From: William Knowles Date: Thu Jun 17, 2004 8:09pm Subject: Re: Re: New poll for TSCM-L I'll be honest, I have been seriously debating axing this list as half the stuff isn't related to TSCM, some could be debunked in five minutes of Googling or Snopes, and the other 30% about TSCM is dead on the money. Its one of the few lists I don't digest, procmail, and read from another mailbox, I consider it important enough to read in my inbox as it comes in. However being on the list as long as I have, (feeling more knowledgeable that when I first joined) if an opportunity pops up from one of my clients wanting TSCM services, I know who to call on to get the job done professionally and who not to call that is going to send in the clowns wearing ninja suits unloading $50K worth of CCS junk. :) While I now know the difference between professional gear and that spy shop crap you can buy from the Sharper Image, I know a number of others don't. If you feel that you must point out these people, put up a webpage like Attrition does for all the fakes within information security and do it for the TSCM business. http://www.attrition.org/errata/charlatan.html I was doing ALOT of deleting here, and there last week, and honestly I am sure I deleted some stuff I probably would have wanted to read, but a little heads-up to the list that your charlatan page has been updated would suffice in my book, not cluttering it up with rumors or gossip that detracts from the true mission of the list. William Knowles wk@c... > A significant portion of this list, including me, is on the very > edge of unsubscribing due to all the horsecrap posted re Mr. Wilson > lately. > > Stop the crap and stick with the mission of this list, which is not > blatant slander of others. I'm as guilty as anyone when a charlatan > pops up and tries to snow us and I put him in his place, but in this > case any discussion of Mr. Wilson is PURE GOSSIP and completely > imappropriate for this list. *==============================================================* "Communications without intelligence is noise; Intelligence without communications is irrelevant." Gen Alfred. M. Gray, USMC ---------------------------------------------------------------- C4I.org - Computer Security, & Intelligence - http://www.c4i.org ================================================================ Help C4I.org with a donation: http://www.c4i.org/contribute.html *==============================================================* 8927 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Thu Jun 17, 2004 8:30pm Subject: Re: Re: New poll for TSCM-L You make a good point, and I appreciate your feedback on the matter. I generally don't waste my time pointing out the smaller con artists in the business, but only cut loose on Wilson as quite few people on the list (including myself) have been screwed by the guy, but until now he was Teflon coated due to his tie to the DEA as a CI. He was also warmly embraced by a number of list members even though I and others in the profession was waving them off. -jma At 09:09 PM 6/17/2004, William Knowles wrote: >I'll be honest, I have been seriously debating axing this list as half >the stuff isn't related to TSCM, some could be debunked in five >minutes of Googling or Snopes, and the other 30% about TSCM is dead >on the money. Its one of the few lists I don't digest, procmail, and >read from another mailbox, I consider it important enough to read in >my inbox as it comes in. > >However being on the list as long as I have, (feeling more >knowledgeable that when I first joined) if an opportunity pops up from >one of my clients wanting TSCM services, I know who to call on to get >the job done professionally and who not to call that is going to send >in the clowns wearing ninja suits unloading $50K worth of CCS junk. :) > >While I now know the difference between professional gear and that spy >shop crap you can buy from the Sharper Image, I know a number of >others don't. If you feel that you must point out these people, put up >a webpage like Attrition does for all the fakes within information >security and do it for the TSCM business. > >http://www.attrition.org/errata/charlatan.html > >I was doing ALOT of deleting here, and there last week, and honestly I >am sure I deleted some stuff I probably would have wanted to read, but >a little heads-up to the list that your charlatan page has been >updated would suffice in my book, not cluttering it up with rumors or >gossip that detracts from the true mission of the list. > >William Knowles >wk@c... > > > > A significant portion of this list, including me, is on the very > > edge of unsubscribing due to all the horsecrap posted re Mr. Wilson > > lately. > > > > Stop the crap and stick with the mission of this list, which is not > > blatant slander of others. I'm as guilty as anyone when a charlatan > > pops up and tries to snow us and I put him in his place, but in this > > case any discussion of Mr. Wilson is PURE GOSSIP and completely > > imappropriate for this list. > > > >*==============================================================* >"Communications without intelligence is noise; Intelligence >without communications is irrelevant." Gen Alfred. M. Gray, USMC >---------------------------------------------------------------- >C4I.org - Computer Security, & Intelligence - http://www.c4i.org >================================================================ >Help C4I.org with a donation: http://www.c4i.org/contribute.html >*==============================================================* > > > > > > >======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, > the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. >=================================================== TSKS >Yahoo! Groups Links > > > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- We Expertly Hunt Real Spies, Real Eavesdroppers, and Real Wiretappers. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 Web: http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 Email: mailto:jmatk@tscm.com ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- World Class, Professional, Ethical, and Competent Bug Sweeps, and Wiretap Detection using Sophisticated Laboratory Grade Test Equipment. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8928 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Thu Jun 17, 2004 8:41pm Subject: Icom R20's The two Icom R20's I ordered last week came in this afternoon, and arrived earlier than expected. I will fiddle around with them for a few weeks before I open them up for modifications or hitch them up for an instrument based evaluation. My initial impression of the unit is favorable, but I will have a better opinion of it in a few weeks, and will post it to the list. -jma ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- We Expertly Hunt Real Spies, Real Eavesdroppers, and Real Wiretappers. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 Web: http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 Email: mailto:jmatk@tscm.com ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- World Class, Professional, Ethical, and Competent Bug Sweeps, and Wiretap Detection using Sophisticated Laboratory Grade Test Equipment. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8929 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Thu Jun 17, 2004 9:48pm Subject: Looking for a carbon capacitor I need a eighteen to twenty each 28+ volt, 100 Farad, very low ESR, carbon capacitors, and would appreciate hearing from any list member who might have these in stock. I also seeking high current shunts of at least 1500 amps at 28 volts, with a 50mV output, and would be happy with shunts rated at 2000 Amps. -jma ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- We Expertly Hunt Real Spies, Real Eavesdroppers, and Real Wiretappers. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 Web: http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 Email: mailto:jmatk@tscm.com ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- World Class, Professional, Ethical, and Competent Bug Sweeps, and Wiretap Detection using Sophisticated Laboratory Grade Test Equipment. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8930 From: kondrak Date: Fri Jun 18, 2004 0:09am Subject: Citizens use Internet to spy on Terrorists … > > >Posted on Thu, Jun. 17, 2004 > >Citizens use Internet to spy on, thwart terrorists > >BY MIKE CARTER >Seattle Times > >CONRAD, Mont. - (KRT) - Shannen Rossmiller finds early mornings are best >for hunting terrorists. > >When it's 4 a.m. in this one-stoplight prairie town, it's 3 p.m. in, >say, Karachi, Pakistan, the sweltering hours just before the evening >call to prayer. That's when Rossmiller, while her husband and three >children sleep, finds the Internet chat rooms and bulletin boards >frequented by radical Muslims and jihad warriors are busiest. > >It is when Rossmiller pursues her deadly serious hobby: Citizen >cyber-spy. > >Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the Internet has become sprinkled >with self-proclaimed intelligence agents and freelance threat analysts >like Rossmiller - ordinary civilians who comb Web sites and chat rooms >for hints of the enemy's next move. The phenomenon, propelled by the >Internet's anonymity and worldwide reach, is unique to the war on >terrorism. > >A few, like Rossmiller, take their pastime further. > >Unencumbered by bureaucracy or by laws requiring warrants or prohibiting >entrapment, she and a few others freely infiltrate the enemy's lairs and >assess what they find there. In some cases, they even disrupt >communications or get people arrested. > >But spying can be dangerous business, even more so when the government >doesn't officially condone or even know about it. Experts say citizen >cyberspies can stumble into risky situations or get in the way of law >enforcement. But they also acknowledge people like Rossmiller have good >intentions - and, occasionally, good luck. > >So it was that, on one of Rossmiller's trawls through Web sites with >names like bravemuslim.com last fall, she came across a posting by a man >calling himself Amir Abdul Rashid. It was clear from the message that >Rashid was edging toward the violent fringes of Islam. > >Over time, it also became apparent to her that he was an American >soldier. > >Posing as an Algerian with ties to that country's outlawed Armed Islamic >Group, she sent Rashid an e-mail with the subject line "A Call to >Jihad." Rashid responded by asking if it was possible that a "brother >fighting on the wrong side could defect." > >Over a period of four months, Rossmiller drew out Rashid through a >series of 27 e-mails. She learned, with growing alarm, that he was a >National Guardsman about to be deployed to Iraq. And he appeared willing >to share information on American troop vulnerabilities with the enemy. >Rossmiller provided the information to the Department of Homeland >Security, which passed it to the FBI and the Army. > >The arrest in that case of Ryan Anderson, 26, a troubled Muslim convert >and a specialist in the Washington state National Guard's 81st Armor >Brigade, was splashed across the country's newspapers in February. It >was a direct result of Rossmiller's work, and she is expected to be the >reluctant star witness at his pending court martial. She testified in a >preliminary hearing last month. > >Until that hearing, almost nobody in Conrad (population 2,753) knew of >Rossmiller's avocation. Townsfolk learned about it only after a wire >story appeared in the Great Falls Tribune. > >Rossmiller said she never wanted the publicity - all she wanted was to >help stop terrorists. Now, people stop her at the grocery and wave her >down at the local coffee shop to thank or congratulate her. > >When asked, however, nobody's quite sure how she got involved or exactly >what she did. >"I don't think people really know what to think of this," Rossmiller >said. > >Even before being outed as a cyber-spy, Rossmiller was a high-profile >member of this farming community: She's the town judge, a paralegal who >was appointed to the post four years ago. > >Conrad, surrounded by farmlands that roll, virtually uninterrupted, to >Glacier National Park some 60 miles northwest, is home to a large >community of Hutterites, a pacifist Christian sect similar to the Amish. >The surrounding county also hosts 17 intercontinental strategic missile >sites operated out of nearby Malmstrom Air Force Base. > >Rossmiller, 34, was born and raised in Conrad, her father a farmer and >her mother a special-education teacher. A former high-school cheerleader >and honors student, she now draws on her legal-research skills in her >quest. >Rossmiller said there is no mystery to how and why she developed her >avocation. It traces to Tuesday morning, Sept. 11, 2001. > >She was bedridden with a fractured pelvis and felt helpless as the >terrorist attacks unfolded. >"I had to do something," Rossmiller said over lattes and lunch at the >Lobby, a kitschy restaurant two doors down from the city offices on Main >Street. > >She started pulling random items out of her purse: her checkbook, a >wallet, a key fob, all adorned with the American flag. "This is who I >am," she said. "When President Bush asked for a dollar for the Afghan >children's fund, I sent $100. I can't help it. > >"Besides, my husband wouldn't let me join the National Guard." > >Her interest in the attacks led her to the Internet, where, in >discussion groups and on bulletin boards, she met others driven to know >more about those responsible. > >It wasn't long before she and a few others formed a loose-knit group. >Alliances evolved over time. The goal, however, was clear from the >start: Disrupt terrorists. The group called itself 7Seas Global >Intelligence Security Team, and its research began extending beyond the >day's headlines. > >"By the time things hit the mainstream media, a deed was pretty much >done," explained Brent Astley, an unemployed physicist and software >designer near Toronto, and a member of the 7Seas team. "We decided to >take it to the next level." > >7Seas has grown into a sophisticated intelligence group, members say. > >Initially, the group gathered information and tried to predict when >another terrorist attack might occur. Members posted their findings on a >Web site called itshappening.com, a bulletin board of like-minded >armchair intelligence neophytes. The first attempts were amateurish, and >Astley concedes a critic's point that 7Seas was prone to crying wolf. > >"They are prone to read an awful lot into very little," said Neil Doyle, >a freelance journalist who has written extensively on international >terrorism. > >"We've evolved," Astley said. "Some of us are quite adept." > >The 7Seas operation has become more sophisticated, Rossmiller and Astley >say. Its members now post their work and share thoughts in a private, >secure area of the Internet. In the meantime, members have put together >a huge database of research and news stories about terrorist groups and >individuals. > >Occasionally, the group takes its findings public. On May 12, 2002, >7Seas posted a news release stating it had correctly warned of bombings >that day in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that killed an Australian man. The >group referenced a rough and garbled translation of an Arabic Web site >that 7Seas had posted four days earlier on itshappening.com. > >Rossmiller said she and others have developed contacts in intelligence >agencies in several countries, and have passed on significant >information. > >It's hard to measure her claim. The Department of Justice did not >respond to requests to discuss 7Seas or the private-intelligence >phenomenon. Likewise, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service >declined to comment. > >But FBI spokesman Bob Wright, a special agent in Salt Lake City - the >field office responsible for FBI activities in Montana - said the agency >would not discourage individuals like Rossmiller. > >"We've always relied on our good relationship with citizens as our eyes >and ears in the community," Wright said. "This is just a new twist on an >old theme. It's sort of like a cyber Neighborhood Watch." > >Cyberspies' tactics are painstaking and sometimes bold. > >The 7Seas Web site - www.7-seas.net - claims the group can provide >"round-the-clock" threat analysis and "real time terrorist information, >intelligence and strategic analysis to law enforcement and military >agencies both within the United States and internationally." > >Rossmiller took a few hours one morning to demonstrate. Over the past >two years, she explained, she has invented and developed several >characters whose identities she assumes when visiting Jihadi chat rooms >and bulletin boards. Nobody in 7Seas speaks Arabic, and Rossmiller might >spend weeks translating a posting using software and a dictionary. > >The details of the personalities she assumes are just as painstakingly >assembled. Their street addresses are real. She knows the address of the >nearest mosque and the name of its imam. A message pops up on her >computer to remind her when it would be prayer time, so she remembers to >stop what she's doing. > >She has software that "proxies" her computer address to that area, >making it appear to all but the most savvy Internet user that she's >physically there. It helps that