From: A Grudko Date: Sun May 27, 2001 4:26am Subject: Cellular jamming -- Original Message -- From: Steve Uhrig > In the U.S., there are at least 7 seven distinct systems with distinct technologies & > frequencies, providing mobile telephone service, and each would require a separate > jammer. Some are spread spectrum, so they would not be easy to jam. > The method I can envision would be to pop some overriding or interfering carrier > on the control frequencies, of which there can be up to fifteen on certain U.S. analog > or digital cell systems. The idea would be to kill the control channel, and then > the mobile could not register with the system and thus could not be paged with a call. Our analog system was decommissioned about 5 years ago and totally replaced by GSM cellular. We have 2 service providers but both use identical technology and frequencies. Overseas visitors with GSM phones can use them here and we can use ours in many countries. A third licence is being negotiated on the system and a second band is on the cards, I think up at about 1.8 gigs. Anyway, my point is that at present we could jam all 900 meg cellphones with one piece of equipment. An Israeli company was offering the equipment using the method you suggest but at a very high price here. I had enquiries but the cost was prohibitive so I did not test one. I have recently been offered a locally made unit at about 20% of the price. I'll find out if it really exists, just for fun - I understand that it does not 'solve the problem' in the US but it's interesting to know if the technology exists, works and the TSCM implications. I'm also interested in the obvious implications of any jamming technology to VIP Protection details as we train and supply such persons. A noise generator emitter can be used to do the RX blocking to prevent the 'phone hearing the base station ctl channel. A quick noise generator can be knocked up using a 24 volt Zener diode reverse biased, drawing a small current, (you cannot use 2 diodes in series) - the higher voltage types generate more broadband noise 30volts DC 3x pp3 batteries via a 1k resistor/pot at the junction point between the cathode of the diode and resistor is where the most noise is. Use your SA to tweak for max output on the ctl ch. This is coupled into a connector via a 1NF to 500pf cap this is then fed into a 20 DB odd amplifier, then into another ....the gain required is about 50 db to make it usable into a 1/4 wave antenna. Very broad and noisy but it should work for 50 or so metres. Use your SA to tweak for max output on the ctl ch. Regards from a cool morning (19C) in the mountains 50 km NW of Johannesburg Andy Grudko. D.P.M., Grad I.S, (S.A.) Grudko Associates - Crime investigation, intelligence and protection Johannesburg - Cape Town - Durban - Pretoria - UK - US - Canada - Australia - Israel. Agents in 41 countries - www.grudko.com - (+27 11) 465 9673 - 465 1487 (Fax) - Est. 1981 GIN (Charter), SACI (Pres), WAD, CALI, SAMLF, SCIP (Past SA Chairman), UKPIN, AFIO (OS), IWWA, PRETrust, AmChamCom - "When you need it done right - first time" 3093 From: Miguel Puchol Date: Sun May 27, 2001 6:30am Subject: RE: GSM jamming Hi Andy, Well, regards from a very hot morning (36oC) in Barcelona! Regarding jamming technology, VIPs in Spain use equipment that jams all frequencies between 1MHz and 2.4GHz, but wich is also capable of leaving 'windows' open, such as GSM. They also put these things in gov' buildings to prevent remote-triggered bombs. Next time I'm near one with the SA I'll take some captures of them. All the best, Mike > -----Mensaje original----- > De: A Grudko [mailto:agrudko@i...] > Enviado el: domingo, 27 de mayo de 2001 10:53 > Para: tscm-l@yahoogroups.com > Asunto: [TSCM-L] GSM jamming > > > -- Original Message -- > From: Steve Uhrig > > In the U.S., there are at least 7 seven distinct systems with distinct > technologies & > > frequencies, providing mobile telephone service, and each would > require a > separate > > jammer. Some are spread spectrum, so they would not be easy to jam. > > The method I can envision would be to pop some overriding or > interfering > carrier > > on the control frequencies, of which there can be up to fifteen > on certain > U.S. analog > > or digital cell systems. The idea would be to kill the control channel, > and then > > the mobile could not register with the system and thus could > not be paged > with a call. > > Our analog system was decommissioned about 5 years ago and > totally replaced > by GSM cellular. We have 2 service providers but both use identical > technology and frequencies. Overseas visitors with GSM phones can use them > here and we can use ours in many countries. A third licence is being > negotiated on the system and a second band is on the cards, I think up at > about 1.6 gigs. > Anyway, my point is that at present we could jam all 900 meg > cellphones with > one piece of equipment. An Israeli company was offering the > equipment using > the method you suggest but at a very high price here. I had enquiries but > the cost was prohibitive so I did not test one. I have recently > been offered > a locally made unit at about 20% of the price. I'll find out if it really > exists, just for fun - I understand that it does not 'solve the > problem' in > the US but it's interesting to know if the technology exists, > works and the > TSCM implications. > > I'm also interested in the obvious implications of any jamming > technology to > VIP Protection details as we train and supply such persons. > > Regards from a cool morning (19C) in the mountains 50 km NW of > Johannesburg > > Andy Grudko. D.P.M., Grad I.S, (S.A.) > Grudko Associates - Crime investigation, intelligence and protection > Johannesburg - Cape Town - Durban - Pretoria - UK - US - Canada - > Australia - Israel. Agents in 41 countries - www.grudko.com - (+27 11) 465 > 9673 - 465 1487 (Fax) - Est. 1981 > GIN (Charter), SACI (Pres), WAD, CALI, SAMLF, SCIP (Past SA Chairman), > UKPIN, AFIO (OS), IWWA, PRETrust, AmChamCom - "When you need it > done right - > first time" > > > > ======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > or email your subscription request to: > subTSCM-L@t... > =================================================== TSKS > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ > > > 3094 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Sun May 27, 2001 10:54am Subject: Big Brother contestants searched by anti-espionage experts Big Brother contestants searched by anti-espionage experts http://www.ananova.com/news/story/sm_305015.html?menu= The Big Brother contestants have been searched to ensure they did not smuggle any banned items into the house. The latest anti-espionage technology was used in the search, and no phones or pagers were found. But the security team made some unusual finds. Amma's suitcase contained six bikinis, 20 pairs of knickers and 16 bras, and one of the boys' cases contained a mascara. A Big Brother spokesman says: "Paul also surprised our security team when they discovered something unusual buried beneath his socks and underpants. We here at Big Brother aren't prepared to reveal exactly what it is they found but let's just say we are looking forward to when he gets it out." All the contestants appear to share an appetite for vitamins and health supplements, although all but Penny and Stuart took alcohol into the Big Brother house. Head of suitcase security, Conny Schalke says: "I am so pleased we didn't find any dirty knickers, but I'm also disappointed they didn't try to smuggle anything 'illegal' in either. Its always so much more fun when we have to take things off them!" Last updated: 12:07 Friday 25th May 2001 -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 3095 From: Miguel Puchol Date: Sun May 27, 2001 3:35pm Subject: RE: Big Brother contestants searched by anti-espionage experts My God!! You also have this hideous program over there!? I think that Einstein has been proved wrong: Crap propagates faster than the speed of light. Have a good week all, Mike > -----Mensaje original----- > De: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng [mailto:jmatk@tscm.com] > Enviado el: domingo, 27 de mayo de 2001 17:55 > Para: TSCM-L Mailing List > Asunto: [TSCM-L] Big Brother contestants searched by anti-espionage > experts > > > > Big Brother contestants searched by anti-espionage experts > > http://www.ananova.com/news/story/sm_305015.html?menu= > 3096 From: A Grudko Date: Sun May 27, 2001 5:38pm Subject: Re: Big Brother contestants searched by anti-espionage experts I only have a younger sister so this message cannot apply to me. Andy Grudko ----- Original Message ----- From: Miguel Puchol > My God!! > You also have this hideous program over there!? > I think that Einstein has been proved wrong: Crap propagates faster than the > speed of light. 3097 From: Steve Uhrig Date: Mon May 28, 2001 0:05am Subject: Stuph for sale Hello list, I have some electronic items for auction up on ebay now that may be of interest to persons here. Go to: http://cgi.ebay.com/aw- cgi/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewItem&item=1241605233 to see one of the items, and click on Seller's Other Auctions to see the rest. Questions welcome. Steve ******************************************************************* Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 "In God we trust, all others we monitor" ******************************************************************* 3098 From: A Grudko Date: Mon May 28, 2001 2:29am Subject: Snake oil Here's something a colligue sent to another (US) list. A simulated 'on hold' situation could be created by simply muting the 'bugger's' handset - hardly a surveillance 'gadget' - and how long will a party wait in hold; never mind what are the chances they will pass an interesting comment to a third party? Generating a fake 'on hold' tone may add a touch of realism. Sounds like overpriced electronic snake oil to me... Andy Grudko Johannesburg "I ran across one of those "spy equipment" websites that is selling an intriguing but questionable telephone attachment. I wonder if any of you are familiar with it or know of any case history concerning this device. Here's what it does... When the user has this gadget plugged into his own phone line, the user is able to simulate the effect of placing the other party "on hold". I emphasise that nothing is attached to the other party's telephone line or planted in his house/office. The trick is that the other party is NOT really on hold and the user is able to listen to whatever remarks or side conversations the other party makes while the other party believes he is 'on hold'. The other party cannot hear the user. He only hears a dead line as if he is truly on hold. There is even an option to make it sound as though the user has received a "call-waiting" signal to increase the realism of this fake call holding. The web site claims this gadget was originally developed for law enforcement and has the usual boilerplate admonition that this is intended "for lawful purposes only." Andy Grudko. D.P.M., Grad I.S, (S.A.) CEO - Grudko Associates - Crime investigation, intelligence and protection Johannesburg - Cape Town - Durban - Pretoria - UK - US - Canada - Australia - Israel. Agents in 41 countries - www.grudko.com - (+27 