Societe Generale]. Dumitru Badescu Former Securitate officer. Taken by the SRI, he became a general in December 1994 and managed the Economic Counterintelligence Division. He played an important role in detouring the investigation into the Cigarette 2 affair, directly participating in forging the file developed by the Military Prosecuting Magistracy. He was dismissed because he made stupid use of an informer, who talked to the press. The way in which he allowed himself to be trapped proved the very low level of his professionalism. Later, he was appointed adviser to the SRI director. Domitian Baltei Former colonel in the Securitate espionage service, deputy station chief in London and Tokyo, then station chief in Cologne. Dismissed from the service for immoral behavior and involvement in various businesses that favored Generals Nicolae Doicaru and Ion Mihai Pacepa. After being placed in the reserves, he became a professor at the Stefan Gheorghiu Academy. After December 1989, he infiltrated himself into the entourage of Corneliu Vadim Tudor [president of the Greater Romania Party, PRM], whom he intoxicated with the most fantastic information, of which some could have compromised this country's foreign relations. When the press exposed his past as a Securitate man, Vadim dismissed him as a political adviser. Ionel Bidireci Former high-ranking Securitate officer. He is now a general and chief of the SRI Counterintelligence Division. Roxana Bichel She has been mentioned by the press recently in the entourage of the management staff of the executive and the Privatization Ministry. A member of the boards of a multitude of economic companies. If by any chance she is a member of the Ivan Bikel family (Bikel was a DIE colonel, who once worked under the cover of Romanian representative of the West German Franz Kirchfeld company), we understand whom we are talking about. Mihai Bichir Former officer of the Securitate espionage service, recycled by the SIE with the rank of colonel. Director of Directorate E 101 (Europe, United States, Canada, and international bodies). He is said to be Teodor Melescanu's man, with whom he cooperated in Geneva and who helped him in his career. Ioan Bidu Former Securitate officer. Currently deputy rector of the National Intelligence Academy, which educates future SRI officers. Cornel Biris Former Securitate officer, recuperated by the SIE. On 30 November 1999, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. Chief of the division in charge of crisis analysis and deputy director of the SRI. Placed in the reserves in February 2002 at the request of [SIE Director] Gheorghe Fulga. Ion Bodunescu Former Securitate colonel, former chief of the MI [Interior Ministry] county inspectorates in the counties of Dolj, Mehedinti, and Teleorman. Until 1989, he distinguished himself by publishing works written by Blacks. Despite the fact that he was caught committing gross plagiarism, he continued to dedicate himself to this hobby [preceding word published in English]. In the early 1990s, his name could be found in Romania Mare, Politica, and Europa, with insipid, nostalgic, and vindictive articles, marked, of course, by ardent patriotism. Titu Bondoc Former Securitate officer, taken in by the SRI and appointed deputy chief of the SRI Section in Gorj County. In June 1990, he coordinated the journey of the miners to Bucharest. Later, he was placed in the reserves, with the rank of colonel. In May 2001, he was still under criminal investigation by the Section of Military Prosecuting Magistracies for undermining state power. Liviu Borcea Former Securitate officer, former labor camp commander at the Danube-Black Sea Canal. Due to his criminal behavior, dozens of political prisoners and common criminals died. After 1989 he retired to Cluj, and nobody has held him accountable for his crimes. Ion Botofei Former Securitate colonel, in charge of ensuring the security of Ceausescu's routes in Bucharest. For a while, he was also deputy commander of the Bucharest Municipality Securitate. After a short recycling at the SRI, he was appointed chief of the Association of Former SRI Officers, which is in fact an association of former Securitate officers. He provided the liaison between former Securitate people in the SRI management and Securitate people placed in the reserves. Valentin Constantin Bretfelean Former Securitate officer. Until September 2001, as a major, he managed the SRI Section in Maramures County. Dismissed and sent before the SRI Trial Council for serious violations of the institution's rules. So far, he has not been punished in any way. Nicolae Briceag Former Securitate officer. He summarily executed at least 12 individuals who had not been sentenced to death; these facts have been determined by the Communist authorities. After 1990, he retired to Cluj, and nobody has held him accountable for his deeds. Doru Blaj Former officer of the Securitate Fourth Directorate. He is now a lieutenant colonel and section chief in the DGIA. Constantin Bucur Former Securitate officer recycled by the SRI, where he specialized in wiretapping telephone conversations. He placed at the disposal of the press several inconclusive tapes that involved the institution in an unwanted scandal. He was dismissed on 14 June 1999, and the Military Court of Appeals sentenced him to two years in prison, suspended. Later, as a member of the PRM, he ran for office and became a deputy in the Romanian Parliament. Vasile Buliga Former Securitate officer. In recent years, he has been an employee of the Gelsor trust, managed by Vantu. Marius Tertulian Budusel Former Securitate officer. After December 1989, he was employed by the SRI and promoted, until he reached the post of section chief in Pitesti. Florin Calapod Former high-ranking Securitate officer. After December 1989, he became commander of UM 0215, the MI unit in charge of intelligence and counterintelligence, which he tried to turn into a parallel service to the SRI. The press repeatedly reported, offering concrete examples, that under Calapod's management, UM 0215 was engaged in political police activities, to the detriment of its legal duties. After having been placed in the reserves, he got involved in suspicious business with US and Australian firms that distribute Viagra illegally online. He has appeared in some television shows, lecturing the nation on what an intelligence service is all about. Cornel Caraba Former Securitate officer in UM 0110. During the last period of the Communist regime, he worked for the Securitate espionage service, namely in UM 0544: in 1986 he was temporarily transferred from there to Cluj. After December 1989, he was employed by the SRI and promoted to the rank of colonel and to the post of SRI section chief in Cluj. The press reported that he could have been one of the artisans of the 1996 Cristal plan, which sought to ensure the survival of the Securitate and the preservation of its influence as the Communist regime collapsed. Owing to his unorthodox relations with the underground economic circles of Transylvania, the local and central press attacked him. In July 1998, he was transferred to the SRI central offices in Bucharest. Mihai Caraman Retired Securitate general. In 1958-1968, as chief of the espionage station in Paris, he led the notorious "Caraman network," which managed to steal documents from NATO headquarters. Later, he was chief of the DIE Counterintelligence Division. After Pacepa's defection, he was transferred to marginal posts and eventually placed in the reserves. Immediately after the December 1989 events, he was appointed chief of the CIE, which later became the SIE. The anomaly was obvious: the espionage service of a country seeking NATO membership was left in the hands of a man who had spied on NATO. Caraman was dismissed in May 1992 at the express request of Manfred Woerner, then NATO secretary general. Currently, the same Caraman is a private adviser to Nastase. Cristian Calinoiu Former Securitate officer. After December 1989, employed by the Antiterrorist Brigade with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He was a member of that brigade, which was deployed at the Otopeni International Airport [near Bucharest]. In 1992, it was determined that he was giving job-related information to Europa magazine, edited by Ilie Neacsu, who is currently a PRM deputy. Traian Chebeleu According to Raceanu, before 1989, Chebeleu was an undercover Securitate officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the 1990s, he became a presidential adviser and spokesman for Iliescu. Under Constantinescu, he went back to diplomacy. Mihai Ciausescu Former Securitate officer, recuperated by the SRI with the rank of captain. Officer in the surveillance service of the SRI Section in Cluj. Traian Ciceo Former officer of the Securitate espionage service. Before December 1989, he worked in Paris under diplomatic cover. There was suspicion that he might have been recruited by the French special services. Despite that, he was promoted in the SRI to the rank of brigadier general. He acted to counteract irredentism, extremism, and separatism on ethnic criteria. In March 1998, owing to his Bacchus-like inclinations, he was dismissed from the SRI. Cigan Former Securitate officer, currently a lawyer with the Bihor County Bar. As the press has reported, by offering bribe to the right people, he propelled his wife up to the post of vice president of the Court of Appeals in Oradea. Ciovica Former Securitate officer. In the SRI, he became chief of the Zonal Operative Center in Targu Mures. Placed in the reserves in 1998. Cismaru Former Securitate officer from Valcea County. As a major in the SRI, he became chief of the section in Bacau. Stefan Floricel Coman Beginning in 1968, he was a Securitate officer in the former Special Unit "T," UM 0634, empowered to wiretap telephone conversations. After the events of December 1989, he became a commander of the Special Telecommunication Service [STS], subordinated to the Country's Supreme Defense Council [CSAT]. Costel Ciuca Former officer of the Securitate DIE. Close ties with people involved in the Cigarette 2 smuggling affair. Close ties with Amer Obeid, president of the League of Iraqis in Romania. Valentin Ciuca Former Securitate officer, arrested in December 1989 and investigated as a member of the Timisoara lot. After two years and some months, he was released from prison, for lack of evidence. With Radu Tinu, he founded the Tival Impex SRL company, which prospered during the embargo imposed on Yugoslavia. Gheorghe Cocos Former high-ranking officer of the Securitate espionage service. He worked in Italy under the cover of chief of the Economic Agency in Milan. Several years ago, he was banned from entering Italy. Currently, he is managing some of the firms that belong to George Constantin Paunescu. Constantin Constantin Former Securitate officer. As a colonel in 1989, he was chief of the UM 0215 personnel service. He is a close relative of Viorel Hrebenciuc. Marian Cornaciu Officer of the Securitate DIE. He worked for the Dunarea foreign trade enterprise. After the events of December 1989, he privatized, specializing in selling concentrated fodder for cattle. Currently, he is an important member of the Romanian Humanist Party [PUR], led by Dan Voiculescu. Corneci Former Securitate colonel. He is currently a member of the SRI management in charge of the thorny personnel issue. Valeriu Corsatea Former Securitate officer. In the SRI, he was deputy commander of the Antiterrorist Brigade. In December 1994, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. In 1998, he was transferred, becoming deputy chief of an SRI intelligence division. Neagu Cosma Securitate general, former chief of the Third Directorate, which was in charge of espionage, former commander of the Baneasa school for Securitate officers. After being placed in the reserves, he became executive president of the Romanian Automobile Club. In 1990, he was reactivated in the SRI as chief of the Inspection Service and adviser to Magureanu. Soon, they dismissed him. General Gheorghe Diaconescu said in an interview that Cosma allegedly tried to obtain some problematic files in the archives of the former Securitate. Lucian Costache Former Securitate captain of the MI Inspectorate in Buzau. He cooperated with Petrica Dinu in recruiting informers. After the events of December 1989, he was hired by the Buzau County Police Inspectorate. Gheorghe Cotoman Former Securitate officer, recuperated by the SRI as lieutenant colonel. In 1994, he was deputy chief of the J Formation. Ovidiu Craciun Former Securitate officer, currently lieutenant colonel, chief of the SRI Section in Piatra Neamt. Dumitru Cristea A professional psychologist, one of the worst acquisitions that Magureanu made from civilian life. As deputy SRI director and rector of the National Intelligence Institute, he was quickly promoted to the rank of general, but he had suspicious relations with female students who were subordinate to him, and this disqualified him morally, so he had to give up his post. Possibly, former Securitate officers in the SRI management stabbed him in the back, because they treated him like a stranger. Mircea Croitoru Former officer of the Securitate espionage service. For a while, he worked under diplomatic cover in London, but he was recalled in 1978 under vague circumstances. Under President Constantinescu, he was appointed ambassador to Oslo, and the press criticized this. Florentin Danciu Former Securitate officer recuperated by the SRI as a lieutenant colonel. In 1994, he was commander of Division E. Mihai Darie Former Securitate officer from 14 April 1976 to 15 April 1990, when he was placed in the reserves. Before December 1989, he monitored the Fundeni hospital. In 1990, he specialized as chief of the FSN economic commission. At the same time he established and managed various private firms. He returned to politics as secretary general of the Bucharest Prefecture. In 1997, he was executive secretary of the PD. Like any important former Securitate man, he has a certificate for fighting for the victory of the Romanian revolution. Gheorghe Dascalu Former undercover DIE officer. Physical therapist, settled in Desenzano, Brescia Province, Italy. Involved in the Porcelain smuggling affair. In 2000, he was reported to have German and Romanian citizenships and an Italian identity document. Stefan David Former Securitate colonel with a dubious past. Until 1985, he managed the Securitate service in Caras Severin County. In the 1992-1996 Parliament, he was a deputy representing the Socialist Labor Party. Daniel Daianu Former officer of the Securitate espionage service, a fact he admitted to after becoming finance minister in the Victor Ciorbea government. The prime minister defended him, saying he allegedly did not conduct political police activities. Aurealian Deaconescu Former Securitate officer. Currently chief of the Fraud Service in the Astra insurance company. He was involved in defrauding the company to Vantu's benefit. Constantin Decu Former Securitate officer, recuperated by the SRI as colonel. In the mid-1990s, he was chief of the SRI section in Constanta. Dumitru Diaconescu Former Securitate colonel, personnel chief of the Bucharest Municipality Securitate. After December 1989, he managed the Aliance Coop company, which was involved in arms trafficking. He had shady financial relations with Bankcoop, a bank that was deliberately led to bankruptcy, and with the military company Romtehnica. Gheorghe Diaconescu Former colonel with the Securitate Third Directorate, which was in charge of counterespionage. After December 1989 he became deputy director of the SRI. Dismissed for illegally possessing documents of the former Securitate, alcoholism, and the incorrect handling of hard currency funds. Later, he ensured the intelligence protection of the deals made by businessman Costel Bobic. Nicolae Dinca Former Securitate officer, taken into the SRI as major. At first, he worked for the SRI Section in Timis County. In July 1998, he was transferred and became deputy chief of the SRI Section in Cluj. Petrica Dinu Former counterintelligence captain at the Buzau County Securitate. There, under cover of representing the Frigo Service, he organized a center to recruit informers. After the events of December 1989, he became chief of the service in charge of protecting personnel in the Buzau County Police Inspectorate, and he was involved in monitoring and harassing the opponents of the Iliescu regime. Doban Former Securitate officer, specialized in "bourgeois" political parties and people who were convicted for political reasons. He managed the file on philosopher Constantin Noica, who was monitored [by the Securitate]. Dimitrie Dobre Former high-ranking officer of the Securitate espionage service, he continued his activity after December 1989 in the SIE. In March 1998, after being promoted to the rank of general, he was placed in the reserves. Vasile Doros Former Securitate colonel, former chief of the SRI Section in Bacau, which he managed for eight years. Through his son, Claudiu Doros, he led the FNI local branch in Bacau, an institution that was deliberately led to bankruptcy by Vantu. Dragoman Former Securitate officer recuperated by the SRI as colonel. In 1998, he was chief of the SRI Section in Arad. Ion Dragoi Former Securitate officer in UM 0110. After December 1989, he became section chief of Politia Romana [Romanian Police] magazine. After being placed in the reserves, he worked for various publications, including Expres magazine (the Cornel Nistorescu series). Currently, he is looking for sponsors to publish an espionage and counterespionage publication. Artur Dumitrescu Prosecutor, an active collaborator of the Securitate before December 1989. Among other things, he was the one who investigated those who participated in the protest rally against the Communist regime in Brasov on 15 November 1987. For his zeal at the time, he was promoted, and he kept his prerogatives after Ceausescu's regime was ousted, as well. In 1998 he was delegated to investigate the Cigarette 2 smuggling affair, namely to erase the traces of the intelligence services' involvement in that con job. Gheorghe Dumitrescu Former Securitate officer. When Cigarette 2 was unfolding, he was a captain with the SRI surveillance service. Vasile Dumitru Former Securitate colonel in the espionage service. He worked undercover as a press attache in London. After December 1989, he specialized as a journalist working for the Expres press trust. He published various articles wherever and whenever he could, exalting the ineptness of the institution he was once a member of. Nicodim Farcas Former Securitate officer, recycled by the SRI as a lieutenant colonel, subordinated to Colonel Ghoerghe Moldovan at the SRI Section in Maramures County. There were reports that he gave information from inside the service to the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party]. Virgil Faur Former officer of the Securitate espionage service, recycled by the SIE as a colonel. Filip Former Securitate officer, a CI [expansion not given] at the Cluj army command. Recuperated by the SRI as a colonel. Florea Former Securitate officer. As a major in the SRI, he was chief of the SRI Section in Harghita County. Gheorghe Alexandru Florea Former Securitate officer recuperated by the SRI as colonel. In 1994, he was chief of the SRI General Secretariat. Ioan Florian Former Securitate officer. In 1998 he was chief of the SRI Section in Buzau. Previously, he managed the Zonal Operative Center in Cluj. Nicolae Garofeanu Former Securitate officer. Recuperated by the SRI, he became the first chief of the Pitesti section. The press published documents that showed the exposure of old informers and political police preoccupations similar to those he had before December 1989. Ion Petre Gavrilescu He was a higher-ranking officer in the former Securitate's espionage department. In 2000, he was brought back to active service in the SIE through a presidential decree. He was promoted to the rank of division general. His true identity triggered controversial debates. A little bit more than one year later, he was passed again into the reserves. Mircea Gheordunescu He used to work as a physics teacher at a Bucharest high school [Spiru Haret]. Until 1989, he was one of the former Securitate's informants. Later, he entered the political life. He joined the PNTCD. In 1996, he was appointed as a deputy director in the Romanian Intelligence Service. Many people who were familiar with his past used to blackmail him. That is why, from the position he had at that time, he favored many fraudulent privatization processes, such as those involving a chain of food shops in Bucharest and the Bucharest Hotel. Dan Gheorghe He is a former Securitate officer. He was the deputy commanding officer of the special unit in charge of antiterrorism. He was an active participant in the attempt to reprimand the street actions that led to Nicolae Ceausescu's fall. In December 1989 -- the media also wrote about this -- in his capacity as the head of the defense unit at the Otopeni International Airport, he allowed approximately 50 Securitate officers to flee abroad by using counterfeit documents. After December 1989, he was appointed head of the SRI's antiterrorist brigade. For a short while, he worked for the UM 0215. This unit had more expertise in the field of the political police than in anything else. After that, he was briefly the director of the Universul news agency while Sorin Ovidiu Vantu owned it. The agency was accused of having been an intelligence service, working in parallel with the similar state services. Dan Gherghe came back to the SRI as an aide to the body's new director, Radu Timofte. On 1 November 2001 he resigned from office. However, he continues to be present in ruling circles. Gheorghe Gherghina He is a former Securitate officer, Colonel Gheorghe Ardelean's deputy (former Moise Bula) at the USLA's [Special Unit To Fight Terrorism] leadership. After having been re-trained in the SRI, he was Ion Botofei's successor in the leadership of the Former SRI's Officers' Association, which is in fact an association of former Securitate officers. He ensures the connection between the former Securitate officers