From: Talisker Date: Sun Jun 10, 2001 3:58pm Subject: Re: Bug-blaster DIY Found it, don't shoot the messenger, I started reading it but was soon overcome by an attack of indifference Andy (talisker) http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/senate/schriner.htm Statement of Mr. David Schriner before the Joint Economic Committee United States Congress Wednesday, February 25, 1998 "The Design and Fabrication of a Damage Inflicting RF Weapon by 'Back Yard' Methods" Note, this paper reflects the personal views and opinion of the author. The material in this paper has been deemed unclassified by those who hold his security clearances but it does not specifically represent their views. This paper is a very brief statement on the subject and it is written from a non-technical point of view to provide an easy look at the subject manner by non-professional people or groups. Further elaboration on any point can be requested in either a technical format or at a classified level with the proper security restrictions in place. For many years research activities in different countries have focused on the use of radio frequency (RF) waves as a weapon. Most of this work has been titled or described under the title of High Powered Microwave (HPM). Worldwide, large amounts of money have been invested in this technology to support both the military interests but also the industrial heating needs. Like most technologies, with maturity the applications increase and the costs to use it become lower. One primary point of this paper is that as these technologies mature they also become affordable and usable by criminals and terrorists. Most military programs are classified and the general public knows little concerning their nature but as the technology becomes available to criminals and terrorists, it may be directly applied to the infrastructure elements of our society. This paper addresses the question concerning the possibility of certain types of this technology being used against the society. The primary focus of this paper will be on a different and new form of HPM called Transient Electromagnetic Devices (TED) that could, in the hands of enemies, criminals, pranksters, or terrorists pose a significant threat to much of the United States infrastructure components that are based on micro-circuits and computer or micro-processor control. This includes financial institutions, aircraft, security, medical, automotive, and other critical equipment used everyday in our society. The systems necessary for the production of this form of energy are much easier to construct and use than the earlier and more well known conventional HPM narrow-band systems that are currently in development for military use. Millions of dollars have been spent on the conventional HPM, systems and it is the type that DOD managers and their funding offices are well acquainted with. This paper will briefly speak to these but the main focus of it will be on the very different type, the TED systems, which is less well known and may be the RF weapon of choice to the modern cyber or infrastructure RF warrior. Conventional HPM systems generate RF wavessimilar to those used for many different purposes including communications, heating, and radio location purposes. We are all very familiar with the term frequency as expressed in mega-hertz (MHz) when we tune our FM radios over the FM band from 88 to 108 MHz. Likewise with the AM radio band from .55 to 1.5 MHz. These expressions of frequency describe how many complete RF cycles occur each second from the radio transmitters that generate them. Radar systems also generate RF signals but these are in thousands of MHz each second (the term Giga-Hertz or GHz applies). This is the type of signal that conventional HPM systems generate or radiate, a sine wave. TED systems do not generate a sine wave and operate entirely differently than narrow-band systems. Narrow band HPM systems are similar to microwave ovens in that they use high powered sine waves to cause material placed in their field to generate heat. This is exactly what narrow band HPM systems do, they attempt to use extremely high powered RF sine waves to cause a target system to burn out. Other types of HPM use high powered, but conventional wave-like signals to enter a target system and cause some of the conventional effects that a jammer or countermeasure system might. All of these narrow band HPM systems employ sine waves that are very different than the signals generated and radiated and employed by the TED systems. RF power is expressed in Watts and one million Watts is expressed as "megaWatts" or MW. A kitchen microwave oven, for example, uses a magnetron tube to produce a continuous wave (CW) .5 to 1 MW RF signal to provide energy to heat the material placed in its presence. In a simple way of describing the heating, the powerful microwave signals cause the molecules of the material to rub together at the frequency generated by the magnetron and heat results in the material exposed to the field. Materials such as meat, many materials containing carbon molecules, and even water heat well when placed in such a field. Many industrial heating applications require considerably larger power levels than the home microwave oven but the basic principles are the same. It is with this view of microwave heating that we have the first notion of the use of microwaves as a weapon. One assumes that if a microwave signal of extremely high power level is aimed at a distant target of some type, then heating and perhaps burnout of some part of the target would occur. If the signal was tuned to the operating frequency of a targeted radio receiver, for example, one would assume that if enough power was provided in the radiated beam directed at the target's radio antenna, that the radio's "front-end", that part directly connected to the antenna, could be heated sufficiently to burn it out. The key here is whether there is an entry point for the high powered signal to enter the targeted system and whether there is enough power to cause burnout. The community involved with HPM systems generally describes a "front-door" and a "back-door" entry point. A front-door point might be, as in the above example, an antenna normally used by the target platform, such as an aircraft or a tank, for some RF function such as communication or radar. Here the RF weapon designer would attempt to radiate an RF signal into the target platform's antenna and cause either a burnout or a disruption effect. A back-door entry point might be an unshielded wire at some point on the targeted platform that would allow the RF weapon signal to enter some part of the platform's electronic systems and, as before, cause a burnout or disruption of some sort. The weapon designer would like to have a priori knowledge of the target so as to select the right frequency and use the right modulations to accomplish the desired result. Since this extremely high-powered RF generation technology also fills the needs of industrial heating applications, essentially very high powered microwave ovens, there is a universal worldwide need for the technology and export controls are confused when it comes to the possible use of this technology as a weapon. The New Kid on the block, the Transient Electromagnetic Device (TED): There is a new type of source technology currently under development in our country and, very likely, other countries as well. This type of directed RF energy is quite different than the narrow-band systems previously described. This type of directed energy is called transient electromagnetic radiation. Instead of generating a train of smooth sine-waves, as the conventional narrow-band systems do, it generates a single spike-like form of energy. This spike-like burst of potential does not have "cycles" or waves and it may be only one or two hundred pico-seconds (psec) in length. 100 psec is the time that it takes light to travel 1.2 inches and often these short time duration puoses are described in "light-inches". It is very similar to the type of signal that occurs when you rub your feet on the carpet on a dry day and then touch your computer keyboard. An electrostatic discharge (ESD) occurs when you do this. The electrostatic charge on your body discharges onto and into the computer and a very brief amount of very high current flows quickly from your finger into the computer circuits causing a momentary break in the normal flow of signals and bits of information. Because of this momentary break in the "bit-flow" the ESD may cause the computer to crash and in some cases it may cause sensitive electronic circuits to be actually damaged to the point where they are non-functional and must be replaced. This vulnerable item may be just a single semiconductor diode in a single integrated chip in a circuit on the motherboard, and there are hundreds or thousands of these in a desk-top computer. It is often economical to simply replace a whole circuit board of components rather than trying to find the one specific circuit and replacing just it. This type of new weapon source, a transient electromagnetic device (TED), is actually a system that radiates an ESD-like signal that is intended to cause a similar responses, as just described, to the targeted system. Let us look at the differences between narrow-band (NB) and TED HPM systems. The NB systems generate sine waves, the TEDs don't. The NB systems are very costly and go to great lengths to generate very high average powers, the TEDs don't, the NB systems are very complex systems, the TEDs are not, the NB systems generate very high average powers (microwave heating), the TEDs generate very high peak powers (and are poor RF heaters). They both use an antenna and the larger it is, the more power they can radiate, in a narrow focused beam, at the target. In a narrow-band HPM device, high technology vacuum tubes are used that are, in some ways, very similar to those used in our highest-powered TV or FM stations and radar systems. They are very delicate devices, are complex, and very expensive. They require large amounts of primary power and generally require some type of cooling system, either air blowers or liquid types. All of this complexity requires complex engineering and development, and the manufacturing time is great and costly. Not for the amateur or a low-cost, start-up operation. Generally a highly skilled team of various technical experts of numerous engineering specialties is required to manage the development and operation of such devices. TEDs, on the other hand, are relatively simple devices that generally use simple spark-gap switches, either in oil or in pressurized gas pulse storage lines. The power supplies are relatively small in size and much lower in average power and cost than for the NB systems. The engineering and mechanical issues are small in comparison to the narrow-band devices. The technology is well described in the various professional Pulse Power references found in good technical libraries. The significant development, engineering, and manufacturing costs are small in comparison to narrow band. Most of the technology required is available and is an outcrop of the various nuclear and flash x-ray work done in the past. NB systems operate at some given frequency with a small bandwidth, and you will find them at one spot on the radio dial. The TEDs do not even have a definable frequency but instead, because of their short time duration, they occupy a very large spectrum space, and you will find it everywhere on every radio dial. When a TED pulse is generated it will have the ability to excite responses in systems designed to receive at any frequency from as low as 100 MHz up to several GHz, from the FM band up to the lower microwave bands. A NB system would excite only those systems that were operating at its frequency, say 2.345 GHz, so a narrow band system must be "tuned" to a given target's known soft spot but a TED system would go after any soft spot of the target platform, back-door or front door. So what is the bottom line of this discussion? Because of the simplicity of TED systems and the suspicion that they may cause disruptive effects to electronic systems that they are aimed at, they make an attractive approach for RF terrorists to use for various purposes. We see hints of this vulnerability in the many warnings that we get each month about locations where we should not use radios and electronic devices for fear that we will do some damage to something. They make passengers on aircraft, during take off and landing, turn off radios, games, and other electronic devices. Hospitals regularly place signs that electronic devices are not allowed. Many people do not want you using your cellular telephones near their computer. Many repair shops require that wrist-bands attached to ground be used when opening electronic equipment for repair. We have a lot of things out there in the world that either have known or suspected vulnerabilities to RF fields or electrostatic discharge. A TED system provides both of these conditions, an RF electrostatic discharge nature and its output (the number of pulses per second) can be adjusted for maximum disruptive effect. Its peak power output can be made much higher than those fields ordinarily found in everyday systems like cellular radios, radar systems, TV and FM stations, and simple ESD effects. It clearly appears, based on testing that has been done as well the information presented at unclassified technical papers and conferences, that the TED would make a good terrorist RF weapon and that, with the proliferation of high technology infrastructure systems that are integral to everyday life in our country, we would be very vulnerable to such systems. It is also clear, because of the extreme cost of repairing all of the vulnerable systems, that until this vulnerability was shown, no one would have much concern or interest in it. Considerable discussion and innuendo has recently been made concerning the possibility of building a TED source using "back-yard" methods, a Radio Shack Terrorist RF weapon. Such a system would have to have sufficient power to, with some degree of probability, cause detrimental effects to common infrastructure items such as those found in; financial institutions (banks, ATMs, and stores), medical facilities, airport facilities, general transportation items (auto engine controls, ABS, air-bags, etc.), utility facilities (telephone exchanges, power grid controllers), and other infrastructure entities. This type of source is imagined to be what a criminal, terrorist, or prankster could develop or build in a reasonable time, with reasonable tools and materials and with open literature or reference material. The accomplishment of such an effort would require that either some sort of estimate of what power level would be necessary to accomplish a given objective or to simply make all of the power that could be made, and then go out and test the weapon against various target items under either controlled conditions or actual attempts against a family of established targets. Since it is an extremely complex process to even come close to some predicted level of vulnerability, using even the most advanced modeling and analysis techniques, the obvious approach would be to "go for the maximum power and then test" approach. Normal testing would be done under strict safety and security conditions but a terrorist would not have such limitations. Normal tests would be conducted at a test location but a terrorist would simply drive around the block or building until something happened. An important criteria for