11) 465 9673 - 465 1487 (Fax) - Est. 1981 GIN (Charter), SACI (Pres), WAD, CALI, SAMLF, SCIP (Past SA Chairman), UKPIN, AFIO (OS), IWWA, PRETrust, AmChamCom - "When you need it done right - first time" 3099 From: Date: Mon May 28, 2001 9:45am Subject: Worldwide spying network is revealed http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,496820,00.html Worldwide spying network is revealed MEPs confirm eavesdropping by Echelon electronic network Stuart Millar, Richard Norton-Taylor and Ian Black Saturday May 26, 2001 The Guardian For years it has been the subject of bitter controversy, its existence repeatedly claimed but never officially acknowledged. At last, the leaked draft of a report to be published next week by the European parliament removes any lingering doubt: Echelon, a shadowy, US-led worldwide electronic spying network, is a reality. Echelon is part of an Anglo-Saxon club set up by secret treaty in 1947, whereby the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, divided the world between them to share the product of global eavesdropping. Agencies from the five countries exchange intercepts using supercomputers to identify key words. The intercepts are picked up by ground stations, including the US base at Menwith Hill in North Yorkshire, and GCHQ's listening post at Morwenstow in Cornwall. In the cold war, eavesdropping - signals intelligence, or Sigint as it is known in the trade - was aimed at military and diplomatic communications. Helped by increasingly sophisticated computers, it has now switched to industrial, commercial targets - and private individuals. Echelon computers can store millions of records on individuals, intercepting faxes, phone calls, and emails. The MEP's report - which faced opposition from the British and American governments and their respective security services - was prompted by claims that the US was using Echelon to spy on European companies on behalf of American firms. France, deeply suspicious of Britain's uniquely close intelligence links with the US, seized on reports that Echelon cost Airbus Industrie an £8bn contract with Saudi Arabia in 1994, after the US intercepted communications between Riyadh and the Toulouse headquarters of Airbus - in which British firms hold a 20% stake. The MEPs admitted they had been unable to find conclusive proof of industrial espionage. The claim has been dismissed by all the Echelon governments and in a new book by an intelligence expert, James Bamford. More disturbing, as Mr Bamford and the MEPs pointed out, was the threat Echelon posed to privacy. "The real issue is whether Echelon is doing away with individual privacy - a basic human right," he said. The MEPs looked at statements from former members of the intelligence services, who provided compelling evidence of Echelon's existence, and the potential scope of its activities. One former member of the Canadian intelligence service, the CSE, claimed that every day millions of emails, faxes and phone conversations were intercepted. The name and phone number of one woman, he said, was added to the CSE's list of potential terrorists after she used an ambiguous word in an innocent call to a friend. "Disembodied snippets of conversations are snatched from the ether, perhaps out of context, and may be misinterpreted by an analyst who then secretly transmits them to spy agencies and law enforcement offices around the world," Mr Bamford said. The "misleading information", he said, "is then placed in NSA's near-bottomless computer storage system, a system capable of storing 5 trillion pages of text, a stack of paper 150 miles high". Unlike information on US citizens, which officially cannot be kept longer than a year, information on foreigners can he held "eternally", he said. The MEP's draft report concludes the system cannot be as extensive as reports have assumed. It is limited by being based on worldwide interception of satellite communications, which account for a small part of communications. Eavesdropping on other messages requires either tapping cables or intercepting radio signals, but the states involved in Echelon, the draft report found, had access to a limited proportion of radio and cable communications. But independent privacy groups claimed Britain, the US and their Echelon partners, were developing eavesdropping systems to cope with the explosion in communications on email and internet. In Britain, the government last year brought in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, which allowed authorities to monitor email and internet traffic through "black boxes" placed inside service providers' systems. It gave police authority to order companies or individuals using encryption to protect their communications, to hand over the encryption keys. Failure to do so was punishable by a sentence of up to two years. The act has been condemned by civil liberties campaigners, but there are signs the authorities are keen to secure more far reaching powers to monitor internet traffic. Last week, the London-based group, Statewatch, published leaked documents saying the EU's 15 member states were lobbying the European commission to require that service providers kept all phone, fax, email and internet data in case they were needed in criminal investigations. -30- John R. Angier II M-Group P.O. Box 721388 Norman, OK 73070-8070 USA 405.321.1015 I can assure you, Sir, we know what we know. Love's Labor's Lost, Act 5, scene 2 3100 From: Mike F Date: Mon May 28, 2001 8:27pm Subject: Re: Re: info needed on ICOM Radio I know I'm very late here Craig. There are some books that cover this subject fairly well. I was looking at so old text books,Both of these expalin Boolean algebra & Karanough mapping clearly 1)Schaum's Outline series,The Theory & Problems of Digital Principles by Roger Tokheim 2)Digital Principles & applications by Malvino & Leach Check for them at http://bibliofind.com Even though its owned by amazon still can find Good prices on used books later4,mike fiorentino info needed on ICOM Radio > Hi.. > > Thanks for all your help. I very interested in "calculating the > placement of the diodes using a Karnaugh Map. The matrix board plugs > in which makes it easier to attack." > > Has anyone got any more info on this?. I realise the radios are old > but i think i can use them for packet radio (or a private little low > power packet network). I did open them all up and see the board with > the marix layout.. > > Thanks again everyone.. > > Craig > 3101 From: Shawn Hughes Date: Mon May 28, 2001 8:05pm Subject: magic mute button >>When the user has this gadget plugged into his own phone line, the user is able to simulate the effect of >>placing the other party "on hold". I emphasise that nothing is attached to the other party's telephone line >>or planted in his house/office. The trick is that the other party is NOT really on hold ......... We had one a those things once. A supervisor who liked toys, and lacked technical knowledge purchased it. Same guy that bought a low end opto wfm and said that was all I needed to do sweeps. Anyways, I forget who really makes those, but the cheapest seller in the US is Shomertec in in WA state. What it does, is you plug it into the phone line. Then, you set up a pretext call, and plant the idea in their head of the subject of interest (yeah, I know, it gets worse), then, you hit the button. It makes a cl-click incoming call sound. You tell them you gotta answer the other line, then lock the button down. Hopefully, they like to talk to theirselves, or have a co-conspirator there. The most serious drawback was, even though it made the click sound, it did NOT mute the phone. Only times it ever worked was on low - level drug dealers " They wanna pay SIX TIMES what we paid for the stuff!!" On the jammer issues, to answer the lawyer, since no one else really addressed her question : _: Is there a "thingie" ...*batty eyelashes*...that tells you when your > cellie is being "JAMMED," The snide answer would be a tech - type with the appropriate equipment. Honestly, there isn't any gizmo i've seen (unless Uhrig is black - hatting something for the three-letter crowd) that will simply blink to let you know that your cellular telephone is being actively jammed. If certain techniques are being employed, you may hear noises, and your call may drop. The most common technique will simply cause your phone to display "no signal", or something similar. And, due to the general unreliabilty of the wireless system, just because you are not getting a signal where you normally do isn't a reliable indicator. ( I got a buddy who does all the work on some local radio and tv station equipment, he refers to FM as F@cking Magic). On the subject of jamming, I have personally seen four systems. One, is a high power swept random modulated RF signal generator that is employed to protect certain US assets, and allegedly provides added insurance from command detonated explosive devices. PW Allen was hawking them. The other three were designed specifically to turn off cell phones. The analog version was a hacked up Motorola bag phone, that started transmitting on the paging channels and wouldn't shut up. With the mag mount antenna, it knocked out phones pretty good. The other two were for TDMA and CDMA phones, but I didn't get to test them. The simplest way to knock an analog phone out ( I did this to force an individual to focus his attention on the hostage phone, and not call the news stations) , was to get a transmitter capable of talking on the paging channels, and dead key on them. Much more difficult than it sounds, but it did work. On knocking out pagers, thats not as difficult technically, but logistically a nightmare. Our region of the Southeastern US has over 75 pager frequencies. and, on the note of Big Brother, (no, i DONT watch it), but.......counter-espionage??? Is this an issue with tv shows? Sweeps, used to be only for the gov or the rich, now coming to a tv show near you! Shawn Hughes Technician in Transition fmr head, Tech / Electronic Surveillance Unit, Knox County (TN) Sheriff's Office 3102 From: =wampyr= Date: Tue May 29, 2001 3:03am Subject: Kami-zapp Virus. My scanner just picked up an odd new (to me) virus. I downloaded it as a team fortress classic map. It was disguised as a .txt file. It was identified by InoculateIT as a Kami-zapp macro virus. When I tried to download the map from the server directly, the same .txt file tried to infect and InoculateIT caught it again. If there are any gamers on the list, be aware of the Kamikaze maps. Nacht. == Those that travel long distances in isolation will defend themselves with strange arts. Shin shin, shin gan. The data contained herein is confidential. Unauthorised dissemination of the contents of this e-mail may be in breach of Criminal and Civil law and may lead to prosecution. _____________________________________________________________ Yourname@i...
When you want them to remember!