her husband, Randy, is a computer >technician. > >Rossmiller spends hours researching the philosophical underpinnings of >terrorist groups. If she were a Kashmir radical, she points out, her >motivations would differ from those of a Saudi Arabian or Afghan. > >Her postings can be brazen. Rossmiller said the goal is to flush out >terrorists, and being timid or obtuse doesn't get it done. >"I've found that the only way to get information is to be a little >bolder than they are," she said. >"This is not conventional. There is no textbook for this." > >There are seven members of 7Seas: Four in the U.S. and one each in >Canada, Australia and Singapore. Rossmiller declined to identify the >others, aside from Astley. But she said they are corporate and personal >security experts, a former detective who speaks seven languages >(although not Arabic), a "global media" specialist, a real-estate agent >and an architect. >For a brief period in 2002, 7Seas was incorporated and its members hoped >to land a government contract. But a falling-out with a founding member >delayed those plans, and Rossmiller let the corporation die before it >ever made a dime. > >She said, however, that its members hope one day to make a profit as >security and intelligence consultants - even though the job has risks. >Conrad police officer Carl Suta said the FBI ordered Rossmiller placed >under police protection after a suspicious telephone call to Conrad City >Hall on May 18. > >Officers believed the call may have come from someone in Canada with >whom Rossmiller had been in contact while using the same alias she used >to trap Anderson. > >Since the Sept. 11 attacks, private security and intelligence sites on >terrorism have sprouted on the Internet. They range from the useful to >the absurd: One site, http://trackingthethreat.com, contains a >remarkable database of known terrorists and groups. > >Then there's http://stevequayle.com, whose founder is a longtime >survivalist, talk-radio host and conspiracy theorist. Quayle's "global >terror alert" can be found alongside links to his research into our >36-foot-tall ancestors and a conspiracy-fueled treatise on missing >Soviet scientists. > >Two years ago, a freelance intelligence agent in Britain named Glen >Jenvey obtained secret videotapes of an Islamic cleric in London named >Abu Hamza al-Masri and a young Seattle acolyte named James Ujaama >talking about jihad. Those tapes were later used to prosecute Ujaama, >who had helped plan to set up a terrorist training camp in Bly, Ore. >Ujaama pleaded guilty and has agreed to testify against Abu Hamza, who >is charged with conspiring to help al-Qaida. > >Last month, the operator of a homeless shelter in Albuquerque, N.M., >Jeremy Reynalds, infiltrated and then exposed several jihad Web sites >unwittingly hosted by American Internet providers. Reynalds, an >associate of Jenvey, said he has spent more than two years posing as a >terrorist to get inside some of the sites. > >"This is a really intriguing phenomenon," said retired Air Force Gen. >Todd Stewart, the executive director of the National Academic Consortium >for Homeland Security, an alliance of colleges and universities >conducting research on homeland-security issues. >"What you're seeing is people taking to heart the calls for increased >vigilance," he said. >The question is, when does vigilance become vigilantism? Stewart and >others say that remains to be seen. > >"I think we'll find that this is all part of the debate over how secure >is secure enough" in the post-Sept. 11 world, Stewart said. "We have yet >to determine the balance between personal security and personal >freedom." > >Cyberspies avoid bureaucracy, but they can land in trouble. > >Still, there is precedent for citizens to take up spying for the common >good, even when it stretches the law, said Steven Emerson, a journalist >whose 1992 book "American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us" took on >new significance after the Sept. 11 attacks. > >"If you uncover some wrongdoing or illegality, then I think this sort of >thing is a public service, really," Emerson said. > >Consider, he said, the seminal investigative work of white Texas writer >John Howard Griffin, who tinted his skin and chronicled the life of a >black man in the Deep South in his book "Black Like Me." Griffin's book >was published in 1961. >Glenn Harlan Reynolds, a University of Tennessee law professor who has >written about what he calls "white-hat hackers" - citizens who use the >Internet to spy on or disrupt terrorism - said the phenomenon is a >natural extension of the war on terrorism. > >"It's not unlike Newton's Law - for every action there is an equal and >opposite reaction," he said. "Terrorism is decentralized. You would >expect the reaction to it to be decentralized, as well." > >Individuals are able, in some instances, to >leapfrog the efforts of the federal agencies whose job it is to protect >the homeland. >"They are not strangled by a bureaucracy" or the requirements of a court >of law, he said. >The downside, he said, is that private citizens don't have the legal >immunities that police do. An officer acting in good faith, even if he >makes a mistake, is difficult to sue. Not so for a private citizen, >Reynolds said. > >And there could be other, more serious, legal consequences. > >"Computers make it possible to play spy from your home, and that can be >good," he said. "But remember, you are still being a spy, and that >carries risks. People might try to kill you. You might violate the law. >You might screw things up." > >Wright, the FBI agent, said, "It's probably true that at times we will >be working at cross-purposes." > >Indeed, one of the points Rossmiller and others who play these spy games >concede is that they can't always tell who is who on the Internet. >Astley, the 7Seas member in Canada, said he was once warned away from a >target by "U.S. law enforcement." He backed off without asking why. > >Elizabeth Bancroft, the executive director of the Association of Former >Intelligence Officers in Washington, D.C., said the role of citizen >spies - she calls them "assets" - has been "a fixture of imaginative >minds for decades. > >"The Internet has only brought forth more gamesmanship and role-playing. >... But hundreds of Walter Mittys and James Bond Juniors exist, and play >their hands with vigor, cloaked by the anonymity of the Net. > >"One of the many features of a free society is having a bit of fun," she >said. "Should they happen to flush out a terrorist or two - we say >bravo." > >--- > >© 2004, The Seattle Times. > >Visit The Seattle Times Extra on the World Wide Web at >http://www.seattletimes.com > >Distributed by Knight Ridder/Tribune Information Services. > >© 2004 KRT Wire and wire service sources. All Rights Reserved. > >http://www.aberdeennews.com 8931 From: Lou Novacheck Date: Thu Jun 17, 2004 10:09pm Subject: Re: Beijing wages cyberwar against DPP headquarters FWIW, the first of my two cents says this is the second feeler the PRC's sent out. The first was last week's "leak" which stated the PRC was planning a "beheading" operation against the ROC, whereby they'll take out the President, his top aides, and certain other top brass, both military and civilian, but mostly civilian. The predominant thinking is that if you sever the head, the body will die. And for my second of the two cents, the PRC will make their move in the thick of the US presidential campaign, very late summer, early fall. Combined with Afghanistan and Iraq, plus what might have developed in Saudi, in the Jordan-Lebanon-Israel area, and the Sudan, and maybe even Iran or Syria by then, the US won't be able to respond to the extent they'll need to. The US military is already stretched way too thin. Robert Crumb's Crumbwrap $9.99 postpaid Life & Adventures of Santa Claus by Mike Ploog $12.99 postpaid Wizard Trading Co PO Box 482 Cudahy WI 53110 ----- Original Message ----- From: kondrak To: TSCM-L@yahoogroups.com Sent: Thursday, June 17, 2004 3:54 PM Subject: [TSCM-L] Beijing wages cyberwar against DPP headquarters A sign of things to come?: >http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2004/06/16/2003175231 > >By Ko Shu-ling >STAFF REPORTER >June 16, 2004 > >An army of hackers based in China has broken into Democratic >Progressive Party (DPP) databases, stealing classified information >such as President Chen Shui-bian's (³¯¤ô«ó) personal itinerary, >according to a Cabinet official who asked not to be named. > >"This is the first time we have found that the DPP headquarters' >computer systems were breached by Chinese hackers," the official said. >"The incident has sent jitters through the Ministry of National >Defense, which deems a systematic information attack launched by China >as military warfare." > >Information stolen from party headquarters included the personal >itineraries of Chen, who doubles as DPP chairman, and those of other >high-ranking party officials such as DPP Secretary-General Chang >Chun-hsiung (±i«T¶¯). > >Also leaked was classified information on visits to the US by >high-ranking DPP officials ahead of the US presidential election. > >According to the Cabinet official, the DPP headquarters was an easy >target and the attackers were aware it would be more difficult to >break into computer systems belonging to the Presidential Office or >the defense ministry, where security is tighter. > >The attacks were noted a few days ago and the situation has been >monitored 24 hours a day since. > >This is not the first time that China has conducted information >warfare against Taiwan. Last September, the Cabinet discovered that >hackers in Hubei and Fujian provinces had spread 23 different Trojan >horse programs to the networks of 10 private high-tech companies in >Taiwan and used them as a springboard to break into at least 30 >different government agencies and 50 private companies. > >The Trojan-horse programs were used against the National Police >Administration, the defense ministry, the Central Election Commission >and the central bank. > >Since it appeared no government information had been stolen, the >Cabinet suspected that the program was likely aimed at paralyzing the >nation's computer systems, stealing sensitive government information >or preparing computers for future information warfare. > >Trojan-horses are one of the most serious threats to computer >security. A computer user may not only have been attacked but may also >be attacking others unknowingly. From: ISN C4I.org - Computer Security, & Intelligence - http://www.c4i.org ======================================================== TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. =================================================== TSKS Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ADVERTISEMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Links a.. To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/TSCM-L/ b.. To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: TSCM-L-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com c.. Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 8932 From: Steve Uhrig Date: Thu Jun 17, 2004 10:24pm Subject: Re: Looking for a carbon capacitor Once upon a midnight dreary, James M. Atkinson pondered, weak and weary: > I need a eighteen to twenty each 28+ volt, 100 Farad, very low ESR, carbon > capacitors, The maximum voltage so far on large (farad size) super caps is 3 point something volts. That's the max. Far more affordable are 2 volts at a few farads. Figure about $5 each in reasonable quality. So you'd need at least fifteen in series to get the voltage you need, then 20 parallel strings of fifteen caps in series to get the capacity you desire. So you're talking 300 caps +/- mental arithmetic, at about $5 each, or $1500. And that's for one. So for twenty, figure $30,000. Carbon capacitors? The only stock you'll find is from manufacturers. A year ago these caps didn't exist. Now they're being treated more as batteries than supercapacitors. They're still not in widespread production yet. Even getting some for engineering samples takes some effort. For your shunt, use a 3/4" piece of rebar of the proper length and something like saddle clamps from Polyphaser or Cadweld to connect to it. Steve ******************************************************************* Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 "In God we trust, all others we monitor" ******************************************************************* 8933 From: frost_bitten_ca Date: Thu Jun 17, 2004 10:41pm Subject: Re: Looking for a carbon capacitor --- In TSCM-L@yahoogroups.com, "James M. Atkinson" wrote: > > I need a eighteen to twenty each 28+ volt, 100 Farad, very low ESR, carbon > capacitors, and would appreciate hearing from any list member who might > have these in stock. > > I also seeking high current shunts of at least 1500 amps at 28 volts, with > a 50mV output, and would be happy with shunts rated at 2000 Amps. > > -jma > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------- > > We Expertly Hunt Real Spies, Real Eavesdroppers, and Real Wiretappers. > -------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------- > > James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546- 3803 > Granite Island Group Fax: > 127 Eastern Avenue #291 Web: http://www.tscm.com/ > Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 Email: mailto:jmatk@tscm.com > -------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------- > > World Class, Professional, Ethical, and Competent Bug Sweeps, and > Wiretap Detection using Sophisticated Laboratory Grade Test Equipment. > -------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------- shunts that I have seen used in the 2000 amp range are generally made of this solid copper plates :) 8934 From: David Alexander Date: Thu Jun 17, 2004 0:07pm Subject: Re: New poll for TSCM-L Steve Very well said. I support you wholeheartedly. I did point out, offline to JMA, that activity and postings such as the ones seen recently on this list would, if done in Europe before a trial: a) Get you prosecuted for doing so b) Probably result in the trial being abandoned on the grounds that he couldn't now get a fair trial The response was not encouraging. I have no problems with postings after a conviction or acquittal that discuss elements, but the way this was reported here reminded me of a downmarket tabloid journalism that leaves a bad taste in my mouth. I appreciate that everyone is entitled to their opinion, and I would defend unto the death the right to free speech, but I believe that the use of that right should be tempered with common sense, not used simply 'because I have the right'. I would also say that, in my opinion and I think that of many others on this list, this thread about Mr Wilson, guilty or not, has a significant risk of bringing the list into disrepute. I don't know if others feel the same, I would value everyones' comments. If I'm in a minority I will accept that with good grace and wind my neck in (wouldn't be the first time). I suggest another TSCM poll: I think that this thread was unnecessary and should not have been posted to the list Yes No I'm not asking anyone to admit being in the wrong, or of showing bad judgement or to apologise. I do think we need to define an acceptable code of conduct for taking this group forwards - and postings such as this should not be acceptable. My 2c. Dave David Alexander Dbi Consulting Ltd Stoneleigh Park Mews Stoneleigh Abbey Kenilworth Warwickshire CV8 2DB Office : 01926 515515 Mobile: 07836 332576 Email : David.Alexander@d... Have you visited our website? http://www.dbiconsulting.co.uk -----Original Message----- From: Steve Uhrig [mailto:steve@s...] Sent: 17 June 2004 06:37 To: TSCM-L@yahoogroups.com Subject: [TSCM-L] Re: New poll for TSCM-L Once upon a midnight dreary, TSCM-L@yahoogroups.com pondered, weak and weary: > Enter your vote today! A new poll has been created for the > TSCM-L group: > Do you think that Steve Wilson > (TSCM'er in TN and VA) is actually > guilty of the criminal acts the > government has accussed him of? > o Yes, I think he is guilty > o No, I think he is innocent --------------------- This is an immature poll. Whomever submitted it has little understanding of the American jurisprudence system and merely is a troublemaker. Whatever PROPOGANDA (which means EDUCATION frequently intended to mislead) you may have read was selectively processed to lead you to believe Mr. Wilson is a slimebag. I am not defending any actions of Mr. Wilson although I have known him for 20 years and do not agree with his business principles and practices, but in THIS country, he IS ASSUMED TO BE INNOCENT UNTIL **PROVEN** GUILTY. To my mind, HE IS INNOCENT. He has NOT been proven guilty. He may not be. It's not our place to gossip. And that's what all this discussion of him has been. GOSSIP. Scripture prohibits us from engaging in idle talk. It also prohibits us from participating in gossiping and rumermongering. GOD SAYS this is forbidden. Don't argue with me. Take it up with Him if you disagree, and you ultimately will find out YOU are wrong. I do not agree with Mr. Wilson's business practices, but I darn well will defend his right to a fair trial and an adequate defense in the appropriate forum, which is not here on this list. If people choose to play little snipe games to subvert our justice system, do it somewhere else. A good number of us took oaths to uphold and defend the U.S. Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. In this case, we have domestic enemies in addition to violating rules laid down by God, who incidentally guided the men who wrote the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Trial by media can kill any credible defense. Innocent or guilty, Mr. Wilson has the absolute right to a competent defense and deserves a fair trial. Children gossiping with polls such as this are demonstrating their personal ethics are directly incompatible with the principles guiding the professional TSCM profession. If you feel you must do this, please be responsible and resign from this list and go to Usenet or somewhere. And anyone posting a poll should have the gonads to do it under their real name, not anonymously. It is irresponsible of the moderator to allow ANYONE to post crap like this much less dignify it by casting a vote, especially anonymously. A significant portion of this list, including me, is on the very edge of unsubscribing due to all the horsecrap posted re Mr. Wilson lately. There are very few, if any, in this business who do not have skeletons in the closet and who would withstand an intensive government investigation. 'There but for the grace of God go I.' Keep your own nose clean, and 'let he who is without sin cast the first stone.' Observe that and not one single person on this entire list would be justified in picking up a stone. BTW, the above words were COMMANDED by the Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, not a fat little bald headed gray bearded cripple in Maryland who admittedly frequently has an attitude. Stop the crap and stick with the mission of this list, which is not blatant slander of others. I'm as guilty as anyone when a charlatan pops up and tries to snow us and I put him in his place, but in this case any discussion of Mr. Wilson is PURE GOSSIP and completely imappropriate for this list. Steve ******************************************************************* Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 "In God we trust, all others we monitor" ****************************************************************** David Alexander Dbi Consulting Ltd Stoneleigh Park Mews Stoneleigh Abbey Kenilworth Warwickshire CV8 2DB Office : 01926 515515 Mobile: 07836 332576 Email : David.Alexander@d... Have you visited our website? http://www.dbiconsulting.co.uk 8935 From: A Grudko Date: Fri Jun 18, 2004 11:58am Subject: Cop's boot bug http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn200406180354356 49C976365 [A Grudko] Bugged boot drama in court case Estelle Ellis June 18 2004 at 03:54AM A rather well-worn velskoen (a soft leather shoe - AG) is at the centre of a bizarre murder-for-hire plot raging behind the scenes in the trial of Andrew Phillips (an 'associate' of many years) , owner of The Ranch. Alleged brothel owner Phillips claims that the senior Scorpions investigator in his case, George Hardaker, tried to entrap him into hiring a man - wearing bugged velskoens - to murder witnesses in his Johannesburg regional court trial. He demanded that Hardaker withdraw from the investigation by Thursday afternoon or face "imminent" legal action. The National Prosecuting Authority does not want to comment officially on Phillips's claims, but sources suggested that it is, in fact, Phillips who might be trying to frame Hardaker, a man reputed to be one of the Scorpions' "straightest" officers. 'We will determine who is framing who' What is certain is that there is no love lost between Phillips and Hardaker. Hardaker, in his capacity as investigator, was previously ordered to pay damages to Phillips after the Johannesburg High Court found that he had defamed Phillips by claiming that there were drugs, child prostitution and trafficking in women at The Ranch. "We will determine who is framing who," was Phillips's riposte on Thursdaynight. "We were wondering what they would do. They could either admit it, or do something else." In documentation in possession of The Star, Phillips claims that Hardaker sent an agent, wearing bugged shoes, to his house on June 6. The agent was allegedly supposed to entice Phillips into ordering a hit on state witnesses in his trial. Phillips got wind of the alleged scheme, however, and managed to lay his hands on the shoes, which he has been bringing to his trial over the past few days. On Thursday morning, the shoe allegedly containing the bug stood conspicuously on the defence counsel's table. "What is the shoe for?" curious regional magistrate Stef Bezuidenhout asked. "It is likely to be an exhibit," advocate Mike Hellens SC, for Phillips, grinned mysteriously. Phillips has been charged with keeping two brothels - The Ranch and the Titty Twister - from 1995 to December 2000; procuring or attempting to procure women to become common prostitutes; facilitating sex for sale at The Ranch and the Titty Twister; living off the proceeds of prostitution; and employing foreigners in contravention of the Aliens Control Act. He has pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him, and is free on bail of R10 000. Previously, the prosecution attempted to have the evidence of women associated with The Ranch heard in camera, but no evidence of threats against their lives has been produced in court. This application was eventually abandoned, but state advocate Joe Davidowitz SC said this week that the prosecution was considering reinstating it. The trial has seen a lot of legal wrangling this week, but without the evidence of a single witness being led. The trial continues on Thursday. a.. This article was originally published on page 1 of The Star on June 18, 2004 --- Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free. Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com). Version: 6.0.707 / Virus Database: 463 - Release Date: 2004/06/15 [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 8936 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Fri Jun 18, 2004 10:46am Subject: On Her Majesty's Secret Service - Uncensored http://cryptome.org/mi6-sd36.htm 15 June 2004. Republished by request. 1 April 2001. Anonymous has restored information censored by the British Government from Chapter 36 of MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service, by Stephen Dorril. It is published here to provide public information on MI6 which Mr. Dorril could not, and has been done so without his knowledge or permission. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ON HER MAJESTY'S SECRET SERVICE - UNCENSORED This is the original text with missing words provided and hyperlinked to footnotes and highlighted in red. Agent D/813317 Richard Tomlinson joined MI6 in 1991. Born in New Zealand, he read aeronautical engineering at Cambridge and was a Kennedy memorial scholar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Fluent in French, German and Spanish, Tomlinson was approached at university where he gained a first. A lecturer had asked him if he wanted to do 'something stimulating' in the foreign service. Despite modern recruiting methods, the trusted old-boy network is still a favoured option at Oxbridge, and a number of other key universities, such as Durham and Exeter, still have a contact group of lecturers on the lookout for 'firsts' as suitable recruits. Historian Andrew Roberts has written about his own experience of being approached in 1987 to join the 'FCO Co-ordinating Staff', as MI6 is known (also "The Executive Branch"): the 'chat with a Cambridge contact', tea at the John Nash-designed Carlton House which overlooks St James's Park, 'a discreet lunch a fortnight later and then a delightfully absurd mini-exam, in which one of the questions was "Put the following in order of social precedence: earl, duke, viscount, baron, marquis" '. At Century House, Roberts recognised 'several of the young Miss Moneypennys from the secretarial schools' parties at university'. The questions continued in a farcical vein: 'If I had been a communist, a fascist or a homosexual . . . Where do Britain's best long-term interests lie? Washington, Brussels or Moscow?' During the medical examination, he was told that 'with Oxford it's the drugs thing, with Cambridge it's the boys'. Attitudes have changed, and by 1997 MI6 was prepared to post a 'gay couple' - 'counsellor' and chief of station Christopher Hurran and his long-time Venezuelan lover - to the British embassy in Czechoslovakia. A few years earlier, the Service had recruited a member of CND. Finally, Roberts went through the process of positive vetting (known since 1990 as EPV). It is generally conducted by a semi-retired officer with a false name, who interviews referees and other contacts, and undertakes checks on credit-worthiness. Suitable candidates are put through the fast-stream Civil Service Selection Board. Roberts, however, decided not to join, and Tomlinson did so only after spending a number of years travelling and working in the City, during which time he had also signed up for the SAS territorial regiment. Over the last decade the Service has recruited a number of personnel from the special forces, though their gung-ho philosophy seems at odds with the image that M16 has projected of the modern spy. Tomlinson eventually joined MI6 for old-fashioned 'patriotic reasons' and sat the standard Foreign Of fice entry examination before being accepted on to the intelligence service training course. New recruits are introduced to the traditional 'tradecraft' of the world of spying and gain a broad range of knowledge from recruiting and running agents to developing agents of influence and organising and servicing 'dead letter' drops. Because of the smaller numbers, MI6 officers indulge in less specialisation than their American counterparts, though the techniques are essentially little different from those used at the beginning of the century. The infamous Dreyfus affair began when a cleaning woman, Marie Bastian, working in the German embassy but employed by the French secret service, handed over to her French controller the contents of the wastepaper baskets she emptied. MI6 recruiters still look out for 'the life-and-soul-of-the-party types who could persuade the Turkish ambassador's secretary to go through her boss's wastepaper basket'. These days, however, the spy is armed with a hand-held digital scanner which can hold the filched material in its memory and can also be used in emergencies to transmit the stolen secrets by burst transmissions via a satellite. Such gadgets are developed for the Directorate of Special Support responsible for providing technical assistance to operations - staffed by MoD locksmiths, video and audio technicians and scientists in sections devoted to chemicals and electronics, forensic services, electronic support measures, electronic surveillance and explosive systems. While the gadgets continue to provide the modern spy with a James Bond-like image - for instance, identification transmitters that can be hidden in an agent's shoes to enable the monitoring by satellite of their precise location - the reality is that most of the work is mundane and office-bound. Trainees still receive small-arms training at Fort Monkton, but much of the training is taken up with learning to use the computer system and writing reports in the house style. As part of the Service's obsession with security, a great deal of time is spent on being indoctrinated in cipher and communications work. Trainee officers are instructed on how to encrypt messages for transmission and how to use the manual BOOK cipher which is regarded as particularly secure. Used at stations abroad to transmit details of operations, potential sources and defectors, BOOK is sent either via the diplomatic bag or by special SIS courier. Diplomatic bags are not totally secure as the success of the Service's own N-Section testified. It employed up to thirty people in Palmer Street rifling the opened bags which were then expertly resealed. The work petered out in the mid-sixties as other means of communication took over. ____________________ t Some code words in this chapter have had to be disguised on legal advice. Officers learn about 'off-line' systems for the encryption of messages such as NOREEN - used prior to transmission by cipher machines - and 'on-line' systems for the protection of telegrams during transmission, code-named HORA and TRUNCHEON. They are indoctrinated into the use of certain cryptonyms for forwarding telegrams to particular organisations and offices such as SIS headquarters, which is designated ACTOR. They also learn about code words with which sensitive messages are headlined, indicating to whom they may be shown. UK EYES ALFA warns that the contents are not to be shown to any foreigners and are intended only for the home intelligence and security services, armed forces and Whitehall recipients. UK EYES BRAVO includes the above categories, the Northern Ireland Office, LIST X firms engaged in the manufacture of sensitive equipment, and certain US, Australian, New Zealand and Canadian intelligence personnel liaising with the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in London. Additional code words mark specific exclusions and inclusions. ECLIPSE material cannot be shown to the Americans, while LOCSEN deprives local intelligence officials and agencies of its content. Material for named individual officers, sometimes at specified times, is headed DEDIP or DESDEN, while particularly sensitive material about a fellow officer or operation is known as DEYOU. The protection of files and their secure handling is a top priority, with officers taught to keep a classified record of their use and location. Photocopiers have the ability to mark and check the origin of non-authorised copies of classified material. Following the development by MoD scientists of a means of reading a computer disk without a computer, all disks are protected in transit. All correspondence by letter is secured by specially developed red security tape which leaves detectable signs if tampered with, though - near-undetectable photographic and laser techniques exist to read the inside of mail and to open envelopes. Each officer has his own safe with dual-combination locking, while the filing cabinets with false tumbler locks, as an added precaution, are protected from penetration by X-rays. Since no lock is secure from picking, they collapse internally if anything more than the slightest force is used. In the event of drilling, a glass plate inside the door shatters, releasing a spring-loaded bolt to prevent opening. Frequent random checks take place on the number settmgs to see if the safe has been opened illegally. These bureaucratic procedures and attention to minute security rules are not merely technical; failure to carry out security precautions can lead to points deduction in the security breach points system. If an officer racks up 160 points over three years (breach of Top Secret counts as 80 points), this may lead to security clearance being withdrawn and instant dismissal. New officers will initially be based at the exotic Vauxhall Bridge headquarters, about which many Service personnel are sensitive, almost embarrassed. Access to 'Ceausescu Towers', as some officers have dubbed it, is gained by use of a swipe card and PlN number. The interior comprises a hive of bare, unmarked air-conditioned corridors. The only visible signs of occupancy are the acronyms on the doors, with nothing on the walls except floor plans and exit signs. As with major stations abroad, such as Moscow and Beijing, Vauxhall Cross is classified as a Category A post, with a high potential physical threat from terrorism (HPT) and sophisticated hostile intelligence services (HIS). Operatives from the TECHNICAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT (TSD) based at Hanslope Park, Milton Keynes, and from MI6's own technical department ensure that the building is protected from high-tech attack (HTA). There is triple glazing installed on all windows as a safeguard against laser and radio frequency (RF) flooding techniques, and the mainframe computer, cipher and communications areas are housed in secure, modularshielded rooms. A secure command-and-control room runs major operations such as those in Bosnia, where 'war criminals' were tracked and arrested by SAS personnel. Off the corridors are open-plan offices which give the impression of informality, though security overrides such considerations. A new officer will find that since l996 more women than men have been recruited to the Service, but males remain predominant, particularly in senior positions. As in many modern offices, officers will be seen working at computers, processing information, collating files, planning operations, liaising with foreign intelligence agencies and networks, and, most importantly, supporting the three to five hundred officers in the field, though only half that number will be stationed abroad at any one time. MI6 has been at the forefront of updating its information technology and, in 1995, installed at a cost of £200 million an ambitious desktop network known as the Automatic Telegram Handling System (ATHS /OATS), which provides access to all reports and databases. Staff are officially not allowed