an RF terrorist would be that any of the parts and materials used would have to be those that could be easily found in any city and were not traceable by conventional counter-terrorist agencies such as the local police, insurance investigators, and FBI. It is clear that there are four basic configurations that could be used, one the size of a briefcase that could be placed very close to a target system (like a computer at a desk or counter), one that could be mounted into a small van and disguised to appear as ordinary, one that was dedicated to be set up at a remote target location and used for some purpose where appearance was not of any concern, and finally, a system that could be located in one's back yard such that it could be aimed at over flying aircraft. The systems would likely have much in common and the builder would employ a learning curve to go to the next more advanced system. The results or vulnerabilities found with any system could be factored into the use of the next system. This learn-as-you-go process would be a natural approach for such an amateur effort. The means of manufacturing the system includes parts and tools that one could purchase at a hardware store or those found in an average garage shop. Tools such as a small lathe with an integral milling machine (available via mail-order at a cost about $2,000), drill press, and general garage tools should be all that were needed, nothing exotic. The effort would likely be started with the small briefcase-sized unit. It could use automobile ignition parts and a camcorder ni-cad battery for the power supply. It might use a small dish antenna bought mail-order and some parts picked up at a surplus store. The total cost of such a unit would be about $300 and it could be built in about one week. The development behind its design could be accomplished by doing some basic experiments with stun-guns or other high voltage components found in surplus stores, automotive shops, and parts from a "well equipped electronics junk box". The unit could easily be tested at close range to the type of computers and hardware found in any home office and if it caused some ill effect, then the terrorist would have proven the effectiveness of the system. Success with step 1. The next step would be to refine the technology and increase the voltage and the repetition frequency. An advanced design might use a 6-foot TV dish antenna that could be bought mail-order (for $200) and it might use a more advanced spark-gap unit than was used in the earlier model. Such learn-as-you-go is a natural process in the design of spark-gaps. Such a unit using a larger antenna (a mail-order 12-foot TV dish), when finished would look like a simple TV dish system and it (or many like it) could be mounted such that it could easily be pointed at over-flying aircraft. In support of the information presented in this testimony and taking advantage of the winter's need to work indoors, a unit that uses oil spark-gaps was designed, built, and tested. The materials for it were mail-ordered at a cost of about $500 and about one week was needed to fabricate the mechanical hardware. It use two ignition coils and a battery for power, an automobile fuel pump and filter for the oil circulation, and commonly available transformer oil. An additional week was required to work out all of the electrical wiring, the oil lines, and the general finishing details. This unit was ready for testing in two weeks after starting the effort. The signal radiated from the unit was measured and found to be a very significant power level that can be compared against available vulnerability and susceptibility levels of military equipment. When the weather permits, this unit will be tested against a set of infrastructure targets at an official test range. From the measurements and known signal levels, this unit is expected to be consistently deadly to many types of infrastructure items at ranges suitable for terrorist usage. This quickly-developed low-cost system could easily be placed in a small van and used in a parking lot or directed at buildings that the van was driven past. It is highly likely that this type of device would be a very effective terrorist system and the findings of its design could be factored into another either a larger, higher powered device, or a more advanced design each with significantly greater effectiveness. The net result of all of this design, experimentation, fabrication and measurement proves that such a weapon system could be made by anyone with an engineering degree or even a bright technician with good hardware experience. The technical information required can be found in open sources, if not just from good common engineering sense. The materials needed are nothing special and if the effort is made, advanced concepts can be made using everyday hardware such as automotive ignition systems. The testing to date has been very limited but the results of this testing have provided considerable insight to just what is vulnerable in infrastructure systems. This insight and work leads to a firm opinion that a terrorist would have little trouble developing such technology and that he would have a high probability of success in the use as an RF weapon against our infrastructure elements found in any city or near facilities around the country. This work has been done within the proper security guidelines since: The models made in my home laboratory/workshop used off-the-shelf materials and open-source references. The laboratory tests of this hardware were made in a controlled environment with the proper security in place. The results of these tests, the data capabilities, and the target set identities are kept in a facility cleared for classified storage. The development of any of this hardware is reported on a regular basis to those with whom I relate at a classified level to assure that they are informed of the work and are able to apply this to their interests and efforts if necessary. Any of this hardware can be used by them for any determination of utility to military interests. Work in this area will be continued and an aggressive test and evaluation of these "back yard" techniques and methods will be accomplished. This process will be done in cooperation, and if requested, under the direction of agencies with an interest in this non-military weapon related process. The author of this report will, if requested, provide to the Committee further details at a classified level in the proper security environment http://www.networkintrusion.co.uk Talisker's Network Security Tools List Security Tools Notification http://groups.yahoo.com/group/security-tools/join ----- Original Message ----- From: "Talisker" To: ; "A Grudko" Sent: Sunday, June 10, 2001 9:18 PM Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] Bug-blaster > Andy > > I think I may have killed to birds with one stone. Bird one = EMP, Bird 2 > = Echelon > > 1. I remember seeing an article on DIY HERF bombs Q3 last year, the fear > was that terrorists etc could use these to take out big chunks of cities > electronic infrastructure, I've done a quick search on google though and > can't find it. I'll dig through my mail later. > > 2. If echelon exists then I suspect my search would almost certainly have > got the cogs whirring, hang on my IDS just went beserk and there's a knock > at the door. > > > ;o) > http://www.networkintrusion.co.uk > Talisker's Network Security Tools List > > Security Tools Notification > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/security-tools/join > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "A Grudko" > To: > Sent: Wednesday, June 06, 2001 7:21 PM > Subject: [TSCM-L] Bug-blaster > > > > We appear to agree that EMP is pretty impressive, killing a high > percentage > > of discrete component devices & probably most 'bugs'. > > > > So how about creating a physical/biological non-destructive artificial > EMP? > > > > Typical application - I have a client that built an office block here. We > > were called in to sweep the building twice before it was completed and > once > > after. > > > > How nice to hit a 'kill' button in the first 2 stages. > > > > I have a feeling that the equipment box might have to carry a government > > health warning... > > > > Andy Grudko. D.P.M., Grad I.S, (S.A.) > > Grudko Associates - Crime investigation, intelligence and protection > > Johannesburg - Cape Town - Durban - Pretoria - UK - US - Canada - > > Australia - Israel. Agents in 41 countries - www.grudko.com - (+27 11) 465 > > 9673 - 465 1487 (Fax) - Est. 1981 > > GIN (Charter), SACI (Pres), WAD, CALI, SAMLF, SCIP (Past SA Chairman), > > UKPIN, AFIO (OS), IWWA, PRETrust, AmChamCom - "When you need it done > right - > > first time" > > > > > > > > ======================================================== > > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > > > or email your subscription request to: > > subTSCM-L@t... > > =================================================== TSKS > > > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ > > > > > > > > > ======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > or email your subscription request to: > subTSCM-L@t... > =================================================== TSKS > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ > > > 3183 From: Bob Washburne Date: Sun Jun 10, 2001 5:12pm Subject: Re: Web bug detector A "web bug" is an unnoticeable single pixel GIF. It is used to track your visits on the web. It, in itself, cannot do anything to or plant anything on your computer. When you load a page into your web browser it contains text only. Within the page may be references to other files. These are usually the graphics (GIF, JPEG,...) files. When your browser sees these references it then requests the additional files automatically. These file references don't have to be from the same system as the original page. In fact, they can be a full URL to anywhere else. That is how most banner ads are built, as references to the advertising site. The host site doesn't need to have anything of the advertising on their site at all. When a GIF file (banner ad) is requested, it can also contain an imbedded reference. These single pixel GIF's point to another site which your browser dutifully requests. The bug site simply records the destination address (it has to be told where to send the GIF, after all). There are databases out there which can (usually) map an IP address back to a person. What's the issue with being counted? Usually nothing. So what if you like to visit sites about electronics. But here is a more malicious scenario: Say a friend comes over and tells you how their brother has been diagnosed with HIV. Can you help find them a support group? You, being a concerned friend, show them how to use the Internet to find a wealth of information. Your activity is tracked and eventually your insurance company finds out that you visit HIV related sites. Your policy is summarily dropped without explaination. Bottom line, while the web bug is not currently illegal, it has the potential of being just as misused as the electronic kind. How do you defend agains web bugs? Use a filtering web proxie. http://www.junkbuster.comis what I use. It is freeware and filters out most banner ads and web bugs. While it causes the occational site to break, it does seem to increase the reliability of the browsers. They don't hang nearly as much when the ads are removes. Junkbuster compares all requests against a "kill list". Unfortunatly, the list comes empty and you must fill it. Or... http://www.waldherr.orghas a nice set of lists which are continuously updated. Hope this helped. Bob Washburne Dawn Star wrote: > > Anybody know what this website is about and what it does? I just don't have > time to check it out. Roger > > http://www.bugnosis.org/ > 3184 From: Dawn Star Date: Mon Jun 11, 2001 10:42am Subject: Wavecom Junior Does any one have a schematic and board layout diagram for the Wavecom Junior/ RF link 2.4 GHZ Video/Audio transmitter and receiver; before I go to the time and expense of generating my own. Thanks Roger 3185 From: The Dog's Bollix Date: Sat Jun 9, 2001 4:04pm Subject: Re: FW: Why are these files on a Dell? Hello, "spy" , in Windows programming terms, is a term used in reference to monitoring memory usage and process threads from outside a program or thread. Microsoft have a little utility that all windows developers are familiar with called spy32.exe, its the can't-live-without tool that lets you know exactly how your deveoped program is behaving in real life. DWSPYDLL.DLL , if unique to Dell, will more than likely be a library that provides an interface to the Bios. It could use somthing like this spyhooddll.dll to do a bios query when you go to Dell.com's support site and let those tasty little ActiveX controls have their wicked way with your computer. PLEASE NOTE : That is purely my speculation based upon previous experience. You should just forward on the DLL to a windows programmer, once loaded into the microsoft developer tools it is often very easy to see exactly what it is the DLL does.... i.e. you get back a list of function names and parameters. Other than that, remove it and see what doesn't work. Only do this if you know what to do if your computer won't boot normally. --- Steve McAlexander wrote: > > > -----Original Message----- > From: scorned@h... > [mailto:scorned@h...] > Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2001 18:28 > To: focus-ms@s...; > security-basics@s... > Subject: Re: Why are these files on a Dell? > > > interesting. this will surely freak out the > conspiracy theorists who assert > that Dell is 0wned by the NSA. (and i wouldn't be > surprised either) > > why are you running an OS that is pre-installed by > Dell? the first thing > we do where i work is order hardware with nothing > installed, so we can > install > our own secure loadsets. if something arrives with > a pre-installed OS, > we wipe it and install our own. you might want to > consider building your > own secure loadsets. > > Regards, > kw > > >"Ed Kain" on 06/04/2001 > 03:22:50 PM > > > >To: focus-ms@s..., > security-basics@s... > >cc: > >Subject: Why are these files on a Dell? > > > >Hi everyone! > > > >This issue was recently brought to my attention > when i found DWSPYDLL.DLL > >in my C:\DELL direcotry on a new lattitude > notebook. This is from Desaware > >(http://www.desaware.com/SpyWorksL2.htm) and the > module is spyworks. > >The extended functionality that this DLL provides > is powerful, and made > >me wonder why it is part of default Dell software. > > > >This started me thinking, then I found other > interesting files, here's > >a list; > > > >02/12/1999 12:49p 124,416 CLEAREVT.EXE > //this clears my system > logs > >02/01/1994 11:25p 68,000 DWSPYDLL.DLL //this is > the spyhook dll i found > >01/09/2001 12:50p 40,960 KBWAKE.EXE > //keyboard init? > >04/13/2000 10:04a 20,480 REGCLEAN.EXE //name says > it all > >05/27/1999 11:29a 38,944 WDELTREE.EXE > //old dos style deltree > >12/01/1994 11:30a 7,508 WINBATCH.EXE //winbatch > compiler > > > > > > I contacted Dell customer support and > asked if they had remote > tech support > >software for administration, to which several techs > claim to never have > been > >trained if one existed, and none had heard of those > files in dell computers > > > >(their call center dell's didn't have these files). > > > > I'm curious, if anyone else using a Dell > product can confirm > the existance > >of these files, or hopefuly provide some insight as > to why they are > necessary. > > > > > >TIA > > > >ed. > Free, encrypted, secure