http://burn.inhell.com 3103 From: Steve Uhrig Date: Tue May 29, 2001 10:00pm Subject: When is cell phone jammed? Once upon a midnight dreary, Shawn Hughes pondered, weak and weary: > On the jammer issues, to answer the lawyer, since no one else > really addressed her question : > _: Is there a "thingie" ...*batty eyelashes*...that tells you > when your > cellie is being "JAMMED," > The snide answer would be a tech - type with the appropriate > equipment. Honestly, there isn't any gizmo i've seen (unless > Uhrig is black - hatting something for the three-letter crowd) > that will simply blink to let you know that your cellular > telephone is being actively jammed. A cellular-capable scanner with the control frequencies programmed in will tell you instantly if you are being jammed. You need to know what a normal control channel sounds like, by listening in a normal service area. Then see if changes drastically, most likely to a dead (unmodulated, or quiet) carrier if jamming is occurring. Of course one could build a box with a blinking light to tell you the same thing, but your ears listening to the speaker will tell you a lot more using readily available consumer equipment. The chances of encountering a jammer in the U.S. are probably essentially zero. This is extremely illegal under all conditions with no exceptions whatsoever and one of the things the FCC would jump on with lights and siren if reported. Watch it when Aimee bats her eyelashes. Strong men have been known to fall when that happens. Steve ******************************************************************* Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 "In God we trust, all others we monitor" ******************************************************************* 3104 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Wed May 30, 2001 9:09am Subject: Intelligence and Espionage in the 21st Century (HL705) Intelligence and Espionage in the 21st Century (HL705) by The Honorable Richard Shelby Heritage Foundation (May 18, 2001) I appreciate the opportunity to speak to this distinguished group on a topic that is a critical part of my responsibility as Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. In the four years I have served as Chairman, the Committee has held more hearings on issues relating to counterintelligence and security--from PRC nuclear espionage and the loss of missile technology to China to the Hanssen case--than any other single issue. This should not come as a surprise. Spying has been described as the world's "second oldest profession"--and one that is, in the words of one former CIA official, "just as honorable as the first." Espionage has been with us since Moses sent agents to spy out the land of Canaan and the Philistines sent Delilah to assess Samson's vulnerabilities. And spies are with us today. I will not attempt to cover the history of espionage from Biblical days to now, but I would like to take the opportunity to address some important recent history, and lessons from recent history, as well as some of the issues and challenges, new and old, that we face as we address counterintelligence in the 21st century. Let me emphasize at the outset that due to the extremely sensitive nature of the subject, and the fact that some of the matters I will discuss are the subject of ongoing investigations, I will be speaking for the most part in very general terms. The first point I would like to make is that, as those of you who follow counterintelligence are well aware, between the peaks of public attention that attend the arrest of an Ames or a Hanssen, or a case like the Wen Ho Lee case, there is a quiet but steady parade of espionage or espionage-related arrests and convictions. A July 1997 Defense Security Service publication lists more than 120 cases of espionage or espionage-related activities against the United States from 1975 to 1997. And those are just the ones that got caught. Since then, we have had the Peter Lee case; the Squillacote and Trofimoff cases; David Boone, an NSA employee; Douglas Groat, who pled guilty to extortion against the CIA in a plea bargain in which espionage charges were dropped; the conviction of INS official Mariano Faget of spying for Cuba; and, of course, the Hanssen case. Counterintelligence success or failure is often a matter of lessons learned or not learned. For today's purposes, I would like to concentrate on some lessons from the most damaging and high-profile recent cases: Ames, PRC espionage against our nuclear and missile programs, and the Hanssen case. THE AMES CASE: A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DISASTER In its investigation of the Ames case, the Senate Intelligence Committee found a counterintelligence disaster. Elements of this disaster included: a crippling lack of coordination between the CIA and the FBI, fundamental cultural and organizational problems in the CIA's counterintelligence organization, a willful disregard of Ames's obvious suitability problems, failure to coordinate and monitor Ames's contacts with Soviet officials, failure to restrict Ames's assignments despite early indications of anomalies, deficiencies in the polygraph program, deficiencies in the control of classified information, and coordination between the CIA's security and counterintelligence operations. Most disturbing was the CIA's failure to pursue an aggressive, structured, and sustained investigation of the catastrophic compromises resulting from Ames's espionage, in particular the destruction of the CIA's Soviet human asset program as a result of Ames's 1985 and 1986 disclosures. By 1986, it was clear to the CIA that, as the SSCI report on the Ames matter concluded, "virtually its entire stable of Soviet assets had been imprisoned or executed." Yet as a result of the failure to mount an effective counterintelligence effort, it was another eight years before Ames was arrested. The FBI, which lost two of its most important assets following Ames's June 1985 disclosures, also bore responsibility for the failure to mount an adequate counterintelligence effort, as a 1997 report by the Department of Justice Inspector General made clear. These two FBI assets, who were KGB officers, and a third KGB asset were betrayed by Hanssen in October 1985--just a few months after all three names were disclosed by Ames, according to the Justice Department affidavit in the Hanssen case. The two KGB officers were later executed; the third asset was arrested and imprisoned. Also extremely disturbing, from my perspective, was the egregious failure by both the CIA and FBI, over the course of Ames's espionage, to inform the congressional oversight committees, despite the clear statutory obligation to notify the committees of "any significant intelligence failure." While the committees obviously would not have been in a position to investigate the compromises themselves, they would certainly have exerted pressure that would have resulted in greater management attention and a more sustained effort that could have led to a more expeditious resolution. Before leaving the Ames matter, I should point out that failure also may come from learning the wrong lessons. Most notably, many of the CIA's failings in the Ames case can be traced to an overreaction to the "excesses" of the Angleton years, which thoroughly discredited the CIA's counterintelligence program, particularly in the Soviet-East European Division of the Directorate of Operations, where Ames worked. CHINA STEALS NUCLEAR SECRETS Turning next to Chinese espionage against the Department of Energy and U.S. nuclear weapons programs: unlike in the Ames case, extensive investigations into the compromise of U.S. nuclear weapons information have failed to resolve all the key questions. That there was espionage, there is no doubt. As the April 1999 Intelligence Community Damage Assessment of PRC nuclear espionage concluded, "China obtained by espionage classified US nuclear weapons information." What is not yet known is how, and from whom, the Chinese got this information. As a result, we do not know enough of the story to attempt a final or definitive exercise in counterintelligence "lessons learned." At the same time, a great deal is known about the overall security and counterintelligence problems at the DOE labs, which have been amply documented, for example in the report of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Because this is so well known, I will not touch upon it in detail, but will only make a few general observations. First, despite the history of espionage against the nuclear labs--and the obvious value of U.S. nuclear information to any nuclear power, whether established, emerging or aspiring--the Department of Energy's counterintelligence program did "not even meet minimal standards," in the words of the director of the program in November 1998. He testified that "there is not a counterintelligence [program], nor has there been one at DOE for many, many years." This was a terrible failure of counterintelligence analysis and practice--and of common sense. Moving from DOE to the role of the FBI, it is abundantly clear that the FBI counterintelligence investigation into the W-88 compromise lacked resources, motivation, and senior management attention; failed to pursue all relevant avenues of potential compromise; and was characterized by a number of missed opportunities. The CIA, for its part, failed to assign adequate priority or resources to the translation of the documents provided by the now-famous walk-in source. But let me be clear: While the investigation and prosecution of Wen Ho Lee that emerged from the W-88 investigation have been widely criticized, we should not lose sight of the facts. Dr. Lee illegally, purposefully, downloaded and removed from Los Alamos massive amounts of classified nuclear weapons information--the equivalent of 400,000 pages of nuclear secrets, representing the fruits of 50 years and hundreds of billions of dollars worth of research. Now I would like to address the Hanssen case. INVESTIGATING THE HANSSEN CASE Robert Philip Hanssen was arrested on February 18. On March 5, the Senate Intelligence Committee directed the Department of Justice Inspector General to conduct a review of the Hanssen matter. On March 7, the Committee authorized a separate Committee investigation. Because of the ongoing criminal investigation and pending prosecution, I cannot go into details of Hanssen's alleged activities beyond what has already been made public by the FBI and the Department of Justice. By the way, there is a great deal of information in that affidavit--too much information, some have suggested--and for anyone interested in counterintelligence, it is a fascinating and chilling story. Because there is much that is not yet known about this case, it would be premature for me to offer any definitive comments or lessons learned. What I will do is identify some of the questions and issues the Committee is investigating, and offer a few preliminary and personal observations. First the Committee will prepare a factual summary of the Hanssen case outlining his FBI career and alleged espionage activities. An important question here, since the Justice Department affidavit describes only espionage activities from 1985 through 1991, and 1999 through February 2001, is explaining what may or may not have been an eight-year gap in Hanssen's activities. We also need to know if he was involved in any activities of concern prior to 1985. The Committee will examine whether there were counterintelligence warning flags indicating a penetration of the FBI--for example, source reporting or unexplained compromises of human sources or technical