currently in the SRI's leadership and those in the reserves. Dan Ghibernea Before 1989, a person with an identical name was an undercover officer in the former Securitate's espionage department. He was accredited as an international civil servant at UNESCO. At the moment, the Dan Ghibernea we refer to is Romania's ambassador to the United Kingdom. Marius Ghile A former Securitate officer in the Second Directorate for economic counterintelligence. He was an expert in Hungarian counterespionage. In 2000, he was appointed as the head of the SRI Salaj County's branch. Benone Ghinea A former officer in the Securitate's espionage department. After the December 1989 events, he was brought back into active service in the SIE. He was sent to South Africa as an undercover agent, acting as a commercial attache. He involved himself in some suspect deals with Puma helicopters and cashed some undue commission fees. He was sent to court and received a mild sentence, just "fit" for a former Securitate officer. Mihai Ghita A former Securitate officer, currently a colonel, and head of the SRI's Slatina branch. Nicolae Goia A former Securitate officer. Currently a member of the Foreign Intelligence Service's leadership. In February 2002, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. Nicolae Dorel Goron A former Securitate officer. Currently a colonel and the incumbent head of the SRI's Arad branch. Grama A former Securitate counterintelligence officer. Following the December 1989 events, the SRI rehabilitated him with the rank of a Colonel. In a short while, he was appointed as the head of the human resources staff in the "G" Division (logistics). Ilie Anghel Gradinaru A former Securitate officer. In the SRI, he was promoted to the position of head of the department for religious cult-sects in the SRI Constanta County branch. He holds the rank of major. In the spring of 2000, he was noticed while keeping the PDSR's [Social Democracy Party of Romania] staff under surveillance during their visit to Constanta. Corneliu Grigoras A former officer in the Securitate's espionage department. He was kept in the system after the events in December 1989, too. On the eve of the 1996 elections, he monitored the moves made in the CDR's [Romanian Democratic Convention] headquarters for the PDSR's benefit. Nevertheless, during Emil Constantinescu's presidential mandate he was promoted to the rank of general and appointed to the General Counterespionage Directorate in the SIE. Two journalists staged a trap for him. He proved to be a stupid person, fell into this trap, and was removed from office. Eugen Grigorescu A former Securitate officer. In the SRI's structures, he was promoted to colonel and then to brigadier general. He is the head of the technical expertise division, code-named Division "S." Gugiu A former Securitate colonel. When the former SRI Officers' Association was set up, he was appointed its cashier. Nicolae Constantin Hateganu A former Securitate officer. Chairman of the Astra Insurance Company's administrative board. His role is still unclear in the damages brought against the company in Sorin Ovidiu Vantu's favor. He was removed from office in March 2001. At the moment, he is being investigated. Ioan Hancu A former Securitate officer. In the SRI, with the rank of colonel, he became the deputy head of the Cluj field branch. He was removed from office in July 1998. Gheorghe Huidu A former Securitate officer. He kept the Romanian Radio Public Station under surveillance. After December 1989, the SRI recovered him with the rank of colonel. The project of the extremist magazine Europa, led by Ilie Neacsu, was drafted at his residence. Neacsu, a former PRM MP, passed with bag and baggage to the PSD. Bujorel Iamandi A former Securitate officer. After being recruited into the SRI, he was promoted to the rank of general. He was promoted to the position of head of the Counterintelligence Department, currently called the Protection Department. He was removed from office following the Timofte-KGB [SRI's incumbent director's alleged ties with the KGB] scandal. Vasile Valeriu Iancu A former Securitate colonel. Currently, the SRI director's first deputy. On 30 November 1999, he was promoted to brigadier general. Before December 1989 he worked within the foreign counterintelligence unit in the UM 0215, which was set after General Ion Mihai Pacepa's defection. He also worked in the UM 0544, for foreign counterintelligence. After the revolution, he was appointed the first head of the SRI's Counterintelligence Directorate. Then he was appointed as head of the SRI's oversight body. Teodor Ilies A former officer in the Securitate's Directorate for Foreign Intelligence. At the moment he is in the leading team of the SC [commercial company] Alliancecoop. During 1995-1996, the Army's Procurement Department contacted him for the purpose of facilitating some dubious arms exports. Florian Ioan A former Securitate officer. He was brought back to active service in the presidential bodyguard and protection service, where he was promoted to colonel. In 1998, he was passed into the reserves due to health-related causes. He has placed himself at the disposal of controversial businessman Sorin Ovidiu Vantu. In this capacity, he set up a paramilitary service in the village of Corbeanca [close to Bucharest]. Its missions included surveillance and escort activities, and even abducting people. Alexandru Iordache A former Securitate officer and expert in criminal investigations. On 31 December 1990, he was passed into the reserves, upon request, from the Romanian Intelligence Service. He was involved in smuggling cigarettes from Cyprus. Through these operations, he brought damages amounting to $110 million to the Romanian State. On 15 July 2001, he was brought back to active service for a short while in the SRI. At the moment he is a personal legal aide to General Zaharia Toma, who is a secretary of state in the Interior Ministry. It has been pointed out Iordache allegedly has bank accounts in Switzerland at the BNP Schweiz. Nicolae Iosub A former officer in the Securitate's Fourth Directorate. Currently a colonel, he is a department head in the Army's General Directorate of Intelligence. Virgil Irimia A former higher-ranking Securitate officer. The SRI recovered him with the rank of colonel. Immediately after the December 1989 events, he became the deputy head of the SRI's Botosani County branch. He was removed from office on charges of being involved in deals carried out by some dubious companies in that county. Nicolae Irinoiu A former high-ranking officer in the Securitate's espionage department. He was kept in the system some time after the 1996 elections. He carried out intelligence missions in the United States and in Turkey. He was passed into reserves with the rank of general. Juverdeanu A former Securitate officer recovered by the SRI with the rank of major. He was passed into the reserves following some blackmail activities carried out by resorting to counterfeit documents. Mihai Lazar A former Securitate officer at the Dunarea foreign trade company, which was under the Securitate's control. At the moment, he is a general manager at Grivco International SA. Pavel Lascut Before 1989, he was an officer within the Foreign Intelligence Center [CIE]. He was the office head in the Department for France-Benelux-Spain-Portugal in the Europe Division. He also carried out missions abroad, under the cover of a commercial representative in Spain and Portugal. During the Constantinescu regime, he was appointed as a deputy director in the Customs Directorate. Tudor Lica A former Securitate officer. In the summer of 2000, he was appointed as head of the department in charge of parallel intelligence offices in the SRI's Division "A." Dan Lungu A former Securitate officer. After December 1989, he was employed in the SRI's Buzau branch with the rank of captain. It is known that he has attempted to recruit a female journalist from the local daily Opinia. Vasile Lupu A former Securitate officer in the UM 0110. Quite inadequately, this unit was considered to be a structure meant to fight the KGB agents in Romania. In fact, the unit used to manufacture arguments, based on which the people who fell into Nicolae Ceausescu's disfavor were charged with spying for the Soviet Union. This method was meant to misinform public opinion, which was sensitive to any Russian threat. After the December 1989 events, he was recruited into the SRI's structures. In a short time, more precisely on 27 March 1994, he was appointed as head of the Counterintelligence Directorate. He was the SRI's first deputy director in two legislatures, under Virgil Magureanu and Costin Georgescu's mandates. Throughout this period, he made considerable efforts to strengthen the former Securitate officers' influence in all fields of political, economic, and social life. On 30 November 1999, he was promoted to Army Corps general. Much earlier, the media pointed out the fact that his successive promotions were the result of intervention by influential people whom he had kept under surveillance in the past. Most of them are important people in the state. Because he was unable to get rid of the specific methods of the UM 0110, he was involved in publicly launching the misinformation that the SRI's future director, Radu Timofte, was allegedly recruited by the KGB. He was passed into reserves as an Army Corps general. Victor Marcu A general in the reserves. He was an active staff member of the former Securitate and headed an office within the former Center for Foreign Intelligence. He was in charge of Romania's immigration problems. Then he was transferred to the Romanian Intelligence Service. For a short time, he was director Virgil Magureanu's first deputy. After he had a conflict with the latter, Marcu was removed from his position and from the SRI in 1995. He was charged with having business relations with Arab mafiosi. His records include the obscure coordination of the dubious deals developed by the SC Macons & Co SA Company, registered in Belgium. His daughter, Anca Steliana Marcu, was the company's main shareholder. However, he remained a reliable person at the Cotroceni [presidential] palace. At one point, with support from some obscure forces, he succeeded in setting up a customs checkpoint downtown Bucharest. He was to administer it together with his circle of friends. When the media exposed the illegal deal, the customs checkpoint vanished into thin air, as if it had never existed. After the November 2000 elections, Victor Marcu was appointed deputy minister in the Privatization Ministry. He held the position of undersecretary of state. Quite cautiously, he forwarded his resignation shortly before the emergence of the scandal around Sorin Ovidiu Vantu and the fraudulent deeds that were carried out to the detriment of the Astra Insurance Company. Marian Matei A former Securitate officer in the Military Academy's counterintelligence department. He is married to the former Communist leader Ion Dinca's niece. In December 1989, he was found armed in the PCR [Romanian Communist Party] CC's [Central Committee] headquarters. He was a lieutenant colonel at the time and was a member of the team appointed to protect the former dictator Ceausescu. On 24 March 1990, the SRI employed him after intervention by Mihai Stan. A short time later, he was promoted to brigadier general. Dumitru Mazilu A former Securitate officer, the former commanding officer at the Baneasa Securitate school from 1965-1967. He was removed from office following his attempt to counterfeit some documents related to a car accident. He was reoriented toward diplomacy. He also played the role of dissident. Immediately after December 1989, he emerged on the political scene as a vice president of the National Salvation Front's Council. In one of the confused days of January 1990, he climbed up on a tank and shouted what the civilians that had taken to the streets never did: "Death to the former Securitate officers!" After having committed himself in something that looked like a coup d'etat, he left for Switzerland for quite some time. He came back to Bucharest later, when people had already forgotten him. At the moment, he is the vice president of a UN commission. Virgil Magureanu The first head of the Romanian Intelligence Service, which was officially set up in March 1990. This body started to structure itself in the first days of that same year. In April 1992, journalist Ioan Itu published Magureanu's file. The latter was a former officer in the syntheses department of the Securitate's Foreign Intelligence Directorate [DIE]. In December 1995, Magureanu himself published his file as a former Securitate informant. Most probably, he had been warned that a major publication was about to do the same thing. Vasile Maierean A former Securitate Colonel. He was involved in culture and art problems. At the moment, he is working in the SIE. On 30 November 1999, he was promoted to brigadier general. Vasile Malureanu A colonel in the former Securitate's structures. A general in the current Romanian Intelligence Service's structures. Vlad Margineanu A former Securitate officer, the former head of the SRI's Brasov branch. He is one of the Romanian Discount Bank's [BRS] founders. The bank was deliberately brought to bankruptcy in 2002, after $17 million had disappeared from the Astra Insurance Company's account. Stefan Masu A former high-ranking Securitate officer. After the December 1989 events, he was briefly the deputy head of the SRI Prahova County's branch. Then he started to do businesses on his own. Among other things, he was one of the shareholders of the dubious SC Macons & Co. SA Company, registered in Belgium. Mecu A high-ranking Securitate officer recovered by the SRI. He was promoted to the rank of general. He is the commanding officer of the SRI's Bran Office. Teodor Melescanu According to statements by Mircea Raceanu, whom President Iliescu has recently granted an award, before 1989, Melescanu was a former Securitate officer under diplomatic cover. After the [December 1989] revolution, he was appointed foreign minister. Later on, he established the Alliance for Romania party [ApR], which he led to total disaster. He ran for president and lost. Ilie Merce A former Securitate colonel. He was the head of the art-culture department in the former Securitate's First Directorate. During 1985-1986, he led the Eterul Department, whose mission was to combat the foreign radio stations that used to broadcast in Romanian. Later, he was appointed head of the Securitate's Buzau County branch. After December 1989, he remained in the Romanian Intelligence Service. He was removed from office due to many inadequate deeds and to the open sabotage carried out against the body's leadership. He was passed into the reserves. He joined the Greater Romania Party, where he went up the hierarchy, until he became the party's first vice president. In the November 2000 elections, he ran on this party's slates. He was elected as an MP. Later, it was proved he had been involved in political police activities. At the moment, he is currently involved in a lawsuit filed by the victims of one of his deeds. Sever Mesca A former Securitate officer in the espionage department. He carried out missions in Italy and the United Kingdom. At the moment, after having been an important member of the Greater Romania Party, on whose slates he had been elected as an MP, he passed into the PSD's camp. He is currently engaged in an argument with the head of his former party. Iosif Mircea Miclea A former Securitate officer, currently a lieutenant colonel, the head of the SRI's Maramures County branch. Lionel Micu A former Securitate officer. After the December 1989 events, he vanished abroad. At the onset of 1999, he was expelled from Canada after being identified as "a member of the former Romanian Securitate and an accomplice to many atrocities." Mircea Miron A former Securitate officer. The SRI recovered him. He became the first head of the Alba Iulia office. An officer under his subordination sent intimidating letters to some opposition members' addresses. Victor Mitran A former Securitate officer in the espionage department. After he displayed abnormal behavior during a drill in Yugoslavia, he was subjected to a medical checkup. He was found to be suffering from paranoia. He was passed into the reserves. Immediately after December 1989, he was brought back to active service within the SRI. However, he damaged the service's image after he published a series of completely phantasmagoric information in the media. He also wrote a book full of completely stupid things. He continues to create confusion in the public opinion on various television shows. Ioan Mocan A former Securitate officer, currently the head of the SRI's Bistrita-Nasaud County branch. Cornel Moga A former Securitate officer. During Emil Constantinescu's regime, he was appointed as the head of the SRI Bihor County branch. A former political prisoner informed the media about the fact that Moga had conducted political police activities before 1989. He said the latter had searched and had even beaten him. Jean Moldoveanu A former Securitate officer, the former commanding officer of the Securitate troops. After the December 1989 events, he was the first head of the Romanian Police forces. Gheorghe Moldovan A former Securitate colonel who was recovered by the SRI. In the first half of the 1990s, he was appointed as the head of the SRI Maramures branch. He was removed from office for having wiretapped some UDMR [Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania -- RMDSZ] local leaders' phones. He claimed he had carried out this mission at Virgil Magureanu's order. However, he failed to provide the slightest evidence in this respect. He was sentenced, but his sentence was suspended. Ion Alexandru Munteanu A former Securitate officer within the Independent "D" [Misinformation] Service. After that, he was in charge of the surveillance of foreign students at the Bucharest University Center. It was found he had been involved in various onerous deals with them. He was demoted, sent to court, and sentenced to several years in prison. After the December 1989 events, he was released from prison. He went through a series of dubious promotions. A little more than two years later, he was promoted from the rank of a soldier to that of a general. He was appointed as general director of the State Archives. He was an important member of the Greater Romania Party. Deceased. Vasile Munteanu He is suspected of having been one of the former Securitate's undercover officers. The Romanian Intelligence Service took him over, too. As the head of the Otopeni cargo customs office, his duties also included ensuring the facilities requested by the special transports of commodities. He was involved in the Cigarette 2 smuggling deal. Constantin Muraru A former Securitate officer. Currently a colonel, the head of the SRI's Suceava County branch. Ionel Muresan A former high-ranking Securitate officer, recovered by the SRI with the rank of colonel. In 1998, he was leading the counterintelligence service of the department in which he had been employed. Victor Nacu A former Securitate officer, re-employed in the SRI's Bacau County branch. Not long ago he was transferred to the Bucharest head unit. Nicolae Nadejde A former colonel in the Securitate's espionage department. In 1983, he was appointed as the DIE's representative in a shadow company, Marsue Holding, meant to cover the activity carried out by some Romanian agents abroad. He retired in 1986 while holding the same position. After December 1989, he was compelled to transfer the money in the company's bank account to an SRL [limited responsibility company] company's bank account. He refused to do it. In 1993, the Foreign Intelligence Service filed charges against him for embezzlement of funds. The gesture was far from the espionage people's habits, which used to launder their dirty linen at home. Consequently, it remains to be seen what is hiding behind the Marsue deal. Victor Nanescu A former high-ranking officer in the Securitate's espionage department. He was kept in the system not too long after the 1996 elections. He was passed into the reserves with the rank of general. Toma Nastase A former Securitate colonel within the Independent "D" (Misinformation) Department. He was brought back into active service in the SRI for a short while. After that, he was passed into the reserves. He became an important member of the Greater Romania Party. From that position, he used the information obtained while he was in office in public life. Deceased. Grigore Neciu A former Securitate officer, [Communist] party secretary of the Cluj County Securitate Inspectorate. In 1998, he was the head of the UM 0215 in Cluj. Aurelian Neferoiu A former Securitate major, the deputy head of the Fifth Office in USLA. After December 1989, he was appointed general manager of the state office for the government's special problems. In 1997, he was Mircea Gheordunescu's deputy at the leadership of the National Agency for the Control on Strategic Exports and Chemical Weapons Ban [ANCESIAC]. Misu Negritoiu According to the statements by Mircea Raceanu, whom President Ion Iliescu has recently granted an award, Negritoiu was an undercover Securitate officer. After 1989, he played an important role in the Romanian power structures. Andrei Nica A former Securitate officer, recovered by the SRI with the rank of lieutenant colonel. In 1994, he was a member of the "B" Counterintelligence Directorate's leadership. Nicolae M Nicolae A former undercover officer in the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. He was removed from that position following General Ion Mihai Pacepa's defection. He was a former foreign trade minister and Romania's ambassador to Washington during Nicolae Ceausescu's regime. In the first post-revolutionary Romanian Government, he returned to the leadership of Romania's foreign trade. Constantin Nicolescu A former officer in the Securitate's espionage department, currently a senator for Arges County. He is the chairman of the Parliament's SIE Oversight Committee. Dumitru Nicusor A former Securitate officer. In the SRI, he was the head of the Dobruja's Regional Operational