Web-based email at > www.hushmail.com > > __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Get personalized email addresses from Yahoo! Mail - only $35 a year! http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/ 3186 From: Steve Weinert Date: Sat Jun 9, 2001 10:46pm Subject: Re: Scam warning Do you need a phone number or address? Whois for www.siin.com .com is the global domain of USA & International Commercial (Whois queries for .com domains can be performed at http://rs.internic.net/cgi-bin/whois) whois -h whois.crsnic.net siin.com Redirecting to NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC. The Data in Network Solutions' WHOIS database is provided by Network Solutions for information purposes, and to assist persons in obtaining information about or related to a domain name registration record. Network Solutions does not guarantee its accuracy. By submitting a WHOIS query, you agree that you will use this Data only for lawful purposes and that, under no circumstances will you use this Data to: (1) allow, enable, or otherwise support the transmission of mass unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitations via e-mail (spam); or (2) enable high volume, automated, electronic processes that apply to Network Solutions (or its systems). Network Solutions reserves the right to modify these terms at any time. By submitting this query, you agree to abide by this policy. Registrant: Spectrum International Investigative Network (SIIN-DOM) 1839-D west vista way #515 vista, CA 92083 US Domain Name: SIIN.COM Administrative Contact, Billing Contact: Ronald, Rhoades (RR10936) ninteach@A... Spectrum International Investigative Network 1839-D West Vista Way #515 Vista , CA 92083 760-639-5527 Technical Contact: Network Operations Center (NOC154-ORG) noc@I... INetU, Inc. 744 Roble Road, Suite 70 Allentown, PA 18103 US (610) 266-7441 Fax- - (610) 266-7434 Record last updated on 05-Jan-2001. Record expires on 30-Jan-2010. Record created on 30-Jan-1999. Database last updated on 9-Jun-2001 12:46:00 EDT. Domain servers in listed order: NS3.INETU.NET209.235.192.3 NS4.INETU.NET209.235.192.4 --- In TSCM-L@y..., "Andrus Aaslaid" wrote: > > They sell plans for time machines and perpetual motion machines > > (I am being figurative) and electronic kits. > > > > I ordered two electronic kits. > > > > /---/ > > > > The gentleman is known to be associated with numerous hacker > > groups, and he runs several websites devoted to electronic > > harassment via the web and extensive hacker resources. > > World works the funny way. Google web cache (http://www.google.com/search? q=cache:bvTE_pYI2TM:www.siin.com/contact.html+plans+% 26+kits+unlimited+vista&hl=en) shows the same venture providing also sweep services as Spectrum Investigations, http://www.siin.com/ ... This address has been removed from their active webpage, that is why I am referensing the cached content. > > Regards, > > Andrus. 3187 From: Ray Van Staden Date: Mon Jun 11, 2001 1:15pm Subject: ILLEGAL SURVEILLANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA WATER WORKERS' PHONES TAPPED Mail & Guardian 8 to 14 June 2001 by PAUL KIRK THE Mail & Guardian has obtained documentary proof that a cash-strapped parastatal organization, Umgeni Water, has illegally tapped the telephones of serving and past senior employees - as well as members of the National Education Health and Workers Union. The illegal telephone bugging operation was carried out at a cost of R51 000 - an amount that appears to have been entirely paid for by the taxpayer. The cost of the exercise is confirmed in a damning letter in the possession of the Mail & Guardian. Less than an hour after asking Umgeni Water for comment on the letter – and faxing a copy of it to Umgeni Water’s offices - an unidentified person phoned the Mail & Guardian and offered R5 000 in cash for all copies of the document. The caller, a male, refused to identify himself but asked to meet at the Pavilion shopping center in Westville. The letter is only a single page long and is a communication to Umgeni Water Chief Executive Cromet Molepo from his then lawyer Robinson Manzi of Robinson Manzi and Company. Headed “TAPES IN YOUR POSESSION,” the letter is dated 29 November 2000 and confirms: “that our office paid R15 000 and R36 000 to Sibusiso on your instructions for the tapes in which some offices of employees under investigation were bugged.” The Mail & Guardian can reveal that “Sibusiso” is in fact Sibusiso Ncube, a former member of the SANDF who falsely claims to work for various large national security companies. The M&G could not locate Ncube in the week before going to press. After its’ shocking opening paragraph the letter then continues: “In terms of the law such bugging is illegal…” The letter then exhorts Molepo to hand the tapes over to Manzi at once so they would be protected under attorney client privilege. When the M&G visited Manzi and showed him the letter he confirmed it to be an authentic document. Said Manzi: “You can write that you showed me the letter and that I verified it is in fact my signature on the letter and that it is a real document. Shortly after that letter was written I withdrew as the legal representative of Umgeni. I am not running the sort of practice that I need to accept any business at all. I do not have to tout for business from anyone.” Manzi told the M&G that he paid the telephone bugger with one of his practices cheques. Umgeni Water then issued a cheque in favour of Manzi’s practice to compensate for the chequ Manzi drew. The effect of this transaction was to hide the fact that Umgeni had paid for illegal telephone taps. It would also have effectively protected Umgeni Water from criminal prosecution. Manzi, as Molepo’s legal counsel, could not legally have been forced to testify against Molepo or Umgeni Water had the matter been detected by police. Manzi told the M&G that, apart from Molepo, at least two other senior Umgeni Water officials had full knowledge of the telephone tapping. Omar Latiff, a member of the board of Directors had full knowledge of the operation as did Todani Moyo – a member of Umgeni’s Exco. According to Manzi it was Moyo who in fact wrote the cheque to compensate his practice for having paid for the bugging. In terms of the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act of 1995 it is a serious criminal offence to monitor telephone conversations. In terms of this act permission has to be sought from a high court judge – or a retired high court judge duly authorized by the Minister of Justice – before a telephone can be tapped. Terrence Manase, a spokesman for the Department of Justice told the M&G that the act allowed for various penalties to be handed down on transgressors, depending on which clauses of the act were broken. The lightest, and most likely penalty, would be a fine of R20 000 and/or two years in jail. Said Manzi: “If Molepo, and some other figures, are not prosecuted for this it will be a complete mystery to me. They have broken the law.” Manzi told the M&G that Sibusiso claimed that the telephones were tapped by paying Telkom employees to attach listening devices to the lines of those to be monitored. Telkom spokesman Ed Tillet told the M&G that in the past his organization had taken action against employees for illegally tapping telephones on behalf of private investigators. Tillet was not in his office at the time of going to press and could not confirm how many such cases are on record. Well known Durban private investigator, Raymond Van Staden, who runs one of the most technologically advanced surveillance countermeasures companies in Southern Africa told the M&G that, while he would never bug a telephone illegally, many other operators would. A trawl though the internet revealed three South African companies openly offering to bug telephones. Van Staden told the M&G that it is a common practice to bribe Telkom employees to monitor telephones. Unlike the movies, very few bugs are hidden in telephones. Instead they are attached to telephone lines between the telephone and the exchange. Said van Staden: “Information is valuable and anything that is valuable is liable to attract thieves. Information theft is one of the major growth areas of crime. I find around two to three illegal monitoring devices every year." Van Staden said that most bugging operations were conducted by unscrupulous private investigators acting in partnership with rotten Telkom employees. Said Van Staden: "We are not dealing with a large number of Telkom operators, just a small rotten core of them. The problem is they are very hard to catch out as they know exactly where to hide bugs along the telephone lines. And the problem is getting worse. A few years ago my company detected maybe a bug every 18 months, now we find two or three every year." The names of at least four individuals whose phones were illegally tapped are known to the Mail & Guardian. One is a senior shop steward of Nehawu. Nehawu has repeatedly called for a detailed investigation of Umgeni Water by the Scorpions, the Office for Serious Economic Offences and the Public Protector. Nehawu has repeatedly alleged massive corruption on the part of Umgeni Water’s senior management. Some years ago Umgeni Water outsourced their treasury operation to a company called Specialised Outsourcing. It soon came out that certain members of Umgeni’s board held shares in Specialised Outsourcing. This contract became the subject of an internal investigation which eventually led to the contract being scrapped. Since then Nehawu has been calling for a thorough probe of Umgeni by law enforcement agencies. Management on the other hand have been investigating several former and current senior managers following various allegations. This week the M&G obtained copies of Umgeni Water management meeting records which seem to show rampant mismanagement and corruption. In one instance Brian Wallet, the chairman of the board of Umgeni, and two others admit to having concealed the theft of R600 000 by a senior financial director. In another instance Umgeni admits to having paid nearly R1 million to a contractor “by mistake.” Finally in another instance Omar Latiff, a member of the Umgeni Board, is revealed to be the director of a graphic design company that has been awarded Umgeni contracts. SInce the investigation began Molepo has claimed his life is under threat. Umgeni Water recently spent a whopping R250 000 on a new burglar alarm for his home. * A list of questions with regard this story were faxed to the Pietermaritzburg offices of Umgeni Water. These were marked for the urgent attention of Cromet Molepo. His office confirmed their receipt but had not responded at the time of going to press. --- From the desk of Raymond van Staden Van Staden and Associates cc P.O. Box 1150 Amanzimtoti 4125 South Africa Tel: +27 (0)31 916-1262 Fax: +27 (0)31 916-1263 Email: raymond@v... Internet: http://www.vanstaden.co.za [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 3188 From: Ryan Huggins Date: Mon Jun 11, 2001 3:19pm Subject: Re: Web bug detector Another good web bug filter is WebWasher (webwasher.com). It filters out banner ads and web bugs (fully configurable). It is a stand alone program that works like a proxy server, allowing only the urls you want to be referrenced. It has a good built-in "Kill-List". On the issue of web bugs, I use them on my main entry page. It's a "hidden" 1 pixel image, or did I do it with width & height = 0? Anyway, my bug is hosted by SiteMeter.com, and to let you know the data it tracks; page views, visits, time zones, os, browser, png graphics, javascript, dhtml, entry pages, exit pages, referrer, domain (ca.us,.com...), visits by last day/month/week/year, and it projects the amount of people to come through. I thought I'd let you know what mine tracks, so that you may know that it is harmless. It also can't trace an IP back to it's owner. Let's face it though, most IPs would go back to some Prodigy or AOL company server anyways, they wouldn't say "Joe Schmoe visited the site today" The only way (I know) to get that info, is if it can be gotten from the browser's user name info by JavaScript (along with the IP address), and then saved to a file. If you want, sitemeter has a free demo on their site. Check it out, not all bugs are used for malicious purposes. Ryan P.S. I'm hosted through Yahoo, and they only give you date, time, IP, file accessed and file code (200, 404...). That's why I use bugs. > -----Original Message----- > Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2001 10:59:39 -0700 > From: Dawn Star > Subject: Web bug detector > > Anybody know what this website is about and what it does? I just > don't have > time to check it out. Roger > > http://www.bugnosis.org/ 3189 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Tue Jun 12, 2001 3:24am Subject: Expert: Foreign spies serious threat to U.S. Expert: Foreign spies serious threat to U.S. http://wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=23168 Recently convicted Cuban agents just tip of espionage iceberg By Toby Westerman C 2001 WorldNetDaily.com A 30-year veteran of the intelligence field says most Americans "almost ignore ... the power of intelligence and counterintelligence" in this country, despite the danger foreign intelligence agents pose to the nation's security. In an exclusive interview with WorldNetDaily, David Major identified the use of counterintelligence as a "serious" public issue for the United States. If a nation "chooses not to invest in good security - counterintelligence," said Major, "it simply makes it easier for the collector [foreign intelligence agents]." Although espionage activities are carried out against the Unites States "every single day," Americans, according to Major, "have a love/hate relationship" with counterintelligence, which people "never really see. ... It's just something that's in Hollywood; its something in a book - but it never really happens." Major, an FBI veteran who was a member of Ronald Reagan's National Security Council, is now dean and professor of the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies, a non-governmental center committed to counterintelligence and security education. The Centre and their professors - former intelligence officers in the FBI, CIA, DOD and KGB - provide advanced counterintelligence and security training for the U.S. government, the intelligence community and private-sector companies. The Centre offers several programs to acquaint the public with the unfamiliar world of spies and counterspies, including its unique SpyCruise, which will be offered March 2002. Revelations from the case of Robert Hanssen and the Wasp Network trial have publicly exposed the vulnerabilities of the U.S. to infiltration by foreign intelligence services. Hanssen, a 25-year veteran of the FBI, is alleged to have spied for the Soviet Union, and then Russia, for 15 years. If the allegations against Hanssen prove correct, the former FBI agent would be guilty not only of revealing U.S. secrets, but would also be implicated in the deaths of several individuals who were assisting the U.S. The six-month Miami Wasp Network trial involves accusations of Cuban-directed spying against U.S. bases, locating points for the importation of explosives into the U.S., Cuban government-sponsored terrorism and murder. Five Cubans were convicted of spying by a Miami jury yesterday. One spy was found guilty of contributing to the death of four Brothers to the Rescue members shot down by Cuban jet fighters in international airspace in 1996. Referring to the ambivalence some Americans have