to discuss their work with colleagues, not even when they relax in the staff bar with its spectacular views over the River Thames, though, as Richard Tomlinson discovered, gossip is in fact rife. All officers will spend time in the field attached to embassies, though they will have little choice as to the location. Turning down a post will jeopardise future promotions and can lead to dismissal. Stations abroad are classed from the high-risk Category A, such as Yugoslavia and Algeria, to the lesser B, such as Washington and New York, C, the European countries, and D, often the Commonwealth, where there is little or no threat. New officers might find themselves among the additional personnel sent to Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea, following the Service's boost to its presence in South-East Asia, or involved in operations into China following the transfer of Hong Kong and the winding up of its espionage operations in the former colony. In a large station such as Washington, operating under 'light' diplomatic cover will be a head of station (often a Counsellor), a deputy and two or three officers (First and Second Secretaries). There will also be back-up staff consisting of three or four secretaries, a registry clerk to handle files and documents, and communications and cipher officers. Easily identified by the trained eye in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 'Diplomatic List' - the number of Counsellor and First Secretary posts is limited and there tend to be too many for the positions available - an MI6 officer's presence will be known to the host intelligence and security agency. In some cases, a senior officer will make his presence known to draw attention away from his colleagues. Before postings and missions abroad, officers receive a briefing from the Information Operations (I/OPs) unit, which provides them with a list of sympathetic journalists who can be trusted to give them help and information. These contacts have become increasingly important in trouble spots such as the Balkans. I/OPs also has a more covert role in planning psychological operations along the lines of the old Special Political Action (SPA) section and the Information Research Department (IRD). I/OPs may also, according to a former MI6 officer, 'attempt to influence events in another country or organisation in a direction favourable to Britain'. One example is MI6's determined effort to 'plant stories in the American press about Boutros Ghali, whom they regarded as dangerously Francophile, in the run up to the 1992 elections for UN secretary-general'. Foreign operations of this sort do not require ministerial sanction.1 I/OPs also expends considerable energy behind the scenes in 'surfacing' damaging stories designed to discredit critics of the Service. They will use off-the-record briefings of sympathetic journalists; the planting of rumours and disinformation, which through 'double-sourcing' are confirmed by a proactive agent; and the overt recruitment of journalist agents. Journalists paid to provide information or to 'keep their eyes open' are known as an 'asset' or an 'assistant' or just 'on side'. According to Richard Tomlinson, paid agents included in the nineties one and perhaps two national newspaper editors. An editor is unlikely to be directly recruited as the Service would require the permission of the Foreign Secretary and would not like to be put in the position of being refused. Such high-fliers are more likely to have been recruited early in their careers. In this case, the journalist was apparently recruited at least three years before becommg an editor and remained an asset until at least 1998. Tomlinson has said that the editor was paid a retainer of £100,000, with access to the money via an offshore bank in an accessible tax haven. The editor was given a false passport to gain entry to the bank, which he regularly visited.2 In trying to identify the editor 'agent', media interest centred on Dominic Lawson, son of the former Tory Chancellor of the Exchequer, who became editor of the Spectator in 1990 and had been editor of the Sunday Telegraph since 1995. Lawson denied that he had ever been 'an agent, either paid or unpaid, of Ml6 or of any other government agency'. On the other hand, the youngest brother of Lawson's second wife, Rosa Monckton, had joined MI6 in 1987. In 1996, Anthony Monckton was appointed First Secretary (Political) in the Croatian capital Zagreb. Quite separately, one of Rosa's closest friends and a godparent to the Lawsons' daughter, the late Princess of Wales had clearly been under some kind of surveillance, as evidenced by the 1,050-page dossier held by the US National Security Agency (NSA) in its archive, detailing private telephone conversations between Diana and American friends intercepted at MI6's request. While all stories linking MI6 to the Princess's death in the car accident in France have been complete nonsense, it has been alleged that working closely with I/Ops in an attempt to deflect enquiries away from the security services had been a chief of staff to 'C', Richard Spearman, temporarily posted to the Paris embassy with his assistant, Nicholas Langman.3 Operational officers can be casually spotted by the 'PENTEL' roller-ball pens in their top pocket (it was discovered by accident that they have the ability to create invisible ink), the Psion organiser and the specially adapted 'Walkman' (PETTLE) they carry to record conversations for up to ten minutes on the middle band of an ordinary commercial music cassette tape. They also use laptop computers for writing reports. If that seems like a recipe for disaster, the secret hard disk contains a protected back-up. The station is usually sited in a part of the embassy regularly swept by technical staff for bugs and other electronic attack. It is entered using special door codes with an inner strongroom-type door for greater security. Following all the procedures learned during training, officers handling material up to the 'Secret' level work on secure overseas Unix terminals (SCOUT) and use a messaging system known as ARRAMIS. Conversations by secure telephone masked by white noise are undertaken via a special SIS version of the BRAHMS system. A special chip developed by GCHQ apparently makes it impossible even for the US NSA to decipher such conversations. Secure Speech System (HOUSEMAN) handset units are used by SIS officers within a telephone speech enclosure. The most important room is electronically shielded and lined with up to a foot of lead for secure cipher and communications transmissions. From the comms room, an officer can send and receive secure faxes up to SECRET level via the CRYPTEK fax system and S***** (encrypted communications with the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Cabinet Office, MI5 (codename SNUFFBOX), GCHQ and 22 SAS. An encrypted electronic messaging system working through fibre optics, known as the UK Intelligence Messaging Network, was installed in early 1997 and enables MI6 to flash intelligence scoops to special terminals in the MoD, the Foreign Office and the Department of Trade and Industry. Manned twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, and secured behind a heavy thick door, the cipher machines have secure 'integral protection', known as TEMPEST. MI6 officers abroad also work alongside GCHQ personnel, monitoring foreign missions and organisations. Officers in the field may include not only those officially classed as diplomats but also others operating under 'deep' cover. Increasingly MI6 officers abroad act as 'illegals'. It is known that Service officers are sometimes employed during the day in conventional jobs such as accountancy, and provided with false identities. British banks - the Royal Bank of Scotland is particularly helpful, and to a lesser extent the Midland - help supply credit cards to officers working under cover. At the end of each month, officers have to pay off their aliases' credit cards. Banks also help transmit money overseas for covert operations. During the Cold War, banks in the Channel Islands and other offshore locations acted as a conduit for secret funding.4 Recruiting or running agents and gathering intelligence are the prime objectives of these deep-cover operatives, and their real work, some claim, starts at six in the evening when the conventional diplomats begin their round of cocktail parties. Such social events can be very useful for gathering intelligence and spreading disinformation. Baroness Park recalled that one of MI6's more successful ploys was 'to set people very discreetly against one another. They destroy each other. You don't destroy them.' Officers would offer the odd hint that it was 'a pity that so-and-so is so indiscreet. Not much more.' Officers will also deal with paid 'support agents' - those who supply MI6 with facilities including safe houses and bank accounts, as well as intelligence. There are also 'long insiders' - agents of influence with access to MI6 assessments and sanitised intelligence. The Service's deep-cover agents have burst transmitters with the ability to transmit a flash signal to MI6 via a satellite when they are in danger.5 (SIS suceeeded in placing a former SIS officer to work closely at a high level on the delicate negotiations of the London/Frankfurt exchange merger. An ex-Cambridge and fluent Asian language specialist, she graduated IONEC with one of the highest scores outlasting all her male colleagues during the hostage endurance course.) Officers abroad may also be asked to aid more sophisticated operations designed to build up the Service's psychological profiles of political leaders. A special department within MI6 has tried in the past to procure the urine and excrement of foreign leaders. A specially modified condom was used to catch the urine of Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu, while the 'product' of Presidents Fidel Castro and Leonid Brezhnev was 'analysed' by medical specialists for signs of their true health. Tomlinson's duties included recruiting agents to inform on foreign politicians. His most important task was to infiltrate in 1992 a Middle Eastern weapons procurement programme network - the BMP3 - with the object of locating and disabling a chemical weapons facility. Authorised by an unnamed senior Cabinet minister, the sabotage plan - onc account suggests the planting of a bomb - aimed to intercept a shipment of machinery and interfere with its extractor fan equipment, despite warnings of the possible risk to the lives of dozens of civilian workers at the plant. In November 1992 using the name 'Andrew Huntley' and the pretext of assisting at a conference run by the Financial Times, Tomlinson went under cover to Moscow. His very sensitive mission was to obtain Russian military secrets on ballistic missiles and effect the defection of a Russian colonel who specialised in this area. Although, strangely, he was not given the usual 'immersion' language training in Serbo-Croat, Tomlinson soon found himself in the former Yugoslavia, whose break-up had taken the Service by surprise.6 When the country fractured in January 1991 into Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, EU recognition of independent Croatia proved to be a critical and disastrous policy, eventually paving the way for Serb aggression which the Foreign Office interpreted as civil war. MI6 had been running a few federal sources in the old Yugoslavia, but they provided little worthwhile intelligence. The Service lacked appropriate linguists and had to start more or less from scratch. The JIC established a Current Intelligence Group (CIG) on the Balkans, and within eighteen months MI6's Controllerate dealing with the area had recruited a number of sources at a high level from among the ethnic military and political protagonists. During 1993, as a 'targeting officer' within the Balkans Controllerate, whose job was to identify potential informants, Tomlinson spent a harrowing and dangerous six months travelling as a journalist to Belgrade, Skopje, Zagreb and Ljubljana, in the process recruiting a Serb journalist - journalists of every nationality were a particular MI6 target in the Balkans, as they proved to be more productive than most other sources - and a leader of the Albanian opposition in Macedonia. In 1993, UN blue-helmeted troops started patrolling the borders of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. According to sources, MI6 used air-drops in an operation to set up arms dumps on the border of Macedonia as part of a stay-behind network.7 Another operation included running as an agent a Tory MP, who gave information about foreign donations to the Conservative Party. Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Northern Ireland minister, Harold Elleston was an old Etonian who studied Russian at Exeter University and subsequently became a trade consultant specialising in the former eastern bloc countries, during which time he was recruited by MI6. He worked for them in eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and during the conflict in former Yugoslavia. After visiting former Yugoslavia in 1992, Elleston, who was employed by a lobbying firm with Conservative candidate John Kennedy (aka Gvozdenovic), notified his Ml6 handlers that donations were reaching the Conservative Party from Serbia. Despite Harold Wilson's ruling in the sixties that the intelligence services would not use MPs as agents, the Service received special sanction from Prime Minister John Major to continue Elleston's secret role. Sir Colin McColl warned Major that the party was possibly accepting tainted money via Kennedy, a key figure in arranging payments from the Serb regime.8 MI6 was itself seen as being pro-Serb in its reporting. In 1994, two articles arguing against western policy in the Balkans conflict appeared in the Spectator (the right-wing magazine unknowingly served as 'cover' for three MI6 officers working in Bosnia, Belgrade and Moldova), written under a Sarajevo dateline by a 'Kenneth Roberts', who had apparently worked for more than a year with the United Nations in Bosnia as an 'adviser'. Written by MI6 officer Keith Robert Craig, who was attached to the MoD's Balkan Secretariat, the first on 5 February rehearsed arguments for a UN withdrawal from the area, pointing out that all sides committed atrocities. The second, on 5 March, complained baselessly about 'warped' and inaccurate reports by, in particular, the BBC's Kate Adie of an atrocity against the Bosnian Serbs. Guardian correspondent Ed Vulliamy recalled being invited to a briefing by MI6 which was 'peddling an ill-disguised agenda: the Foreign Office's determination that there be no intervention against Serbia's genocidal pogrom'. Without the slightest evidence, the carnage that took place in Sarajevo's marketplace was described as the work of the Muslim-led government, which was alleged to be 'massacring its own people to win sympathy and ultimately help from outside'. As Vulliamy knew, Sarajevo's defenders were 'dumb with disbelief'. Despite UN Protection Force reports which found that it was Serb mortars which were killing Muslims, the MI6 scheme 'worked - beautifully', as the allegations found their way into the world's press. Vulliamy noted that 'it was quickly relished by the only man who stood to gain from this - the Serbian leader Radovan Karadzic'.9 Perhaps it was only an intelligence/Foreign Office faction which was pro-Serb. From March 1992 until September 1993, Tomlinson worked in the East European Controllerate under the staff designation UKA/7. He has claimed that in the summer of 1992 he discovered an internal document that detailed plans to assassinate President Slobodan Milosevic. During a conversation, an ambitious and serious colleague who was responsible for developing and targeting operations in the Balkans (P4 / OPS), Nick Fishwick, had pulled out a file and handed it to Tomlinson to read. 