programs--and the response of the counterintelligence community, if any, to these events. This is a critical issue. The 1997 Department of Justice Inspector General report on the Ames case criticized the FBI for failing to mount an intensive counterintelligence effort to pursue evidence of catastrophic damage to the FBI's and CIA's Russian operations beginning in 1985. The signs were there, but the FBI did not pursue them in an aggressive and systematic fashion. We now know that such an effort might have detected Hanssen, as well. We will look closely at the FBI's efforts following the 1997 IG report to see if the agency applied these lessons from the Ames investigation to its ongoing counterintelligence efforts. There have been press reports of other source information or counterintelligence analyses that might have pointed to Hanssen sooner. I cannot address those reports; I can only say that we are reviewing both Ames-era and post-Ames reporting and analysis to determine whether any relevant warning flags were missed. Moving to Hanssen himself, the Committee will review possible warning flags in Hanssen's own behavior that raised, or should have raised, questions about his loyalty or suitability, and the response, if any, by Hanssen's colleagues and security personnel. FBI internal security procedures during the period of Hanssen's activities will be another critical focus of the Committee's work. The Committee will review personnel security issues, such as the FBI's failure to adopt an across-the-board polygraph program comparable to those at the CIA and NSA, and the adequacy of financial disclosure requirements. The Committee will look hard at the FBI's computer and information systems security practices, and at Hanssen's computer activities, including the possibility that he gained unauthorized access or might have manipulated FBI computer systems. Another issue is the control of classified information in general. Hanssen appears to have been able to gain authorized or unauthorized access to an extremely wide range of sensitive intelligence programs and activities, many of which may have been beyond his "need to know." (Ames too was able to gain access to a great deal of information for which he had no need to know.) This problem may be FBI-wide, and not limited to Hanssen. In the 1987 ANLACE report--the first of several inconclusive efforts to solve the 1985 Ames/Hanssen compromises I described earlier--FBI agents found that as many as 250 FBI employees in the Washington Field Office alone had knowledge of these highly sensitive cases. Also, I am concerned that Hanssen was able, according to the affidavit, to provide the KGB with original documents (rather than copies), pointing to a serious failure in document control. These security issues also are the subject of Judge Webster's investigation. We look forward to the results of the Webster Commission, which should aid the Committee in making budgetary and other decisions to enhance security at the FBI. The impact of Hanssen's alleged espionage on operational, budgetary, and programmatic decisions across the Intelligence Community goes to the heart of the Committee's responsibilities and will be a critical component of our review. The key issues include: what operations, programs and sources were compromised, and their remaining utility, if any; how much it will cost to replace or replicate these capabilities, if it can be done at all; and the impact of the compromise on the utility of these collection capabilities against other, non-Russian targets. The Committee will review the possibility that Moscow used sources or programs compromised by Hanssen for "perception management" purposes. In the wake of the Ames case, the CIA concluded that the Soviets and later the Russians had used controlled sources or information compromised by Ames to manipulate U.S. assessments of issues ranging from internal Soviet political developments to Soviet and Russian military capabilities and Russian policy toward the former Soviet republics. In sum, the Committee will collect the facts, identify shortcomings and failures in the FBI's internal security and counterintelligence operations that may have facilitated Hanssen's alleged activities, determine the impact on the U.S. government's intelligence collection efforts, and take such legislative or other steps as appropriate. The Committee also will review possible changes in law to facilitate the investigations and prosecution of espionage cases. This process may take some time, as the final assessment of the Hanssen case will not be completed for some time, even if Hanssen were to reach a plea agreement tomorrow. In the meantime, we intend to take preliminary steps, as appropriate, in this year's intelligence authorization bill. DIFFICULT QUESTIONS ABOUT HANSSEN Let me offer a few general thoughts on the Hanssen matter, reiterating that these are personal and preliminary in nature. First, let me restate the obvious question: How did the nation's premier counterintelligence organization fail to detect a spy in its midst for 15 years? While a number of explanations have been and will continue to be offered, it is difficult to avoid returning to that simple question. In any case, we intend to find out the answer. Part of the answer may lie in Hanssen's ability to use his knowledge of FBI activities and techniques to avoid detection. While some of the early assessments of Hanssen as a master spy may have been exaggerated, it is clear that he was in a position to benefit from his inside knowledge of FBI procedures, and that would explain at least some of his success in evading detection for so long. On the other hand, it seems fair to say that Hanssen, like Ames, benefited from the FBI's failure aggressively to pursue the source of the 1985 agent losses and other compromised FBI activities, as documented by the Justice Department IG. Second, why didn't the FBI do more to take advantage of the lessons that the CIA learned so painfully from the Ames case with respect to financial disclosure, compartmentation, an effective polygraph program, and other security and counterintelligence measures? Granted, the reforms adopted by the CIA post-Ames could not have stopped Hanssen in time to prevent grave damage to the national security because Ames's arrest and the subsequent recriminations and reforms came almost a decade after Hanssen appears to have started spying. On the other hand, we may well learn that additional losses could in fact have been avoided had Hanssen been caught five years earlier. A RESTRUCTURED NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SYSTEM I would now like to move to an important development in national-level counterintelligence policy. On December 28, 2000, President Clinton signed a Presidential Decision Directive entitled "U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness--Counterintelligence for the 21st Century," or "CI-21." President Bush has proceeded to implement the directive. CI-21 reflects the concerns of senior counterintelligence officials--which the Committee shared--over the ability of existing U.S. counterintelligence structures, programs, and policies to address both emerging threats and traditional adversaries using cutting-edge technologies and tradecraft in the 21st century. I am pleased to say that the Senate Intelligence Committee, on a bipartisan basis, played an important role in keeping the pressure on the executive branch to force them to come up with a counterintelligence reform plan even when the executive branch process bogged down amid interagency disagreements. From an analytical perspective, CI-21 restates and expands upon other recent assessments of the emerging counterintelligence environment. It recognizes that the threat has expanded beyond the traditional paradigm of "adversary states stealing classified data"--which includes traditional espionage by Russia, the PRC, and others--to include new efforts by these traditional adversaries, as well as certain allies and friendly states, to collect economic information and critical but sometimes unclassified technologies, as we have seen just recently in the Lucent case. A key element of this threat is the growing use of modern technology, particularly modern computer technology and the Internet, to develop information warfare (IW) and intelligence collection capabilities and intelligence tradecraft that alter traditional notions of time, distance, and access. Faced by these emerging challenges, the drafters of the CI-21 plan found current U.S. counterintelligence capabilities to be "piecemeal and parochial," and recommended adoption of a new counterintelligence philosophy--described as more policy-driven, prioritized, and flexible, with a strategic, national-level focus. CI-21 also established a restructured national counterintelligence system. Key elements of the plan include a proactive, analytically driven approach to identifying and prioritizing the information to be protected, enhanced information-sharing between counterintelligence elements, and more centralized guidance for counterintelligence policies and resources. CI-21 proposes significant changes in the way the United States government approaches, and organizes itself to meet, the threat of foreign espionage and intelligence gathering. The Committee looks forward to working with the new Administration to ensure the effective implementation of the CI-21 plan. THE CHALLENGE FOR THE NEW CENTURY: THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE In closing, I would like to make a couple of general points about the challenge of counterintelligence in the 21st century. The first is the impact of technology. Modern microelectronics and information technology have revolutionized just about everything else, so it is not surprising they would have an impact on counterintelligence. After all, the currency of espionage is information. Therefore, the impact of evolving information technologies is particularly significant. One aspect of this is the miniaturization of information. It took Jonathan Pollard 17 months to spirit away enough classified documents to fill a 360 cubic foot room. Today, that information can fit in a pocket, dramatically diminishing the risk of detection while increasing the productivity of an agent. A laptop computer like the one that disappeared from the State Department can fit into a briefcase or backpack yet yield an entire library of information. Another is the revolutionary change in the dissemination of information. Depending on the computer security measures in place, an agent can transfer or simply retype classified information into an unclassified e-mail system and send it around the world in seconds. Or consider the "virtual dead drop." No more marks on mail boxes or hiding messages in a soda can. Classified information can be transferred or retyped into an unclassified computer with an Internet connection, and left there for someone to "hack" into. The whole transaction may be difficult or impossible for security officials to detect or recreate. Even if the agent is careless and fails to delete classified information from an unclassified computer, it may be difficult if not impossible to prove anything beyond a security violation. Another challenge, in an era of extensive