regarding counterintelligence, Major stated that there is "nothing evil about doing counterintelligence. ... Vigilance is very important." Major addressed the lack of media coverage given to the Wasp Network trial in Florida and the group's connection with the government of Cuban President Fidel Castro. Regarding evidence implicating the Cuban government with assassination attempts and murder, Major expressed surprise that "nobody talks about it. No one seems to mind that Castro is involved in this," yet the myth of the CIA as "the personification of evil" is spread throughout the world. "The United States doesn't do it (assassinations), and yet no one seems to mind that Castro is involved in this," Major said. "There appears to be no price to pay for Castro for implementing this kind of program, Major observed. "It shows you the aggressiveness of the [Cuban intelligence] service." "If you were to look at intelligence operations against the United States for the last 50 years, you'll not find one that has more intrigue, more complexity. ... It shows that the Cubans have all the toys," Major reflected. Major stated that intelligence services normally seek to have more than one source for information - "redundancy" - and the public revelations surrounding the Wasp Network may indicate "what else is going on that you don't see in the public domain." On the question of Cuba sharing its intelligence information gathered in the U.S. with "rogue states," Major responded, "I think the chances of that are extremely high." Cuban intelligence also hosts a super-sophisticated Russian spy base at Lourdes. "For what purpose" is the base, Major asked, "if Russia is the ally it says it is?" Major quoted one associate, a retired KGB agent, who stated that reform in Russia "is clearly slipping away." The Peoples Republic of China, another close friend of Cuba, represents a formidable counterintelligence problem for the U.S. In contrast to European and American methods of intelligence gathering, the Chinese government relies mainly upon those in sympathy with it to come forward and supply information. The Chinese, according to Major, do not use embassy personnel or seek to recruit agents in the same manner as the Americans and Europeans. Major's organization is striving to make the world of intelligence and counterintelligence understandable to the general public. The group's activities include a variety of training seminars on intelligence topics, and a "spy tour" of Washington, D.C. - examining the nation's capital the way a spy might do. Related stories: Media ignore Cuban espionage http://wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=23134 'Wasp Network' stung in Miami http://wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=21253 Spying on the spies http://wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=22818 --------------------- I.J. Toby Westerman, mailto:twesterman@w... is a contributing reporter for WorldNetDaily who focuses on current events in the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Balkans. -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 3190 From: David Alexander Date: Tue Jun 12, 2001 4:45am Subject: re; Hi-tech spy with the net curtains Having worked in many UK government buildings with the ubiquitous net curtains, I have to say that their purpose is much more mundane than that discussed here. They are very voluminous and long, much taller than the window height, and the bottoms are filled with lead weights. The idea is that if there is a bomb explosion they will billow inwards and help to absorb and contain any fragments of glass and debris blown in through the window. I don't think they are of sufficient density to have any effect on sound to prevent laser surveillance. I am sure everyone knows that the only proven method is a vibration device attached to the glass - or don't talk in that room ! regards David Alexander M.INSTIS Global Client-Server, Communications & Infrastructure Manager Bookham Technology plc DDI: 01235 837823 Mobile: 0779 988 1284 David.Alexander@B... ======================================================================= This e-mail is intended for the person it is addressed to only. The information contained in it may be confidential and/or protected by law. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, you must not make any use of this information, or copy or show it to any person. Please contact us immediately to tell us that you have received this e-mail, and return the original to us. Any use, forwarding, printing or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. No part of this message can be considered a request for goods or services. ======================================================================= Any questions about Bookham's E-Mail service should be directed to postmaster@b.... 3191 From: A Grudko Date: Tue Jun 12, 2001 10:18am Subject: SA Gov. bugs staff If you like to keep such things for future reference, I'd have a newspaper article on an SA local Government department illegally phone tapping it's past and present staff, plus some comments. MS word, about 3 k. Andy Grudko. D.P.M., Grad I.S, (S.A.) Grudko Associates - Crime investigation, intelligence and protection Johannesburg - Cape Town - Durban - Pretoria - UK - US - Canada - Australia - Israel. Agents in 41 countries - www.grudko.com - (+27 11) 465 9673 - 465 1487 (Fax) - Est. 1981 GIN (Charter), SACI (Pres), WAD, CALI, SAMLF, SCIP (Past SA Chairman), UKPIN, AFIO (OS), IWWA, PRETrust, AmChamCom - "When you need it done right - first time" 3192 From: Robert G. Ferrell Date: Tue Jun 12, 2001 11:42am Subject: Re: FW: Why are these files on a Dell? >PLEASE NOTE : That is purely my speculation based upon >previous experience. You should just forward on the >DLL to a windows programmer, once loaded into the >microsoft developer tools it is often very easy to see >exactly what it is the DLL does.... I've got MS Visual C++ 6 Pro at home. If you want to ship the DLL to me there, I can take a look at it for you. rferrell@t... Cheers, RGF Robert G. Ferrell, CISSP Information Systems Security Officer National Business Center U. S. Dept. of the Interior Robert_G_Ferrell@n... ======================================== Who goeth without humor goeth unarmed. ======================================== 3193 From: Date: Tue Jun 12, 2001 1:20pm Subject: Agencies Ask for Help in Cybercrime Agencies Ask for Help in Cybercrime By D. IAN HOPPER .c The Associated Press WASHINGTON (AP) - Law enforcement officials asked Congress Tuesday for more money and expanded powers to fight cybercrime, as they touted some recent successes. Michael Chertoff, head of the Justice Department's criminal division, said his staff wants higher penalties for computer criminals. He specifically cited the case of David Smith, who pleaded guilty to writing the 1999 ``Melissa'' virus. ``In that case, even though the defendant caused tens of millions - if not billions - of dollars of damage,'' Chertoff told the House subcommittee on crime, ``the maximum penalty was five years in prison.'' Chertoff also said police should have broader powers to investigate computer crimes, including an update to the wiretap laws that were written for telephones and have been translated clumsily to the Internet age. New wiretap laws are essential in tracking criminals who use the Internet, Chertoff said. He revealed that investigators traced e-mail messages connected to James Kopp, who was on the run for three years after being indicted for the death of an abortion doctor. Kopp was found and detained in France, where he is awaiting a decision on extradition to the United States. The FBI and Justice Department use a device called DCS1000 - once known as Carnivore - to monitor e-mail messages going to and from a suspect. The device has been under fire from privacy advocates and some legislators. Investigators have used electronic wiretapping to track fugitives, drug dealers, extortionists and computer hackers, as well as suspected foreign intelligence agents. Carnivore critic Alan Davidson of the Washington-based Center for Democracy and Technology told Congress that new laws should come in the form of privacy enhancements, not investigative powers. Davidson said the last ``significant update'' to privacy rules occurred in 1986, before the World Wide Web was invented. The outdated rules leave ``gaps and ambiguities'' that can lead to abuse, he said. ``Greater clarity and enhanced protection are needed both to promote public confidence in law enforcement,'' Davidson said, ``and to provide deserved guidance about what is and is not acceptable behavior for electronic surveillance and data gathering.'' Davidson said the best way to promote online security is to encourage the use of strong encryption by regular Internet users. The Justice Department has argued against that and called for the police to be able to decrypt a message with a court order. An official with the Secret Service described several cases it has worked on to illustrate different flavors of computer crimes. As part of the Treasury Department, the Secret Service investigates crimes against financial institutions. Without naming the victims, James A. Savage of the financial crimes division told legislators about a medical diagnostic service provider that suffered a ``catastrophic shutdown'' of its entire computer network in March. A former employee later admitted guilt. In February, two ``major wireless telecommunications service providers'' identified two hackers who got free long distance and other services, Savage said. While they only stole service, they had enough access to the network to shut down telephone service over a large area, including emergency 911 systems and government installations. Savage said an unidentified financial institution had its entire banking network shut down just two weeks ago. It could not control its ATMs, banking transactions or other functions. Again, a former employee admitted to disabling the system. Savage told lawmakers that the Secret Service is being swamped with ``desperate pleas'' from local police departments for training, assistance and equipment ``on an alarmingly increasing basis.'' On the Net: House Judiciary Committee: http://www.house.gov/judiciary Justice Department: http://www.usdoj.gov 3194 From: Dragos Ruiu Date: Tue Jun 12, 2001 8:55am Subject: U.S. supreme court limits high-tech surveillance url: http://www.wirednews.com/news/politics/0,1283,44444,00.html Can't Scan Without a Warrant By Declan McCullagh 2:00 a.m. June 12, 2001 PDT WASHINGTON -- If the feds want to spy on your home using whizzy tech gadgets, they'd better get a warrant first, the Supreme Court said on Monday. In an important 5-4 ruling that extends privacy's shield to radiation not visible to the human eye, the court said federal agents should have obtained a warrant before using an infrared imaging device to snoop on Danny Lee Kyllo, an Oregon man they later arrested for growing marijuana. The decision, written by conservative Justice Antonin Scalia, said even though the law has long allowed police to peer at homes through their naked eyes, enhanced cameras and similar devices in law enforcement hands "would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology -- including imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the home." This ruling seems likely to affect how federal and state police may use their rapidly-growing arsenal of advanced surveillance tools. In the Kyllo case, agents used an Agema 210 unit to detect unusual heat emissions from the halide lamps used to grow marijuana. Since the Interior Department's unlawful surveillance of Kyllo in January 1992, infrared and other forms of electronic monitoring devices have become far more invasive, and the Justice Department has spent millions of dollars in research on X-ray devices that can see through even brick and concrete walls. "Certainly optical performance has improved. And over the years thermal sensitivity has grown a lot greater," said Doug Little, spokesman for FLIR Systems of Portland, Oregon, which bought Agema in 1998. "Cameras are a lot more accurate now." FLIR no longer lists the Agema 210 on their website. Little says that police typically now opt for the MilCAM LE, a handheld infrared camera that weighs 3 pounds, costs about $50,000, and is advertised with this slogan: "Perpetrators can turn out the lights but they can't turn off the heat." The slender majority of the justices in the Kyllo case strongly reaffirmed the common law belief that a man's home is his castle, as described by Sir Edward Coke four centuries ago: "The house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose." That strident defense of privacy against government intrusion makes Kyllo "probably the most significant decision on the constitutionality of technologically-aided electronic surveillance in a generation," said Marc Rotenberg, director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center in Washington, D.C. Noting that the Court's majority decided that Americans inside their homes expect their heat signatures and other incidental emissions to be private, Rotenberg said that the case breathes new life into the Fourth Amendment "after its battering by overflight, nightscopes, dog sniffing and other techniques that courts have generally found do not violate the 'reasonable expectation of privacy test.'" Larry Lessig, a professor of law at Stanford University, agrees that the case is a landmark one -- at least, if the slim majority can prevent one of its side from defecting. "The question is how sustainable it is," Lessig said. "Given the range of these technologies and the minimal actual kind of invasion they present, the question is whether the court will be resolute in protecting this conception of private spaces instead of yielding to the temptation to allow (surveillance) of criminal activity." Since the Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable" searches and seizures, it implicitly permits reasonable ones. In Kyllo, the majority wrestled with whether viewing a home with electronically-enhanced gear was even a search at all. Scalia concluded that "obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a search -- at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use." Future technology, Scalia said, might even reveal "at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath." In a dissent, liberal Justice John Paul Stevens -- joined by conservative Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and swing-vote Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy -- sided with the Justice Department's defense of warrantless surveillance, saying disparagingly that "the countervailing privacy interest is at best trivial." "Heat waves, like aromas that are generated in a kitchen, or in a laboratory or opium den, enter the public domain if and when they leave a building. A subjective expectation that they would remain private is not only implausible but also surely not one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable,'" Stevens said. This decision could influence whether police need a warrant to capture radio frequency emissions -- a practice known as TEMPEST monitoring -- produced by CPUs and monitors. The minority said they dissented because the "observations were made with a fairly primitive thermal imager" that could only see rough heat patterns and no details -- but TEMPEST monitoring is reportedly far more precise. On a related note, the Justice Department is paying for research on projects that include the Radar Flashlight and the Radar-Based Through-the-Wall Surveillance System, which can detect the presence of people through wooden doors, concrete walls and brick buildings. 