'It was approximately two pages long, and had a yellow card attached to it which signified that it was an accountable document rather than a draft proposal.' It was entitled 'The need to assassinate President Milosevic of Serbia' and was distributed to senior MI6 officers, including the head of Balkan operations (P4), Maurice Kenwrick-Piercy, the Controller of East European Operations (C/CEE), Richard Fletcher, and later Andrew Fulton, the Security Officer responsible for eastern European operations (SBO1/T), John Ridd, the private secretary to the Chief (H/SECT), Alan Petty ('Alan Judd'), and the Service's SAS liaison officer (MODA/SO), Maj. Glynne Evans. According to Tomlinson, Fishwick justified assassinating Milosevic on the grounds that there was evidence that the 'Butcher of Belgrade' was supplying weapons to Karadzic, who was wanted for war crimes, including genocide. US and French intelligence agencies were alleged to be already contemplating assassinating Karadzic. There were three possible scenarios put forward by MI6. Firstly, to train a Serbian paramilitary opposition group to carry out the assassination. This, Fishwick argued, had the advantage of deniability but the disadvantage that control of the operation would be low and the chances of success unpredictable. Secondly, to use the small INCREMENT cell of SAS/SBS personnel, which is especially selected and trained to carry out operations exclusively for MI6/MI5, to send in a team that would assassinate the President with a bomb or by a sniper ambush. Fishwick said that this would be the most reliable option, but would be undeniable if the operation went wrong. Thirdly, to kill Milosevic in a road crash which would be staged during one of his visits to the international conferences on former Yugoslavia in Geneva. Fishwick suggested that a stun device could be used to dazzle the driver of Milosevic's car as it passed through one of Geneva's motorway tunnels.10 A year later, Tomlinson acted as a counsellor to the commander of the British forces in Bosnia and worked at manipulating the sources in the entourage of Karadzic. One participant to these operations suggests that these sources 'produced a very detailed intelligence picture which included not just the military plans and capabilities of the different factions but also early warning of political intentions'. There appears to have been little evidence of this intelligence coup in the Foreign Office decisions that followed, and its value is contradicted by another source which, while admitting that several significant agents were recruited, concludes that they did not 'produce substantial intelligence of quality'.11 The intelligence deficit was worsened by the United States' unwillingness to provide its Atlantic partner with all its intelligence on the Serbs. General Sir Michael Rose, a former head of the SAS and commander-in-chief of the UN Protection Force, realised that during 1994 all his communications were being electronically intercepted and his headquarters in Sarajevo was 'bugged' by the Americans because Washington, which wanted to use Nato air strikes to bomb the Serbs to the negotiating table, thought the British were too supportive of the Bosnian Serbs. The Americans also monitored the communications of SAS scouts deep in Bosnian territory and discovered that they were deliberately failing to identify Serb artillery positions. This lack of trust caused friction and led to a backstage confrontation between the secret services, and reminded some observers that the special relationship existed only on the basis that the US saw Britain as a cnance to extend its reach into Europe.12 The plans for Milosevic were not the only assassination plot in which MI6 became entangled. Renegade MI5 officer David Shayler, who was released by a French court in November 1998 on 'political grounds' following his detention in prison as part of extradition proceedings to England, first heard of a plot to kill the Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddafi, in November 1995. Shayler had been posted to MI5's counter-terrorist G9A section with responsibilities for issues relating to Lockerbie and Libya. A higher executive officer, earning £28,000 per year, Shayler headed up the Libyan desk for over two years and was held in high esteem, undertaking presentations to senior civil servants on all matters relating to Libya. For this work he received a performance-related bonus. An MI6 officer, referred to as PT16B, with whom Shayler had developed a close working relationship, informed him during a liaison meeting on Libya that the Service was running an important Arab agent. A former Libyan government official code-named 'Tunworth', the agent was a go-between with Libyan opposition groups, including a little-known band of extremists called Al Jamaa Al Islamiya Al Muqatila (Islamic Fighting Force). Tunworth had apparently approached MI6 in late 1995, outlining plans to overthrow Gaddafi by the Islamic Fighting Force, and later met with an MI6 officer in a Mediterranean country where he asked for funding. Shayler was told that more than £100,000 had been handed over in three or four instalments beginning in December. PT16B and his colleagues wrote a three- to four-page CX report for Whitehall circulation to other agencies, which stated that MI6 was merely in receipt of intelligence from agent Tunworth on the militants' coup plotting and the group's efforts to obtain weapons and Jeeps. It seems that no mention was made of any MI6 involvement in an assassination attempt.13 [Cryptome note, see: http://cryptome.org/qadahfi-plot.htm ] Shayler later heard that there had been a bomb attack on Gaddafi's motorcade near a town called Sirte, but the device was detonated under the wrong car. In fact, it seems that the dissidents launched an attack with Kalashnikovs and rocket grenades on the wrong car. In a communique to Arab newspapers on 6 March 1996, the Islamic Fighting Force stated that its men had tried to attack Gaddafi as he attended the Libyan General People's Congress. The attempt went wrong when Gaddafi did not show up in person, and the terrorists were forced to cancel the attack. 'But as our heroes were withdrawing they collided with the security forces and in the ensuing battle there were casualties on both sides.' Three fighters were killed but the leader of the hit team, Abd al-Muhaymeen, a veteran of the Afghan resistance who was possibly trained by MI6 or the CIA, 'escaped unhurt'. Following a crackdown by Gaddafi's secret police, his family home in the town of Ejdabiya was burnt down. The back of the Fighting Force was broken and its leaders retreated to Afghanistan.14 When Shayler subsequently met PT16B, the MI6 othcer mentioned the attack with 'a kind of note of triumph, saying, yes, we'd done it'. Shayler's reaction was 'one of total shock. This was not what I thought I was doing in the intelligence service.' He told BBC's Panorama programme: 'I was absolutely astounded ... Suddenly we were talking about tens of thousands of pounds of taxpayers' money being used to attempt to assassinate a foreign head of state.' He concluded that 'no matter who is funding this, it's still international terrorism. The Brits might say we're the good guys, but it's a very difficult road to go down.' Government officials dismissed Shay]er's claims as 'completely and utterly nutty'. A Foreign Office spokesperson said that it was 'inconceivable that in a non-wartime situation the Government would authorise the SIS to bump off a foreign leader. In theory, SIS can carry out assassinations but only at the express request of the Foreign Secretary.' The 1994 Intelligence Services Act refers to MI6 being able to perform 'other tasks' and protects of ficers from prosecution for criminal acts outside Britain. Indeed, a clause was especially inserted into the 1998 Criminal Justice Bill - which outlaws organisations in Britain conspiring to commit offences abroad - giving all Crown agents immunity from prosecution under the legislation, including possibly the assassination of foreign leaders. It was clear to Shayler, however, and confirmed by BBC sources, that MI6 had not sought ministerial clearance for backing the attempt on Gaddafi. MI6, Shayler believed, was 'operating out of control and illegally'.15 Whatever the truth is surrounding Shayler's accusations, the public and politicians will not discover the full facts. Unlike in the United States, where similar, but less detailed, revelations led to a major Senate enquiry into alleged assassination plotting in the mid-seventies, there will be no House of Commons investigation. As Tomlinson explains, 'there is a deep-rooted belief that, should a policy or operation go wrong, nobody will be held ultimately responsible. The Service will always be able to hide behind the catch-all veil of secrecy provided by the Official Secrets Act or, if the heat really builds up, a Public Interest Immunity Certificate.16 Given his operational experience, as a Grade 5 officer Tomlinson might have expected steady promotion through the ranks and a long career in the secret service, perhaps ending as head of a Controllerate. Senior officers, who are easily spotted in the honours lists with their OBEs, retire at fifty-five. Their attachment to the Service does not end there, however. A number are found appointments as non-executive directors with companies or subsidiaries that have dealt with MI6, or employed as security or corporate liaison officers. 'It is part of their retirement package,' Tomlinson has revealed. 'They are effectively MI6 liaison officers. iust like MI6 liaison officers in Whitehall departments.'17 Since MI6 helped establish Diversified Corporate Services in Rome, New York and London in the late sixties, there has been an increasing trend for setting up consultancies, with the tacit approval or encouragement of the Service. Among the consultants to Ciex, which has 'cornered a lucrative market' in providing a restricted 'confidential service' in 'strategic advice and intelligence' for 'a small group of very substantial customers', are Hamilton McMillan, who retired from the Service's counter-terrorist section in 1996, and former head of the Middle East department Michael Oatley, who previously worked tor another intelligence-linked consultancy, Kroll Associates. Set up in 1995 by the late Sir Fitzroy Maclean, with a board that includes a former Royal Dutch Shell managing director and a former BP deputy chair, the Hakluyt Foundation provides leading British businesses with information that clients 'will not receive by the usual government, media and commercial routes'. Hakluyt's managing director, Christopher James, was until 1998 in charge of MI6's liaison with commerce, while a fellow-director, Mike Reynolds, was regarded as one of the Service's brightest stars.18 Tomlinson's career in the secret world turned out to be short-lived. He returned home from the Balkans exhausted and traumatised by the atrocities he had witnessed, but, fearing that the Service's personnel managers might regard this as a sign of weakness, he did not tell them of his emotional state.* At one point he had been depressed following the death of his girlfriend. Since he had no one to whom to unburden himself - as is standard practice, his parents were unaware of his secret life - his personal problems mounted. Despite the claims of improved personnel management within the Service, Tomlinson received little or no support. It seems that the Service has not put in place any counselling provision as a result of Tomlinson's (and others') experience, but, instead, has decided that officers be vetted by clinical psychologists in order to 'identify actual or potential personality disorders', particularly those being appointed to sensitive posts. Harold Macmillan once said that anyone who spent more than ten years in the secret service must be either weird or mad.19 ____________________ * Recalcitrant officers and agents under suspicion are sometimes interrogated at the 'cooler' facilities in Chelsea and in a special soundproofed 'rubber' room situated beneath a hotel in west London Tomlinson's personnel manager claimed that he was not a team player, lacked judgement and was not committed to the Service because he was prone to going on 'frolics of his own'. In early 1995, Tomlinson turned up for work and discovered that his swipe card would not gain him entry to MI6 headquarters. Security guards informed him that it had been cancelled. His security clearance had been stopped after he complained to his superiors that a number of MI6's operations and tactics were unethical. Tomlinson was also privy to much sensitive information, as gossip was prevalent inside headquarters. For instance, he was aware that a British businessman had threatened to go public with allegations that intelligence officers had destroyed his company. MI6 was said to have mounted a covert operation, including telephone tapping, against the businessman to ensure that he did not contact the press. Tomlinson was formally dismissed from the Service in August 1995. He did not believe that MI6 was properly accountable to the law. This lack of accountability at the top 'cascades downwards to even the lowest levels' and provides 'a fertile breeding ground for corruption'.20 One MI6 officer paid for his divorce by pocketing the expenses of a fictitious agent whose fake intelligence had been taken from the pages of the Economist. Another senior officer sold false passports to Middle Eastern businessmen and possibly drug traffickers, and diverted taxpayers' money intended for defectors and informants - up to £400,000 - into his offshore bank account. 'Agent J' was allowed to retire on a full pension with no police investigation or prosecution because 'he knew where the bodies were buried'. The scandal was uncovered by the US authorities, who were investigating drugs in the Caribbean and came across an offshore bank account opened with a British passport issued in a false name. Senior MI6 of ficers are allowed to open new bank accounts and transfer cash.21 Tomlinson blamed his dismissal on a personality clash with a personnel manager. Other officers, including his immediate superior, protested that the personnel officer's accusations were unsubstantiated. Tomlinson was allowed to appeal to the intelligence services' tribunal, set up in 1994 and chaired by Lord Justice Brown, but, following the rejection of his appeal, he dismissed it as a 'star chamber'. 'I was denied the basic natural justice. I had no legal representation or access to papers which were said to give reasons for my dismissal. I could not cross-examine key witnesses.'* When he then told the head of the Personnel Department that he would pursue his claim for unfair dismissal at an industrial tribunal, he was informed: 'There's no point in doing that because nobody can tell the Chief what to do.'22 ____________________ * In February 1999 Foreign Secretary Robin Cook accepted that M16 staff should 'as much as possible, enjoy the same rights as other employees'. A special investigator with access to all intelligence files would be appointed to look into allegations of malpractice. Home Secretary ack Straw, however, said that the Official Secrets Act would not be amended to allow 'whistleblowing' because the security services were now 'accountable'. MI6 refused to co-operate with the tribunal, which led to Tomlinson's decision to write a book about his experiences. Investigated by Special Branch officers, Tomlinson was subsequently jailed for twelve months on 18 December 1997 under the Official Secrets Act in order 'to deter others from pursuing the course you chose to pursue'. He spent six months in Belmarsh prison, courtesy of Her Majesty, and was released in April 1998.23 Publicity concerning Tomlinson's case led to considerable anxiety in Whitehall and is said to have caused turmoil inside MI6. The Service feared that the publicity would expose poor management and lead to calls for changes and reform. It became the task of the Director of Security and Public Affairs, and effectively C's number two, John Gerson, to 'deal' with Tomlinson. A Far East specialist with close ties with the Americans, Gerson, who is an associate member of the Centre for the Study of Socialist Legal Systems at London University, is the model of the well-versed and evasive civil servant as portrayed in Yes, Minister. His hobby is the classic spy's pastime of birdwatching. Rewarded with a CMG in the 1999 New Year's Honours, Gerson has been ably assisted by the main contact with the press, Iain Mathewson, a former official in the DHSS and Customs and Excise, who joined MI6 in 1980. The Cold War was easy for the intelligence agencies, to the extent that they had clear, identifiable targets. It also provided a curtain behind which they could hide their failures. Without an all-embracing enemy to counter, the Secret Intelligence Service has developed a bits-and-pieces target list, known as the 'Mother Load' agenda, which lacks coherence. This is sometimes explained as being due to the fact that the world has become more unstable. This is nonsense. There is no danger of a world conflagration such as there was during Berlin in 1961, Cuba in 1962, the Middle East in 1967 and 1973, or at other crisis points when nuclear bombers took to the air. Threats from so-called rogue states such as Iran and Iraq are altogether of a different magnitude. Even then, it is apparent that many of the 'scares' - suitcase nuclear bombs, missiles with nuclear and biological warheads, nuclear terrorists, etc. - are either grossly exaggerated or simply manufactured by the intelligence services. It is true that there are significant trouble spots in the world and Britain rightly has to take measures to monitor them, but what this so-called instability has exposed is the inability of agencies designed for the Cold War to tackle the problems of today. In the United States, where a much more open, democratic debate has taken place, the CIA's director from 1977 to 1981, Stansfield Turner, has suggested that the solution is to build a new intelligence service from scratch. Others talk of open-source intelligence agencies that would exploit the explosion of information and do away with the mystique that surrounds secret sources. The most trenchant criticism of the changes that MI6 has undertaken since the end of the Cold War has come from insiders. David Bickford, former lawyer to the security services, argued in November 1997 that the British intelligence community - MI6, MI5, whose Director-General, Stephen Lander, is not regarded as an inspired choice, and GCHQ - 'is not doing its job properly'. He said that the cost was completely unjustified as there was 