Center. In 1994, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. Carol Nihta A former Securitate officer. Currently a lieutenant colonel, the head of the SRI's Resita branch, Caras-Severin County. Ogasanu A former Securitate officer, re-employed by the SRI. With the rank of general, he led the SRI's Operation Center in Transylvania. After passing into the reserves, he became the director of the Gelsor branch in Oradea. He played an important role in the National Investment Fund's [FNI] collapse. Emil Olariu A former high-ranking Securitate officer, recovered by the SRI, with the rank of colonel. In 1998, he worked in the SRI's Harghita County branch. Otelea General Otelea's son, from the Steaua sports club. He was an officer in the Securitate's Fourth Directorate. At the moment, he is a colonel in the Army's General Directorate for Intelligence. Valerica Pamfil A former Securitate officer. In the SRI, he was appointed as office head in the Anti-terrorist Brigade with the rank of lieutenantcolonel. He was charged with influence peddling. Gheorghe Pasc He was a former Securitate major before 1989. Later, during Virgil Magureanu's mandate, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and then to colonel. He was promoted as head of the "F" Division in the SRI, which used to store computer data and managed the institution's archives. Before the establishment of the National Council in Charge of Studying the Former Securitate Archives [CNSAS], a civil body that should be the same thing as the Gauck Institute in Germany, he retired due to health-related problems. He set up a security guard and protection company. In 1999, when the CNSAS was established, nobody knows what methods he used, but he succeeded in obtaining the exclusive right for his company to ensure the guarding and protection for the aforementioned council. At the CNSAS' headquarters, he installed various pieces of special equipment. Supposedly, many microphones controlled from outside are among these devices. Thus, those who reportedly have to study the former Securitate's behavior are still at the Securitate's mercy. All of their moves are allegedly being kept under control. Petre Pavel A former Securitate officer, taken over in the SRI's structures with rank of colonel. After having passed into the reserves, he helped manufacture a counterfeit commitment in the Division "S" laboratories, proving its author was as a former Securitate informant, to Senator Corneliu Vadim Tudor's detriment and to the benefit of Ziua. George Constantin Paunescu A former undercover Securitate officer. In this capacity, before 1989, he led the Romanian Economic Agency in Milan. He was and perhaps still is banned from entering Italy. The Italian special services know more about him than the SRI claims to know. He runs his operations in Italy via a branch in the Swiss canton of Ticino. In 1996, when he was subjected to some criminal investigations, he fled the country, at first to Switzerland, under the pretext of a medical treatment. Then he settled temporarily in the United States. From that position, he sponsored several of Ion Iliescu and Adrian Nastase's trips across the Atlantic Ocean, with the help of the lobbyist called the Eurasia Group, with a majority Russian capital. Petru Pele A former Securitate officer. In the SRI, he was appointed head of the SRI's Timisoara branch. He had a conflict with Virgil Magureanu. His file, which proved he was a former collaborator for the local Securitate, was made public. He was removed from the system and currently has dedicated himself to his businesses. Cornel Pentelie A former Securitate officer. He was later promoted to the rank of major within the SRI. His true name has the initials DM. He worked under General Dumitru Badescu, who was the head of the division in charge of economic counterintelligence. He was present in the unit that carried out the "Cigarette 2" smuggling operation. He was identified as such on the video recordings made at the airport. Corneliu Petre A former Securitate officer in the Third Directorate for Counterespionage. After December 1989, he was passed into the reserves. Later, he involved himself in various businesses with persons working for the Russian Lukoil Company. Stelian Pintilie A former Securitate General, appointed as the minister of postal services and telecommunications in the first government after December 1989. At the moment, he is running various businesses, also in the telecommunications field, along with STS head General Tudor Tanase. Among other things, he worked as a councilor to the Ericsson Company, which was among the main players involved in the scandal related to the Romanian Army's transmissions system. Ion Pinta A former Securitate officer. He was the first head of the SRI's Gorj County branch. He had the rank of colonel. He took part in the June 1990 miners' incursion. He directed the miners' travel to Bucharest. Later, he was employed in SRI's central unit in Bucharest. In May 2001, he had the same position, although the legal system's bodies were conducting an investigation against him. He was charged with undermining state power. Radu Podgoreanu A former Securitate general's son-in-law. At the moment, he is the chairman of the Chamber of Deputies' Foreign Policy Committee. Gabriel Polmolea A former Securitate officer in Brasov. The SRI took him over. At first, he was the deputy head of the SRI's Dolj County branch. When his superior was ousted, he was appointed leader of the branch. In June 1994, he was appointed head of the Oltenia Region's Operational Center. Dumitru Pop A former Securitate officer. In the SRI, with the rank of a colonel, he was appointed as the deputy head of the SRI's Cluj County branch. He was removed from office in July 1998. Viorel Pop A former Securitate officer, re-trained in the SRI with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He was Gheorghe Moldovan's subordinate in the SRI's Maramures County branch. It has been reported he used to provide information from inside the service to the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party]. Ioan Popa A former officer in the Securitate's espionage department, re-trained in the SIE, with the rank of colonel. He headed the Directorate for Synthesis and Analysis for some time. Doru Popescu A former Securitate officer. After the December 1989 events, he fled abroad and disappeared. In early 1999, he was expelled from Canada after being identified as "a member of the former Romanian Securitate and an accomplice to many atrocities." Ion Popescu A former Securitate colonel. During his espionage-related activities in Paris, his mission was to compromise priest Vasile Boldeanu and to transfer the Romanian Christian Orthodox Church in France's capital under the Bucharest Patriarchy's authority. His mission failed. He was asked to return to Romania. He continued to work as an undercover officer. He was appointed as the head of the Department for Religious Cults. After December 1989, with support from some high-ranking clergy, with whom he had probably used to work, he set up the International Bank of Religions. The dubious sponsorships, along with the mismanagement of funds, have ultimately brought this bank's sonorous bankruptcy. Other former Securitate officers, tied to the incumbent ruling party, were also involved in this bankruptcy. Poporoaga A former low-ranking Securitate officer, recovered by the SRI, in the surveillance division. He fell into a trap on the occasion of the Anda Terrace scandal. Alexandru Constantin Postelnicu A former Securitate officer. After the December 1989 events, he was promoted to the rank of general and he was the first head of the SRI's Dolj County branch. He tried to recruit journalists from troublesome media circles in Craiova. The local media focused on his activities. It succeeded in taking his picture in a professional situation. He was removed from office. Obviously, he has started to run his own businesses. Ioan Preda A former Securitate officer. In the SRI, with the rank of colonel, he was appointed as head of the Constanta County branch. Ristea Priboi A former Securitate colonel. He was an active staff member of the UM 0199, which was a sub-unit of the espionage department, which dealt with European territory. Starting in May 1988, he was transferred to the UM 0225, another sub-unit dealing with espionage activities. This unit was involved in infiltrating Romanian immigrants in Europe and fighting the foreign radio stations that used to broadcast in Romanian. Some former Securitate officers say that, before 1989, he trained incumbent Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Nastase to place him in the West as an undercover agent. The operation was to take place in 1990. However, the December 1989 revolution triggered the project's cancellation. Later, Ristea Priboi became Adrian Nastase's aide. Allegations say he is very close to the prime minister. Following the November 2000 elections, Adrian Nastase tried to impose Priboi as the head of the Parliament's SIE Oversight Committee. The deal failed, following the forceful intervention by the media, which had managed to find a few facts about Ristea Priboi's past. He remained Adrian Nastase's aide. From his position, he makes it easier for other former Securitate officers to enter the ruling party's structures and, implicitly, the state bodies. In December 2000, Ristea Priboi was imposed as a member of the administrative board of the SIF [Financial Investment Company] Oltenia. This allowed him to control the economic activities carried out in one of the country's important regions, in collaboration with another former Securitate officer, Dinut Staicu. A group of former Securitate officers has recently forwarded to the major media's editorial offices, to some parties, and institutions' headquarters, a letter that states that his former comrades also dislike Ristea Priboi. This letter calls the character with the comradely name "Pig!" We also happen to be familiar with some things about how Ristea Priboi plots against the incumbent prime minister's political opponents. It is impossible to explain how a cultivated person, with an education achieved in normal conditions, with masters and doctoral degrees, who has often traveled to Western countries and speaks several foreign languages, like Nastase, can bear to have such an aide close to him. Dumitru Prichici A former officer in the State Securitate Department's technical divisions. After December 1989, as an associate of the Zenith Trading Consulting Company, he illegally manufactured and traded devices for wiretapping phones. He involved his son, Codrut Prichici, in these activities, too. In the fall of 1997, after having exposed himself at a television station, he was sent to court. He was charged with violating the National Security Law. Florin Radu A former Securitate officer, recovered by the SRI with the rank of major. After having passed into the reserves, he launched himself in business. In 1997, he was subjected to an investigation for outstanding debts incurred by a bank loan. In 1998, the Democratic Party [PD] nominated him to be appointed as the head of the Financial Oversight Body in Buzau County. Nicolae Radu A former Securitate officer. He was taken over by the SRI with the rank of colonel. He led the SRI's Galati County branch. In the spring of 1994, he was transferred to Bucharest and promoted both to a higher position and to a higher rank. Niculae Radu A former Securitate officer, he was re-trained in the SRI. He was appointed as the head of the counterespionage office at the SRI's Botosani County branch. He was removed from office for alleged involvement in the deals carried out by some dubious companies in that county. Ion Raita A former Security major, recovered by the SRI. At the onset of the 1990s, he was appointed as the head of the SRI's office in Sinaia. He was passed into the reserves following the protests voiced by those who had been subjected to his investigations before December 1989. In 1992, he ran for mayor of Sinaia as an independent candidate. Stefan Ramfu A former Securitate colonel, employed in the Independent Misinformation Department. Among other things, he used to launch some fake stories abroad. According to them, some dissidents that could not be kept in the country anymore had allegedly been among the former Securitate's agents. Mathematician Mihai Botez was one of the persons who was subjected to this despicable treatment. At the moment, Ramfu is delivering expert training at the National Intelligence Institute. Gheorghe Ratiu A former Securitate colonel, the former head of the Securitate's First Directorate in charge of domestic intelligence during 1986-1989. Immediately after the December 1989 revolution, he left Romania and went abroad. He went to West Germany and returned to Romania from... China after things settled down a little bit. At the moment, he is one of businessman Sorin Ovidiu Vantu's most important councilors. Marian Rizea A former Securitate officer. He was later recruited to the SRI's structures. He led the SRI's Dambovita County branch. Aurel Rogojanu A former Securitate colonel, the former head of General Iulian Vlad's secretarial office. The latter was the head of the State Security's Directorate. When he retired from the SRI, he published a book that justifies the former Securitate's actions. At the moment, he is SRI Director Radu Timofte's aide. Viorel Ros A former Securitate officer, he graduated from the Baneasa School for active staff members of the Interior Ministry. He worked for the UM 0279 as an expert in foreign intelligence. Starting in 1979, when he was passed into the reserves, he worked in the legal system. In 1993, he was appointed as chairman of the Bucharest Court of Justice. Constantin Rotaru A former Securitate colonel, currently a general, the deputy director of the Foreign Intelligence Service. Before December 1989, he was the deputy director at the ICE [foreign trade company] Dunarea. He remained in that positions in the early 1990s, too. He left the system temporarily. He led the Intact media trust. He has a close collaboration with businessman Dan Voiculescu [owner of the Antena 1 private television station] at the moment. The latter was the endorser of the Crescent Company, another one of the former Securitate companies, with its headquarters Cyprus. In fact, according to the information published by the media, through General Constantin Rotaru, the SIE manages and grants protection to several of Dan Voiculescu's companies. Cornel Rudareanu A former Securitate colonel. At the moment, he is one of businessman Sorin Ovidiu Vantu's advisers. Valer Rus The former head of the SRI's Turda branch. He is an expert in irredentism-related matters. The SRI took him over in its structures with the rank of Colonel, as an expert in the problems of ethnic minorities. In 1998, he was the head of the SPP's [Guard and Protection Service] structure in Transylvania. Rusan A former high-ranking Securitate officer, recovered by the SRI, with the rank of colonel. Before December 1989, he used to work hand in hand with General Vasile Lupu, who took Rusan with him. In the mid-1990s, Colonel Rusan was appointed head of the Surveillance Directorate. Ion Rusu Alias Ion Prigoreanu. A former Securitate major. He was a French teacher at the Interior Ministry's school for active officers at Baneasa. In the years before December 1989, he worked as an undercover agent, as an employee of the Agerpres news agency. Immediately after December 1989, he was appointed as a general secretary of Zig Zag magazine's editorial office (the Ion Cristoiu series). At present he teaches French at a Bucharest high school, after having earned his doctorate on the basis of articles written by other people. Vasile Rusu A former high-ranking officer in the Securitate's espionage department. After December 1989, he continued to work within the SIE. In March 1998, after being promoted to the rank of brigadier general, he was passed into the reserves. Ion Savonea A former Securitate first lieutenant in Sinaia. During the first months of 1990, he was involved in the violation of the local Securitate archives' seals. Ion Sabareanu A former Securitate officer. In the SRI, he was appointed deputy head of the antiterrorist Brigade, with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He was charged with influence peddling. Cornel Satmareanu A former officer in the former Securitate military counter-espionage and counter-intelligence departments (Third and Fourth Directorates, respectively). He was passed into the reserves in 1991. However, he was kept in the structures parallel to the active structures. In 1999, he was asked to testify as a defense witness in the lawsuit filed by former President Emil Constantinescu against Andrei Zeno. The latter accused the head of state of being a foreign power's alleged agent. Vasile Secares According to statements by Mircea Raceanu, whom President Ion Iliescu has recently granted an award, Secares was an undercover Securitate officer before 1989. He was a member of the teaching staff at the [former] "Stefan Gheorghiu" [only for party members in leading communist structures] Academy. After the December 1989 Revolution, he became an important member of the innovative group "A Future for Romania." At present, he is the rector of the Academy for Political and Administrative Sciences. This is also some kind of "Stefan Gheorghiu," but with a different shape. Constantin Silinescu A former Securitate colonel. He was an operative agent abroad during 1974-1984. He was an office head in the communist espionage department. After December 1989, he was kept in the system. He was promoted to general. He was promoted to be deputy director of the Foreign Intelligence Service. He collaborated with General Florentin Popa in operations involving arms trafficking. Following a conflict with General Ioan Talpes, the SIE director, he was passed into the reserves. After the 2000 elections, he became one of Prime Minister Adrian Nastase's aides. He currently holds the same position. Ion Tomita Sima A former Securitate officer. He was a colonel, with a PhD in engineering, in the Special Telecommunications Service. On 30 November 1999, he was promoted to brigadier general. Tiberiu Simon A former Securitate officer. He is currently a lieutenant colonel and the head of the SRI's Bacau County branch. Ovidiu Soare A former Securitate officer within the Fifth Directorate, which dealt with ensuring the guard and protection of former Communist dignitaries. He ensured Nicu Ceausescu's protection and guard and then that of Alexandrina Gainuse. During the December 1989 events, he sought refuge in the Militia's Section 1. At present, he is the head of the SRI's "A" Division. Vlad Soare A former Securitate undercover officer in the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade [Bancorex]. He contributed to the bank's bankruptcy after December 1989. At present, he is the chairman of the Gelsor financial group, which is the property of businessman Sorin Ovidiu Vantu. Sobolu A former officer in the Securitate's Fourth Directorate. He is currently a colonel and an office head in the Army's General Directorate for Intelligence. George Sotir A former officer in the Securitate's Fourth Directorate. At present, he is a colonel and the head of the Air Forces service in the Army's General Directorate for Intelligence. Ilie Suba A former Securitate officer in the Bucharest Municipality's branch. He was an expert in youth- and student-related problems. After the December 1989 events, he went vanished. He returned to public life in April 1990 as an SRI officer. He led the Antiterrorist Brigade. He was an adviser to Senator Sergiu Nicolaescu's parliamentary commission, which dealt with the investigation of the December 1989 events. In 1997, he passed into the reserves. Later, he was appointed as head of the Protocol Department and staff's protection at the World Trade Center. Dinel Staicu A former Securitate officer in the Dolj County inspectorate. After December 1989, to cover up his deeds, he developed some businesses that were not too legal in Hunedoara County. He took advantage of that county's status as a disadvantaged area. When things calmed down a little, he returned to Craiova. He played a significant role in the International Bank of Religions' bankruptcy. At present, he controls SIF Oltenia through various intermediaries. He is closely tied to businessman Sorin Ovidiu Vantu and to Ristea Priboi, Prime Minister Adrian Nastase's aide. Laurentiu Stamatescu A former Securitate major in the counterintelligence department in Covasna County. During the events in December 1989, he was involved in the deadly shooting of engineer Gheorghe Suiu. Later, he was recruited by the Romanian Intelligence Service. He was promoted to the rank of colonel and to the position of head of the Covasna County branch. Gelu Stan A former Securitate officer, who dealt with religious cult-related problems. In 1998, he was secretary of the Cluj branch of the [former] National Romanian Party [PNR], chaired by Virgil Magureanu. Mihai Stan A former Securitate colonel in the Independent Misinformation Department. After December 1989, he became SRI Director Virgil Magureanu's deputy. He was promoted to general. Following the Berevoiesti deal, he was removed from office. This scandal involved the mismanagement of the transportation of some documents belonging to the former Securitate. He was then appointed head of the Directorate for International Relationships in the Private Ownership Fund. Soon afterward, he was appointed head of the Center for Operational Documentation of the Guard and Protection Service. He was again removed from office against the backdrop of the scandal triggered by the Cigarette 2 state smuggling operation. At present, he is nothing less than the general director at the... Organization for Human Rights Protection in Romania. Ion Stanescu A former Securitate officer, currently a lieutenant colonel and head of the SRI's Ploiesti branch. Ion Stoica A former Securitate colonel. Before 1989, he worked in the Securitate's Bucharest Municipality branch. After 1989, he was reintegrated into the SRI. To lose any trace of him, he was transferred to the position of head of the SRI's