3195 From: Craig Snedden Date: Tue Jun 12, 2001 6:14am Subject: Fw: re; Hi-tech spy with the net curtains ----- Original Message ----- From: "Craig Snedden" To: "David Alexander" Sent: Tuesday, June 12, 2001 12:12 PM Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] re; Hi-tech spy with the net curtains > Oh dear! > > I'll expect the men in suits to come knocking at any day, just to prove > "echelon" is reality....... > > :-) > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "David Alexander" > To: "'Craig Snedden'" > Sent: Tuesday, June 12, 2001 11:37 AM > Subject: RE: [TSCM-L] re; Hi-tech spy with the net curtains > > > > Hi Craig > > > > Yes, you are right about room locations, etc, but I didn't want to go into > > too much detail for brevity and for fear of giving away knowledge not for > > 'public consumption'. > > > > regards > > > > David Alexander M.INSTIS > > Global Client-Server, Communications & Infrastructure Manager > > Bookham Technology plc > > > > DDI: 01235 837823 > > Mobile: 0779 988 1284 > > David.Alexander@B... > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Craig Snedden [mailto:craig@d...] > > > Sent: Tuesday, June 12, 2001 11:07 AM > > > To: David Alexander > > > Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] re; Hi-tech spy with the net curtains > > > > > > > > > Correct answer David. They are indeed "shard collectors". > > > > > > I suspect that U.S. & other NATO countries have the same > > > policy, but you > > > will find that areas designated for the "processing" > > > (including discussion) > > > of "sensitive" information either have no windows at all, or > > > are positioned > > > such (in most cases, remembering that in the U.K. a lot of Government > > > facilities have been in use for many many years, when the > > > most sophisticated > > > bug was the human ear) that access to the window, either > > > directly or by line > > > of sight is restricted in some way. > > > > > > Craig > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > > From: "David Alexander" > > > To: "'TSCM submissions'" > > > Sent: Tuesday, June 12, 2001 10:45 AM > > > Subject: [TSCM-L] re; Hi-tech spy with the net curtains > > > > > > > > > > Having worked in many UK government buildings with the > > > ubiquitous net > > > > curtains, I have to say that their purpose is much more > > > mundane than that > > > > discussed here. > > > > > > > > They are very voluminous and long, much taller than the > > > window height, and > > > > the bottoms are filled with lead weights. The idea is that > > > if there is a > > > > bomb explosion they will billow inwards and help to absorb > > > and contain any > > > > fragments of glass and debris blown in through the window. > > > I don't think > > > > they are of sufficient density to have any effect on sound > > > to prevent > > > laser > > > > surveillance. > > > > > > > > I am sure everyone knows that the only proven method is a > > > vibration device > > > > attached to the glass - or don't talk in that room ! > > > > > > > > regards > > > > > > > > David Alexander M.INSTIS > > > > Global Client-Server, Communications & Infrastructure Manager > > > > Bookham Technology plc > > > > > > > > DDI: 01235 837823 > > > > Mobile: 0779 988 1284 > > > > David.Alexander@B... > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ============================================================== > > > ========= > > > > This e-mail is intended for the person it is addressed to only. The > > > > information contained in it may be confidential and/or protected by > > > > law. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, you must > > > > not make any use of this information, or copy or show it to any > > > > person. Please contact us immediately to tell us that you have > > > > received this e-mail, and return the original to us. Any use, > > > > forwarding, printing or copying of this message is strictly > > > prohibited. > > > > > > > > No part of this message can be considered a request for goods or > > > > services. > > > > > > > ============================================================== > > > ========= > > > > Any questions about Bookham's E-Mail service should be directed to > > > postmaster@b.... > > > > > > > > ======================================================== > > > > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > > > > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > > > > > > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > > > > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > > > > > > > or email your subscription request to: > > > > subTSCM-L@t... > > > > =================================================== TSKS > > > > > > > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to > > http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ > > > > The data contained herein is confidential. Unauthorised dissemination > > of the contents of this e-mail may be in breach of Criminal and Civil law > > and may lead to prosecution. > The data contained herein is confidential. Unauthorised dissemination of the contents of this e-mail may be in breach of Criminal and Civil law and may lead to prosecution. 3196 From: Craig Snedden Date: Tue Jun 12, 2001 6:13am Subject: Fw: re; Hi-tech spy with the net curtains ----- Original Message ----- From: "Craig Snedden" To: "David Alexander" Sent: Tuesday, June 12, 2001 11:06 AM Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] re; Hi-tech spy with the net curtains > Correct answer David. They are indeed "shard collectors". > > I suspect that U.S. & other NATO countries have the same policy, but you > will find that areas designated for the "processing" (including discussion) > of "sensitive" information either have no windows at all, or are positioned > such (in most cases, remembering that in the U.K. a lot of Government > facilities have been in use for many many years, when the most sophisticated > bug was the human ear) that access to the window, either directly or by line > of sight is restricted in some way. > > Craig > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "David Alexander" > To: "'TSCM submissions'" > Sent: Tuesday, June 12, 2001 10:45 AM > Subject: [TSCM-L] re; Hi-tech spy with the net curtains > > > > Having worked in many UK government buildings with the ubiquitous net > > curtains, I have to say that their purpose is much more mundane than that > > discussed here. > > > > They are very voluminous and long, much taller than the window height, and > > the bottoms are filled with lead weights. The idea is that if there is a > > bomb explosion they will billow inwards and help to absorb and contain any > > fragments of glass and debris blown in through the window. I don't think > > they are of sufficient density to have any effect on sound to prevent > laser > > surveillance. > > > > I am sure everyone knows that the only proven method is a vibration device > > attached to the glass - or don't talk in that room ! > > > > regards > > > > David Alexander M.INSTIS > > Global Client-Server, Communications & Infrastructure Manager > > Bookham Technology plc > > > > DDI: 01235 837823 > > Mobile: 0779 988 1284 > > David.Alexander@B... > > > > > > ======================================================================= > > This e-mail is intended for the person it is addressed to only. The > > information contained in it may be confidential and/or protected by > > law. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, you must > > not make any use of this information, or copy or show it to any > > person. Please contact us immediately to tell us that you have > > received this e-mail, and return the original to us. Any use, > > forwarding, printing or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. > > > > No part of this message can be considered a request for goods or > > services. > > ======================================================================= > > Any questions about Bookham's E-Mail service should be directed to > postmaster@b.... > > > > ======================================================== > > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > > > or email your subscription request to: > > subTSCM-L@t... > > =================================================== TSKS > > > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ > The data contained herein is confidential. Unauthorised dissemination of the contents of this e-mail may be in breach of Criminal and Civil law and may lead to prosecution. 3197 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Wed Jun 13, 2001 9:12am Subject: The Espionage Price Tag The Espionage Price Tag http://www.idg.net/ic_551538_1794_9-10000.html IDG 23:14 12-Jun-01 Now that the cold war is history, intelligence pros are turning their black-bag wizardry toward corporate targets-maybe even the likes of you. BY ALISON BASS JOHN NOLAN, A FORMER U.S. intelligence officer, took the call on a hot sticky day in July. It was from the CEO of a major consumer electronics company in California. He told Nolan that his company was working on a mysterious new technology that once launched, would change the face of his industry and double the company's revenue base. The CEO said he had taken "extraordinary security measures" to make sure no competitors found out about the new product. But just to make sure, he wanted Nolan, who had founded his own intelligence agency after retiring from the Department of Defense, to penetrate his company's fortifications and find out what his R&D group was working on, how much money was being invested and when the new product would be rolled out-all in 30 days or less. It took Nolan's crew about three hours of working the phones to John Nolan says he applies his intelligence background to help clients find flaws in their own defenses. find out that one of the company's senior managers had been out of the office for the past three months. So they staked out the executive's home and early one morning, tailed him as he drove to a nondescript building about 15 miles from the company's headquarters. An armed guard let the executive through. Nolan's people made no attempt to follow. Instead, they took down the license plate numbers of every car in the parking lot and ran those numbers against Web databases until they had the identities and after more digging, the work titles of every person who had driven to the facility that day. Posing first as pollsters and later as headhunters, Nolan and his crew covertly interviewed almost all of the key engineers involved in the project. They not only discovered what the top secret technology was, how much it cost to develop and when it would be launched. They also-and well within the 30-day deadline-gave the shocked CEO the names and contributions of six strategic partners in the project. Nolan, whose Huntsville, Ala.-based Phoenix Consulting Group is one of the best-known competitive intelligence (CI) firms in the business, says he only does the James Bond stuff to show companies their vulnerabilities. But according to Nolan and others in the field, a growing number of intelligence gatherers regularly transgress ethical and even legal boundaries on behalf of corporate clients both here and abroad. Such spooks-many of them former government spies who migrated to the civilian sector after the Cold War ended-will resort to every dirty trick in the book. They'll lie, misrepresent themselves, steal phone records and do anything they can to wiggle their way into your confidence. Perhaps even now they are shopping their specialized talents to your competitors. So, listen up and remember that forewarned is forearmed. The Espionage Price Tag Earlier this year, in a report to the European Parliament, a British investigator asserted that both U.S. and European companies routinely engage in corporate espionage. And many foreign corporations regularly receive help from intelligence-gathering networks in their own governments, which use the latest in information monitoring technology to keep abreast of supposedly private Web communiqués. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, corporate espionage costs U.S. shareholders at least $25 billion a year in intellectual property losses. "The Internet has made it so much easier to gain access to information. It has actually made people and companies more open," Nolan says. "It's getting harder and harder to protect your assets from the bad guys." Consider, for example, the recent unpublicized case of a California biotech CEO who got a call from someone claiming to be a reporter from a foreign television company. The "reporter" wanted to interview him, and the CEO was happy to oblige. "One of his crew had a shoulder video camera, and they walked with the CEO around his R&D lab with the camera running," says Alan Brill, a senior managing director at investigative firm Kroll Associates who is familiar with this case. "They were able to steal a number of secrets by videotaping the equipment, the settings on the equipment, and papers and notebooks that were lying around. And this CEO was so busy trying to be a star that he never noticed what they were doing or validated who they were." Some companies, like the biotech CEO's, are at a competitive disadvantage because they are simply unaware of the spies among them. Others know what's going on but are afraid to take the steps necessary to protect themselves. "Most companies don't like to get embarrassed, and they don't want to risk the bad press that comes from doing the James Bond stuff," says Nolan, who worked for the Defense Department's intelligence agency for 22 years. "We can't even use the term counterintelligence with the business community; they think of torture and assassination when we use that term. So we call it competitive assurance." Competitive assurance may not involve torture. But it does sometimes involve lying or misrepresentation. There's the old headhunter trick, for instance, or A Ruse by Any Other Name Protect yourself against the devious tricks that some folks in the business employ (whether they'll admit to it or not) the potential investor who just has to know a company's R&D plans. The ruses are endlessly varied (see "A Ruse by Any Other Name," right), and what many executives may not realize is that they are perfectly legal. Lying to obtain information is not even cause for a successful trade secret lawsuit-unless the imposter has signed a nondisclosure agreement. Ironically, the only party who can legitimately be charged with a trade secret violation is, in many cases, the employee who unwittingly shared the crown jewels. "It's not illegal to misrepresent yourself," says R. Mark Halligan, an expert on trade secret law and a principal with the Chicago law firm Welsh & Katz. "And the pretext itself is not actionable." Making matters worse, many corporate executives have a faulty understanding of just how to go about doing the kind of intelligent intelligence gathering that will keep them one step ahead of the competition. While corporate CI units need to know the arsenal of dirty tricks competitors might use against them, specialists say they should also understand that good competitive intelligence can often be accomplished without resorting to such shenanigans. If you know what you're doing, they say, the information you seek about your competitor's plans can usually be obtained by legitimate "open source" means. "You don't have to do the Mickey Mouse stuff to get proprietary information," Nolan says. "We get that kind of thing all the time