scientific cooperation between nations that are, if not adversaries, not exactly friends, is the difficulty of protecting sensitive, proprietary, or even classified information in the course of scientific exchange or joint ventures. This problem was especially apparent in the interactions between American and Chinese engineers launching U.S. satellites in China that were the subject of an Intelligence Committee investigation. American satellite company engineers, who have multimillion-dollar payloads riding on primitive Chinese rockets, face a serious conflict of interest: how to ensure successful launches while not doing anything to improve Chinese rockets that are essentially identical to Chinese ICBMs in everything but the payload. Identifying sensitive, but unclassified, technical information at risk in transactions of this type, and then finding ways to protect it, will be an important focus of the CI-21 plan. Most fundamental to counterintelligence--as true today as ever--is the need to "think the unthinkable." Yet this is one of the most difficult attitudes to instill and maintain because it runs contrary to human nature, especially in open societies like the United States. Consider the following scenarios: Two Soviet agents are named by an American President to serve as Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury. Unthinkable? You might think so. Yet Henry Wallace, Vice President during Franklin Roosevelt's third term, said later that if Roosevelt had died and he had become President, he would have appointed Laurence Duggan and Harry Dexter White--both of whom were revealed to have been Soviet agents--to those positions. As it happened, Harry Truman replaced Wallace three months before Roosevelt's death. Or imagine that another Soviet agent became chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service, or SIS. Yet Kim Philby was one of the main contenders to take over the SIS before he came under suspicion and eventually defected. (And there are still people who claim that Roger Hollis, head of the British internal security service MI-5, was a Soviet agent.) Today, thinking the unthinkable is not getting any easier, but it is just as critical to our national security. As we proceed to face the counterintelligence threat of the 21st century, we are faced with a host of challenges: some new, others ancient and deeply rooted in human weakness, and some not yet even invented. I am pleased to say that today we have an Administration that is more willing to see the world as it is, and not as we would wish it, and this gives me confidence in our ability to meet these challenges. I look forward to working with the Bush Administration to build on the lessons of the past, and seize the opportunities of the present and future, to strengthen our national counterintelligence policies and posture in defense of our nation's security. --The Honorable Richard Shelby, a Republican, represents Alabama in U.S. Senate and serves as Chairman of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 3105 From: Robert G. Ferrell Date: Wed May 30, 2001 1:46pm Subject: Identifying Echelon Stations From ZDNet, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/0,,s2087713,00.html - How to spot Echelon listening stations 16:12 Tuesday 29th May 2001 Matt Loney The European Parliament's report into the network that snoops on civilian communications gives some useful clues on how to spot Echelon bases In its draft report into the Echelon communications interception network, the European Parliament provided a guide to identifying Echelon listening stations. Most Echelon stations are, according to rapporteur Gerhard Schmid, operated by the US National Security Agency (NSA) or, in the case of the UK, by the Air Force on behalf of the British GCHQ intelligence service. One such installation is RAF Menwith Hill, which is owned by the UK Ministry of Defence, and made available to the US Department of Defence as a communications facility. The station chief is provided by the NSA, and last summer there were 415 US military staff at RAF Menwith Hill, compared with just five UK military staff. The main difference between sites such as Menwith Hill and other installations operated by civilian bodies such as the Post Office, BT, broadcasters or research institutions are that the latter group are open to visitors -- at least by appointment. Interception stations are not. The other important differences lie in the type of antennae used and their size. A military site such as Menwith Hill will have various types of antennae: arrangements of tall rod antennae in a large-diameter circle (Wullenweber antennae), for example, are used for locating the direction of radio signals; circular arrangements of rhombic-shaped antennae (Pusher antennae) serve the same purpose; while omnidirectional antennae, which look like giant conventional TV antennae, are used to intercept non-directional radio signals. But only parabolic antennae are used to receive satellite signals. If the parabolic antennae are standing on an open site, it is possible to calculate which satellite is being received. Most often parabolic antennae are concealed under spherical white covers known as radomes: these protect the antennae, but also conceal which direction they are pointing in. "If parabolic antennae or radomes are positioned on an intercepting station site," says Schmid in his report, "one may be certain that they are receiving signals from satellites, though this does not prove what type of signals these are". Schmid goes on to single out military-run sites that are closed to the public and which have large parabolic antennae, with diameters of around 30 inches. "As far as your rapporteur knows there is no military application for antennae of this size," he says. "Consequently, if they are found on a site [run by the military with no public access], it may be concluded that civilian satellite communications are being intercepted on that site." The reason that the European Parliament's own raporteur had to work on clues such as the type and size of antennae is that there is still no official statement by the foreign intelligence services of the Echelon global interception system. 3106 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Wed May 30, 2001 10:17pm Subject: New Aegean Park Press Textbooks Here are a few Aegean Park Press textbooks that other list members may find of interest (please mention that you saw them listed here). Aegean is very well known for their materials, and all of us have at least a few of their volumes on the shelf. -jma CLASSICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY COURSE, Volume II, Randall K. Nichols The lessons in this book, a continuation of Volume 1, cover the solution of polyalphabetic substitution ciphers in the Vigenhre family, plus the difficult aperiodic cipher systems. The theory of coincidences and statistical tests, including the Kappa, Chi, and Phi tests, are discussed in detail. A variety of transposition ciphers are covered. The book concludes with an historical look at codes and cipher machines. Of particular value is the expanded bibliography and a detailed section of Internet websites and resources concerning cryptography and cryptanalysis. C-76 · 8-1/2" x 11", xii + 452pp, Paperback, ISBN: 0-89412-264-9 · $42.80 DESCRIPTIVE DICTIONARY OF CRYPTOLOGIC TERMS Compiled after World War II by the U.S. Army Security Agency, the terms in this book are used by the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy, as well as agencies in the U.K., Germany, Japan, Italy, France, and other countries. Once classified TOP SECRET, this recently declassified book contains definitions of hundreds of cryptologic terms plus an extensive bibliography of sources, with derivation of terms keyed to these sources. For example: Purple, n. (U.S. cover name.) The Japanese diplomatic cipher machine introduced 20 January 1939. It used three banks of rotary selectors for three wheels of twenty letters and an additional rotary selector for the remaining six letters. CT-AbSD. For the scholar and researcher, this book and its bibliography provides a wealth of important information. C-77 · 8-1/2" x 11", xx + 166pp, Paperback, ISBN: 0-89412-266-5 · $32.80 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION AND KEY-CLUSTERING, Dr. I. J. Kumar This comprehensive text, written by an acknowledged cryptologic expert, contains six major chapters: An Introduction; System Identification and Key-Clustering; Rotor-Based Systems; Stream Ciphers; Modern Cryptology: DES and Public-Key Systems; Cryptology of Speech Signals; and Mathematical and Statistical Supplement. Material not usually found in other books concerning cryptology will be found in this important book. Seventy pages are devoted, for example, to Cryptology of Speech Signals. Background information, cryptography of speech signals, and the cryptanalysis of speech secrecy systems are covered. This chapter contains numerous speech spectograms. Each chapter contains references and a related bibliography. C-78 · 8-1/2" x 11", vii + 492pp, Paperback, ISBN: 0-89412-267-3 · $52.80 BASIC CRYPTANALYSIS, Field Manual 34-40-2, A Department of the Army Publication Text contains six parts: Introduction to Cryptanalysis, Monographic Substitution Systems, Polygraphic Substitution Systems, Polyalphabetic Substitution Systems, Transposition Systems, and Analysis of Code Systems. Text also contains exhaustive material to aid in the solution of cipher systems, including frequency distributions, word and pattern tables, as well as utility tables. Most important, this text contains a valuable computer program which supports the development of Field Manual 34-40-1, Basic Cryptanalysis. The program, a listing of which is provided, gives the capability to encipher and decipher messages in mono-alphabetic and polyalphabetic substitution systems, to produce a variety of statistical data about the encrypted messages, and to print the results or to save them to a disk. C-79 · 8-1/2" x 11", v + 360pp, Paperback, ISBN: 0-89412-272-X · $28.80 U.S. ARMY SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II, A Documentary History, James L. Gilbert and John P. Finnegan, eds. Much of the intelligence obtained by the United States during World War II came from intercepting and deciphering the most secret communications of adversaries. For many years security considerations prevented any public mention of these successes in official histories. Now, much of the story can at last be told. Book includes 16 pages of added pictures plus a complete added personality index of all names mentioned in the text. C-80 · 8-1/2" x 11", xii + 243pp, Paperback, ISBN: 0-89412-274-6 · $30.80 THE STORY OF MAGIC, Memoirs of an American Cryptologic Pioneer, Frank B. Rowlett Text tells the story of Frank B. Rowlett, a codebreaker whose work was done for years before and during World War II in deepest secrecy. Although dozens of cryptographic systems of both friends and enemy were broken, the greatest triumph was perhaps that of breaking the Japanese PURPLE diplomatic cipher machine, the machine used for transmission of Japan's most secret and sensitive diplomatic messages before and after the entrance of the United States into World War II. Adding greatly to the book is its Foreword