'triplication of management, triplication of bureaucracy and triplication of turf battles'. SIS appears to be top heavy with management, with resources being shifted away from operations to administration, such as employing lawyers to deal with the new crime agenda, as well as public relations officers, accountants, etc. There would appear, then, to be room for cuts. Officials claim that MI6 currently costs about £140 million. This is hardly a credible figure for an organisation employing two thousand staff. Indeed, sources who were privy to the figures as presented to the Permanent Secretaries' Committee on the Intelligence Services in thc mid-eighties were then quoting £150 million. What few people are aware of is that the budget only covers MI6's operations: everything else is excluded. (Overseas Estate Department) It does not take a specialist to appreciate that a realistic budget would be considerably higher if all the running costs of maintenance, pensions, travel, overseas stations, computers, equipment, communications, and the full building costs of the new headquarters (the National Audit Office report on the £90 million overspend is to remain secret) are taken into account. The Treasury insists that costs which were previously hidden away in the budgets of other departments, such as the MoD, are now included in the Secret Vote figure for MI6. This cannot be true. Staff costs are met by the Foreign Office, while the MoD pays for Fort Monkton and the Hercules transport plane and Puma helicopter that are kept on permanent stand-by for the Service's use. It is unlikely that ministers are aware of the network of 'front' companies that MI6 set up in the early nineties, nor of the numerous bank accounts, such as the one at the Drummonds branch of the Royal Bank of Scotland, which the Service operates. It can now be revealed that the real budget figure - intelligence sources with access to the budget call it MI6's biggest secret - is at least double the official figure. One source with access to the internal accounts puts it as high as five times this figure. Ministers and MPs are being misled. So is the Commons Intelligence Security Committee. The American experience is that it is budgetary control which provides the only means of real leverage and represents a move towards genuine oversight. Intelligence chiefs have argued successfully that a detailed audit of MI6 expenditure would 'prejudice their operational security'. The result is, Tomlinson argues, 'a management and budgetary structure which would provide a theme park for management consultancies'. It is not surprising to learn that MI6 officers have 'little idea how to manage a budget, and even less incentive to manage it well'. Tomlinson discovered many cases of profligate waste. It was common at the end of the financial year for departments to feverishly spend the remaining budget on planning expensive operations - which, in reality, had little chance of success - in order to prevent cuts to the following year's allocation.24 Bickford had his own agenda, believing that British Intelligence was turning 'a blind eye to the fact that economic crime - organised racketeering in narcotics, kidnap extortion, product contamination and fraud - now poses the greatest threat to the security of the international community'. During 1995 the intelligence agencies had apparently tried to persuade the Major government to allow them to develop closer links with large companies so as to provide them with 'protective business intelligence'. The initiative failed because, Bickford claimed, the different agencies bickered between themselves on how to finance and run the new scheme. Tomlinson agrees that there is 'often bitter fighting between the two agencies over who should have primacy over a particular target or operation'. Although arbitrary ground rules are sometimes brokered between warring departments, communication between MI6 and MI5 remains 'desperately poor'. There is 'remarkably little cross-fertilisation of ideas or operational co-ordination'.25 Besides economic crime, the main threat to Britain, Bickford believed, was 'super-terrorism', involving weapons of mass destruction, and because of the 'common international nature of these threats', the case for having three different agencies 'falls at the first hurdle'. These threats and the many others that the intelligence services have warned us about often do not stand up to close scrutiny - indeed, the modern intelligence service's prime purpose appears to be to generate fears - but Bickford's argument that a merger between the three services would save 'tens of millions of pounds' and provide the necessary 'focused direction, integration and analysis of electronic and human intelligence' deserves to be taken seriously. Tomlinson argues that such a streamlined organisation should be accountable to a parliamentary committee so that 'intelligence targets, priorities and budgets are all controlled through the normal democratic process'.26 A new Treasury-led interdepartmental committee inquiry was instigated in 1998 to put the security and intelligence services under what was said to be an unprecedented 'root-and-branch' scrutiny, the aim being to expose the intelligence agencies to zero-based budgeting, a Treasury discipline that asks the agency concerned to explain from first principles the value of everything it does. As Independent political correspondent Donald Macintyre suggested, 'Ministers will have to be tough; when an effort was made from within the Treasury to do the same thing in the 1980s, it foundered when the security services, almost certainly with Margaret Thatcher's backing, put the shutters up. Although the official budget for MI6, MI5 and GCHQ is claimed to be £713 million, rising to £776 million in 1999/2000 (not including a Treasury supply estimate for the capital budget of £144 million) and up to £1 billion for all agencies, Sir Gerald Warner, who as former deputy head of MI6 and Intelligence and Security Co-ordinator at the Cabinet Office (1991-6) should be in a position to know, put a figure of £2.5 billion on the entire cost of Britain's intelligence community. The reality is that the intelligence budget has increased in a period when defence spending has gone down from 5 per cent to around 3.5 per cent of GDP. Defence intelligence, the international arms trade and nuclear proliferation absorb about 35 per cent; intelligence on foreign states and their internal politics about 10 per cent; intelligence operations, including supplying diplomats and ministers in negotiations with secrets and economic espionage, about 20 per cent; counter-terrorism another 20 per cent; with counter-intelligence, counter-espionage, drugs and international crime the rest. An inquiry conducted by the Cabinet Office in 1998, with wide terms of reference, including ensuring that the agencies' objectives are properly 'focused' on providing relevant intelligence to other Whitehall departments, asked them to justify their activities as well as their usefulness. It was acknowledged that the scrutiny team would probably recommend some 'down-sizing' of MI6, which had 'run out of things to do', though no clues were forthcoming from the politicians. The intelligence chiefs have them selves complained that New Labour has had no policy on the intelligence services, and it is true that all efforts to elicit a pre-election policy statement from the future Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Home Secretary met with failure. MI6 Chief Sir David Spedding, however, had no need to worry. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, the former left-winger who in opposition regularly criticised the intelligence and security services for their threat to civil liberties, lack of accountability and waste of taxpayers' money, had, one intelligence source told Richard Norton-Taylor, 'further to travel than his predecessors' in coming to terms with his responsibilities for the Secret Intelligence Service. It did not take long. Labour politicians who, in the main, have had little contact wlth the intelligence world, or much interest in its activities, have been and continue to be easily seduced by the magic of secrecy and privileged access to special sources. MI6 senior staffers knew what to do, having for so long, as Tomlinson warned, 'carefully and successfully cultivated an air of mystique and importance to their work'. Knowing that the reality is very different, SIS continues to devote considerable time and resources to lobbying for its position in Whitehall. Cook made the short trip across the Thames to the Service's palatial Vauxhall Cross headquarters, where Spedding and his successor, Richard Dearlove, avoiding discussion of MI6's real budget, briefed him on their latest 'successes': a 'crucial role' in revealing Saddam Hussein's continuing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programme; uncovering Iranian attempts to procure British technology; and tracking drug smugglers and countering money laundering in the City of London. And then, in April 1998, dressed in the traditional white tie and tails for the Mansion House Easter dinner for diplomats and City businessmen, ** Cook went out of his way - indeed, further than any previous Labour Foreign Secretary - to praise SIS, noting that they 'cannot speak for themselves' because 'the nature of what they do means that we cannot shout about their achievements if we want them to remain effective. But let me say I have been struck by the range and qualily of the work. It seems that some things in the British state never change. ** There have been numerous rumours in areas of Whitehall's intelligence community that while in opposition, Mr Cook used a well know high class London based escort agency (A****) [A reader suggests "Adam's"] - apparently the preferred choice of several MP's and Whitehall civil servants. The Security and Intelligence services keep on file indiscretions, however politically sensitive, of crown servants, MP's etc - An example of that would be the sexual encounter that occurred between Gordon Brown and Peter Mandelson (interrupted accidentally by a member of Michael Meacher's staff) in Gordon Brown's office at the House of Commons while in opposition and is still only known to a very select number of Commons and Whitehall hierarchy. The services are also aware of the sexual relationship between Mr Hague and Mr Coe. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Notes 1. Punch, No. 71, 2.199. 2 & 3. Sunday Business, 20.12.98 & 24.1.99. Family friend and former Conservative defence procurement minister, Jonathan Allen, who was an MI6 agent, providing insights into the Saudi royal family and their defence spending plans. 4. Sunday Business, 11.10.98. 5. Observer, 21.11.93; BBC1 Panorama, 22.12.93. 6 & 7. Sunday Times, 22.9.96, 21.12.97 & 2.8.98. 8. Observer, 22.12.96. 9 & 10. Guardian, 25.3.98 & 7.10.98; Sunday Times, 30.8.98; Independent, 2.9.98. 11. Adams [?], p. 101; Mark Urban , UK Eyes Alpha: The Inside Story of British Intelligence, pp. 215-16; Sunday Times, 22.9.96, 21.12.97 & 2.8.98. 12. Guardian, 20.12.94; Times, 10.11.98. 13 & 14. Guardian, 10.8.98; Sunday Times and Observer, 9.8.98. 15 & 16. Guardian, 8.8.98. 17 & 18. Sunday Business, 11.10.98; Times, 15.11.98. 19. Guardian, 19.12.97; Sunday Times, 17.11.96 & 9.1.97; Observer, 25.10.98. 20 & 21. Guardian, 21.9.96, 20.5 & 8.8.98; Observer, 16.8.98; Punch, 2.1.99. 22. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook has indicated that in future the tribunal route might be allowed. Daily Telegraph, 3.11.98; Guardian, 15.8.98. 23. Sunday Times, 31.3.97. 24. Independent, 29.8.97. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Footnotes on censored text BOOK CIPHER Book cipher, as such, is not a codename, this is probably referring to the method used - the one-time pad (OTP) encryption system. It is a slow manual "off-line" system using one-time pads and books to convert plain text into groups of figures. The resultant cipher text is reduced by 20% compared to the text to be enciphered. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NOREEN/ROCKEX CIPHER An "off-line" (off-line: text is enciphered prior to transmission) machine system using coded tapes and manual entry through a typewriter keyboard. The resultant cipher text is increased by up to 40% compared to the text to be enciphered. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ON-LINE CIPHER SYSTEMS Past and present systems are: AUCTIONEER, TOPIC, TREDS (Topic Rapid Encryption Decryption System), ALVIS, TRUNCHEON, FRANTON, and HORA. An "on-line" (on-line: text is protected during transmission) machine system using encryption tapes to set current cipher protocols and an advanced day counter, both must tally or the cipher is considered compromised. The resultant cipher text is usually increased by 10-20% compared to the text to be enciphered. AUCTIONEER and TOPIC can work in either mode, they have a manual keyboard for off-line and cipher key tapes for on-line. Transmission speeds are reduced by up to 10% with these systems. CONSORT is the portable communications satellite system. Message and communications handling is through six main communications hubs; Darwin, Hanslope Park communications centre in Bedfordshire, a jointly operated SIS/GCHQ station in Poundon, Bucks, about 20 miles south west of Hanslope, GCHQ Cheltenham and two main London Communications Centres servicing both the Diplomatic Service and SIS. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ACTOR is the codename given to SIS within the United Kingdom Home, Defence and Diplomatic messaging services. It is designed to add an extra level of security when telex and telegrams are copied to SIS and reference to CX's from SIS. The Security Service codename is SNUFFBOX. All government sections are allocated a router indicator and channel indicator, in the case of SNUFFBOX; OI and SNFBX respectively. Even the BBC World Service in London has its own; HT and BBCBH. Bush House has an encrypted FCO communications terminal. Interestingly, all BBC World Service employees are NG (negatively) vetted for clearance up to and including CONFIDENTIAL through the resident BBC's Security Service liaison officer. Those members of staff working directly for the BBC Director General, particularly with access to the DG's management registry, are PV'd (positively) vetted up to and including SECRET. During national security alerts the DG's office will receive a direct 'subtle' briefing on behalf of the JIC from the resident Security Service liaison officer on "the line to take" in terms of what would, and would not be in the national and operational interest to broadcast. In some cases BBC World Service editors have, in the past, been individually approached to allow certain news items to be transmitted 'verbatim', unwittingly on behalf of SIS, as communication codes to agents in the field. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- L***** This may refer to a caveat called LOCSEN which is used within the Diplomatic Service to restrict information from locally engaged staff that are suspected of being a member of a hostile intelligence agency (HIS) or have been assessed as having possible connections with a subversive or terrorist organisation, but has no meaning in respect of sensitive inter-agency liaison. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ECLIPSE A caveat previously known as GUARD. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- UK EYES ALFA The caveat EXCLUSIVE is used for the physical transportation of this material. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- BRAHMS A secure mobile system based on the Racal Comsec MA4300 secure system. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CRYPTEK This is a commercially available system available in classified and unclassified versions. The Communications Electronics Security Group (CESG), part of GCHQ, sets the standards for the installation of the fully Tempested classified system which operates on the UK public key system and, once in situ, is afforded the same level of security as UK cipher systems. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- DEDIP, DESDEN DEYOU They are ostensibly Diplomatic codewords used for the transmission of very sensitive information and are used by SIS for operational and staff details over the diplomatic cipher system. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- It comes as no surprise to members of the FCO or SIS, to see sensitive accounting or budget documents carrying the caveat "NOT FOR NAO EYES" effectively restricting the document from dissemination to the National Audit Office. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TECHNICAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT (TSD) TSD is officially a branch of the Diplomatic Service based at the FCO's Communications and Information Systems Divisions (ISD) at the Hanslope Park compound just outside of Milton Keynes in Bedfordshire. However, TSD also has offices in the FCO, GCHQ and SIS. TSD has a dual function - its is primarily responsible for all Diplomatic communications security at home and abroad but it also supplies technical and operational support for SIS and technical security for other government departments overseas. TSD is tasked with handling all overseas technical intelligence liaising closely and in many cases providing cover for SIS TOS (Technical and Operations Support) GCHQ and the Security Service's technical intelligence departments. TSD consist of five main sections: Branch A Branch B Branch C Branch D Branch E Technical Security Security Engineer Operations Support Technical Support and Forensics Technical Intelligence and Security A1 - Technical Security Inspectorate B1 - Intruder Detection C1 - Information Systems and Telephones D1 - Forensic Investigations E1 - Technical Analysis Directorate A2 - Tempest and Radiation Monitoring A3 - Tempest and Radiation Exploits B2 - Protective Systems and Future Projects B3 - Locks and CCTV B4 - Specialist Locksmiths C2 - Operational Maintenance C3 - Operational Personnel D2 - Research and Development D3 - Computers and Electronics E2 - Projects Analysis E3 - Technical Archives -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The FCO's Overseas Estate Department's budget is designed to cover SIS officers accommodation under diplomatic cover. These costs therefore do not surface in the SIS overall yearly budget. For example, in one of the top SIS postings such as H/NY (Head of Station New York) - which comes with a very pleasant family size upper eastside apartment and costs in excess of $12,000 per calendar month - the cost is covered under the FCO's local UK Mission to the UN budget. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PENTEL A secret writing technique using a commercially available pen. [This is more fully described in Richard Tomlinson's The Big Breach.] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PETTLE A secret recording device that looks and acts like a commercially available walkman but utilises the middle part of the tape to record a "third" track through a slightly modified PCB that provides limited semi-duplex encryption. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- We Expertly Hunt Real Spies, Real Eavesdroppers, and Real Wiretappers. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 Web: http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 Email: mailto:jmatk@tscm.com ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- World Class, Professional, Ethical, and Competent Bug Sweeps, and Wiretap Detection using Sophisticated Laboratory Grade Test Equipment. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8937 From: contranl Date: Fri Jun 18, 2004 8:23pm Subject: ATM ...hidden cameras in money machines . Stealing from ATM's (money machines) using a wireless camera and cardcopier...this time with nice detailed pictures ! http://www.snopes.com/crime/warnings/atmcamera.asp another story from the same website on using celphone-cameras to steal info.... http://www.snopes.com/crime/warnings/phonecam.asp Greetings Tetrascanner www.tetrascanner.com 8938 From: contranl Date: Fri Jun 18, 2004 9:21pm Subject: Gadget time ! . Hi welcome to the weekly :)GADGET(: hour 1) Keyhanger with built in Hidden camera detector (from 400MHz to 2.4GHz) covers all the frequency ranges of hidden-cameras....and...counterfeit money detector 2) Multifunctional hidden Camera detector with Siren, Flashlight and Burglar alarm system and Pepperspray http://www.globalsources.com/gsol/GeneralManager? &design=clean&language=en&action=GetSupplier&page=supplier/Showroom&s upplier_id=6008804103839&showroom_type=&action=GetPoint&point_id=3000 000152127&catalog_id=2000000003844&prod_id=17034 Are they crazy or what ?.........here is the short one: http://tinyurl.com/24kwd I am seriously curious if these things can differentiate between video-signals and other signals in the same frequency band...and how they do that..seems to me that you would need a videodetection- circuit wich looks for a video-line-sync frequency (15~16 Khz)...i suspect there is no such a circuit inside...so they are basically wideband AM-detectors ? They are not available in my country (Netherlands)...anyone in the US feel like buying one of these(cheap)gadget videodetectors ? and see if they only react to real (rf) videosignals ? Greetings Tetrascanner www.tetrascanner.com 8939 From: contranl Date: Fri Jun 18, 2004 10:04pm Subject: "Wireless-Video-Camera-Jammers" from the Far-East . Latest low-cost..."Wireless-Video-Camera-Jammers" from the Far-East http://tinyurl.com/2v5dk I suppose this will only work when they overpower the other (peeping) transmitter ? (at the receivers end),in practice they would have to be 100 mW at least to safely overpower a standard 10mW video- transmitter ? How do you now the frequency to jam on ? sweeping ? wideband-rf-noise-generator ? Maybe it is only somekind of 15 khz (sync)Am wideband signal ? not a real and complete videosignal ? Notice the 2 antennas and the fact that they mention different standards (Ntsc,Pal..etc) By the way...a good website to see the latest on Far-East (Taiwan,Korea,China) spystuff,gadget-detectors and for example very small harddisk video-recorders is here: http://www.globalsources.com Half the "spyshop"" products is now coming from this area....time to learn Chinese ! Tetrascanner www.tetrascanner.com 8940 From: Paul Curtis Date: Fri Jun 18, 2004 10:35pm Subject: RE: "Wireless-Video-Camera-Jammers" from the Far-East If people will buy this stuff to conduct serious screening imagine what they could do with my warehouse full of dark emitting diodes. Now . . . if I could just figure out a way to find them :) Paul Curtis National Ventures, Inc. -----Original Message----- From: contranl [mailto:contranl@y...] Sent: Friday, June 18, 2004 20:04 To: TSCM-L@yahoogroups.com Subject: [TSCM-L] "Wireless-Video-Camera-Jammers" from the Far-East . Latest low-cost..."Wireless-Video-Camera-Jammers" from the Far-East http://tinyurl.com/2v5dk I suppose this will only work when they overpower the other (peeping) transmitter ? (at the receivers end),in practice they would have to be 100 mW at least to safely overpower a standard 10mW video- transmitter ? How do you now the frequency to jam on ? sweeping ? wideband-rf-noise-generator ? Maybe it is only somekind of 15 khz (sync)Am wideband signal ? not a real and complete videosignal ? Notice the 2 antennas and the fact that they mention different standards (Ntsc,Pal..etc) By the way...a good website to see the latest on Far-East (Taiwan,Korea,China) spystuff,gadget-detectors and for example very small harddisk video-recorders is here: http://www.globalsources.com Half the "spyshop"" products is now coming from this area....time to learn Chinese ! Tetrascanner www.tetrascanner.com ======================================================== TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. =================================================== TSKS Yahoo! Groups Links 8941 From: John McCain Date: Fri Jun 18, 2004 10:22am Subject: Re: Cute Little TDR James, Another of those rare chances where I can contribute something to this list. Usually lurking here, but since I touched one of these at a trade show last month along with another made by Biddle, and several from Triplett , I thought I'd give my impressions. They were all similar and if I had the free cash, I'd have gone for one of them simply because of the convenience factor. They were all quite inexpensive... with one under 400 $US. Positives are well defined in the marketing literature. I saw a couple of minor negatives that all of them had to various degrees. 1. On the trade show floor, all displays were easy to see. In the sunlight, I think you would have to build a sun-shade to read most of them with ease. I suspect a bit of cost savings on the display, but you'd expect them to be used outdoors in the sun. Since I couldn't take one outside, I can't be positive of this defect, but sure seemed to be there 2. I was unable to zoom into the display for much detail. I suspect you'd miss a higher impedance "fault" on some of those due to display resolution. 3. No 150 or 600 ohm output on most. Not a killer, but I'd like to have it. I like to match what I'm connecting to. 4. One unit had a variable Vf control, but you had to enter the factor, reset the unit, then restart it. On the plus side, that unit had numerous Vf numbers for common cable in a table for easy recall. But, I never know what cable is installed, so have to measure something and work backwards for a Vf if accurate lengths are required. 5. I didn't care for the connectors. I tend to like BNC connectors on this kid of stuff, and the "fluke type" safety connectors bug me. Caveat.. I'm not into commercial TSCM (but have an interest), I mostly do digital communications work; so my uses are different from most on this list. For now, I'll keep using the home-made NE-555 based tiny unit with a Fluke hand-held scope when I'm need a small package (I have to have the scope anyway), the RiserBond (thanks Steve) for accurate stuff, and the heavy old Tek 1503 if there's a chance of burning it up. Unless you're one of the big buck guys, if planning on buying one, to make sure it doesn't live in the closet, I'd get a hour's use on it before committing to the cash. Cheers, JohnM James M. Atkinson wrote: > Here is a cute little hand held TDR that is the fraction the price of a > Riser Bond unit (even a used unit). > > http://www.jensentools.com/product/group.asp?parent_id=60855 > > It may not be fancy, but it is a good place to start, and it is under $1500. > > One real plus is that it is about the size of a typical DVM, and not the > size of a suitcase. > > > Description from Jensen site follows: > > This battery powered, handheld TDR can identify many types of faults on any > cable consisting of at least two insulated metallic conductors. It has > internal matching networks of 25, 50, 75 and 100 Ohms. The balance and > velocity of propagation controls allow you to closely match any cable. It > has a measurement range of 0 to 10,000' with resolution of four inches. The > unit autoranges around the cursor giving the best view of the fault. The > large back lit display is easy to read. Includes case, leads, manual and 6 > AA batteries. 9 x 4.5 x 1.9", 1.3 lbs. > > -jma > > > > > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > We Expertly Hunt Real Spies, Real Eavesdroppers, and Real Wiretappers. > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 > Granite Island Group Fax: > 127 Eastern Avenue #291 Web: http://www.tscm.com/ > Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 Email: mailto:jmatk@tscm.com > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > World Class, Professional, Ethical, and Competent Bug Sweeps, and > Wiretap Detection using Sophisticated Laboratory Grade Test Equipment. > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] > > > > > ======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, > the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > =================================================== TSKS > Yahoo! Groups Links > > > > > 8942 From: Steve Uhrig Date: Fri Jun 18, 2004 9:37pm Subject: Re: Gadget time ! Once upon a midnight dreary, contranl pondered, weak and weary: > I am seriously curious if these things can differentiate between > video-signals and other signals in the same frequency band...and how they > do that..seems to me that you would need a videodetection- circuit wich > looks for a video-line-sync frequency (15~16 Khz)...i suspect there is no > such a circuit inside...so they are basically wideband AM-detectors ? They detect any RF within their frequency range if the RF is loud enough. Basically a diode detector into some sort of alert indicator. No demodulator at all. If they're within a foot or so of a cell phone (200 mW max in the U.S., and usually less), they'll trigger when the cell phone registers with the cell site. So they're not terribly sensitive, but not deaf either. If you want to finance it, I'll do a controlled test and document the results of field strength it takes to trip it, and at what frequencies, with various forms of modulation! The price gives you an indication of the quality. A lot of these Pac Rim places will send a demonstration sample at no charge if you contact them via fax with a professional letterhead. Steve ******************************************************************* Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 "In God we trust, all others we monitor" ******************************************************************* 8943 From: frost_bitten_ca Date: Sat Jun 19, 2004 2:17am Subject: Re: Looking for a carbon capacitor --- In TSCM-L@yahoogroups.com, "Steve Uhrig" wrote: > Once upon a midnight dreary, James M. Atkinson pondered, weak and weary: > > > I need a eighteen to twenty each 28+ volt, 100 Farad, very low ESR, carbon > > capacitors, > > The maximum voltage so far on large (farad size) super caps is 3 point > something volts. That's the max. Far more affordable are 2 volts at a few > farads. Figure about $5 each in reasonable quality. > > So you'd need at least fifteen in series to get the voltage you need, > then 20 parallel strings of fifteen caps in series to get the capacity > you desire. So you're talking 300 caps +/- mental arithmetic, at about $5 > each, or $1500. > > And that's for one. > > So for twenty, figure $30,000. > > Carbon capacitors? > > The only stock you'll find is from manufacturers. A year ago these caps > didn't exist. Now they're being treated more as batteries than > supercapacitors. They're still not in widespread production yet. Even > getting some for engineering samples takes some effort. > > For your shunt, use a 3/4" piece of rebar of the proper length and > something like saddle clamps from Polyphaser or Cadweld to connect to it. > > Steve > > > ******************************************************************* > Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) > Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip > mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com > tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 > "In God we trust, all others we monitor" > ******************************************************************* in the plating industry most plating we did was being done around the 6VDC region up to 20,000 amps. The rule of thumb for current carrying bus bars etc was 1 sq inch of copper/1000 amps of current carrying, so 2000 amp work pieces would require a 2 sq inch copper bus bar and so on. You can replace with aluminum bar but its not as efficient over the long term. 8944 From: A Grudko Date: Sat Jun 19, 2004 10:12am Subject: NYC Plans Giant WiFi Safety Net By Glenn Fleishman Special to Wi-Fi Networking News Permanently archived item [1] Computerworld reports that New York City will build a wireless network to supports 10,000s of public-safety users at speeds of up 70 mph: Bids are expected next month. They'll start with a three-month pilot project to test with multiple bidders, and then award a five-year contract with the potential for two five-year renewals. The bid's spec apparently calls for two Mbps access and simultaneous streaming for 1,000s of users. The first phase would support about 5,000 fire, police, and emergency medical personnel. The full cost could be $500 million to $1 billion, but the city won't confirm it. Mesh architecture is practically a necessity, the article quotes experts as saying. Tropos says they could deploy such a network with 600 of their access points in the 2.4 GHz band. More would be needed to use the 4.9 GHz public-safety band. Lucent suggests that EvDo running at 2.4 Mbps in the 1.9 GHz band would be an option as well. URLs referenced: [1] -- pgp key: http://www.jonbaer.net/jonbaer.asc fingerprint: F438 A47E C45E 8B27 F68C 1F9B 41DB DB8B 9A0C AF47 -- NYCwireless - http://www.nycwireless.net/ Un/Subscribe: http://lists.nycwireless.net/mailman/listinfo/nycwireless/ Archives: http://lists.nycwireless.net/pipermail/nycwireless/ Andy Grudko (British), DPM, Grad IS (South Africa) Consulting Investigator, Est. 1981. PSIRA reg. No. 8642 www.grudko.com , andy@g... Pretoria (+27 12) 244 0255 - 244 0256 (Fax) Sandton (+27 11) 465 9673 - 465 1487 (Fax) Johannesburg (+27 11) 781 7206 - 781 7207(Fax) Cellular (+27) 82 778 6355 - ICQ 146498943 SACI(Pres) SASA, IPA, WAD, CALI, UKPIN, IWWA. "When you need it done right - first time" --- Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free. Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com). Version: 6.0.707 / Virus Database: 463 - Release Date: 2004/06/15 [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 8945 From: Date: Sat Jun 19, 2004 11:34am Subject: New file uploaded to TSCM-L Hello, This email message is a notification to let you know that a file has been uploaded to the Files area of the TSCM-L group. File : /Wilson Burns/Criminal Complaint, Arrest, and Detention.pdf Uploaded by : graniteislandgroup Description : Criminal Complaint You can access this file at the URL http://groups.yahoo.com/group/TSCM-L/files/Wilson%20Burns/Criminal%20Complaint%2C%20Arrest%2C%20and%20Detention.pdf To learn more about file sharing for your group, please visit http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/groups/files Regards, graniteislandgroup 8946 From: Date: Sat Jun 19, 2004 11:39am Subject: New file uploaded to TSCM-L Hello, This email message is a notification to let you know that a file has been uploaded to the Files area of the TSCM-L group. File : /Wilson Burns/Plea Bargain Agreement.pdf Uploaded by : graniteislandgroup Description : Plea Bargain Agreement You can access this file at the URL http://groups.yahoo.com/group/TSCM-L/files/Wilson%20Burns/Plea%20Bargain%20Agreement.pdf To learn more about file sharing for your group, please visit http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/groups/files Regards, graniteislandgroup 8947 From: Date: Sat Jun 19, 2004 11:53am Subject: New file uploaded to TSCM-L Hello, This email message is a notification to let you know that a file has been uploaded to the Files area of the TSCM-L group. File : /Wilson Burns/Search Warrant and Results.pdf Uploaded by : graniteislandgroup Description : Search Warrant Results You can access this file at the URL http://groups.yahoo.com/group/TSCM-L/files/Wilson%20Burns/Search%20Warrant%20and%20Results.pdf To learn more about file sharing for your group, please visit http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/groups/files Regards, graniteislandgroup 8948 From: Date: Sat Jun 19, 2004 0:01pm Subject: New file uploaded to TSCM-L Hello, This email message is a notification to let you know that a file has been uploaded to the Files area of the TSCM-L group. File : /Wilson Burns/Initial Affidavit for Search Warrant.pdf Uploaded by : graniteislandgroup Description : Initial Affidavit and Search Warrant You can access this file at the URL http://groups.yahoo.com/group/TSCM-L/files/Wilson%20Burns/Initial%20Affidavit%20for%20Search%20Warrant.pdf To learn more about file sharing for your group, please visit http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/groups/files Regards, graniteislandgroup 8949 From: R. Snyder Date: Sat Jun 19, 2004 11:45am Subject: Re: John McCain's comments on TDR's John McCain mentioned his use of a 555-based ping box with a handheld o'scope. Having owned and used several Riser Bond and Biddle TDR's, I still have to express a particular fondness for the 74AC14-based ping box design on epanorama.net. In the version I built, powered from a 9V battery via a 78L05, with one rotary switch for off, batt chk, and output impedances of 50, 75, 100, and 125 ohms, and another rotary switch for 20nS, 33nS, 96nS, 360nS, 1.6uS, and 7uS pulse widths, the whole thing fits in a 6"x2"x1" box, and all the parts cost less than $20. Sure it takes more mental gymnastics to measure a wire in Vp*nS/2 rather than simply reading a convenient measurement in feet or meters, but just like the various clicks and pops of the old WECO 1013 butt set, once one develops a particular intuition for using a cheap ping box, every little idosyncracy of it can be used to extract information about the cable to which it is attached. That said, I'm not about to give up my latest Riser Bond TDR, as it's just too convenient. __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Mail - Helps protect you from nasty viruses. http://promotions.yahoo.com/new_mail 8950 From: kondrak Date: Sat Jun 19, 2004 5:06pm Subject: Re: Re: John McCain's comments on TDR's Ive got one right here I built,a long time ago using a 555. It was from an article in the old 73 amateur radio magazine. At 12:45 6/19/2004, you wrote: >John McCain mentioned his use of a 555-based ping box >with a handheld o'scope. Having owned and used >several Riser Bond and Biddle TDR's, I still have to >express a particular fondness for the 74AC14-based >ping box design on epanorama.net. In the version I >built, powered from a 9V battery via a 78L05, with one >rotary switch for off, batt chk, and output impedances >of 50, 75, 100, and 125 ohms, and another rotary >switch for 20nS, 33nS, 96nS, 360nS, 1.6uS, and 7uS >pulse widths, the whole thing fits in a 6"x2"x1" box, >and all the parts cost less than $20. Sure it takes >more mental gymnastics to measure a wire in Vp*nS/2 >rather than simply reading a convenient measurement in >feet or meters, but just like the various clicks and >pops of the old WECO 1013 butt set, once one develops >a particular intuition for using a cheap ping box, >every little idosyncracy of it can be used to extract >information about the cable to which it is attached. >That said, I'm not about to give up my latest Riser >Bond TDR, as it's just too convenient. > > > >__________________________________ >Do you Yahoo!? >Yahoo! Mail - Helps protect you from nasty viruses. >http://promotions.yahoo.com/new_mail > > > > >======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, > the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. >=================================================== TSKS >Yahoo! Groups Links > > > > 8951 From: delta Date: Mon Jun 19, 2000 1:53pm Subject: m1 counter hello everybody i don t know if my last message appear on the liste because i obtain no answer so i ask the list again : does anyone use the m1 counter from optoelectronics or another product (opto ) to inspect the rf level ? what do you think about the m1 counter ? it work from 50hz to 2. 8 ghz ? is this unit a good product to help us in the search of rf transmitter or another product like the scout 40 ? thank to everybody david from paris 8952 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Sat Jun 19, 2004 10:49pm Subject: Re: Re: John McCain's comments on TDR's I've been using the 555 based ping boxes for years, and have found it helpful to modify the design so that it drives two or more additional transistors on the output which gives you a really cheap multi-line TDR, and to use a potentiometer as the biasing resistor on the transistors instead of just a fixed value. This way you can fine tune the biasing to a better impedance match into the line you are testing, which makes all the difference in detecting mischief relative to eavesdropping devices. Get the impedance close with a fixed resistor (ie. 45 ohms), then use a ten turn pot to bring it up to between 45 and 150 ohm. Sure, I still prefer to use a Riser Bond or Tek TDR, but those little ping-boxes can be really handy what you have some special situation to work in, or when you want non-standard documentation (those of you who have seen my big four pair TDR printouts know what I am talking about). -jma At 12:45 PM 6/19/2004, R. Snyder wrote: >John McCain mentioned his use of a 555-based ping box >with a handheld o'scope. Having owned and used >several Riser Bond and Biddle TDR's, I still have to >express a particular fondness for the 74AC14-based >ping box design on epanorama.net. In the version I >built, powered from a 9V battery via a 78L05, with one >rotary switch for off, batt chk, and output impedances >of 50, 75, 100, and 125 ohms, and another rotary >switch for 20nS, 33nS, 96nS, 360nS, 1.6uS, and 7uS >pulse widths, the whole thing fits in a 6"x2"x1" box, >and all the parts cost less than $20. Sure it takes >more mental gymnastics to measure a wire in Vp*nS/2 >rather than simply reading a convenient measurement in >feet or meters, but just like the various clicks and >pops of the old WECO 1013 butt set, once one develops >a particular intuition for using a cheap ping box, >every little idosyncracy of it can be used to extract >information about the cable to which it is attached. >That said, I'm not about to give up my latest Riser >Bond TDR, as it's just too convenient. > > > >__________________________________ >Do you Yahoo!? >Yahoo! Mail - Helps protect you from nasty viruses. >http://promotions.yahoo.com/new_mail > > > > >======================================================== > TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List > "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" > > To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: > http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L > > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. > It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, > the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. > It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. >=================================================== TSKS >Yahoo! Groups Links > > > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- We Expertly Hunt Real Spies, Real Eavesdroppers, and Real Wiretappers. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 Web: http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 Email: mailto:jmatk@tscm.com ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- World Class, Professional, Ethical, and Competent Bug Sweeps, and Wiretap Detection using Sophisticated Laboratory Grade Test Equipment. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8953 From: Date: Sun Jun 20, 2004 2:31am Subject: Humor On the Lighter Side.... "How many spies,does it take to change a lightbulb? answer= "What,light bulb?" Dogpile Web Search Home Page- Joke Of The Day ---------- http://www.dogpile.com/ [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 8954 From: Steve Uhrig Date: Sat Jun 19, 2004 11:15pm Subject: Re: John McCain's comments on TDR's Once upon a midnight dreary, James M. Atkinson pondered, weak and weary: > I've been using the 555 based ping boxes for years, and have found it > helpful to modify the design so that it drives two or more additional > transistors on the output which gives you a really cheap multi-line TDR, > and to use a potentiometer as the biasing resistor on the transistors > instead of just a fixed value. A real good description of a simple ping box TDR is the one incorporated into Marty Kaiser's 1080H telephone analyzer. The simplest ideas tend to be the most brilliant. It's well worth reading everything here, not just the TDR part, just for the learning experience: http://www.martykaiser.com/1080h~1.htm Learn to use line balance, which costs pennies and is extremely effective. Steve ******************************************************************* Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 "In God we trust, all others we monitor" ******************************************************************* 8955 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Sun Jun 20, 2004 2:41am Subject: CIA TSCM Contractor Busted I have uploaded a new directory of information concerning the Wilson bust to the file space on Yahoo, and have the following analysis of the court documents turned up thus far in the case. I will add documents to the file space as they become available. Steve Wilson has repeatedly claimed to be working for the CIA, and according to official documents has claimed this numerous numerous times to federal agents. Amusingly, when he was busted his defense was that he was dealing in drugs on behalf of the CIA. The court records indicate that Wilson was engaging in a long-tern large scale indoor marijuana growing operation, and they caught him not with a couple of dozen plants, or even a hundred plants... but with over 550 plants, that a huge amount of drugs was being produced, that he had been producing it for a number of years, and was likely bringing in over a million dollars a year in cash. It appears that he was running a money laundering activity through his business called "Technical Intelligence Group" and used numerous other business names to clean his drug money proceeds. On a side note, for the last ten years or so he was using the drug money to buy up surplus test equipment and sell it to the folks in the TSCM business, which means the government is going to be coming after a whole bunch of people in the TSCM business who bought equipment from him. Remember, if the deal seems to good to be true it probably is... You can expect a number of Private Investigators to loose their licenses over this situation, but it's their own fault as they should have figured this clown out years ago when he started pouring Kool-Aid at the meetings.. Both Steve, and his wife confessed to dealing drugs, as did some of his business associates. It looks like his adult some was the drug courier, and list members will recall that this kid was the one that Steve had been bringing out with him to help on bug sweeps. They caught him with almost three dozen firearms, and he has already confessed that he was using them in his drug business. It should be noted that while he had a large number of weapons the quality of most of it was really poor, lacked decent optics, and he seemed more concerned with quantity instead of quality. Also, there does not appear to be any kind of duplicate weapons (ie. two or three of the same model), which means the guy had absolutely no clue when it came to tactical operations. The affidavits spell out that Steve had threatened to kill federal law enforcement officer, and was ready for a Waco-style shoot-out if they confronted him. The documents also spell out that they caught him with what appears to be an illegal sawed off shotguns, rifles, and an illegal silenced pistol. The ATF will likely find that some of the seized weapons had been illegally converted to full-auto. Wilson claimed that he was indigent, and was appointed a public defender, but this is curious as the guy was flush with cash, had caches of weapons and money all over his area, and assets and resources stashed for future access. Consider the amount of dope he was caught with, the amount of money that was rolling in, and will see that there is an issue of some rather significant missing money. Of course of the other hand he did file bankruptcy two years ago, and recently claimed that his business partner ripped him off for over $400,000. In the "Reasons for Detention" it mentions that Steve was planning to flee the country after the government raided his compound, but that the government moved too fast for him and arrested him before he got away. Unless he had a bunch of cash and assets stashed in another country it would not have done him much good to run away... so where are these assets? He has a private pilot's license (what drug dealers don't), he has moved over 12 times in the past 20 years, had copious businesses to launder his money, and a probable history of dealing drugs dating back since at least 1983. He has agreed to plead guilty (see the Plea Agreement), and faces between five and forty years in prison, millions of dollars in fines, and so on. He seriously complicated his sentence buy admitting the guns were used in his drug dealings, and even though he has agreed to rat-out his associates the severity of the "complicating factors" is going to end up in the government super-sizing his prison term so that he will likely be in his seventies before he sees the light of day... assuming of course that he doesn't get killed in prison. Most notable is that he turned on his own son, and showed his true colors by screwing over his own child. The documents spell out that it was his own son was the weak link, and that he became vulnerable to detection nearly two years ago when Steve Wilson got greedy and tried to pay someone $25,000 as a consulting fee to help him grow better drugs. His offer was refused, but the consultant remembered who Steve was, and where he was located. When the consultant was arrested recently and charged he immediately called upon his memory to play "let's make a deal" and recalled sufficient details to allow the authorities to hunt down Steve Wilson and secure a search warrant. The documents Mention that Steve Wilson operated under the business names of "Wilson and Associates", "Technical Intelligence Group", "Black Branch Farms", and numerous others which he would move assets , cache, equipment and such around into so as to hid his assets, and launder proceeds from drug deals. On January 25, 1993 he and his wife filed a claim that their house burned down, and collected a pay-off from the insurance company, but the court records seem to indicate the fire was a planned arson. Coincidentally, right after this Steve started dropping huge amount of money on anything even remotely involving TSCM, communications, security, etc. He got set up as a dealer of equipment and was moving a small amount here and there, but nothing significant. The documents indicate that Steve had bypassed his electric meter, and was stealing power to run his grow lights, but that he screwed up on at least one occasion and had to explain a rather hefty bill. Now the electric company is going after him for stealing tens of thousands of dollars in power over the past ten years. Wilson had a couple of run-ins with the FBI in Nov 18, 2003 after he was heard to say that "he would kill any federal officer that came onto his property"... they were not amused... and Wilson launched into his rant that he was working for the CIA. The documents reveal that in Feb 2004 Wilson had a contact with someone who was serving on the Drug Task Force, and he tried to social engineer his way into their inner circles but they were suspicious and didn't let it happen. During this contact Wilson claimed that he had infiltrated biker gangs for the CIA, and that he was a CIA Contractor.-jma -jma ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- We Expertly Hunt Real Spies, Real Eavesdroppers, and Real Wiretappers. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 381-9111 Granite Island Group Fax: 127 Eastern Avenue #291 Web: http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 Email: mailto:jmatk@tscm.com ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- World Class, Professional, Ethical, and Competent Bug Sweeps, and Wiretap Detection using Sophisticated Laboratory Grade Test Equipment. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------