just by calling the right people, going through public records and putting the pieces of the puzzle together." That doesn't mean, however, that there aren't bad guys out there. CI insiders say that certain Fortune 500 companies regularly rely on subcontractors to do their dirty work. "The fact of the matter is there are independent contract relationships," says Halligan, referring to what happens when a CI firm turns around and hires a subcontractor to do the work they don't want to get caught doing. The subcontractor "comes back with a report, and [the contractor] doesn't really inquire how you got the results of that report. You can call that plausible deniability; the fact is the corporation's relationship is with the first person, not with any subcontractor he may have hired." Interview with the Vampire Marc Barry is one of the bad guys. He says so himself. A cocky fellow from Dorchester, a working-class section of Boston, Barry won't Marc Barry is a self-styled bad guy whose "highly manipulative" nature helps him unearth business intelligence. say how he learned to do intelligence work or which agencies he may or may not have worked for in the past. "I basically developed my skills working undercover for years against Asian organized crime networks that were manufacturing counterfeit stuff" is all Barry will acknowledge in a long phone interview from his office in New York City. But he readily confesses that people who do the kind of work he does have to be "highly manipulative" and "borderline sociopathic." (Barry is also quite friendly. After two brief preinterview phone conversations, he invited this reporter, a perfect stranger, to his loft in Manhattan to see his priceless collection of modern furniture.) Barry, who is a founder and president of a CI firm-C3I Analytics-in New York City, says he regularly uses false pretenses to get information on his clients' competitors. And he knows a lot of other intelligence gatherers who do likewise. "The Society for Competitive Intelligence Professionals [SCIP] claims that all of their members abide by ethical rules, that they do everything by open source," says Barry. "You know, information you can pull down from a company's 10K, patent searches, Internet searches, pollution permits, that sort of thing. But that's simply not true. And the reason I know this is because I have been hired by SCIP members to engage in some very dubious activity on their behalf." Barry claims he once (illegally) obtained the phone records of a West Coast defense contractor at the request of a prominent CI firm whose founder is on the SCIP's board of directors. "We do as much open-source stuff as anyone else-and if you know where to look, you can get a wealth of information without resorting to deception and trickery," he notes. "But when it comes to things like profiling a competitor's R&D-like finding out Pfizer's formula for a drug it's developing for arthritis-you're not going to get that without deception or trickery." -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 3198 From: Date: Tue Jun 12, 2001 10:13pm Subject: Supreme Court Ruling on Through-The-Wall Scanning Opinion: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/99-8508.ZS.html --- http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,44444,00.html Can't Scan Without a Warrant JV 3199 From: Aimee Farr Date: Wed Jun 13, 2001 10:44am Subject: FW: Roundup of newspaper editorials on Sup. Ct thermal imaging ruling Also FYI, for those interested. ~Aimee ..... > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-politech@p... > [mailto:owner-politech@p...]On Behalf Of Declan McCullagh > Sent: Wednesday, June 13, 2001 9:12 AM > To: politech@p... > Subject: FC: Roundup of newspaper editorials on Sup. Ct thermal imaging > ruling > > > Background from Politech: > http://www.politechbot.com/cgi-bin/politech.cgi?name=kyllo > > --- > > No spying on heat waves > Jun. 13, 2001 05:57 ET > insidedenver.com/drmn/opinion/article/0,1299,DRMN_38_645263,00.html > > Privacy first > Jun. 13, 2001 05:42 ET > http://www.sptimes.com/News/061301/Opinion/Privacy_first.shtml > > Blinding high-tech snoopers > Jun. 13, 2001 05:18 ET > http://home.post-dispatch.com/channel%5Cpdweb.nsf/pd/86256A0E0068F E5086256A6900243C32?OpenDocument&PubWrapper=Editorial Supreme Court Jun. 13, 2001 05:00 ET http://www.freep.com/voices/editorials/ecourt13_20010613.htm Hands off the Fourth Amendment Jun. 13, 2001 04:15 ET http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20010613-560933.htm EDITORIAL: Spying and searches Jun. 12, 2001 06:57 ET http://http://www.lvrj.com/lvrj_home/2001/Jun-12-Tue-2001/opinion/16300320.h tml Scalia's right! Jun. 12, 2001 05:44 ET http://www.nj.com/editorial/ledger/index.ssf?/editorial/ledger/1385715.html -- UPI roundup of editorials: U.S. newspapers editorialize on court Jun. 12, 2001 12:14 ET http://www.vny.com/cf/News/upidetail.cfm?QID=193309 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice. To subscribe, visit http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3200 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Wed Jun 13, 2001 8:31pm Subject: Top Spy Sir David Spedding Dies Top Spy Sir David Spedding Dies By Audrey Woods Associated Press Writer Wednesday, June 13, 2001; 8:56 p.m. EDT http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20010613/aponline205643_000.htm LONDON -- Retired spy chief Sir David Spedding, once the real-life embodiment of James Bond's fictional boss "M," died Wednesday at the age of 58. The Foreign Office, which did not even publicly acknowledge the existence of the Secret Intelligence Service until 1994, said Spedding died after a long illness. After nearly 30 years as a spy, Spedding had been appointed in 1994 to head the service long known to thriller readers and the general public as MI6. He had been the youngest head of the agency since its founding in 1909. An expert in Middle East terrorism, Spedding was the first MI6 chief not to be a Soviet specialist, reflecting the post-Cold War shift of emphasis in the espionage agency. Spedding, who had studied at Oxford University, was recruited into MI6 in 1967 and attended the Middle East Center for Arabic Studies, near Beirut, Lebanon - once a training center for British spies. His postings took him to Lebanon, Chile, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan. In Chile, which was his only posting outside the Middle East, he was second secretary at the British Embassy from 1972 to 1974, a post that was then a prime cover position for spies. There was speculation that he would have been aware of a U.S. plot against the elected socialist government of Salvador Allende. CIA director George Tenet called Spedding "a tremendous friend, colleague and mentor not only for me but for all the men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency and the entire Intelligence community." "Sir David was a magnificent partner; together our nations fought the scourges of terrorism, destabilizing regional conflict, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international narcotics trafficking," the statement said. Spedding, like his predecessors, was known in government circles as "C," for Chief, the inspiration for "M," the creation of James Bond author Ian Fleming. Sir David invited Dame Judi Dench to MI6's Christmas lunch in 1998, after the actress, who has played "M" in recent 007 movies, expressed an interest in learning more about her real-life counterpart. Traditionally, "C" writes memos in green ink, and is the only member of the service who is allowed to do so. "C" is also the only MI6 member whose identity is made public, but Spedding discouraged the taking of his photograph. In "Who's Who" he listed his recreations as golf and reading, and gave a post office box as his address. The new "C", Richard Dearlove, was appointed in August 1999. The Foreign Office said Prime Minister Tony Blair and newly appointed Foreign Secretary Jack Straw were informed immediately of Spedding's death. "Sir David was a determined and effective leader of a service whose contribution to Britain's security and well-being has to be unsung, but is nonetheless substantial," Straw said in a statement. "I personally was very grateful to him for his continuing advice to me on various subjects even after his formal retirement," said Straw who as former Home Secretary had been responsible for police and security issues, as well as customs and immigration matters. Spedding, who was knighted in 1996, is survived by his wife, Gillian, and two sons. Funeral arrangements were pending. © Copyright 2001 The Associated Press -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 3201 From: Dave Emery Date: Wed Jun 13, 2001 3:16pm Subject: Anybody know of a source for Anritsu MS-2670A manuals ? Does anyone out there have or know of a source for a service and an operations manual (or a good photocopy of one) for an Anritsu MS-2670A 1.8 ghz color LCD display spectrum analyzer with integrated tracking generator ? I am desperately seeking these manuals and Anrtisu claims the MS-2670A "is not supported by Anritsu Japan" and they have no manuals for it in stock in the US. This after several months of giving me the run around about the manuals. This spectrum analyzer is a close cousin to the commercial 3 ghz Antitsu MS-2661A (current model is a MS-2661C) and apparently was produced as a special for the US Navy GPETE program in response to a 1995 RFP. According to government records 512 of these were sold to the government between 1996 and Dec 1999. It covers between 1 khz and 1.8 ghz with a 10 hz minimum resolution bandwidth and fully synthesized tuning, integrated frequency counter with 1 hz resolution and 10 ^^ 7 accuracy (or better with an external standard) and a number of firmware features including color display, A/B traces, markers, bandwidth measurements, peak search and so forth. A number of these instruments seem to have shown up surplus recently, I saw two of them at Dayton and one was just sold on Ebay (Item 1603474567). A couple of dealers have advertised them as well. None of the sellers has had an available manual when I asked them. Someone must have a manual they are willing to sell or take to the local Kinkos copy and have copied - I will pay liberally for an original or good copy as the instrument I bought last january on Ebay isn't much use without the manuals since it needs calibration... -- Dave Emery N1PRE, die@d... DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass. PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18 3202 From: Dawn Star Date: Thu Jun 14, 2001 0:36pm Subject: Manuals Message: 2 Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2001 16:16:35 -0400 From: Dave Emery Subject: Anybody know of a source for Anritsu MS-2670A manuals ? There are companies that just specialize in manuals. Go to: www.google.com and run manuals or equipment manuals and there are about a dozen companies. Roger 3203 From: Date: Thu Jun 14, 2001 0:12pm Subject: U.S. House leader presses FBI surveillance worries U.S. House leader presses FBI surveillance worries By Jim Wolf WASHINGTON, June 14 (Reuters) - House Majority leader Dick Armey may seek U.S. Justice Department budget cuts to curb the use of the FBI e-mail surveillance tool formerly known as Carnivore, a spokesman said on Thursday. "If necessary he would consider using Congress's power of the purse to pull the plug on Carnivore," said the aide, Richard Diamond. At issue is specialized software used by the FBI for court-authorized tracking of a criminal suspect's online communications with the cooperation of an Internet service provider. Unlike other court-ordered electronic surveillance tools, Carnivore, as it is still widely known, gives law enforcers access to the communications of all the service provider's customers, critics have charged. In a letter earlier in the day, Armey, a Texas Republican, urged Attorney General John Ashcroft to rethink the program, which he inherited from the Clinton administration. "I respectfully ask that you consider the serious constitutional questions Carnivore has raised and respond with how you intend to address them," Armey wrote. He cited a decision on Monday by the Supreme Court restricting drug-hunting police officers' use of thermal-imaging technology to peer inside a suspect's home unless they first obtain a warrant. The court's 5-4 ruling was a setback for the Justice Department, which had argued the use of a thermal imager to scan a home's heat patterns was not covered by Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure. As a result, Armey said it was reasonable to ask whether Carnivore "similarly undermines the minimum expectation that individuals have that their personal communications will not be examined by law enforcement devices unless a specific court warrant has been issued." Chris Watney, a Justice Department spokeswoman, said Ashcroft was "very concerned about this issue and is reviewing it." She said he would respond directly to Armey. Ashcroft, like Armey, is widely regarded as a strong advocate of privacy rights. He has been studying a Justice Department task force's report on possible changes to the system which the FBI has renamed DCS-1000, a name spokesman Paul Bresson said did not signify anything in particular. Watney said she had no indication when Ashcroft would decide what, if anything, to do about the system. The in-house task force was assembled by Ashcroft's predecessor, Janet Reno, under pressure from Armey and other lawmakers. 