and Epilogue, written by David Kahn, author of The Codebreakers. Text includes pictures. C-81 · 6" x 9", x + 266pp, Hardback, ISBN: 0-89412-273-8 · $32.80 BRIEFING NOTES CONCERNING ANALYSIS OF GERMAN AIR-FORCE LOW-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS DURING WORLD WAR II, Code & Cypher School This book contains notes made by one of the recipients of a comprehensive briefing of the analysis of German low-level cryptographic systems given by the British Code and Cypher School in Bletchley Park, England in 1944. Contains information concerning Orchestral Codes, Zenits, GAF Signal System, the Bird Book, GESCHWADER Operational prefixes. C-82 · 8-1/2" x 11", iv + 94pp, Paperback, ISBN: 0-89412-275-4 · $26.80 NSA CRYPTOLOGIC DOCUMENTS, National Archives Text contains a listing of some five-thousand recently released NSA documents, many previously TOP SECRET and very sensitive. A large number of the documents concern the "breaking" by the NSA of the codes of neutral and friendly governments during World War II, including the Swiss, Vatican, etc. Many British (MOST SECRET) documents provided to the NSA during World War II have also been released. Text contains a wealth of new information for the researcher and scholar with not only the titles of the many documents, but also their exact location (Box number) within the National Archives. C-83 · 8-1/2" x 11", vi + 134pp, Paperback, ISBN: 0-89412-244-4 · $26.80 GENERAL SOLUTION FOR THE DOUBLE TRANSPOSITION CIPHER, Solomon Kullback, Ph. D. Text contains a mathematical approach to the solution of the double transposition cipher. Classified for many years, this fine text has finally been released by the NSA. Also contains a number of problems for the student. C-84 · 8-1/2" x 11", viii + 32pp, Paperback, ISBN: 0-89412-278-9 · $20.80 RUSSIAN CRYPTOLOGY DURING WORLD WAR II, Alex Dettmann, Wilhelm Fenner, Wilhelm Flicke, Kurt Friederichsohn, Adolph Paschke This previously TOP SECRET (Code Word SUEDE) document is a reproduction without changes of the National Security Agency document NR 1310 CBHD15 11803A. Text contains six parts: Sources of Information, Organization of Cryptology in the Red Worker and Peasant Army, Organization of Cryptology in the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, Organization of Cryptology in Other Agencies, the Basic Systems as found in Russian Cryptology, and Areas and Dates of Use of the Basic Systems. C-85 · 8-1/2" x 11", iv + 51pp, Paperback, ISBN: 0-89412-279-7 · $26.80 VATICAN CODE SYSTEMS, National Security Agency Typeset from the original manuscript, this previously classified and highly sensitive book provides the astonishing evidence that the U.S. Government was "breaking" and reading the codes of friendly governments during World War II. Chapters provide the general characteristics of Vatican systems, information concerning the Red Code, Yellow Code, and the Green Code, plus information concerning Vatican commercial traffic, plus an overall survey of Vatican Codes and an appraisal of Vatican cryptography. C-86 · 8-1/2" x 11", x + 70pp, Paperback, ISBN: 0-89412-280-0 · $28.80 U.S. REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD CRYPTOGRAPHY, Signal Security Agency This is a specially edited and revised version of a previously classified paper, Secret Writing in the Revolutionary Period, prepared under the direciton of the Chief Signal Officer on 21 July 1945. Important appendices, Ciphers of the Revolutionary Period, British Secret Writing in the Revolution , and Codes and Camouflage, have been included for the reader. C-87 · 8-1/2" x 11", vi + 60pp, Paperback, ISBN: 0-89412-282-7 · $26.80 GENERAL SOLUTION OF THE ADFGVX CIPHER SYSTEM, J. Rives Childs During World War I, the Germans employed a combined substitution-transposition cipher system, known as the ADFGVX Cipher, because the ciphertext consisted solely of the letters A, D, F, G, V, and X. The principles involved with this solution apply not only to other ciphers of this type, but largely also to the solution of code systems which are subsequently enciphered by a columnar transposition cipher. This book of J. Rives Childs, which descibes the solution of this cipher system also contains a similar solution written by Alan G. Konheim. Adding to the value of this book are appended many dozens of actual ADFGVX messages that were transmitted by Germany in World War I, messages that the student may solve. C-88 · 8-1/2" x 11", vi + 245pp, Paperback, ISBN: 0-89412-284-3 · $36.80 NSA REVEALS HOW THE CODES OF MEXICO WERE BROKEN, National Security Agency It is believed that in part, largely to the prompting of the Clinton Administration to declassify across the board older classified documents - in general those over fifty years old- regardless of their degree of classification or sensitivity, the National Security Agency has now declassified some five-thousand highly sensitive documents which can now be found in the National Archives. A listing with title of these released documents can be found in book C-83, NSA CRYPTOLOGIC DOCUMENTS. The present book C-89, NSA REVEALS HOW THE CODES OF MEXICO WERE BROKEN, describes the techniques used in "breaking" the Mexican cryptographic systems. The solutions of the systems, MXC, MXD, MXE, and MXH, as titled by NSA, are described in detail. The systems include transposition, substitution, and combination transposition-substitution systems. In addition, the National Security Agency has kindly provided dozens of raw traffic which the reader or student can attempt to solve. The reader will surely wonder why the U.S. Government has permitted the release of the material found in this book. The dictum that gentlemen do not read the mail of other gentlemen has now been proven to be false. C-89 · 8-1/2" x 11", vi + 157pp, Paperback, ISBN: 0-89412-289-4 · $36.80 HANDBOOK FOR CRYPTANALYSIS, Army Security Agency Various versions of this book, now unclassified, were released by the Army Security Agency and its predecessor, the Signal Intelligence Agency, some fifty years ago; and recently have been furnished to the National Archives. While the use of today's computer has supplanted many cryptographic procedures previously done by hand, there are some items described in this handbook which still remain important for today's analyst. Although seemingly minor, one of the important items which affect cryptanalyst's work is the standardization of cryptographic procedures described in chapter one. This cannot be emphasized too much. The cryptanalyst must make every effort to print letters and numerals in the manner described. A few of the chapters included in this book are as follows: The Phi Test, The Solution of 2-Square Matrices, Statistical Methods in the Determination of Generatrices C-90 · 8-1/2" x 11", vi + 103pp, Paperback, ISBN: 0-89412-291-6 · $26.80 Thank you for your time. For a complete listing of our publications, please feel free to visit our website at www.aegeanparkpress.com. Best regards, Aegean Park Press -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 3107 From: Steve McAlexander Date: Thu May 31, 2001 0:26am Subject: E-mail users warned over spy network http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1357000/1357264.stm -----Original Message----- From: Miguel Puchol [mailto:mpuchol@w...] Sent: Sunday, May 27, 2001 15:36 To: TSCM-L Mailing List Subject: RE: [TSCM-L] Big Brother contestants searched by anti-espionage experts My God!! You also have this hideous program over there!? I think that Einstein has been proved wrong: Crap propagates faster than the speed of light. Have a good week all, Mike > -----Mensaje original----- > De: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng [mailto:jmatk@tscm.com] > Enviado el: domingo, 27 de mayo de 2001 17:55 > Para: TSCM-L Mailing List > Asunto: [TSCM-L] Big Brother contestants searched by anti-espionage > experts > > > > Big Brother contestants searched by anti-espionage experts > > http://www.ananova.com/news/story/sm_305015.html?menu= > Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ======================================================== TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L or email your subscription request to: subTSCM-L@t... =================================================== TSKS Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 3108 From: Craig Snedden Date: Thu May 31, 2001 3:59am Subject: Re: Identifying Echelon Stations Being bound as I am by my obligations to certain UK laws, I can't make any comment on Echelon, but I can say that in my military career, I have used parabolic antennae of around this size to access military satcoms........ > Schmid goes on to single out military-run sites that are closed to the > public and which have large parabolic antennae, with diameters of > around 30 inches. "As far as your rapporteur knows there is no > military application for antennae of this size," he says. > "Consequently, if they are found on a site [run by the military with > no public access], it may be concluded that civilian satellite > communications are being intercepted on that site." / When I worked with the satcom detatchment, we regularly used satcom equipment, static and tactical setups with varying sizes of antennae, from the huge to the hand-held, but I was amazed to see a "tactical" satcom unit of a certain NATO country appear on a deployment consisting of a large (4-6 metre) dish mounted on one truck and the TX/RX mounted on another and the associated switching systems on yet another, with the power detachment coming along for the ride as well. All our kit could be stowed in the back of a small 4X4 and did exactly the same job.....!!!! Craig Snedden The data contained herein is confidential. Unauthorised dissemination of the contents of this e-mail may be in breach of Criminal and Civil law and may lead to prosecution. 