Dambovita County branch. When things calmed down a little, he was invited back to Bucharest. When Virgil Magureanu was replaced, he retired. He was immediately hired to become an aide to Adrian Nastase, whose party was in opposition at the time. After the November 2000 elections, he kept the same position. In parallel, he was the head of the domestic protection department at the International Bank of Religions. A gang of former Securitate officers brought the bank to bankruptcy. When Adrian Nastase was appointed as the country's prime minister, Stoica was honored with the position of deputy general director of the Romanian customs system. Ion Sandru A former Securitate colonel employed by the Romanian Intelligence Service after 1989. In 1997, he was passed into the reserves. He is considered to be a member of Mircea Gheordunescu's entourage, one of the SRI's deputy directors. After having passed into the reserves, he was appointed head of the legal office at the International Bank of Religions [BIR]. Another former Securitate officer, Colonel Ion Popescu established and chaired this bank. The depositors' savings were wasted. The bank went bankrupt in 2000. Later, on behalf of Mircea Gheordunescu, he was also involved in the privatization process of the Bucharest Hotel. He acted to the detriment of many honest investors and to the benefit of a genuine mafiosi ring made up of financial frauds. Later, he was appointed as a legal expert and an AGA [Shareholders' General Assembly] secretary at the SC Bucharest-Turism SA. Constantin Serban A former Securitate officer from the UM 0110. After that, the SRI incorporated him into its structures. Until the spring of 1998, he was head of the SRI's Targu Mures branch. At that time, he entered the reserves with the rank of colonel. He was brought back to active service in 1998, when he was appointed as the head of the SRI's Cluj County branch. Bebe Serbanescu A former Securitate officer, re-employed in the SRI's structures. He is Dinel Staicu's godson. When he gave up his job, he started to import listening and recording devices from abroad, used in his godfather's dubious connections in Craiova. Ion Serbanoiu A former higher-ranking Securitate officer. He was a general, the head of the Cluj County's Securitate Inspectorate. After the December 1989 events, he was in charge of the guard and protection system at the Dacia Felix Bank, which was soon brought to bankruptcy. Alexandru Somlea A former Securitate officer, restored by the SRI with the rank of colonel. After having passed into the reserves, he became the co-owner of a company in the Civic Center. Marian Stefan A former Securitate officer. Currently a colonel, the head of the SRI's Timisoara branch. Ion Manole Stefanut A former Securitate officer, recovered by the SRI. On 30 November 1999, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. Ion Stirbu A former Securitate officer. Before December 1989, he was a member of the team that ensured Nicolae Ceausescu's guard. He was passed into the reserves with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He was appointed deputy director at the Galati customs office. In the spring of 1994, he was brought back to active service. He was employed as the head of the SRI's Galati County branch. Tudor Tanase During 1976-1978, he was an officer in the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. During 1978-1989, he worked in the Special Unit "R" in the State Security Directorate. In 1993, Nicolae Vacaroiu's government re-employed him in the Special Telecommunications Service. He involved himself in many private deals, based on obscure funds, together with former Securitate General Stelian Pintilie. In May 2001, although his participation in companies with similar objects of activity had not yet been wound up, he was appointed as head of the Special Telecommunications Service, with the rank of general. The incumbent government did not take into account any of the warning signals sent by the media. Alexandru Tanasescu A former Securitate General, passed into the reserves in 1999. He was an active officer in the former Directorate for Foreign Intelligence. He carried out several missions abroad for the aforementioned body, mainly in the United States. After December 1989, he was kept in the Foreign Intelligence Service's structure. He went up the hierarchy, until he was appointed its first deputy director. He was the topic of frequent media campaigns. He was removed from the espionage service in 2000. Later, he was appointed as an adviser to the director of the Aedificia Carpati construction trust. This trust had built the SIE's current headquarters in Baneasa. Its director, Petre Badea, owed Alexandru Tanasescu a few favors, because his company had been favored in the bid. We would like to point out the fact that the Aedificia Carpati construction trust, with the help of some other former Securitate officers, has benefited and continues to benefit from important orders from the state. We may list the National Library, the consolidation works of the Telephones' Palace, the Special Telecommunications System's headquarters, the repair works at the Royal Palace, and so forth. Everybody kept taking from Petre Badea until they led him to the verge of bankruptcy. Ion Tanasoiu A former undercover Securitate officer. He acted mainly in the Benelux region. Through his children, Oana and Nineta, he was involved in the SC Macons & Co SA's dubious deals, a company that was registered in Belgium. Razvan Temesan A former undercover Securitate officer at the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade. After December 1989, he was appointed as the bank's director. He remained in that position until he led the bank to bankruptcy. Although he was brought to court and was held in preventive custody, he succeeded in getting off scot-free. At present, it should be noted that he is deeply involved in Sorin Ovidiu Vantu's deals, in his capacity as an adviser to the much-contested Romanian Discount Bank. He has been recently proposed to be appointed as a manager at the Romanian Commercial Bank. It is desirable that he would fail to bring this bank to bankruptcy, too, to make us privatize it at the cost of one euro. Teodor A former officer in the former Securitate's Fourth Directorate. At present, he is a colonel. He is the deputy office head within the Army's General Directorate for Intelligence. Aurel Teodorescu A former Securitate officer in Bucharest. After December 1989, he worked as a commissioner in the Financial Oversight Body, as head of a department in the Bucharest City Hall, and then as a deputy director at the Customs General Directorate. The media paid attention to him because he favored dubious cigarette shipments. Teslovan A former Securitate officer, recovered by the SRI with the rank of colonel. In 1998, he worked in the SRI's Harghita County branch. Tinca A former high-ranking Securitate officer, recovered by the SRI. He led the Oradea Regional Operational Center. Tinca A former low-ranking Securitate officer recovered by the SRI in the Surveillance Department. He fell into the trap during the Anda Terrace scandal. Gheorghe Tinca According the statements by Mircea Raceanu, whom President Ion Iliescu has recently granted an award, Tinca was a former Securitate officer who worked undercover in the Foreign Ministry. At the onset of the 1980s, the United States refused to grant him an entry visa. In 1994, he was appointed defense minister. Later, he joined the ApR, Teodor Melescanu's bankrupt political party. At present, he is Romania's ambassador in Prague. Radu Tinu A former Securitate major, deputy head of the Timis County's Securitate Inspectorate. He was in charge of the misinformation and counterespionage departments. He was arrested in December 1989. He was subjected to an investigation as a member of the Timisoara lot. After a little more than two years, he was released from prison due to a lack of evidence. Along with Valentin Ciuca, he set up the Tival Impex SRL Company, which thrived during the embargo against Yugoslavia. Although he declared he would not want the return of the communism, all of his published statements speak extremely highly of the former Securitate. Maria Tiriboi A former Securitate officer. She was in charge of surveillance at the Institute for Research and Technological Design for Transportation Activities. She returned to the institution in 1992, this time as an SRI officer. Gheorghe Toader A former officer in the Securitate's espionage department. Under Ioan Talpes' mandate, he was the SIE's deputy director. In December 1994, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. He was passed into the reserves on 3 April 2000. Constantin Toma A former high-ranking Securitate officer. The SRI recovered him. He was the deputy head of the SRI's Bacau branch and then its acting head. He was appointed as such in January 1998. Alexandru Tonescu A former high-ranking Securitate officer. At present, he is a general and a member of the SRI's central leadership. Ioan Trifu A former Securitate officer. Until January 2002, he led the SRI's Bistrita-Nasaud County branch. Alin Vivian Tudose A former Securitate colonel in the Second Directorate in charge of economic counterintelligence. No evidence proves he had been re-trained in the SRI. However, in the fall of 1999, he published in the media the information that Radu Campeanu [liberal politician, former presidential candidate in 1990] used to work for the former Securitate. This kind of misinformation is not sent to the public at random. This kind of activity is carried out in an organized framework. It also depends on the SRI's Securitate-oriented leadership's momentary interests. Romica Turcanu A former Securitate officer. Immediately after the December 1989 events, the SRI recovered him with the rank of colonel. He was appointed as head of the SRI's Botosani County branch. He was removed from office following his involvement in the financial pyramid scheme Caritas. Olimpian Ungherea A former Securitate officer. At first, he worked in the Craiova Inspectorate. He was transferred to Bucharest, where he was in charge of the Interior Ministry's Pentru Patrie magazine. He wrote thrillers. After December 1989, he was appointed as the PDSR's media councilor. He was the vice president of the PDSR's Sector 3 Bucharest branch. In 1997, at a signal from behind the scenes, he forwarded his resignation in a boisterous manner. He also wrote a book in which he mocked Ion Iliescu. Marian Ureche A former Securitate colonel. He is the former deputy head of the First Directorate in charge of domestic intelligence. He was involved in activities aimed at combating the foreign radio stations that used to broadcast in Romanian. When he retired from the SRI, he collaborated on a book that contains extremely high praise for the former Securitate. Following the 2000 elections, he was appointed head of the Independent Department for Protection and is in charge of the fight against corruption in the Justice Ministry. Gavrila Valean He is a former officer in the Securitate's Foreign Intelligence Directorate. At present, he is a member of the SC Alliancecoop's leadership. During 1995-1996, the Army's Procurement Department contacted him to facilitate some dubious arms exports. Constantin Valceanu A former Securitate officer. He was an expert in arms exports. In 1997, he was appointed as Mircea Gheordunescu's deputy in the leadership of the National Agency for the Control of Strategic Exports and Chemical Weapons Ban. Later, he was appointed as general director of the Pro Romania Consulting Company. Victor Veliscu He is a former Securitate officer who passed into the reserves after December 1989. At present he is SRI Director Radu Timofte's main aide. The latter is a former Border Guard officer who does not have any expertise in the field of intelligence. In Timofte's name, Victor Veliscu does and undoes everything in the SRI. He acts to the former Securitate officer's constant benefit, to the detriment of those who graduated from the National Intelligence Institute. Victor Veliscu is known for his extremely close ties with Sorin Ovidiu Vantu, a businessman who is expert in fraudulent operations and who has spread his tentacles over the entire Romanian financial-banking sector. Veliscu has also worked for the latter for a number of years. Gheorghe Vicol A former Securitate officer. In 1998, he was the head of the SRI's Onesti branch, in Bacau County. Mihai Vidican A former Securitate officer. After December 1989, he was employed in the SRI's structures at the Timisoara branch office. Following a scandal related to the collection of some signatures in favor of Viorel Salagean's candidacy for president, he retired. The SRI's branches in Transylvania also took part in that difficult task. Florin Viisoreanu A former Securitate officer in Giurgiu. Following the December 1989 events, he was transferred to the SRI's office in the town of Alexandria. He is a typical example of the changes performed at the former Securitate's staff level to lose track of some officers who had been previously involved in despicable activities. Tanase Vizitiu A former Securitate officer. After the December 1989 events, he was recruited into the SRI's Antiterrorist Brigade, in its troops deployed at the Otopeni International Airport. In 1992, it was discovered he used to deliver job-related information to the Europa magazine, edited by Ilie Neacsu. The latter used to be a PRM MP until not long ago. He has recently joined the PSD. Dan Vladu A former Securitate officer. In the SRI, he was appointed head of the counterespionage department in the Constanta County branch. In the spring of 2000, he made himself obvious because he conducted surveillance on the PDSR staff members who were visiting the locality. Teodor Vlaicu A former high ranking Securitate officer. The SRI recovered him with the rank of colonel. Before December 1989, he led the counterintelligence department in Cluj. He was assigned the same mission for the entire Transylvania area after the establishment of the SRI. His son was employed at the SRI's Cluj branch, even though he did not have the training needed for this job. Ioan Vladut A former Securitate officer. He was among the first commanding officers of the SRI's Oltenia Regional Operational Center. He had the rank of lieutenant colonel. Ilie Vranceanu A former Securitate officer. He is the former head of the National Investment Fund in Bistrita County. Sorin Ovidiu Vantu brought the fund to bankruptcy because he fraudulently appropriated most of the 300,000 depositors' money. Ion Zahiu A former Securitate officer. After the December 1989 events, he was recruited into the SRI's structures. He was promoted to the rank of colonel and to the position of head of the SRI's Buzau County branch. After having passed into the reserves, he was employed as the director of the DHL branch in Romania. Dumitru Zamfir A former Securitate colonel, at present an SRI general. He is the head of the department that also deals with wiretapping phone conversations. On 30 November 1999 he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. Those who know him say he reportedly got rich due by embezzling funds from the SRI's budget. Grigore Zagarin A former Securitate officer. The SRI took him over in its structures. He was promoted to the rank of colonel and then to brigadier general. He has recently retired from the position of head of the counterespionage division. Andrei Zeno A former Securitate officer. After December 1989, he was passed into the reserves. Under Emil Constantinescu's presidential mandate, he accused the head of state of having allegedly been the agent of a foreign power. The PRM has managed his declarations in such a manner to make them generate an extremely sonorous scandal. Andrei Zeno was sentenced, but his sentence was suspended. He was elected a PRM MP. Deceased. [Description of Source: Bucharest Ziua in Romanian -- popular, privately owned daily; generally critical of the political establishment across the board] ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPh: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island GroupFax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "...three shall be the number to count, and the number to be counted shall be three.....four shall thou not count......five is right out". - M. Python -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5145 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Mon Apr 8, 2002 8:03pm Subject: Cost of IT security breaches doubles - FBI http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/24747.html Cost of IT security breaches doubles - FBI By John Leyden Posted: 08/04/2002 at 11:44 GMT Two in three US firms say they lost money after falling victim to security breaches last year, according to an FBI survey. The cost of intrusions was almost double that of 2000. Eighty-five percent of respondents taking part in the sixth annual Computer Crime and Security Survey, detected computer security breaches in 2001. Most resulted in a financial hit, with 64 per cent saying their firms had lost money due to security lapses. The survey discovered a slight increase in willingness to report computer crimes. More than a third (36 per cent) of the 538 security professionals polled reported intrusions to law enforcement, up from 25 per cent who contacted the authorities about breaches in the previous year. The average cost of security breaches, for those 186 firms prepared to estimate losses, was more than $2 million, compared to an average loss of $1.06 million recorded last year. As in previous years, the most serious financial losses occurred through theft of proprietary information (34 respondents reported loses of $151 million) and financial fraud (21 respondents lost an estimates total of $93 million). Internet connections, rather than internal systems, were cited as the most common point of attack. Denial of service attacks, employee misuse of computers (downloading pirate software or porn) and viruses become more serious problem last year, according to the survey, which was conducted by the Computer Security Institute trade association with the FBI. Patrice Rapalus, CSI Director, said the survey showed "neither technologies nor policies alone really offer an effective defence for your organisation". Firms which want to build secure infrastructures should embrace "both the human and technical dimensions" of information security, and develop a properly funded strategy to combat security breaches, he said. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPh: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island GroupFax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "...three shall be the number to count, and the number to be counted shall be three.....four shall thou not count......five is right out". - M. Python -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5146 From: Matthew Paulsen Date: Mon Apr 8, 2002 11:19pm Subject: RE: Cost of IT security breaches doubles - FBI (pet peeve..)This is such a common occurrance for large and small businesses... I average a few security scans a week, one today yielded 3 high level holes where data could be exported and site disruption could occur, as well as a legal issue that now needs to be involved (this done in 5 minutes of testing.. what would 6 months of in-depth analysis yield?). I tend to handle a few fraudlent traces that are grand theft fraud 50% of the time each week - I have 11 open now. I'll probably have 5 more come in this week, and perhaps deal with 100 more in the course of the year. This equates to probably around .01% of the general purchasing level of my clients customer bases. That .01% may not look too large, but think about how much money is getting moved around on the Internet these days and you may change your mind. Companies that are open to these problems typically do not secure their systems properly and will not budget for, nor outsource for, the expertise necessary to resolve the issue. Hence insurance firms such as Zurich and Chubb creating new "e" policies to save their own financials from ruin, then setting timelines on the policies rather than $$ amounts before reaction is resolved... so you lose millions if you're ddos'd, or your ISP's lines are cut before the insurance co's start paying out. No wonder .com's can't make money.. They can't cover losses or keep their doors open. Card processing firms market AVS as the good way to go for credit processing, and bump up fraud to unbelievable levels to make shopping experiences easier, but merchants lose millions to countries such as Bangladesh, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Qahar, Morocco and more as fraud is transacted and government response is nil. Also, the FBI and Secret Service and other firms are partially to blame since they have not clearly identified which jurisdictions nor operating arenas they are involved in and have maintained a cloak and dagger image to the general public since their inception. I dare someone to kick off a call to Verisign and ask where to send a credit card fraud investigation to - you will either get the FBI or the Secret Service. Perhaps a phone call to the FBI will yield the FBI's credit card complaint domain if you're lucky. I've had recommendations to submit data to the Postal Services investigation groups for international investigations, as well as Interpol, but not once have I heard anyone mention the CIA should be contacted for international investigations involving grand theft, and yet the Secret Service and the FBI will clearly tell you that international investigations are not in their domain but they "have offices in those countries" so they'll "send the report" over to them to do what they can (ie: nothing). Clarity is needed in plain simple terms for businesses to react to these disruptions. Further fieldings of calls to the FBI will get you nowhere in a hurry if you mention you want information on InfraGard... Trying to get an application mailed to you is like trying to get an IRS audit dropped. Most folks inside (not to mention outside) the FBI don't know what it is, and if they do, a local chapter is non-existent in many cases. If it does exist, you're probably faced with fees which doesn't prompt many highly qualified individuals and service organizations to become involved (not to mention it may get the ax with the rest of the FBI's computer crime stuff if folks have their way up higher in govt.). Proprietary information theft is sometimes a hard thing to qualify as well. Since some companies hide behind "Trade Secret" clauses, it's hard for investigating organizations and courts to subpoena data properly to determine if a crime is, has or may be occurring, or even if you can get enough information together to go after a potential criminal or organization committing criminal acts. Also, tracing data is inconsistent when determining suspects since the general security managers of organizations have no logging, little logging, or a lot but not necessarily the technical capabilities to understand what is being logged. And if by some miracle of luck, they do have a log, you're back at that happy subpoena moment, which spins you back to dealing with... the Secret Service.. no wait.. The FBI... no.. perhaps the CIA.. no.. what about... Or, maybe I'm all wrong and things are happy campy. Matt -----Original Message----- From: James M. Atkinson [mailto:jmatk@tscm.com] Sent: Monday, April 08, 2002 6:04 PM To: TSCM-L Mailing List Subject: [TSCM-L] Cost of IT security breaches doubles - FBI http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/24747.html Cost of IT security breaches doubles - FBI By John Leyden Posted: 08/04/2002 at 11:44 GMT Two in three US firms say they lost money after falling victim to security breaches last year, according to an FBI survey. The cost of intrusions was almost double that of 2000. Eighty-five percent of respondents taking part in the sixth annual Computer Crime and Security Survey, detected computer security breaches in 2001. Most resulted in a financial hit, with 64 per cent saying their firms had lost money due to security lapses. The survey discovered a slight increase in willingness to report computer crimes. More than a third (36 per cent) of the 538 security professionals polled reported intrusions to law enforcement, up from 25 per cent who contacted the authorities about breaches in the previous year. The average cost of security breaches, for those 186 firms prepared to estimate losses, was more than $2 million, compared to an average loss of $1.06 million recorded last year. As in previous years, the most serious financial losses occurred through theft of proprietary information (34 respondents reported loses of $151 million) and financial fraud (21 respondents lost an estimates total of $93 million). Internet connections, rather than internal systems, were cited as the most common point of attack. Denial of service attacks, employee misuse of computers (downloading pirate software or porn) and viruses become more serious problem last year, according to the survey, which was conducted by the Computer Security Institute trade association with the FBI. Patrice Rapalus, CSI Director, said the survey showed "neither technologies nor policies alone really offer an effective defence for your organisation". Firms which want to build secure infrastructures should embrace "both the human and technical dimensions" of information security, and develop a properly funded strategy to combat security breaches, he said. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------ The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------ James M. Atkinson Ph: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------ "...three shall be the number to count, and the number to be counted shall be three.....four shall thou not count......five is right out". - M. Python ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -------------------------- Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ADVERTISEMENT ======================================================== TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. =================================================== TSKS Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 5147 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Tue Apr 9, 2002 8:43am Subject: Highly Classified Recruiting Video The following classified video just turned up on the net. http://cagle.slate.msn.com/mondo/MondoAlQaeda.asp List members would do well to take a few minutes to review the materials, and forward them to the proper authorities. -jma -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPh: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island GroupFax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "...three shall be the number to count, and the number to be counted shall be three.....four shall thou not count......five is right out". - M. Python -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5148 From: D.A.Linsky Date: Tue Apr 9, 2002 3:39pm Subject: We must not forget. All, The following are the very wise words of Retired Marine Master Gunnery Sergeant, Ed Evans. His words are very striking and pointed, well worth your time to read. This one is worth a "pass on." (He is a Member of The Third Marine Division Association.) I Will NOT Forget! I sat in a movie theater watching "Schindler's List," asked myself, "Why didn't the Jews fight back?" Now I know why. I sat in a movie theater, watching "Pearl Harbor and asked myself, "Why weren't we prepared?" Now I know why. Civilized people cannot fathom, much less predict, the actions of evil people. On September 11, dozens of capable airplane passengers allowed themselves to be overpowered by a handful of poorly armed terrorists because they did not comprehend the depth of hatred that motivated their captors. On September 11, thousands of innocent people were murdered because too many Americans naively reject the reality that some nations are dedicated to the dominance of others. Many political pundits, pacifists and media personnel want us to forget the carnage. They say we must focus on the bravery of the rescuers and ignore the cowardice of the killers. They implore us to understand the motivation of the perpetrators. Major television stations have announced they will assist the healing process by not replaying devastating footage of the planes crashing into the Twin Towers. I will not be manipulated. I will not pretend to understand. I will not forget. I will not forget the liberal media who abused freedom of the press to kick our country when it was vulnerable and hurting. I will not forget that CBS anchor Dan Rather preceded President Bush's address to the nation with the snide remark, "No matter how you feel about him, he is still our president." I will not forget that ABC TV anchor Peter Jennings questioned President Bush's motives for not returning immediately to Washington, DC and commented, "We're all pretty skeptical and cynical about Washington." And I will not forget that ABC's Mark Halperin warned if reporters weren't informed of every little detail of this war, they aren't "likely nor should they be expected-to show deference." I will not isolate myself from my fellow Americans by pretending an Attack on the USS Cole in Yemen was not an attack on the United States of America. I will not forget the Clinton administration equipped Islamic terrorists and their supporters with the world's most sophisticated telecommunications equipment and encryption technology, thereby compromising America's ability to trace terrorist radio, cell phone, land lines, faxes and modem communications. I will not be appeased with pointless, quick retaliatory strikes like those perfected by the previous administration. I will not be comforted by "feel-good, do nothing" regulations like the silly "Have your bags been under your control?" question at the airport. I will not be influenced by so called "antiwar demonstrators" who exploit the right of expression to chant anti-American obscenities. I will not forget the moral victory handed the North Vietnamese by American war protesters who reviled and spat upon the returning soldiers, airmen, sailors and Marines. I will not be softened by the wishful thinking of pacifists who chose reassurance over reality. I will embrace the wise words of Prime Minister Tony Blair who told Labor Party conference, "They have no moral inhibition on the slaughter of the innocent. If they could have murdered not 7,000 but 70,000, does anyone doubt they would have done so and rejoiced in it? There is no compromise possible with such people, no meeting of minds, no point of understanding with such terror. Just a choice: defeat it or be defeated by it. And defeat it we must!" I will force myself to: * hear the weeping * feel the helplessness * imagine the terror * sense the panic * smell the burning flesh * experience the loss * remember the hatred. I sat in a movie theater, watching "Private Ryan" and asked myself, "Where did they find the courage?" Now I know. We have no choice. Living without liberty is not living. * Ed Evans, MGySgt., USMC (Ret.) Not as lean, Not as mean, But still a Marine. SSC,Inc. David A. Linsky President **************************************************************************** "The truth is incontrovertible. Malice may attack it. Ignorance may deride it. But in the end, there it is. " - Winston Churchill [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 5149 From: Charles P Date: Tue Apr 9, 2002 7:27pm Subject: A bit more humor Why are there no Wal Marts in Afghanistan? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 'cause they're all Targets. 5150 From: Steve Uhrig Date: Tue Apr 9, 2002 10:54pm Subject: Chad Margita front and center Chad, please email me with your new address. Your old ISP is kicking a message back saying they went out of business. Steve ******************************************************************* Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 "In God we trust, all others we monitor" ******************************************************************* 5151 From: john schmitt Date: Wed Apr 10, 2002 0:15am Subject: Re: We must not forget. Dear Mr. Linsky, Pardon me, but rhetoric, however inspirational you may find it to be in the case of Mr. Evans, is not necessarily "wisdom". It is simply opinion. Railing against President Clinton, or Dan Rather or Peter Jennings, reveals a political stance of your own, but has nothing to do with the topic of TSCM, unless one were to assume that all TSCM-ers have a particularly extreme right-wing point of view, which I do not believe to be the case. Your sentiments at the end I share, that living without liberty is not worth living. Mr. Franklin shared this opinion in the late 18th century, saying that those who would trade privicy for safety deserved neither. But, I strongly question whether your blind allegience to a political party, or to a President who was failed to be elected by a majority of the votes, or to his amateur leadership in the very silly procedures currently being practiced in our "airport security" programs, or to his current historically-record lack of leadership in the MidEast, to say nothing of his wrecking of the economy with ridiculous tax cuts, insidious Enron relationships, and insider crafting of energy policies, has anything to do with either liberty or TSCM. I recommend we keep this forum on the very useful topics for which it was established. John C. Schmitt, Ph.D Vice President, Business Development BioLink Technologies, International, Inc, www.biolinkusa,com ----- Original Message ----- From: "D.A.Linsky" To: Sent: Tuesday, April 09, 2002 4:39 PM Subject: [TSCM-L] We must not forget. > All, > > The following are the very wise words of Retired Marine Master Gunnery > Sergeant, Ed Evans. His words are very striking and pointed, well worth > your time to read. This one is worth a "pass on." (He is a Member of The > Third Marine Division Association.) > > I Will NOT Forget! > I sat in a movie theater watching "Schindler's List," asked myself, "Why > didn't the Jews fight back?" > > Now I know why. > I sat in a movie theater, watching "Pearl Harbor and asked myself, "Why > weren't we prepared?" > > Now I know why. > > Civilized people cannot fathom, much less predict, the actions of evil people. > > On September 11, dozens of capable airplane passengers allowed themselves > to be overpowered by a handful of poorly armed terrorists because they did > not comprehend the depth of hatred that motivated their captors. > > On September 11, thousands of innocent people were murdered because too > many Americans naively reject the reality that some nations are dedicated > to the dominance of others. Many political pundits, pacifists and media > personnel want us to forget the carnage. They say we must focus on the > bravery of the rescuers and ignore the cowardice of the killers. They > implore us to understand the motivation of the perpetrators. Major > television stations have announced they will assist the healing process by > not replaying devastating footage of the planes crashing into the Twin Towers. > > I will not be manipulated. > I will not pretend to understand. > I will not forget. > I will not forget the liberal media who abused freedom of the press > to kick our country when it was vulnerable and hurting. > > I will not forget that CBS anchor Dan Rather preceded President Bush's > address to the nation with the snide remark, "No matter how you feel about > him, he is still our president." > > I will not forget that ABC TV anchor Peter Jennings questioned President > Bush's motives for not returning immediately to Washington, DC and > commented, "We're all pretty skeptical and cynical about Washington." > > And I will not forget that ABC's Mark Halperin warned if reporters weren't > informed of every little detail of this war, they aren't "likely nor should > they be expected-to show deference." > > I will not isolate myself from my fellow Americans by pretending an Attack > on the USS Cole in Yemen was not an attack on the United States of America. > > I will not forget the Clinton administration equipped Islamic terrorists > and their supporters with the world's most sophisticated telecommunications > equipment and encryption technology, thereby compromising America's > ability to trace terrorist radio, cell phone, land lines, faxes and modem > communications. > > I will not be appeased with pointless, quick retaliatory strikes like those > perfected by the previous administration. > > I will not be comforted by "feel-good, do nothing" regulations like the > silly "Have your bags been under your control?" question at the airport. > > I will not be influenced by so called "antiwar demonstrators" who exploit > the right of expression to chant anti-American obscenities. > > I will not forget the moral victory handed the North Vietnamese by American > war protesters who reviled and spat upon the returning soldiers, airmen, > sailors and Marines. > > I will not be softened by the wishful thinking of pacifists who chose > reassurance over reality. > > I will embrace the wise words of Prime Minister Tony Blair who told Labor > Party conference, "They have no moral inhibition on the slaughter of the > innocent. If they could have murdered not 7,000 but 70,000, does anyone > doubt they would have done so and rejoiced in it? > > There is no compromise possible with such people, no meeting of minds, no > point of understanding with such terror. Just a choice: defeat it or be > defeated by it. And defeat it we must!" > > I will force myself to: > * hear the weeping > * feel the helplessness > * imagine the terror > * sense the panic > * smell the burning flesh > * experience the loss > * remember the hatred. > > I sat in a movie theater, watching "Private Ryan" and asked myself, "Where > did they find the courage?" > > Now I know. > > We have no choice. Living without liberty is not living. > * Ed Evans, MGySgt., USMC (Ret.) > Not as lean, > Not as mean, > But still a Marine. > > > > SSC,Inc. > > David A. Linsky > > President > > > > > **************************************************************************** > "The truth is incontrovertible. Malice may attack it. Ignorance may deride it. But in the end, there it is. " > - Winston Churchill > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] > > > ======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, > the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > =================================================== TSKS > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ > > 5152 From: David Alexander Date: Wed Apr 10, 2002 11:22am Subject: Russia accuses US of spy plot From BBC news website Russia accuses CIA of spying (No ! really ? I thought that was what they were paid for) http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1921000/1921567.stm Russian intelligence officials say they have uncovered a plot by the United States of trying to steal military secrets through secret agents. A spokesman for Russia's internal intelligence agency, the Federal Security Service (FSB), accused the CIA of trying to get classified information on new kinds of weaponry and Russia's defence links with other ex-Soviet states. American agents posing as diplomats were detected in Russia and a second, unnamed ex-Soviet state as they tried to recruit an employee at a secret defence installation, he said. The US Embassy in Moscow has refused to comment on the case, which comes just weeks before a US-Russian summit. "The FSB has irrefutable evidence of the CIA's spying activities against Russia," the FSB official said. He said that a diplomat at the US Embassy had led the operation, which allegedly involved coded letters and "caches". But early intervention had prevented any damage being done to Russian security interests, he said. Russia and the United States have traded mutual accusations of spying a number of times in recent years. Just over a year ago, the US expelled 50 Russian diplomats on spying charges, prompting Russia to expel 46 American diplomats. _______________________________ David Alexander M.INSTIS Global Infrastructure Director Bookham Technology plc Tel: +44 (0) 1327 356264 Mobile: +44 (0) 7799 881284 Fax: +44 (0) 1327 356775 http://www.bookham.com ======================================================================= This e-mail is intended for the person it is addressed to only. The information contained in it may be confidential and/or protected by law. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, you must not make any use of this information, or copy or show it to any person. Please contact us immediately to tell us that you have received this e-mail, and return the original to us. Any use, forwarding, printing or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. No part of this message can be considered a request for goods or services. ======================================================================= Any questions about Bookham's E-Mail service should be directed to postmaster@b.... 5153 From: u12armresl Date: Wed Apr 10, 2002 2:45pm Subject: Wireless Monitors I knew that it was coming soon but not this soon. There are several totally wireless monitors on the market now which now pose even greater securiry risk to all people that have them. It used to be that line of sight lasers were reading monitors and the tech got pretty good, but now it looks as you wont need a laser anymore. 