3204 From: Miguel Puchol Date: Thu Jun 14, 2001 5:13pm Subject: RE: Anybody know of a source for Anritsu MS-2670A manuals ? Hi Dave, We have an Anritsu office here in Spain, and they are usually quite nice. I can give them a try, but there is a slight chance that the manuals may be in spanish - I say slight because this type of equipment is usually handled by people with some knowledge of english. Another maybe is that the devices probably were sold only in the U.S., so... In any case, I'll give them a go tomorrow. All the best, Mike -----Mensaje original----- De: Dave Emery [mailto:die@d...] Enviado el: miercoles, 13 de junio de 2001 22:17 Para: tscm-l@yahoogroups.com Asunto: [TSCM-L] Anybody know of a source for Anritsu MS-2670A manuals ? Does anyone out there have or know of a source for a service and an operations manual (or a good photocopy of one) for an Anritsu MS-2670A 1.8 ghz color LCD display spectrum analyzer with integrated tracking generator ? I am desperately seeking these manuals and Anrtisu claims the MS-2670A "is not supported by Anritsu Japan" and they have no manuals for it in stock in the US. This after several months of giving me the run around about the manuals. This spectrum analyzer is a close cousin to the commercial 3 ghz Antitsu MS-2661A (current model is a MS-2661C) and apparently was produced as a special for the US Navy GPETE program in response to a 1995 RFP. According to government records 512 of these were sold to the government between 1996 and Dec 1999. It covers between 1 khz and 1.8 ghz with a 10 hz minimum resolution bandwidth and fully synthesized tuning, integrated frequency counter with 1 hz resolution and 10 ^^ 7 accuracy (or better with an external standard) and a number of firmware features including color display, A/B traces, markers, bandwidth measurements, peak search and so forth. A number of these instruments seem to have shown up surplus recently, I saw two of them at Dayton and one was just sold on Ebay (Item 1603474567). A couple of dealers have advertised them as well. None of the sellers has had an available manual when I asked them. Someone must have a manual they are willing to sell or take to the local Kinkos copy and have copied - I will pay liberally for an original or good copy as the instrument I bought last january on Ebay isn't much use without the manuals since it needs calibration... -- Dave Emery N1PRE, die@d... DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass. PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18 ======================================================== TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L or email your subscription request to: subTSCM-L@t... =================================================== TSKS Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ 3205 From: Marcelrf Date: Thu Jun 14, 2001 9:50am Subject: New Radar Can Detect Weapons In A Crowd New Radar Can Detect Weapons In A Crowd Source: Palm Beach Post Publication date: 2001-06-12 Arrival time: 2001-06-14 It's faster than a speeding bullet, more powerful than an airport metal detector. And, ahem, it may even be able to see through your underwear. Meet the new radar-like device that can detect concealed weapons through clothing from up to 50 feet away. Like a "remote frisk," the device being developed by U.S. government engineers could be used by police to spot people in unruly crowds who may be carrying guns, knives, or even plastic explosives. Plans for the system come amid growing concern over domestic terrorism, while adding new fuel to the debate over the constitutionality of high-tech policing practices. "There's a certain voyeuristic aspect to this that just makes me uncomfortable," said Richard Smith, chief technology officer for the Denver-based Privacy Foundation. Indeed, a ruling Monday by the U.S. Supreme Court could influence the use of high-tech devices by law enforcement officials in the future. The justices ruled 5-4 in the case of an Oregon man whose home was searched after a federal agent used a thermal-imaging device to detect heat waves emanating from the building. Although police found that Danny Kyllo was using powerful lights to grow marijuana, the court majority agreed that they violated Kyllo's Fourth Amendment rights by using the device without first obtaining a search warrant. But defenders of the device say it would help police identify and capture potentially dangerous criminals before they have a chance to use their weapons. The device emits high-frequency electromagnetic waves that pass through clothing, but are reflected by dense objects. The device focuses the reflected radiation onto small silicon wafers, converting it into images that appear on a laptop computer. "It penetrates clothing quite well," said Erich Grossman, who is leading the research. "Some clothing, like leather jackets, is more difficult, but there's not much difference. We're really very confident that it will produce recognizable images." He said the device wouldn't harm a person's health or affect a pacemaker. Although a working prototype will likely be ready by the end of the year, U.S. officials say there are no immediate plans to deploy the system. -- "NEXTEL1 IT'S NOT JUST NEXTEL" Subscribe to Nextel1: http://www.onelist.com/subscribe/NEXTEL1 3206 From: Ray Van Staden Date: Fri Jun 15, 2001 5:01am Subject: Telephone bugger’s wings clipped MAIL & GUARDIAN 15 TO 21 June 2001 Telephone bugger’s wings clipped By Paul Kirk The high-profile owner of a Durban electronic shop was arrested this week on suspicion of illegally tapping the telephones of a major shipping company. Police say only three cases of illegal telephone tapping – including this week’s case – have been prosecuted since the new legislation was passed allowing for serious jail time for telephone buggers. People illegally tapping phones can be jailed for up to two years, and up to five years for disclosing information obtained from an illegal telephone tap. But although this is on the increase - with dozens of ex-Telkom technicians and out-of-work police offering bugging services - the law that prevents telephone tapping is so restrictive it severely hinders the investigation of crime. Andrew Brophy advertised in the Durban telephone directory that his business - the Spy Shop in the Durban pavilion - supplied electronic surveillance and bugging. In effect he was advertising that he was prepared to break the law. The Interception and Monitoring Act places enormous obstacles in the way of government agencies that may legally monitor telecommunications lines. Only an assistant commissioner of police, a major general of the South African Defence Force (SANDF) or a chief director of Intelligence services may approach a judge to request permission to monitor a telecommunications line. Permission may only be granted for crimes that are being committed over a long period of time, or if they are committed on an organised or regular basis. The only exceptions to these rules are crimes committed under the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act, or crimes that may harm the economy. A copy of the October 1999 Law Commission report on the Act states that these conditions may be a serious defect to the law – as once-off murder, rape, or armed robbery would not be sufficient to justify a telephone “bug”. The report reads: “A matter which is alarming in South Africa is the large number of advertisements, sometimes in law journals, of private investigators offering to deliver services which include ‘bugging’. In view of the fact that only the [police], the SA Secret Service, the SANDF and the National Intelligence agency may be authorised to do interception and monitoring, the legality of monitoring by private investigators is questionable, especially in regard to instances of third party monitoring.” Brophy was one of Durban’s most high-profile advertisers. His arrest followed the employment of Durban debugging expert Raymond van Staden to check the telephone lines of a shipping company. Most telephone taps are not placed inside the home or office of a victim; instead they are connected to the street boxes to which telephone lines run. Bugs do not normally make any noise on a telephone line and as a rule cannot be detected without specialised equipment and training. Van Staden says bugs are most commonly in the form of specially modified small tape recorders with wires attached to the telephone line. A special adaptation of the tape recorder switches the device on as soon as the telephone is lifted. The small tapes can generally record one hour of conversation. According to police sources, the standard charge is R3 000 a week to monitor a telephone line. After Van Staden discovered the telephone box outside his client’s home had been forced open, he looked inside and saw the tell-tale signs of an illegal telephone tap. He then contacted Telkom and police and prepared to wait for the telephone bugger to return. To Van Staden’s amazement the two alleged buggers returned only minutes later to change the tapes in their monitoring device. Once Brophy opened the junction box, Van Staden pounced and made a citizen’s arrest. Moments later police and Telkom officials arrived. After a detailed search the telephone “bug” was found hidden among the tangle of wires in the junction box. Members of the police technical support unit searched Brophy’s car. Brophy’s driver, Thinus Delport, was arrested as well. The bug was removed for fingerprinting and a partial fingerprint was found on the small tape inside. Brophy was found to be in possession of tape recorders like the one found in the telephone box. Police also found a file in his car containing the business cards of most of Durban’s large security companies suggesting that Brophy’s client base may have been significant. Brophy appeared in court and was Granted R2 000 bail on Tuesday. Van Staden said he suspected that industrial espionage may have been the motive for the bugging. Andy Grudko, the South African Council of Investigators, said although telephone bugging was on the increase, it was more widespread before the new Act was passed. He said the council was attempting to weed out illegal telephone tappers from the industry. --- From the desk of Raymond van Staden Van Staden and Associates cc P.O. Box 1150 Amanzimtoti 4125 South Africa Tel: +27 (0)31 916-1262 Fax: +27 (0)31 916-1263 Email: raymond@v... Internet: http://www.vanstaden.co.za [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 3207 From: Date: Fri Jun 15, 2001 10:45am Subject: TSCM Organizations & Conferences Are there any memberships/organizations that are specifically for TSCM specialist? What about conferences/expositions? Is there anywhere you can see the latest TSCM equipment? Looking for recommendations, I'm new to the field and trying to find out as much as I can. Thanks ahead for any info. 3208 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Fri Jun 15, 2001 3:44pm Subject: Telephone Bugger's Wings Clipped Telephone Bugger's Wings Clipped Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg) June 15, 2001 Posted to the web June 14, 2001 Paul Kirk http://allafrica.com/stories/200106140457.html The high-profile owner of a Durban electronics shop was arrested this week on suspicion of illegally tapping the telephones of a major shipping company. Police say only three cases of illegal telephone tapping -- including this week's case -- have been prosecuted since new legislation was passed allowing for serious jail time for telephone buggers. People illegally tapping phones can be jailed for up to two years, and up to five years for disclosing information obtained from an illegal telephone tap. But, although this crime is on the increase -- with dozens of ex-Telkom technicians and out-of-work police offering bugging services -- the law that prevents telephone tapping is so restrictive it severely hinders the investigation of the crime. Andrew Brophy advertised in the Durban telephone directory that his business -- the Spy Shop in the Durban Pavilion -- supplied electronic surveillance and bugging. In effect he was advertising that he was prepared to break the law. The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act places enormous obstacles in the way of government agencies that may legally monitor telecommunications lines. Only an assistant commissioner of police, a major general of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) or a chief director of Intelligence Services may approach a judge to request permission to monitor a telecommunications line. Permission may only be granted for crimes that are being committed over a long period of time, or if they are committed on an organised or regular basis. The only exceptions to these rules are crimes committed under the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act, or crimes that may harm the economy. A copy of the October 1999 Law Commission report on the Act states that these conditions may be a serious defect to the law -- as a once-off murder, rape or armed robbery would not be sufficient to justify a telephone "bug". The report reads: "A matter which is alarming in South Africa is the large number of advertisements, sometimes even in law journals, of private investigators offering to deliver services which include 'bugging'. In view of the fact that only the [police], the SA Secret Service, the SANDF and the National Intelligence Agency may be authorised to do interception and monitoring, the legality of monitoring by private investigators is questionable, especially in regard to instances of third party monitoring." Brophy was one of Durban's most high-profile advertisers. His arrest followed the employment of Durban debugging expert Raymond van Staden to check the telephone lines of a shipping company. Most telephone taps are not placed inside the home or office of a victim, instead they are connected to the street boxes to which telephone lines run. Bugs do not normally make any noise on a telephone line and as a rule cannot be detected without specialised equipment and training. Van Staden says bugs are most commonly in the form of specially modified small tape recorders with wires attached to the telephone line. A special adaptation of the tape recorder switches the device on as soon as the telephone is lifted. The small tapes can generally record one hour of conversation. According to police sources, the standard charge is R3 000 a week to monitor a telephone line. After Van Staden discovered the telephone box outside his client's home had been forced open, he looked inside and saw the tell-tale signs of an illegal telephone tap. He then contacted Telkom and the police and prepared to wait for the telephone bugger to return. To Van Staden's amazement the two alleged buggers returned only minutes later to change the tapes in their monitoring device. Once Brophy opened the junction box, Van Staden pounced and made a citizen's arrest. Moments later police and Telkom officials arrived. After a detailed search the telephone "bug" was found hidden among the tangle of wires in the junction box. Members of the police technical support unit searched Brophy's car. Brophy's driver, Thinus Delport, was arrested as well. The bug was removed for fingerprinting and a partial fingerprint was found on the small tape inside. Brophy was found to be in possession of tape recorders like the one found in the telephone box. Police also found a file in his car containing the business cards of most of Durban's large security companies -- suggesting that Brophy's client base may have been significant. Brophy appeared in court and was granted R2 000 bail on Tuesday. Van Staden said he suspected that industrial espionage may have been the motive for the bugging. Andy Grudko, of the South African Council of Investigators, said although telephone bugging was on the increase, it was more widespread before the new Act was passed. He said the council was attempting to weed out illegal telephone tappers from the industry. Copyright © 2001 Mail & Guardian. Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media (allAfrica.com). -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 3209 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Fri Jun 15, 2001 4:50pm Subject: Re: TSCM Organizations & Conferences At 3:45 PM +0000 6/15/01, guzlo1@y... wrote: >Are there any memberships/organizations that are specifically for >TSCM specialist? What about conferences/expositions? Is there >anywhere you can see the latest TSCM equipment? Looking for >recommendations, I'm new to the field and trying to find out as much >as I can. Thanks ahead for any info. It's a really tough, and awkward question. 1) The TSCM industry is small with only a few dozen major players in the world operating outside of a government agency. Due to this the number of "hardcore TSCM'ers" is very limited, and will continue to be so for quite some time to come. Of course their are hundreds of government TSCM'er (who have to keep their head down), and ten times as many people working in the private sector with similar responsibilities. 2) There are over a dozen "Boy's Clubs" out there that cater to people who are also TSCM'ers, but they don't actually exclude non-TSCM'ers so you get clumped together and painted with a broad brush.. 3) Many of the organizations out there accept members and issue certificates so long as their check clears the bank (my dog has actually been formally certified to perform TSCM by one such organization). 4) Other organizations are so tight and restrictive with membership that they only let their own personal friends, or people their own age level join (some require you to be on medicare). Such organizations will let anybody join (felons, mental Patients, Con Artists, etc) join so long as an appropriate amount or brown-nosing and ass kissing is performed. 