3109 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Thu May 31, 2001 8:41am Subject: Re: Identifying Echelon Stations At 1:46 PM -0500 5/30/01, Robert G. Ferrell wrote: > >From ZDNet, >http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/0,,s2087713,00.html >- [snip] >But only parabolic antennae are used to receive satellite signals. If >the parabolic antennae are standing on an open site, it is possible to >calculate which satellite is being received. Most often parabolic >antennae are concealed under spherical white covers known as radomes: >these protect the antennae, but also conceal which direction they are >pointing in. > >"If parabolic antennae or radomes are positioned on an intercepting >station site," says Schmid in his report, "one may be certain that >they are receiving signals from satellites, though this does not prove >what type of signals these are". [snip] Bullshit, A parabolic dish is nothing more then a high gain antenna which are very commonly used for line of site communications all over the world. It can be pointed sideways, out towards the horizon, or up into the sky. Not all dishes look at satellites. As the frequencies climb the higher gain the antenna needs to be, and the parabolic dish simply provides the ability to focus more energy more effectively. Radomes are used to keep the dish protected, NOT to conceal what it is looking at (in fact a radome gives you a performance hit). If the article is to be taken seriously then every cell phone tower with a 22 GHz link is part of the conspiracy, and every weather radar system is scanning the brains of the the public, Utter Rubbish. The journalist who wrote the piece should be ashamed of himself for such shoddy research. -jma -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 3110 From: Robert G. Ferrell Date: Thu May 31, 2001 8:51am Subject: Re: Identifying Echelon Stations >If the article is to be taken seriously then every cell phone tower >with a 22 GHz link is part of the conspiracy, and every weather radar >system is scanning the brains of the the public, Utter Rubbish. Yeah! Weather radar systems have nowhere near the resolution necessary to gather useful data from something that small... ;-) RGF Robert G. Ferrell, CISSP Information Systems Security Officer National Business Center U. S. Dept. of the Interior Robert_G_Ferrell@n... ======================================== Who goeth without humor goeth unarmed. ======================================== 3111 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Thu May 31, 2001 9:14am Subject: Re: Identifying Echelon Stations Yikes, The next urban legend that will start to circulate is that weather radar systems are being used for mind control, and that the CIA is using cell phones to mentally send covert messages to deep cover agents. I am amazed how many people with mental problems actually belive the foolishness out there, and use fragments of information to try to support their own delusions of harassment, mind control, secret messages, etc. It simply boggles the mind, and yet you have to pity the poor folks. -jma At 8:51 AM -0500 5/31/01, Robert G. Ferrell wrote: > >If the article is to be taken seriously then every cell phone tower >>with a 22 GHz link is part of the conspiracy, and every weather radar >>system is scanning the brains of the the public, Utter Rubbish. > >Yeah! Weather radar systems have nowhere near the resolution >necessary to gather useful data from something that small... > >;-) > >RGF -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 3112 From: Miguel Puchol Date: Thu May 31, 2001 1:39pm Subject: RE: Identifying Echelon Stations James, In any case, I believe that for the opponent, in an intelligence war, it's useful to know towards what your dish is pointing - and this is fairly easy to find out just by looking at the antenna. So, if indeed the dishes are pointed at satellites like Intelsat, then we could safely assume that civilian traffic is being intercepted. But, again, I agree that paranoia is really taking on this article, and it should be taken with a couple of tons of salt. All the best, Mike > -----Mensaje original----- > De: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng [mailto:jmatk@tscm.com] > Enviado el: jueves, 31 de mayo de 2001 16:14 > Para: TSCM-L@yahoogroups.com > Asunto: Re: [TSCM-L] Identifying Echelon Stations > > > > Yikes, > > The next urban legend that will start to circulate is that weather > radar systems > are being used for mind control, and that the CIA is using cell phones to > mentally send covert messages to deep cover agents. > > I am amazed how many people with mental problems actually belive the > foolishness out there, and use fragments of information to try to > support their own > delusions of harassment, mind control, secret messages, etc. > > It simply boggles the mind, and yet you have to pity the poor folks. > > -jma > > > > At 8:51 AM -0500 5/31/01, Robert G. Ferrell wrote: > > >If the article is to be taken seriously then every cell phone tower > >>with a 22 GHz link is part of the conspiracy, and every weather radar > >>system is scanning the brains of the the public, Utter Rubbish. > > > >Yeah! Weather radar systems have nowhere near the resolution > >necessary to gather useful data from something that small... > > > >;-) > > > >RGF > > -- > > ======================================================================= > Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? > "In a time of universal deceit, telling the > truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell > ======================================================================= > James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 > Granite Island Group Fax: > 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ > Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com > ======================================================================= > The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, > Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. > ======================================================================= > > > ======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > or email your subscription request to: > subTSCM-L@t... > =================================================== TSKS > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ > > > 3113 From: Robert G. Ferrell Date: Thu May 31, 2001 1:45pm Subject: RE: Identifying Echelon Stations >In any case, I believe that for the opponent, in an intelligence war, it's >useful to know towards what your dish is pointing - and this is fairly easy >to find out just by looking at the antenna. So, if indeed the dishes are >pointed at satellites like Intelsat, then we could safely assume that >civilian traffic is being intercepted. You know, when I was in high school back in the 70s, I was an avid amateur radio astronomer. I built a interferometer array in my yard consisting of three 8 foot diameter parabolic dishes guided by a complex collection of garage door openers and step-down motors. There weren't any commercially available 21 cm receivers in my price range, so I had to build one out of a bunch of cobbled-together parts. This was before the days of satellite television; I often wonder just what in the heck my neighbors thought I was doing. Teenage CIA spook? Cheers, RGF Robert G. Ferrell, CISSP Information Systems Security Officer National Business Center U. S. Dept. of the Interior Robert_G_Ferrell@n... ======================================== Who goeth without humor goeth unarmed. ======================================== 3114 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Thu May 31, 2001 4:18pm Subject: Evil Overlord Guidelines Evil Overlord Guidelines If I ever become an Evil Overlord: 1. My legions of terror will have helmets with clear Plexiglass visors, not face-concealing ones. 2. My ventilation ducts will be too small to crawl through. 3. My noble half-brother whose throne I usurped will be killed, not kept anonymously imprisoned in a forgotten cell of my dungeon. 4. Shooting is not too good for my enemies. 5. The artifact which is the source of my power will not be kept on the Mountain of Despair beyond the River of Fire guarded by the Dragons of Eternity. It will be in my safe-deposit box. 6. I will not gloat over my enemies' predicament before killing them. 7. When the rebel leader challenges me to fight one- on-one and asks, "Or are you afraid without your armies to back you up?" My reply will be, "No, just sensible." 8. When I've captured my adversary and he says, "Look, before you kill me, will you at least tell me what this is all about?" I'll say, "Nope" and shoot him. 9. After I kidnap the beautiful princess, we will be married immediately in a quiet civil ceremony, not a lavish spectacle in three weeks time during which the final phase of my plan will be carried out. 10. I will not include a self-destruct mechanism unless absolutely necessary. If it is necessary, it will not be a large red button labeled "Danger: Do Not Push". 11. I will not order my trusted lieutenant to kill the infant who is destined to overthrow me -- I'll do it myself. 12. I will not interrogate my enemies in the inner sanctum -- a small hotel well outside my borders will work just as well. 13. I will be secure in my superiority. Therefore, I will feel no need to prove it by leaving clues in the form of riddles or leaving my weaker enemies alive to show they pose no threat. 14. I will not waste time making my enemy's death look like an accident: I'm not accountable to anyone and my other enemies wouldn't believe it. 15. I will make it clear that I _do_ know the meaning of the word "mercy"; I simply choose not show them any. 16. One of my advisors will be an average five-year- old child. Any flaws in my plan that he is able to spot will be corrected before its implementation. 17. All slain enemies will be cremated, not left for dead at the bottom of the cliff. The announcement of their deaths, as well as any accompanying celebration, will be deferred until after the aforementioned disposal. 18. My undercover agents will not have tattoos identifying them as members of my organization, nor will they be required to wear military boots or adhere to any other dress codes. 19. The hero is not entitled to a last kiss, a last cigarette, or any other form of last request. 20. I will never employ any device with a digital countdown. If I find that such a device is absolutely unavoidable, I will set it to activate when the counter reaches 117 and the hero is just putting his plan into operation. 21. I will design all doomsday machines myself. If I must hire a mad scientist to assist me, I will make sure that he is sufficiently twisted to never regret his evil ways and seek to undo the damage he's caused. 22. I will never utter the sentence "But before I kill you, there's just one thing I want to know." 23. When I employ people as advisors, I will occasionally listen to their advice. -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 3115 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Thu May 31, 2001 4:20pm Subject: Discussion Item - Carry On TSCM Kit I would like to propose a topic for the list, and I belive that everyone will benefit as the issue if discussed. Here is the hypothetical situation: A set of TSCM items that completely fits inside a standard piece of ATA carry-on luggage with a maximum size of 9*14*22 (case must be small enough to fit both under a seat, AND in the overhead bin). Contents of the case must allow a single person to perform a limited scope "Bug Sweep" of a typical business office within a standard 8 hour work day. The sweep must include a detailed RF evaluation, an analysis of all conducted signals, and a limited evaluation of the phone system. The kit must be able to detect any device which radiates any RF signal which is generally available in a spyshop, Radio Shack, Walmarts, Home Depot, etc. The kit must be able to detect audio or VLF signals present on any conductor. Kit must include (as a minimum) a 100 MHz+ Oscilloscope, a digital voltmeter, audio amplifier, broadband diode detector system, a tuned receiver or scanner (with sub-carrier capability) with coverage at least 1.5 GHz, video receiver with coverage of all ATV bands (including the 433, 900, 1300 and 2400 MHz bands). Any hand tools included in the kit must be small enough to pass though airport security Xray machine without causing a problem (ie: keep the screwdrivers small). Also, the kit must be light enough to carry with one hand, and able to take a nominal amount of getting bumped around in transit. The question is: What you you include in the kit (and why), and what would you leave out (and why). Remember; it must be "carry-on", and must be able to pass airline security checkpoints. -jma -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 3116 From: Bob Washburne Date: Thu May 31, 2001 5:25pm Subject: Re: Evil Overlord Guidelines The complete list has well over a hundred listings and can be found here: http://minievil.eviloverlord.com/lists/overlord.html Other lists usefull for Evil Henchmen, Daughters or Cult Members can be found here: http://www.thalia.org/henchman.html All in all, some very practical advice. It is also fun to try and guess which story each guideline came from. (Yep, that's the one that killed the Evil Overlord in "Celery Stalks at Midnight"). Bob Washburne 48. I will treat any beast which I control through magic or technology with respect and kindness. Thus if the control is ever broken, it will not immediately come after me for revenge. "James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng" wrote: > > Evil Overlord Guidelines > > If I ever become an Evil Overlord: > (sort of like , but sounding more like a double handed axe or a guillotine). 