5154 From: Date: Wed Apr 10, 2002 4:26pm Subject: New file uploaded to TSCM-L Hello, This email message is a notification to let you know that a file has been uploaded to the Files area of the TSCM-L group. File : /mission.txt Uploaded by : graniteislandgroup Description : TSCM-L Mission Statement You can access this file at the URL http://groups.yahoo.com/group/TSCM-L/files/mission.txt To learn more about file sharing for your group, please visit http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/groups/files Regards, graniteislandgroup 5155 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Wed Apr 10, 2002 4:22pm Subject: Nontechnical Descriptions of Selected Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorders Here is a cheat sheet of Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorders I got from DSS. It is a good piece of material to refer to from time to time as it covers many of the problems some TSCM clients may exhibit. When you talking to a prospective client you should listen quietly and carefully and keep the following materials in mind to see if any of what they say creates a hit on a disorder. On the other hand your potential client may be perfectly OK, but is just scared, confused, or misguided... learn to tell the difference. -jma ------------------------------------------------------ Nontechnical Descriptions of Selected Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorders See below for descriptions in lay terminology of some of the more common or significant disorders. These descriptions are based principally on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV), published by the American Psychiatric Association. Refer to DSM-IV for specific diagnostic criteria and for information on disorders not described here. Emotional, mental, and personality disorders are not as easily recognized as some physical illnesses like measles and mumps. Although the description of each disorder contains a general pattern of symptoms, there are many differences in the symptoms present from one case to another. The severity and duration of symptoms also varies. Many symptoms are characteristic of several different disorders. The boundaries that divide one disorder from other emotional or mental disorders are not always clear. Many individuals have multiple disorders. When adjudicating emotional, mental, and personality issues, the key point is not what disorder a subject has, if any. It is whether subject has behaved in a manner that suggests unreliability, untrustworthiness, poor judgment, or any other reason for believing subject may be a poor security risk. Adjustment Disorder Adjustment disorder occurs as a reaction to a stressful circumstance. It is diagnosed if the distress the individual feels is greater than expected given the nature of the stressful event, or if there is significant impairment in social relationships or work performance. By definition, adjustment disorder must begin within three months of the stressful event and be resolved within six months afterwards, unless the stressful circumstance is ongoing. If the problem was triggered by death of a close relative or friend, it is generally considered bereavement rather than adjustment disorder. This disorder is generally classified by subtype -- adjustment disorder with depressed mood, with anxiety, or with disturbance of conduct. Depressed mood refers to depression, tearfulness, or feelings of hopelessness. Anxiety refers to nervousness, worry, or jitteriness. Disturbance of conduct generally refers to antisocial behavior. Ref 15 Antisocial Personality Disorder Antisocial behavior, also known by the more technical terms of psychopathy and sociopathy, involves lack of respect for the commonly accepted rules of society. Manipulation of others and deceit are central features of this disorder. The following section cites an example of this disorder from a prominent espionage case. Antisocial behavior is a serious security concern. Values that normally inhibit illegal or vindictive behavior are missing. This can lead to fraud, embezzlement, computer sabotage or espionage when an individual sees an easy opportunity for illicit gain or becomes disaffected from the organization. Selling secrets may be viewed as a simple business opportunity rather than as treason Persons with antisocial personality disorder shamelessly take others for granted and manipulate them to serve their own self-interest or indulge their own desires. Such persons take pleasure in beating the system and not getting caught. Lying to others is common, as is lack of gratitude. Stealing, shoplifting, cheating on taxes, failure to pay parking tickets, aggressive or reckless driving, failure to pay bills even though money is available, picking fights, extreme promiscuity, sexual harassment, cruelty to animals, and spouse or child abuse are examples of antisocial behaviors. There is little remorse about the adverse effects of one's behavior on others. At work, typical behaviors include padding travel vouchers or expense accounts; being consistently late to work or leaving earlier than is reasonable; abusing sick leave; lack of concern with meeting deadlines; taking classified information home; misusing the diplomatic pouch; pilfering office supplies; lying to cover up a mistake or to make oneself look good; maneuvering to undermine a colleague who is viewed as a competitor for promotion; drug use or any other violation of regulations by a government employee. Antisocial persons tend to resent authority and dislike supervision, to attribute their lack of success to others "having it in for me," to think no one understands them, and that life is giving them a raw deal. Most people tend to blame others for their problems, but antisocial individuals are likely to focus the blame on their supervisor. They may submit extensive written appeals in response to any criticism in their performance evaluation. When antisocial subjects feel offended or frustrated in their desires, they may be inclined to hold a grudge and to seek revenge. Antisocial persons believe such improper behavior is commonplace and will not be punished. They have a high opinion of their ability to con their way out of trouble, and a low opinion of the astuteness of authorities who would catch them. The arrogance and self-confidence of the con man may be very useful in certain occupations (intelligence operations officer, undercover police officer, salesperson), so it is sometimes difficult to distinguish a valuable talent from a serious character defect. In severe cases of antisocial personality disorder, individuals are likely to have a criminal record that clearly disqualifies them for access to classified information. They are also unlikely to have the history of academic or career success that qualifies them to apply for a position of responsibility. Moderately antisocial personalities, however, may appear to be very desirable candidates for employment. They are often excellent con artists, and able to manipulate people so effectively that they do exceptionally well in interviews and are evaluated favorably by casual acquaintances. The true character is revealed only after prolonged or intimate contact. Antisocial personality disorder often occurs together with narcissistic personality disorder. This usually begins in childhood or adolescence. The most flagrant antisocial behavior may diminish after age 30. However, inability to sustain lasting, close, and responsible relationships with family, friends, sexual partners, or employer may persist into late adult life. Ref 15 A person with some antisocial characteristics, but who does not meet the criteria for diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, may be assessed under the Personal Conduct guideline, Pattern of Dishonest, Unreliable, or Rule-Breaking Behavior. Espionage Case Example 1 John Walker As a youth, Navy spy John Walker rolled used tires down hills at cars passing below, threw rocks through school windows, stole money from purses and coats left unattended at school functions, stole coins from church donation boxes for the poor, set fires, and shot at the headlights of cars. When arrested for attempted burglary at age 17, Walker admitted six other burglaries. He was pardoned so that he could join the Navy. A childhood friend, who says he knew Walker like a brother, described him many years later as "cunning, intelligent, clever, personable, and intrinsically evil." After his arrest, he enjoyed the publicity; he had no remorse. He rationalized involving his brother, son and friend in espionage, and trying to recruit his daughter, as trying to help them be successful in life, and he later criticized them for using him. He felt his only real mistake was allowing himself to be surrounded by weaker people who eventually brought him down. He concluded, "I am the real victim in this entire unpleasant episode." One author who spent about 160 hours interviewing Walker after his conviction wrote: "He is totally without principle. There was no right or wrong, no morality or immorality, in his eyes. There were only his own wants, his own needs, whatever those might be at the moment." He betrayed his country, crippled his wife emotionally, corrupted his children, and manipulated his friends. Yet all the while, he didn't see himself as different from others, only a little smarter. In his view, "Everyone is corrupt...everyone has a scam." Ref 16 Bipolar Disorder Bipolar disorder is characterized by episodes of extreme excitability (mania) and usually, but not invariably, also some degree of depression. It is the current terminology for what used to be called manic-depressive. If only episodes of mania are present, or mainly mania with some depression, it is called bipolar I disorder. If it is mainly depression, with some mania, it is called bipolar II disorder. If only episodes of depression are present, it is called depressive disorder. Episodes of mania are identified by: *An abnormally elevated, expansive, or irritable mood that leads to hyperactivity, impulsive behavior, and poor judgment. Mood may alternate between euphoric and irritable if subject's wishes are thwarted. *Inflated self-esteem, decreased need for sleep, increased talkativeness, thoughts that race faster than they can be expressed, easily distracted. *Abnormal (for the individual) involvement in pleasurable activities with high potential for painful consequences, e.g., unrestrained buying sprees, sexual indiscretions, foolish business investments. Episodes of depression are identified by: *Feelings of sadness and emptiness, or loss of interest or pleasure in normal activities. *Weight loss or weight gain, insomnia, fatigue or loss of energy, feelings of worthlessness or inappropriate guilt, diminished ability to concentrate, indecisiveness, or recurrent thoughts of death. *Significant distress or significant adverse effects on work, social, or family activities. Bipolar disorder is a recurring disorder. More than 90% of people who have one manic episode go on to have future episodes, although there may be several years between episodes and individuals may be fully functional between episodes. Because it recurs, and because it causes talkativeness and poor judgment, bipolar disorder is a significant security concern. Ref 15 Borderline Personality Disorder The principal characteristics of borderline personality disorder are: *Unwarranted fear of rejection or abandonment, usually associated with low self-esteem. Such persons are uncomfortable alone. Examples of such behavior include inappropriate anger when someone important to them must cancel an appointment, or panic at a temporary separation. *A pattern of unstable relationships with friends, lovers, or bosses. Such persons need a great deal of nurturing and support from any relationship. They may initially idolize someone who provides that nurturing, but then shift suddenly and dramatically to view that same person as hostile or cruel if they do not care enough or are not "there" enough for them. *Suicide, threats of suicide, or self-mutilation precipitated by fears of separation or rejection, such as fear of abandonment by a lover. *Unstable self-image leading to sudden changes in career goals, values, or types of friends. *Potentially damaging impulsive behavior in several areas such as substance abuse, unsafe sex, gambling, spending money irresponsibly, reckless driving, or binge eating. *Inappropriate expressions of anger, or difficulty controlling anger; chronic feelings of emptiness or boredom; or short but intense periods of irritability or anxiety. Lacking self-confidence, such persons may undermine themselves just at the moment a goal is about to be achieved, e.g., dropping out of school just before graduation, destroying a good relationship just when it is clear that the relationship could last. Self-destructive acts may also be precipitated by fear of having to assume increased responsibility. Borderline personality disorder is a significant security concern, because loyalty may shift so suddenly and dramatically to whomever purports to offer the necessary nurturing and support. Irrational feelings of abandonment by a supervisor or employing organization may precipitate self-destructive behavior or vindictive rage at one's employer. Borderline personality disorder is present in about 2% of the general population. It may occur together with other disorders. It is diagnosed about three times as often in females as in males. Physical and sexual abuse, neglect, family conflict, and early loss or separation from parents are common in the family histories of persons with this disorder. Ref 15 Dependent Personality Disorder Persons with dependent personality disorder have a pervasive and excessive need to be taken care of that leads to submissive behavior, fears of separation, and great difficulty making everyday decisions. Such individuals tend to be passive and to need an excessive amount of advice and reassurance from others. They want to be told what to do. They may agree to things they know are wrong rather than risk losing the support of those on whom they depend. Dependent personality disorder often occurs together with other disorders, such as borderline, avoidant, and histrionic personality disorders. Ref 15 Depression The essential feature of depression is either a feeling of being depressed, sad, hopeless or discouraged, or the loss of interest or pleasure in nearly all activities previously considered enjoyable. Brief periods of depression are normal, especially if life is difficult, one is ill, or after a traumatic experience such as divorce, death of a close friend or relative, or personal failure of some kind. To qualify as a major depressive disorder, depression must persist for most of the day, nearly every day, for at least two consecutive weeks and must include one or more of the following characteristics: *Decreased energy, tiredness, apathy, or fatigue. *Sense of worthlessness or guilt, such as guilty preoccupation over minor past failings; or a sense of helplessness. *Changes in sleeping patterns -- insomnia or somnolence. *Marked changes in appetite. *Agitation, e.g., inability to sit still, pacing, hand-wringing, pulling or rubbing of skin or clothing. *Talk about death or suicide. *Difficulty in thinking, concentrating, or making decisions. Depression can generally be controlled by medication or professional counseling. The security significance depends upon whether the depression affects judgment or work performance. It is quite possible for some persons to feel considerable personal distress from depression without this affecting their judgment or work performance. As in a number of other areas, how the individual actually behaves may be more relevant for security evaluation than the medical diagnosis. Ref 15 Eating Disorders The individual with anorexia nervosa refuses to maintain a minimally normal body weight. Weight loss is usually achieved primarily by restricting food intake, although there may be some self-induced vomiting or misuse of laxatives or diuretics. The self-esteem of individuals with anorexia nervosa is highly dependent upon their body shape and weight. As a result, there is an intense fear of gaining weight or becoming fat. Paradoxically, concern about gaining weight often increases as actual weight declines. Self-starvation has significant physical and sometimes psychological consequences. Hospitalization is common and death is not infrequent. The essential features of bulimia nervosa are binge eating a couple times a week following by self-induced vomiting or misuse of laxatives to avoid gaining weight. Individuals with bulimia nervosa are similar to those with anorexia nervosa in their fear of gaining weight and high level of dissatisfaction with their own bodies, but generally do maintain a normal weight. Anorexia and bulimia both indicate fundamental problems of low self-esteem and poor adjustment. Bulimia is a greater security concern than anorexia as bulimics are typically ashamed of their eating problems and attempt to conceal them. Binge eating usually occurs in secrecy. Bulimia is frequently accompanied by other mood, anxiety, and personality disorders. About one-third of those with bulimia also have a substance abuse problem. From one-third to one-half also have one or more personality disorders, most frequently borderline personality disorder. Ref 15 Histrionic Personality Disorder The word histrionic refers to behavior that is theatrical, deliberately affected, or deliberately displaying emotion for the effect that it has. The histrionic personality is identified by excessive emotionality and attention-seeking behavior that begins in early childhood and is present in a variety of contexts. Histrionic individuals appear very charming, enthusiastic, and open or flirtatious, but this wears thin as they constantly demand to be the center of attention. They feel so uncomfortable or unappreciated when not the center of attention that they may make up stories or create a scene to focus attention on themselves Physical appearance is often used to draw attention. For a woman, there may be seductive dress or behavior; for a man, macho dress or behavior. Romantic fantasy is common, but such persons often have difficulty achieving emotional intimacy in romantic relationships. Relationships fluctuate between emotional manipulation of the partner and strong dependence on the partner. Dramatic expression of emotions may be turned on and off so quickly that others may suspect the individual is faking these feelings. Histrionic personalities may express strong feelings with dramatic flair, but without any supporting facts or details. They are impulsive, bored with routine work, and crave the excitement of new experiences. Histrionic Personality Disorder often occurs together with other disorders such as Borderline Personality, Antisocial Personality, Narcissistic Personality, and Dependent Personality Disorder. Ref 15 Histrionic personality is a security concern because such persons are easily influenced by others and by current fads. They make quick and impulsive judgments and crave excitement. They may be overly trusting, especially of strong authority figures whom they see as magically solving their problems. Narcissistic Personality Disorder A narcissistic personality is characterized by unwarranted feelings of self-importance or self-esteem (grandiosity), a sense of entitlement, and a lack of empathy for others. These characteristics are discussed separately below and then related to security issues. Grandiosity Wholly unwarranted feelings of self-importance or self-esteem are referred to by psychologists as grandiosity. Grandiose persons grossly overestimate their abilities and inflate their accomplishments. They are often preoccupied with fantasies of success, power, beauty or love. They may need constant reinforcement of this fantasy image of themselves. Grandiose persons expect to be viewed as "special" even without appropriate accomplishments. The need for praise and sensitivity to criticism dominate relationships with others. Personal friendships, relationships with supervisors and co-workers, and amorous relationships turn quickly from love to hate, and vice versa, depending upon whether the relationship supports or undermines subject's self-esteem. The narcissist demands unconditional acceptance of his or her specialness, and relationships blossom only when this is given and sour quickly when it is not. Self-esteem is almost always fragile. An unreasonably high, overt self-evaluation masks inner doubts and insecurities. It is paradoxical that someone with such a crippling sense of inadequacy should act in such an arrogant, imperious, and grandiloquent manner. Grandiose persons feel they are so smart or so important that the rules, which were made for ordinary people, do not apply to them. Rules and social values are not necessarily rejected as they are by the antisocial personality; it is just that one feels above the rules. Entitlement A sense of entitlement is characterized by unreasonable expectation of especially favorable treatment. Such persons expect to be given whatever they want or feel they need. They may feel entitled to a promotion or to a higher grade in school just because they worked hard for it, regardless of the quality of their performance; entitled to more money because housing or college costs are so high, even though they didn't earn it; entitled to cut in front of the line because they are so busy or their time is so valuable. They may also feel entitled to punish others, to "give them what they deserve," because others failed to recognize their special abilities or frustrated their desires in some other way. Instead of congratulating a colleague who receives a promotion, the narcissist may feel bitter and grouse that the promotion wasn't deserved. Several persons arrested for embezzlement have revealed that they started to take money only after someone on a par with them got a promotion that they didn't receive. They felt entitled to take the money because they should have been promoted. Many people genuinely do get a raw deal, and may be justified in feeling they deserve better. Feelings of entitlement in such cases become a security problem only if the person is planning revenge or retaliation. Lack of Empathy Narcissists generally view the world only from the perspective of how it affects themselves. There is little empathy or ability to understand the feelings or problems of others. For example, when a co-worker becomes seriously ill, one may be upset by the inconvenience caused by the worker's absence and relatively unconcerned about the welfare of the worker. Narcissistic persons shamelessly take others for granted and manipulate or exploit them to achieve their own ends. They may be unusually aggressive and ambitious in seeking relationships with others in positions of power. In romantic relationships, the partner is often treated as an object to be used to bolster one's self-esteem. In extreme cases, the narcissist who gains power over others, as in a relationship between supervisor and subordinate, may use this power in humiliating and cruel ways, sometimes just for what seems like personal amusement. Ref 15 Relevance to Security Narcissism should not be confused with the simple egotism found in many capable and loyal employees who progress to senior positions due to their strong abilities, self-confidence, and ambition. An unwarranted sense of self-importance is a concern only when self-evaluation is so far out of line with reality, and with how one is perceived by supervisors and colleagues, that disappointment and resentment are inevitable. The narcissist's need for recognition is so strong that failure provokes a need for vindication and revenge. The compelling need to justify unwarranted self-esteem may cause a grandiose person with a grudge to seek recognition elsewhere -- with an opposition intelligence service or business competitor. Feelings of entitlement are a security concern because they may be used to rationalize illegal behavior or may reduce the inhibitions that otherwise deter illegal behavior. When combined with antisocial attitudes, grandiosity, or desperate need or greed for money, a feeling of entitlement leads to easy rationalization of theft, fraud, or other illegal activity for monetary gain. "I'm only taking what I deserve." It is also an easy rationalization for revenge. "If they hadn't screwed me, I wouldn't be doing this, so it's their fault; they deserve it." When narcissists fail to perform adequately at work, it is always someone else's fault. The many arrested spies who exhibited this characteristic blamed others for their treason. They blamed their behavior on the counterculture movement of the 1960s, on an insensitive and intrusive Intelligence Community, poor security practices, supervisors who failed to recognize their potential, spouses for not being understanding, or government for not taking the right political stance. Few saw themselves as traitors; they saw themselves as victims. Self-deception and rationalization facilitate criminal behavior, as they enable an individual to consider such behavior in a more justifiable light. They also soothe an offender's conscience as the activity progresses. Narcissism is illustrated by the following examples from espionage