5) Some organizations which cater to Private Investigators accept TSCM'ers, but in reality TSCM has very little to do with PIs. TSCM is a highly specialized technical discipline much like that of a professional locksmithing, professional photography, and so on. Just because a PI owns a 35mm camera does not make him a wedding photographer, much the same way as just owning a gun does not make you a bodyguard. 6) There are also organizations which a TSCM'er can join which exist solely as a front firm to make the TSCMer appear more legitimate, but even a basic query on the organization by an investigator turns up its true purpose (which completely kills the TSCM'ers credibility). Join those organizations, mailing lists, and conferences which are appropriate to your technical disciplines, interests, and expertise. Then expand your memberships to include those areas where you share a mutual interest (ie: PI's, lawyers, etc), and then finally consider membership in something more specific the TSCM business (which does not yet exist). Over the past few years I have been repeatedly asked to create an organization strictly for "TSCM people" with a tiered membership system with educational, experience, and minimal equipment qualifications for each level. The only problem is that half the people insists on being grand-fathered in as part of the old boys network, and the other half are amused by the first group and refused to join any organization unless admission is controlled by a rigorous board examination. It all boils down to TSCM being a highly specialized technical skills that is of great value to a wide variety of clients. However, the number of legitimate TSCM people out their is very limited, an thus creating "an organization" for two dozen people simply isn't practical or cost effective. [...so ends the sermon] -jma -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= 3210 From: Ray Van Staden Date: Sat Jun 16, 2001 5:09am Subject: Fw: Telephone Bugger's Wings Clipped I am responsible for arresting the 2 suspects. I charged them under following law in South Africa: THE INTERCEPTION AND MONITORING PROHIBITION ACT (ACT No. 127 OF 1992) part 2 (1) (a) and (b) of the act which states: 2. Prohibition on interception and monitoring (1) No person shall- (a) intentionally and without the knowledge or permission of the dispatcher intercept a communication which has been or is being or is intended to be transmitted by telephone or in any other manner over a telecommunications line; or (b) intentionally monitor any conversation or communication by means of a monitoring device so as to gather confidential information concerning any person, body or organization. Raymond VAN STADEN --- From the desk of Raymond van Staden Van Staden and Associates cc P.O. Box 1150 Amanzimtoti 4125 South Africa Tel: +27 (0)31 916-1262 Fax: +27 (0)31 916-1263 Email: raymond@v... Internet: http://www.vanstaden.co.za ----- Original Message ----- From: "James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng" To: "TSCM-L Mailing List" Sent: 15 June 2001 10:44 Subject: [TSCM-L] Telephone Bugger's Wings Clipped Telephone Bugger's Wings Clipped Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg) June 15, 2001 Posted to the web June 14, 2001 Paul Kirk http://allafrica.com/stories/200106140457.html The high-profile owner of a Durban electronics shop was arrested this week on suspicion of illegally tapping the telephones of a major shipping company. Police say only three cases of illegal telephone tapping -- including this week's case -- have been prosecuted since new legislation was passed allowing for serious jail time for telephone buggers. People illegally tapping phones can be jailed for up to two years, and up to five years for disclosing information obtained from an illegal telephone tap. But, although this crime is on the increase -- with dozens of ex-Telkom technicians and out-of-work police offering bugging services -- the law that prevents telephone tapping is so restrictive it severely hinders the investigation of the crime. Andrew Brophy advertised in the Durban telephone directory that his business -- the Spy Shop in the Durban Pavilion -- supplied electronic surveillance and bugging. In effect he was advertising that he was prepared to break the law. The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act places enormous obstacles in the way of government agencies that may legally monitor telecommunications lines. Only an assistant commissioner of police, a major general of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) or a chief director of Intelligence Services may approach a judge to request permission to monitor a telecommunications line. Permission may only be granted for crimes that are being committed over a long period of time, or if they are committed on an organised or regular basis. The only exceptions to these rules are crimes committed under the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act, or crimes that may harm the economy. A copy of the October 1999 Law Commission report on the Act states that these conditions may be a serious defect to the law -- as a once-off murder, rape or armed robbery would not be sufficient to justify a telephone "bug". The report reads: "A matter which is alarming in South Africa is the large number of advertisements, sometimes even in law journals, of private investigators offering to deliver services which include 'bugging'. In view of the fact that only the [police], the SA Secret Service, the SANDF and the National Intelligence Agency may be authorised to do interception and monitoring, the legality of monitoring by private investigators is questionable, especially in regard to instances of third party monitoring." Brophy was one of Durban's most high-profile advertisers. His arrest followed the employment of Durban debugging expert Raymond van Staden to check the telephone lines of a shipping company. Most telephone taps are not placed inside the home or office of a victim, instead they are connected to the street boxes to which telephone lines run. Bugs do not normally make any noise on a telephone line and as a rule cannot be detected without specialised equipment and training. Van Staden says bugs are most commonly in the form of specially modified small tape recorders with wires attached to the telephone line. A special adaptation of the tape recorder switches the device on as soon as the telephone is lifted. The small tapes can generally record one hour of conversation. According to police sources, the standard charge is R3 000 a week to monitor a telephone line. After Van Staden discovered the telephone box outside his client's home had been forced open, he looked inside and saw the tell-tale signs of an illegal telephone tap. He then contacted Telkom and the police and prepared to wait for the telephone bugger to return. To Van Staden's amazement the two alleged buggers returned only minutes later to change the tapes in their monitoring device. Once Brophy opened the junction box, Van Staden pounced and made a citizen's arrest. Moments later police and Telkom officials arrived. After a detailed search the telephone "bug" was found hidden among the tangle of wires in the junction box. Members of the police technical support unit searched Brophy's car. Brophy's driver, Thinus Delport, was arrested as well. The bug was removed for fingerprinting and a partial fingerprint was found on the small tape inside. Brophy was found to be in possession of tape recorders like the one found in the telephone box. Police also found a file in his car containing the business cards of most of Durban's large security companies -- suggesting that Brophy's client base may have been significant. Brophy appeared in court and was granted R2 000 bail on Tuesday. Van Staden said he suspected that industrial espionage may have been the motive for the bugging. Andy Grudko, of the South African Council of Investigators, said although telephone bugging was on the increase, it was more widespread before the new Act was passed. He said the council was attempting to weed out illegal telephone tappers from the industry. Copyright © 2001 Mail & Guardian. Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media (allAfrica.com). -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. ======================================================================= ======================================================== TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L or email your subscription request to: subTSCM-L@t... =================================================== TSKS Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ 3211 From: James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng Date: Sat Jun 16, 2001 11:01am Subject: The Wrong Way to Do Dirty Tricks http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,44567,00.html The Wrong Way to Do Dirty Tricks By Declan McCullagh 2:00 a.m. June 16, 2001 PDT WASHINGTON -- A startling report from the Minnesota Senate race provides a stunning example of American politics as tech-cluelessness combined with petty nastiness. Christine Gunhus, the wife of a U.S. senator who ran unsuccessfully for re-election in 2000, pleaded no contest last week to charges of using a pseudonym to unlawfully send e-mail messages that disparaged her husband's Democratic rival. To hear state prosecutors tell it, Gunhus -- now married to former GOP senator Rod Grams -- violated the state's criminal election laws. Gunhus reportedly posted as a left-wing activist angry at the liberal, pro-labor candidate Mike Ciresi, who promptly turned around and filed a complaint under the Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices Act after he lost the primary election. That would be unusual enough in itself, but this look at how not to write e-mail nastygrams underscores the risks of using technology you don't understand -- especially when it can reveal your identity: *Gunhus is accused of using a Hotmail account (Katie Stevens -- kylomb@h...) to send the disparaging mails, which talked about how Ciresi had represented corporate polluters and anti-union companies. But Hotmail includes an X-Originating-IP header that shows the IP address of the sender -- a problem if you're typing it from the opposing campaign's computer. *Prosecutors say they traced the IP address back to an AT&T WorldNet user that had repeatedly used the "Katie Stevens" Hotmail account by connecting from Gunhus' home number. (Guess Worldnet keeps Caller ID logs.) Apparently, the person using the "Katie Stevens" pseudonym was cautious at first, sending the mail from a Kinkos store, but then got sloppy. *The e-mail attacks included Microsoft Word attachments, which a Ciresi aide investigated. The aide found that Word listed the document authors as Grams staffers including -- you guessed it -- Christine Gunhus. *Democratic researchers reported finding Globally Unique Identifiers in the Word documents. The GUID includes the Ethernet MAC address. Prosecutors obtained a search warrant last August to seize Gunhus' computer, from which they could extract the MAC address if the Ethernet card was still the same. *Let's not forget the political risk. In an article in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune last year, the Grams campaign offered a remarkably narrow denial. A spokesman said, "We didn't put this together and send it out of the Grams campaign office," leaving open the question of whether it was sent by a campaign worker from another location. *And what about the legal risk to free speech? The Minnesota Civil Liberties Union argues that a criminal law that bans sending pseudonymous messages is unconstitutional. A Supreme Court decision, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, says that a prohibition on the distribution of anonymous campaign literature violates the First Amendment. Epilogue: Grams managed to derail his Democratic rival's primary bid, and Ciresi did not win his party's nomination. Even though Grams lost the general election in November, that hasn't halted his political ambitions. The Washington Times reported in April that Grams is said to be considering a challenge in 2002 to U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone, a liberal Democrat. - - - Fidel.com: Fidel Castro has no plans to launch a crippling "cyberattack" against the United States. An apparently pained Castro, insulted that he would be suspected of such an offense, insisted last week that his honor was beyond reproach. How could those running-dog-capitalists even imply such a thing? Though cyberattacks are out, verbal attacks are still muy bueno. Castro labeled the feds "orphans, and bereft of ideas," and the U.S. as "an empire that only knows lies," according to the Associated Press. In February, as we told you at the time, Admiral Tom Wilson, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told the Senate that the 74-year-old dictator may be preparing a cyberattack against the United States. "There's certainly the potential for them to employ those kind of tactics against our modern and superior military," Wilson said at the time. - - - Carnivore update: House Majority Leader Dick Armey is asking the Justice Department to rethink Carnivore. "I respectfully ask that you consider the serious constitutional questions Carnivore has raised and respond with how you intend to address them. This is an issue of great importance to the online public," Armey said last week in a letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft. Armey said that the Supreme Court's decision this week in the Kyllo infrared surveillance case raises more questions about the continued use of the FBI's monitoring system. - - - Assassinate this: Jim Bell may have been convicted of intimidating an IRS agent, but the world's most notorious crypto-convict remains undaunted. Bell sent Wired News a copy of his latest legal filings, which include a renewed attempt to fire his court-appointed attorney and a request for an appeal of his conviction to the Supreme Court. Bell is the anarcho-cypherpunk whose political propagandizing and authorship of the "Assassination Politics" essay drew the unwelcome attention of the feds and led to his conviction in April on two of five counts of stalking government agents. He couldn't persuade the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to overturn his ruling, so now Bell's taking his fight to the nation's highest court. A legal filing in U.S. District Court and the appeals court that Bell wrote from federal prison says that U.S. District Judge Jack Tanner "was essentially incapable of conducting any sort of complete, proper, 'by the book' hearing, from the looks of things." During the trial, Tanner denied all of Bell's requests for witnesses that Bell said would have illuminated unlawful surveillance on the part of government officials. Copyright © 1994-2001 Wired Digital Inc. All rights reserved. -- ======================================================================= Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act" - George Orwell ======================================================================= James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@tscm.com ======================================================================= The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Technical Security, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. =======================================================================