3117 From: Aimee Farr Date: Thu May 31, 2001 6:48pm Subject: Be afraid, be very afraid. First, The "Bartnicki Kite" & now....."The Boehner Barn Door"...as to non-press publishers. Boehner is the real domino. Supreme Court Order: http://www4.law.cornell.edu/php/orderinquiry2.php3?caseid=22342 Background - Boehner media (1998): http://www.enquirer.com/editions/1998/04/21/attn-cinci.html Bartnicki Opinion: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/99-1687.ZS.html ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- TODAY @: http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=14035 Ohio congressman John Boehner plans to pursue his four-year-old case against Rep. Jim McDermott for releasing the contents of an illegally intercepted cellular phone conversation even though the U.S. Supreme Court last week determined that the First Amendment trumped privacy rights in a similar case. The justices, in a 6-3 decision in the joined cases of Bartnicki v. Vopper and U.S. v. Vopper, said that a radio host cannot be sued for airing an illegally taped telephone conversation that he obtained legally. The Supreme Court appears to agree. Yesterday, it waived a ruling by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that revived Boehner's lawsuit against McDermott, D-Wash. The justices instructed the lower court to resolve the case in light of the Bartnicki ruling. "Factually, there are distinctions, but there is nothing that should lead the Court of Appeals on remand to refuse to apply Bartnicki," Abrams said. "If anything, the information in Boehner is more newsworthy than the information in Bartnicki." Abrams also said he doubted that the courts would make distinctions between whether the speaker or publisher is a member of the press, the government or some other group. [....] ========== Historically, the courts have distinguished somewhat between PRESS and 'normal' First Amendment avenues. Because of the Net, the lines are blurring, since everybody can be a publisher. This is likely to get interesting, considering today's Net audio/visual capabilities, and the yet-to-be-worked-out tensions between basing decisions on the nature of the medium v. the nature of the content. "SURVEILLACTIVISM" might be a coming buzzword. ("Brand" is the corporate equivalent to The Ark Of The Covenant.) Aimee Farr mailto:aimfarr@p... LAW OFFICE OF AIMEE FARR Waco, Texas 3118 From: Craig Snedden Date: Thu May 31, 2001 9:22am Subject: Re: Identifying Echelon Stations > > Bullshit, > > A parabolic dish is nothing more then a high gain antenna which are > very commonly used for line of site communications all over the > world. It can be pointed sideways, out towards the horizon, or up > into the sky. Not all dishes look at satellites. > I concur! Echelon, rumours about it's capabilities and associations with certain military sites have been in the public domain for years. To my mind this is more to do with the politics of the "European Superstate" than serious reporting and "civil liberties". There are many reasons that make this report a load of worthless crap. The comment below, that by examining the bearing and azimuth of the dish you can work out which sat is being tracked is a bit wide of the mark. I don't have an up to date figure on exactly how many com-sats there are up there now, but a large fixed ground station dish, pointed vaguely in the direction of the Indian or Atlantic Oceans is bound to be within the footprint of a fairly large number of military and civil sats. You only know for sure which one is being tracked by getting access to the RX head and seeing what is being received! (It has been known for mil ops to tune in to the CNN feed from time to time>>>>! & nothing whatsover to do with eavesdropping, more boredom, wanting to watch the game etc. etc.) I think that the journo who wrote this was thinking about the guy here in the UK who managed to trace quite a number of Regional Operation Centres (or Wartime Seats of Government) about 30 to 40 years ago now. Not surprisingly, although most of these "bunkers" were built "out in the sticks", they were built (1950's) to a single design, with the antenna farm located not very far away (for some bizarre reason). By noting the direction of the antenna's on the array and plotting them on a map, then moving out along the plot until he came to another "innocuous looking farm building", finding it's associated antenna array... etc. etc. (you get the picture) he build up a pretty good picture of the location of the UK's emergency bunker system for the "cold war". Most of these places are now closed, but I did work in one or two about 15-20 years ago and I can say that what the guy claimed he did was credible and accurate. Have a nice weekend.... I'm off to update my PGP keys.... :-) Craig The data contained herein is confidential. Unauthorised dissemination of the contents of this e-mail may be in breach of Criminal and Civil law and may lead to prosecution. 3119 From: A Grudko Date: Fri Jun 1, 2001 6:34am Subject: Re: Identifying Echelon Stations ----- Original Message ----- From: Craig Snedden >.....I was amazed to see a "tactical" satcom unit > of a certain NATO country appear on a deployment consisting of a large (4-6 > metre) dish mounted on one truck and the TX/RX mounted on another and the > associated switching systems on yet another, with the power detachment > coming along for the ride as well. All our kit could be stowed in the back > of a small 4X4 and did exactly the same job.....!!!! Who needs night vision when all you have to look for is the glow of the 'bottles' (valves) in the second truck. I joke of course, but there was serious talk a few years ago about some Soviet military backup equipment being designed around miniature thermionic valves rather than solid state components because of being thousands of times less susceptible to EMP after a nearby nuclear strike or the use of Pulse type weapons. (in a nearby lightning groundstrike recently 4 'state-of-the art' miniaturised receivers went deaf and are in the repair shop. My 20 year old FRG-7700 is as fresh as a puppy....) Andy Grudko. D.P.M., Grad I.S, (S.A.) ZR6UU ZRAJ7795 G8RXE 3120 From: A Grudko Date: Fri Jun 1, 2001 9:15am Subject: Mmind Ccontrol humour ----- Original Message ----- From: James M. Atkinson > The next urban legend that will start to circulate is that weather > radar systems are being used for mind control. > It simply boggles the mind, and yet you have to pity the poor folks Don't tell me you haven't noticed that every other time you use your TV remote control, PysOpsDir Jerry Springer appears - proof of negative mind control. And that trigering your garage remote makes your right eye wink even if Cindy Crawford ISN'T jogging past!. My Optoelectronics Xplorer covers the frequency range of all garage type TXs but won't detect or record these short data bursts, according to the manufacurer's own specs. But for $22 I can buy an over the counter kit in downtown J*h*a*n*e*b*r* (sorry, the location is classified) that not only captures but records (one event) and can retransmit this data. I have the power to open strange garage doors. I have offered this facility to Microsoft for a one Billion Dollars licence fee. Today, Garage Control. Tomorrow, Mind Control Andy Grudko. D.P.M., Grad I.S, (S.A.) Grudko Associates - Crime investigation, intelligence and protection Johannesburg - Cape Town - Durban - Pretoria - UK - US - Canada - Australia - Israel. Agents in 41 countries - www.grudko.com - (+27 11) 465 9673 - 465 1487 (Fax) - Est. 1981 GIN (Charter), SACI (Pres), WAD, CALI, SAMLF, SCIP (Past SA Chairman), UKPIN, AFIO (OS), IWWA, PRETrust, AmChamCom - "When you need it done right - first time" . 3121 From: A Grudko Date: Fri Jun 1, 2001 8:32am Subject: Echelon, US culture, speed and BMW shark fins -- Original Message -- > >If the article is to be taken seriously then every cell phone tower > >with a 22 GHz link is part of the conspiracy, and every weather radar > >system is scanning the brains of the the public... I dusted off my old Radio Shack 22 gig rig and pointed the dish at my neighbours. All I see could looked like Ted Bundy and George Dubbaya fighting with Jerry Springer and Pamela Anderson. And my neighbours aren't even American! I must say, the introduction of cellphone towers seriously slowed down my Corvette. Every time I went over a rise on a highway my radar detector went balistic - and there in the distance was the ubiqutous cellphone tower ! A high percentage of BMWs round the world are built not in Germany but here in South Africa, and every BMW built in the past 10 years has SA parts. But we import the 7 series, and I've seen an interesting GSM cellular antenna on the latest models. It looks like 2 flattened black anodised rounded 'shark fins', similar to some of the Erikson 'phones, about a quarter wave high and a quarter wave apart on the horizontal, in line with the front/rear axis of the car. It appears to be a. OEM capacitive/inductive glass mount. I assume this is an attempt to 'smooth out' the wave form maxima/minima as the vehicle moves through the GSM RF field - almost the oposite of a doppler phased array which compares maxima and minima to compute a direction. I guess the object is to cancel out the phase effect, and therefore reduce 'dropped calls' and capture effect 'break-up'. I don't understand the mechanics of impedance matching 2 antennas through a glass mount but it must be similar to using a 75 ohm harness to match two 50 ohm antennas I think this kind of design could assist in detecting (as against locating) very low power suspect signals because wherever you are in the room you will get maximum signal, regardless of your position on the sine wave phase relative to the transmit antenna. Just an idea from looking at the latest BMW back windows! Andy Grudko. D.P.M., Grad I.S, (S.A.) Grudko Associates - Crime investigation, intelligence and protection Johannesburg - Cape Town - Durban - Pretoria - UK - US - Canada - Australia - Israel. Agents in 41 countries - www.grudko.com - (+27 11) 465 9673 - 465 1487 (Fax) - Est. 1981 GIN (Charter), SACI (Pres), WAD, CALI, SAMLF, SCIP (Past SA Chairman), UKPIN, AFIO (OS), IWWA, PRETrust, AmChamCom, IPA - "When you need it done right - first time"