cases. Espionage Case Example 2 Jonathan Pollard Jonathan Jay Pollard was a Naval Intelligence analyst arrested for espionage on behalf of Israel. From an early age, Pollard had a fantasy of himself as a master strategist and a superhero defending Israel from its enemies. He became obsessed with the threats facing Israel and a desire to serve that country. In college, Pollard boasted that he had dual citizenship and was a colonel in the Israeli Army. His Stanford senior yearbook photo listed him as "Colonel" Pollard, and he reportedly convinced almost everyone that Israeli intelligence was paying his tuition. After his arrest, Pollard said this was all "fun and games," and "no one took it seriously." But most of his fellow students did not see it as a game. Pollard kept his pro-Israeli views to himself while working for Naval Intelligence, but other tall tales about himself were more or less a joke in the office. He was unpopular among his colleagues, as they resented his bragging, his arrogance, and his know-it-all attitude. At one point, Pollard received permission to establish a back-channel contact with South African intelligence through a South African friend he had known in graduate school. Through a combination of circumstances, Pollard's story about his relationship with the South Africans began to unravel. After telling Navy investigators fantastic tales about having lived in South Africa and his father having been CIA Station Chief there, Pollard's security clearance was pulled and he was told to obtain psychiatric help. When the doctor concluded he was not mentally ill, Pollard filed a formal grievance and got his clearance and job back. Pollard's need to feel important, and to have others validate that importance, led him to pass several classified political and economic analyses to three different friends whom he felt could use the information in their business. This was before he volunteered his services to Israel. Although he hoped to eventually get something in return, his principal motive was simply to impress his friends with his knowledge and the importance of his work. Several years later, under a different supervisor, it was again Pollard's grandiosity that attracted adverse attention, contributing to his eventual compromise and arrest. The supervisor caught Pollard lying about his dealings with another government agency. The only purpose of the lie was apparently to make Pollard appear to be a more important person than he was. The supervisor wondered why Pollard would make up stories like this and began paying much closer attention to Pollard's activities. He noticed that Pollard was requesting so many Top Secret documents concerning Soviet equipment being supplied to the Arab world that it was becoming a burden on the clerk who had to log them in. The risk Pollard ran by requesting so many documents may also be explained by his grandiosity; such persons often think they are too smart to be caught. Ref 20 Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder This disorder is characterized by recurrent obsessions or compulsions. Obsessions are persistent ideas, impulses, or images that intrude on one's consciousness and that cause anxiety or distress. Compulsions are repetitive behaviors usually performed to relieve the anxiety or distress caused by obsessions. For example, an obsession about cleanliness might be relieved by compulsive hand washing. An obsession about having things in order, might be relieved by reordering things every morning to ensure they are in exactly the right place. An obsession with an obscene sexual image may be driven from the mind by counting to 10 forward and backward 100 times. Many obsessions or compulsions are insignificant. Obsessive-compulsive disorder is diagnosed only when there is a problem severe enough to be time-consuming, cause distress, or adversely affect an individual's performance. Obsessive-compulsive disorder suggests the presence of unresolved underlying problems. It is often associated with other emotional disorders. There is a distinction between this disorder and obsessive-compulsive personality disorder. The obsessive-compulsive personality attempts to maintain a sense of control through painstaking attention to rules, trivial details, procedures, lists, and schedules. Individuals with obsessive-compulsive personality disorder pursue orderliness and perfection at the expense of flexibility and efficiency. Ref 15 Although job performance may be adversely affected by inflexibility and stubbornness, the obsessive-compulsive personality is likely to follow all security regulations to the letter. Such a person is unlikely to ever, under any circumstances, leave a safe unlocked. Paranoid Personality Disorder The paranoid personality is distinguished by a pervasive distrust and suspicion of other people. Such persons are preoccupied with unjustified doubts about the loyalty or trustworthiness of friends or associates. They are reluctant to confide in others for fear that information they share will be used against them. They may refuse to answer personal questions, saying the information is "nobody's business." They read hidden meanings that are demeaning or threatening into innocent remarks or unrelated events. They may interpret an innocent mistake by a store clerk as a deliberate attempt to shortchange them. A supervisor's compliment on an accomplishment may be misinterpreted as an attempt to coerce more or better performance. An offer of help may be viewed as a criticism that they are not doing well enough on their own. Minor slights arouse major hostility, and these slights are never forgiven or forgotten. Such persons often have unjustified suspicions that their spouse or sexual partner is unfaithful. They want to maintain complete control over intimate relationships to avoid being betrayed. They may gather trivial and circumstantial "evidence" to support their jealous beliefs. Paranoid personalities may blame others for their own shortcomings. Because they are quick to counterattack in response to perceived threats, they may become involved in legal disputes. Such persons are attracted to simplistic black and white explanations of events, and are often wary of ambiguous situations. Paranoia often disrupts relationships with supervisors and co-workers. Severe paranoia is often a precursor of other mental disorders or found together with other disorders. Ref 15 Paranoia is a serious security concern, as the paranoid can easily view his or her employer or the U.S. Government as the enemy, and act accordingly. Alternatively, what appears to be paranoia may have a factual basis. Seemingly extreme concern about being investigated or watched or searching for listening devices or hidden cameras may indicate that a person is engaged in illegal activity and fears detection. Phobias and Panic Attack A phobia is a strong and persistent fear of some specific object or situation. A phobia may cause anxiety, such as fear of heights or fear of flying. In more serious cases, it may precipitate a panic attack. A panic attack is a sudden and usually short period of intense fear or discomfort accompanied by symptoms such as pounding heart, sweating, trembling, shortness of breath, feeling of choking, chest pain, nausea, dizziness, numbness, chills or hot flushes, fear of going crazy, or fear of death. Phobias that could entail security risk in some work environments include Agoraphobia and Social Phobia. Agoraphobia is fear of being in places or situations from which escape might be difficult or embarrassing, or in which help may not be available, in case of a panic attack. Typically, this leads to avoidance of situations such as being alone outside the home or at home alone, being in a crowd of people, traveling in an automobile or airplane, or being on a bridge or in an elevator. Seriousness is measured by the extent to which avoidance of these situations interferes with a person's daily routine, work performance, or social life. Social phobia is fear of social situations in which one is exposed to unfamiliar people, or fear of any situation in which one's performance will be observed by others, such as public speaking. The subject fears their anxiety will be apparent to others and cause embarrassment or humiliation. Some anxiety is common. It qualifies as a phobia only if avoidance of the feared situation interferes with social relationships or work performance or causes marked distress. Ref 15 Schizophrenia There is no single definitive symptom for schizophrenia, but a constellation of various possible symptoms that together cause a significant reduction in ability to function effectively at work, in interpersonal relations, or in care for oneself. The following symptoms are characteristic but do not normally all appear in any single case. *Delusions, such as belief that one is being persecuted or ridiculed, or that one's thoughts or body parts are being manipulated or have been replaced by someone else's. *Hallucinations, such as hearing voices. *Disorganized thinking and speech, such as slipping off the track from one topic to another, or completely unrelated responses. *Bizarre behavior, such as wearing multiple overcoats on a hot day, maintaining a rigid posture, or being unaware of one's surroundings. *Absence of emotion; inability to initiate or complete common, everyday activities at work or at home, Schizophrenia is a serious mental illness. Although some symptoms respond to treatment, complete remission is unusual. Ref 15 Schizotypal Personality Disorder Schizotypal personality disorder can be viewed as a mild form of schizophrenia. Behavior is eccentric rather than bizarre. Instead of delusions and hallucinations, there are milder perceptual distortions. Such persons may be preoccupied with superstitions or paranormal phenomena. They may believe they have magical control over others, e.g., believing that their spouse taking the dog for a walk is a direct result of their thinking it should be done an hour earlier. They may incorrectly interpret unrelated events as having a special message for them. A defining element of schizotypal personality disorder is a pervasive pattern of having little desire for, being uncomfortable with, and having little capacity for maintaining close relationships. Such persons prefer to keep to themselves as they feel they are different and don't fit in. They usually have no or few close friends or confidants other than a close relative. Ref 15 Schizotypal personality disorder is a serious security concern, as judgment is distorted. Inability to form close relationships suggests inability to develop loyalty. Reference Materials Glossary of Psychiatric Terms Ref. 14 abreaction: expressing feelings that have been suppressed. acrophobia: excessive fear of heights. acute: sudden onset and brief duration (as opposed to chronic). adjustment disorder: a reaction to a stressful event or circumstances that causes significant distress or impairs work performance or social relationships. affect: generally, a synonym for feelings, moods, emotions. affective disorders: conditions in which feelings of sadness or elation are excessive and not realistic, given the person's life conditions. Depression and mania are affective disorders. agoraphobia: unrealistic fear of open spaces. ambivalence: contradictory attitudes toward a person, such as love and hate, that occur at the same time. anesthesia: numbness of part of the body surface, absence of sense of touch. anorexia nervosa: aversion to food, usually caused by psychological conditions. antisocial personality: persons who are in constant conflict with society, without conscience, incapable or unwilling to establish bonds of affection or loyalty (see also sociopath, psychopath). anxiety: a state characterized by apprehensiveness, nervousness, fear. atypical: not typical, unusual or infrequent. axis: some psychiatric reports classify patients on five dimensions or axes. See Five-Axis System of Psychiatric Evaluations. avoidant personality: a pervasive pattern of avoiding interpersonal contact for fear of criticism, disapproval, or rejection. bipolar disorder: behavior that involves both depressive and manic episodes (depressive = unusual degree of sadness; manic = excitable, expansive, unrealistically cheerful). borderline personality: a term applied to very unstable persons who are impulsive, unpredictable, often self-destructive, and deficient in interpersonal skills. bulimia: a disorder characterized by periods of overeating followed by induced vomiting or the use of laxatives. chronic: a condition of lengthy duration; sometimes used to mean irreversible and incurable. compulsion: an irrational and repetitive impulse to perform some act, e. g. frequent handwashing. compulsive personality: excessive concern with rules, efficiency, order, neatness, and punctuality. conduct disorder: patterns of behavior that consistently violate established norms, usually applied to children and adolescents. conversion reaction: bodily symptoms, in the absence of any tissue damage, that symbolize the patient's psychological conflict. defense mechanism: a pattern of behavior that protects the person from anxious feelings. delusion: a persistent or dominating false conception regarding matters of fact, and which is resistant to reason. dementia: impairment of mental abilities, such as memory and problem-solving. dependent personality: a person who lacks of self-confidence, is easily influenced through dependence on others, and often avoids initiating action. depressed affect: refers to sadness or depression. depression: extreme sadness, often accompanied by self-blame. dissociation: the action of separating psychological processes that ordinarily are associated or connected; for example, upon experiencing misfortune the person fails to show expected or conventional signs of sadness. dysfunction: impairment of judgment or action, abnormal function. dyslexia: reading disorder characterized by omission, distortion, and modification of words while reading, often leading to avoidance of situations requiring normal reading skills. dysphoria: unhappy, feeling bad, unpleasant feelings (opposite of euphoria). ego-dystonic: refers to thoughts, images, and feelings that a person regards as alien, unwanted, and inconsistent with self-image. endogenous depression: feelings of sadness attributable to internal causes in the absence of external circumstances such as loss of job, death of a loved one, etc. entitlement: unreasonable expectation of especially favorable treatment. epilepsy: a physical illness, not a mental illness, characterized by seizures and loss of consciousness. Epileptics who conscientiously take standard doses of medication and who are free of seizures are not a security concern. Unusually high doses of medication or continued seizures indicate need for a medical evaluation. exhibitionism: displaying one's genitals or other private parts to an involuntary observer for the purpose of sexual arousal. exogenous depression: feelings of sadness associated with external circumstances such as loss of job, death of a spouse, not winning a coveted prize, etc. euphoria: feeling good, experiencing pleasant feelings. flashback: vivid, intense reliving of a past experience, usually an experience associated with the use of mind-altering drugs or post-traumatic stress disorder. functional psychosis: severe disturbance in thought, emotional display, and overt conduct in the absence of brain damage, intoxication, or chemical imbalance. grandiosity: exaggerated self importance, conceited, exaggerated expectations of recognition for ordinary job performance. hallucination: the report of imaginings that are bizarre and that others regard as inappropriate. The person "sees" things or events, or "hears" voices that cannot be validated by others. histrionic personality: a person who is typically overly dramatic, usually for the purpose of manipulating others. hysteria: a diagnostic term that has been replaced by either histrionic personality or conversion reaction. Historically, bodily symptoms in the absence of organic pathology. mania: extreme excitability, unrealistic cheerfulness, grandiose thinking often accompanied by insomnia. masochism: a term to denote a person's achieving sexual gratification from pain inflicted by another person. narcissism: self-indulgent, self-love, absorbed in self. neurosis: dominant feelings of anxiety, obsessive thoughts, compulsive actions, or physical complaints without objective evidence of physical disease. The concept of neurosis has been virtually displaced by "personality disorders." neurotic: pertaining to behavior associated with excessive use of defense mechanisms. obsessive-compulsive disorder: the person is preoccupied with unwanted thoughts and images (obsessions) and/or involuntary, repetitive actions that have no apparent purpose (compulsions). organic brain syndrome: impaired behavior attributable to brain disease or damage (sometimes called organic psychosis). paranoid: suspicious and mistrustful in the absence of reasons for such behavior. paraphilia: recurrent and intense sexual urge or sexually arousing fantasy generally involving either objects, suffering or humiliation, children, or nonconsenting partners. pathology: abnormal physical or psychological condition. phobia: irrational fear, often associated with avoidance of the object of such fears. physiological: pertaining to bodily, organic functioning. posttraumatic stress disorder: delayed stress resulting from some earlier traumatic event, flashbacks, nightmares, lack of concentration, and reports of feeling strange and out of touch with everyday events. premorbid: the psychological status of a person before the development of abnormal conduct. projection: a defense mechanism; attributing to another person, or to the environment, some undesirable impulse or characteristic which is actually within oneself. psychopathic personality: see antisocial personality. psychosis: a serious mental disorder involving severe distortion of reality; extreme impairment of thought and action (equivalent to everyday terms such as insanity, lunacy, madness, crazy). remission: marked improvement or recovery from an illness, although the improvement may be temporary. repression: a defense mechanism; a threatening thought is ignored in order to avoid the pain of acknowledging one's guilt or shame. Some authorities define repression as the mental condition of not being conscious of a painful thought or feeling. sadism: sexual gratification achieved by inflicting pain on others. schizophrenia: a term used to describe undesirable conduct characterized by hallucinations, delusions, or bizarre behavior. schizoid: a descriptive term for a person who appears alienated from others, has poor interpersonal skills, and withdraws from social interaction. sociopathic personality: see antisocial personality. somatic: refers to the body. stupor: unresponsiveness, sometimes equivalent to unconsciousness. voyeurism: sexual pleasure through observing others in the act of undressing, colloquially such a person is called a "Peeping Tom." Five-Axis System of Psychiatric Evaluations Some psychiatric evaluations follow a format suggested by the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition. The diagnosis is given on five dimensions, or "axes." Axes I and II are for reporting any emotional, mental, or personality disorders or other conditions that are a focus of clinical attention. These are the heart of any assessment. Many psychiatric evaluations deal only with Axes I and II. Axis III is for reporting other general medical conditions that are potentially relevant to the understanding or management of the Axes I and II problems. For example, depression may be caused by a thyroid problem. Axis IV is for reporting stressful circumstances that may affect the diagnosis, treatment, or prognosis for mental disorders reported under Axis I and II. Examples of such circumstances are death of a family member, financial problems, job problems, sexual or physical abuse, and inadequate health care. These stressful circumstances are sometimes categorized on a scale that ranges from mild through moderate, severe, and extreme to catastrophic. Axis V is for reporting clinical judgment of the individual's overall level of psychological, social, and occupational functioning. How well the subject functions is summarized by a single number on a scale from 1 to 100. This can be useful to an adjudicator as a measure of how subject's mental condition may impact on work performance and ability to maintain the security of classified information. For an explanation of what these numbers mean, see the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) Scale, below. Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) Scale Psychological, social, and occupational functioning is measured on a hypothetical continuum of mental health - illness. Impairment in functioning due to physical (or environmental) limitations is not included. Intermediate numbers such as 45, 68, or 72 may be used as appropriate. 100 - 91: Superior functioning in a wide range of activities, life's problems never seem to get out of hand, is sought out by others because of his or her many positive qualities. No symptoms. 90 - 81: Absent or minimal symptoms (e.g., mild anxiety before an exam), good functioning in all areas, interested and involved in a wide range of activities, socially effective, generally satisfied with life, no more than everyday problems or concerns (e.g., an occasional argument with family members) 80 - 71: If symptoms are present, they are transient and expectable reactions to psychosocial stressors (e.g., difficulty concentrating after family argument); no more than slight impairment in social occupational or school functioning (e.g., temporarily falling behind in schoolwork). 70 - 61: Some mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia) OR some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional truancy, or theft within the household), but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful interpersonal relationships. 60 - 51: Moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and unnecessarily detailed or repetitive speech, occasional panic attacks) OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers). 50 - 41: Serious symptoms ( e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job). 40 - 31: Some impairment in reality testing or communication (e.g., speech is at times illogical, obscure, or irrelevant ) OR major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood ( e.g., depressed man avoids friends, neglects family, and is unable to work; child frequently beats up younger children, is defiant at home, and is failing at school). 30 - 21: Behavior is considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations OR serious impairment in communication or judgment ( e.g., sometimes incoherent, acts grossly inappropriately, suicidal preoccupation) OR inability to function in almost all areas (e.g. stays in bed all day; no job, home, or friends). 20 - 11: Some danger of hurting self or others (e.g., suicide attempts without clear expectation of death; frequently violent; manic excitement) OR occasionally fails to maintain minimal personal hygiene (e.g., smears feces) OR gross impairment in communication (e.g., largely incoherent or mute). 10 - 1: Persistent danger of severely hurting self or others (e.g., recurrent violence) OR persistent inability to maintain minimal personal hygiene OR serious suicidal act with clear expectation of death. 0: Inadequate information. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPh: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island GroupFax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "...three shall be the number to count, and the number to be counted shall be three.....four shall thou not count......five is right out". - M. Python -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5156 From: Steve Uhrig Date: Wed Apr 10, 2002 5:56pm Subject: Re: Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorders My inferiority complex is bigger and better than anyone else's. Anyone who goes to a psychiatrist ought to have his head examined. ******************************************************************* Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 "In God we trust, all others we monitor" ******************************************************************* 5157 From: Matthew Paulsen Date: Wed Apr 10, 2002 6:46pm Subject: RE: Re: Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorders Test yourself.. and your cat! http://www.4degreez.com/misc/personality_disorder_test.mv The Top 16 Signs Your Cat has a Personality Disorder 16. Couldn't muster up sufficient disdain if all nine lives depended on it! 15. You've repeatedly found him in the closed garage, hunched over the wheel of your running Buick. 14. Sits for hours in fascination while listening to Bob Dole. 13. Teeth and claw marks all over your now-empty bottles of Prozac. 12. No longer licks paws clean, but washes them at the sink again and again and again... 11. Continually scratches on the door to get in... the OVEN door. 10. Doesn't get Garfield, but laughs like hell at Marmaduke. 9. Rides in your car with its head out the window. 8. She's a dues-paid, card-carrying member of the Reform Party. 7. You realize one day that the urine stains on the carpet actually form the letters N-E-E-D T-H-E-R-A-P-Y. 6. Has built a shrine to Andrew Lloyd Webber entirely out of empty "9 Lives" cans. 5. Spends all day in litterbox separating the green chlorophyll granules from the plain white ones. 4. After years of NPR, Tabby is suddenly a Ditto-Puss. 3. Sullen and overweight, your sunglass-wearing cat shoots the TV with a .45 Magnum when it sees cartoon depictions of stupid or lazy felines. 2. Your stereo is missing, and in the corner you find a pawn ticket and 2 kilos of catnip. and the Number 1 Sign Your Cat has a Personality Disorder... 1. Makes an attempt on "First Cat" Sock's life in a pathetic attempt to impress Jodie Foster. -----Original Message----- From: Steve Uhrig [mailto:steve@s...] Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2002 3:56 PM To: Tscm-l@yahoogroups.com Subject: [TSCM-L] Re: Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorders My inferiority complex is bigger and better than anyone else's. Anyone who goes to a psychiatrist ought to have his head examined. ******************************************************************* Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 "In God we trust, all others we monitor" ******************************************************************* Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ADVERTISEMENT ======================================================== TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. =================================================== TSKS Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 5158 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Wed Apr 10, 2002 8:28pm Subject: Russia accuses US of 'spy plot' [The nice kids at Langley seems to have step in it again -jma] http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1921000/1921567.stm Wednesday, 10 April, 2002, 17:35 GMT 18:35 UK Russia accuses US of 'spy plot' ==================================== "The FSB has irrefutable evidence of the CIA's spying activities against Russia." - FSB official ==================================== The case has echoes of the old days of the KGB Russian intelligence officials say they have uncovered a plot by the United States to try to steal military secrets using spies. A spokesman for Russia's internal intelligence agency, the Federal Security Service (FSB), accused the CIA of trying to get classified information on new kinds of weaponry and Russia's defence links with other ex-Soviet states. "The mission was carried out by CIA officers, working under cover of US diplomatic representations in Moscow and one of the CIS countries," the FSB said in a statement. The US embassy in Moscow has refused to comment on the case, which comes just weeks before a US-Russian summit. Tricks of the trade "The FSB has irrefutable evidence of the CIA's spying activities against Russia," an FSB official said. A diplomat at the US embassy in Moscow is accused of leading an operation to recruit a Russian defence ministry specialist who was working on top secret matters. The timely intervention of the Russian counter intelligence services enabled them to prevent serious damage to Russia's security FSB statement Sources told the Interfax agency that the diplomat, a woman, had already left Moscow. She allegedly used coded letters, invisible ink and dead letter boxes to communicate with her target. Another CIA undercover agent, a man named as David Robertson, is alleged to have met the informer outside Russia. "The timely intervention of the Russian counter intelligence services enabled them to uncover the CIA's plans at an early stage, bring their activities under control and prevent serious damage to Russia's security," the FSB said. Tensions rising Russia and the United States have traded mutual accusations of spying a number of times in recent years. The Robert Hanssen case sparked dozens of expulsions Just over a year ago, the US expelled 50 Russian diplomats on spying charges, prompting Russia to expel 46 American diplomats, after FBI agent Robert Hanssen was revealed to have spied for Russia. And six months before that, American Edmund Pope was sentenced to 20 years in jail for trying to acquire military secrets. President Vladimir Putin later pardoned him on grounds of ill health. The latest spying allegations are set to heighten tensions before Mr Putin meets US President George W Bush in a few weeks' time. After a brief spell of detente, following the 11 September attacks, friction between the nations has recently grown as they come into conflict over issues including steel tariffs and poultry imports. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPh: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island GroupFax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "...three shall be the number to count, and the number to be counted shall be three.....four shall thou not count......five is right out". - M. Python -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5159 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Wed Apr 10, 2002 8:30pm Subject: FBI Concedes Spy Could Still Go Undetected [Like I said before, and will say again... -jma] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22524-2002Apr9.html FBI Concedes Spy Could Still Go Undetected By Walter Pincus Washington Post Staff Writer Wednesday, April 10, 2002; Page A06 More than a year after the arrest of FBI spy Robert P. Hanssen, there is still "substantial risk" that a bureau insider could commit espionage undetected, the FBI's new chief of security told a Senate committee yesterday. Kenneth H. Senser, the FBI's new assistant director for security, said it will take more time to install adequate safeguards in the FBI's aging computer system and another six months before a personal financial disclosure program can be started. Senser told Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, that "there is a greater possibility we would probably detect him [Hanssen] today than a year ago." But he quickly added: "I can't say with certainty that they [inside spies] would be detected." The delay in introducing financial disclosure requirements for FBI agents and employees surprised senators because Hanssen had told a commission investigating his more than 20 years of espionage that such a requirement might have led to his discovery. Senser said the FBI is drawing up the program requirements and hiring people to supervise and review the submitted disclosures. "It may be in the next six months," Senser said, "that we may be able to launch the program." Hanssen, 57, was arrested by the FBI in February 2001 after he left a cache of classified documents for his Moscow handlers in a park near his Vienna home. The Soviet Union and Russia paid him more than $1.4 million in cash, diamonds and promised bank deposits in exchange for betraying U.S. secrets, officials have said. The 25-year FBI veteran pleaded guilty in July to 15 counts of espionage as part of an agreement to avoid the death penalty. He is scheduled to be sentenced May 10. Senser and two other senior FBI officials appeared before the panel after the testimony of William H. Webster, who headed the commission that last week recommended several reforms after a year-long inquiry into the Hanssen case that found numerous security gaps at the FBI. Webster, who led the FBI and CIA at different times in the 1980s and 1990s, emphasized one of the recommendations stemming from the inquiry: that a government-wide system be established so "security lapses in a particular intelligence entity lead to improved security measures throughout the entire intelligence community." Many of the Webster panel's recommendations concerned the FBI's computer systems, which Webster said had been "underfunded for years." Hanssen, he said, did not have to "hack" his way into the system becauseeven restricted information is available to anyone with access to the computers. Some of the improvements being sought would create "tripwires" that would reveal the identity of anyone trying to access case files. But Sen. Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.), who has studied the bureau's computers, said the new computer system the FBI is installing "would not be able to pull [the FBI program] out of the swamp" it is in. Senser said a recently approved supplemental appropriation would "begin the process of getting an information assurance program" and another $78 million was in the fiscal 2003 budget. But he could not estimate the cost of complete modernization. In September 2000, Congress approved $379 million for updating FBI computers. Leahy said the FBI's practice of putting sensitive foreign intelligence wiretap information on its computer case-tracking system, given the limited security precautions, ran contrary to FBI promises to hold such information more closely when it requested increased authority to conduct wiretaps after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Dale Watson, the FBI's chief of counterterrorism and counterintelligence operations, assured Leahy that the rules involving that information, which had not been enforced in the past, "must be followed." © 2002 The Washington Post Company -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPh: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island GroupFax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "...three shall be the number to count, and the number to be counted shall be three.....four shall thou not count......five is right out". - M. Python -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5160 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Wed Apr 10, 2002 8:43pm Subject: SPA-22-Russia says it uncovers CIA spy ring http://www.spa.gov.sa/html/archive_e.asp?srcfile=512180&NDay=10/04/2002&wcatg=0 Date :4/10/02 2:59:57 PM No.: 22 SPA-22-Russia says it uncovers CIA spy ring - Interfax MOSCOW, April 10, SPA - - Russia's Federal Security Bureau said on Wednesday it had uncovered a U.S. plan to steal Russian military secrets, Interfax news agency reported. CIA officials posing as U.S. diplomats tried to recruit an expert in a secret Defense Ministry plant before the FSB intervened, the agency said. "The FSB has irrefutable evidence of the CIA's spying activities in Russia," an FSB official was quoted as saying. "The work was carried out by CIA officers, working under the cover of American diplomats in Moscow and in one of the CIS states." The U.S. embassy was not immediately available for comment on the accusations, which come just over a month before a summit in Russia between President Vladimir Putin and his U.S. counterpart George W. Bush. --SPA1459 Local Time 1159 GMT -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPh: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island GroupFax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "...three shall be the number to count, and the number to be counted shall be three.....four shall thou not count......five is right out". - M. Python -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5161 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Wed Apr 10, 2002 8:46pm Subject: Russian Agency Accuses CIA Of Spying http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-1651368,00.html Russian Agency Accuses CIA Of Spying Wednesday April 10, 2002 10:10 PM MOSCOW (AP) - The Russian successor to the KGB on Wednesday accused the CIA of trying to acquire military secrets, allegations that include such traditional spy tradecraft as invisible ink, secret drop points and mind-altering drugs. Russian television showed grainy footage provided by security services. Mark Mansfield, spokesman for the Langley, Va.-based CIA, declined to comment Wednesday. Agency officials routinely decline to discuss foreign allegations of U.S. espionage. Despite the end of the Cold War, experts say the spy business is alive and well between Russia and the United States and that both sides have a healthy interest in trying to predict the other's next moves - even if they're now allies. A spokesman for the Federal Security Service, the Soviet-era KGB's chief successor, said CIA officers posing as embassy officials in Russia and another, unidentified ex-Soviet republic had tried to recruit an employee at a secret Russian Defense Ministry installation. The security service interfered at an early stage and was able to monitor the CIA officers' activities and prevent serious damage to Russia's security, the spokesman said on condition of anonymity. The service named two alleged participants in the operation: David Robertson, whose post at an unnamed embassy in the former Soviet Union was not described, and Yunju Kensinger, reportedly a third secretary in the consular department of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The Interfax news agency, citing an ``informed source,'' said Kensinger had already left Moscow. It quoted the security service's press office as saying that Kensinger, like other alleged American intelligence agents in Russia, had not met personally with her Russian contact or contacts. Instead, she used secret drop points and messages in invisible ink. State-controlled ORT television showed grainy footage of a woman identified as Kensinger walking with other embassy employees. It also broadcast pictures of a plastic-wrapped package stashed among some bushes in what it identified as the Sokolniki region of Moscow, and an interview in a darkened room with a man identified as a Federal Security Service operative. He explained that the Russian Defense Ministry employee, identified only by his first name, Viktor, had gone to a U.S. Embassy in another former Soviet republic last spring to try to find information about a relative who had gone missing abroad. Embassy officers allegedly slipped him psychotropic drugs to get information, because he was found a week later wandering the streets in shock and with amnesia. The ITAR-Tass news agency reported that only after psychiatric treatment had Viktor - whom a security service employee called a ``real patriot'' - been able to reconstruct the details of his visit. ``As a result, the Federal Security Service took the necessary steps to stop the leak of Russian secrets through this channel and unmask the Langley employees who used the most unscrupulous methods,'' ITAR-Tass said. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow would not comment on the espionage accusation, which followed a warm spell prompted by Russia's participation in the U.S.-led anti-terror campaign. Analysts noted the latest spy scandal emerged just weeks ahead of a May summit between President Bush and Putin. ``It's the choice of timing that immediately raises questions,'' said Tom Sanderson of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. ``There are a number of people who are unhappy at how Putin is walking in lockstep with the Americans.'' Viktor Kremenyuk, deputy director for the USA-Canada Institute in Moscow, doubted the scandal will affect the summit. ``Of course spy scandals aren't good for bilateral relations, but they don't have any negative consequences,'' he told the Interfax news agency. Relations haven't been too cozy, however. In December, President Bush announced that the United States would dump the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which Moscow had vowed to preserve. The two nations also sparred over newly imposed U.S. steel tariffs, which Russia says will severely damage its metals industry, and Russia's ban on U.S. poultry. Shortly after Putin, a former KGB agent, became acting president in December 1999, U.S. businessman Edmond Pope became the first American convicted of spying in Russia in 40 years. Putin pardoned him shortly after his conviction. Last year, Russia ordered 50 U.S. diplomats to leave the country, mirroring the U.S. expulsion of Russian diplomats following the arrest of FBI agent Robert Hanssen on charges of spying for Moscow. The Russians' arrest of U.S. Fulbright scholar John Tobin on marijuana charges also attracted wide attention after security officials said they believed he was a spy in training. Tobin was freed from prison last August. Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2002 -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPh: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island GroupFax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "...three shall be the number to count, and the number to be counted shall be three.....four shall thou not count......five is right out". - M. Python -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5162 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Wed Apr 10, 2002 8:44pm Subject: Russia says uncovers CIA spy ring - Continued http://www.russiajournal.com/news/index.shtml?nd=12675#n12675 19:44 [Wednesday 10th April, 2002] Russia says uncovers CIA spy ring MOSCOW - Russia on Wednesday accused the United States of trying to steal military secrets, just weeks before President Vladimir Putin and his U.S. counterpart George W. Bush are due to meet in Moscow. The Interfax news agency quoted an official of the FSB domestic security service as saying it had uncovered a U.S. spy ring. CIA officials posing as U.S. diplomats had tried to recruit an expert in a secret Defence Ministry plant before the FSB, the main successor to the Soviet KGB, intervened, it said. "The FSB has irrefutable evidence of the CIA's spying activities in Russia," an FSB official was quoted as saying. "The timely intervention of the Russian security service stopped the U.S. plans at an early stage, taking control of their action and preventing a serious threat to the security of the Russian Federation." Officials at the U.S. embassy in Moscow and the CIA in Washington declined to comment. The FSB was unavailable for comment. Russia and the United States have improved ties since the September 11 attacks against U.S. cities, when Putin was among the first to offer his support. The Kremlin has since backed the U.S.-led war on terrorism. The FSB charges add to a growing list of woes likely to crop up at the May 23-25 summit in Moscow and St Petersburg, already set to include bickering over U.S. poultry imports, a U.S.-funded radio broadcast to Russia's separatist Chechnya region and nuclear disarmament. The unnamed FSB official, speaking to Interfax, named a junior diplomat in the U.S. embassy in Moscow as leading the operation, adding the diplomat had already left Russia. "The work was carried out by CIA officers, working under the cover of American diplomats in Moscow and in one of the CIS states," the official said. In March last year, 50 Russian diplomats were expelled from the United States, prompting a tit-for-tat response from the Kremlin in the worst spy scandal to shake Moscow and Washington since the Cold War. /Reuters/ -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. AtkinsonPh: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island GroupFax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@tscm.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "...three shall be the number to count, and the number to be counted shall be three.....four shall thou not count......five is right out". - M. Python --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------