From: James M. Atkinson Date: Thu Aug 14, 2003 5:52am Subject: Spy Shop Creed A wealthy old lady decided to go on a photo safari in Africa. She took her faithful pet Chihuahua along for company. One day, the Chihuahua starts chasing butterflies and before long the Chihuahua discovers that he is lost. So, wandering about, he notices a leopard heading rapidly in his direction with the obvious intention of having lunch. The Chihuahua thinks, "OK, I'm in deep trouble now! Then he noticed some bones on the ground close by, and immediately settles down to chew on the bones with his back to the approaching cat. Just as the leopard is about to leap, the Chihuahua exclaims loudly, "Boy, that was one delicious leopard. I wonder if there are any more around here." Hearing this, the leopard halts his attack in mid-stride, as a look of terror comes over him, and slinks away into the trees. "Whew," says the leopard. "That was close. That Chihuahua nearly had me." Meanwhile, a monkey who had been watching the whole scene from a nearby tree figures he can put this knowledge to good use and trade it for protection from the leopard. So, off he goes. But the Chihuahua saw him heading after the leopard with great speed, and figured that something must be up. The monkey soon catches up with the leopard, spills the beans and strikes a deal for himself with the leopard. The leopard is furious at being made a fool of and says, "Here monkey, hop on my back and see what's going to happen to that conniving canine." Now the Chihuahua sees the leopard coming with the monkey on his back, and thinks, "What am I going to do now?" But instead of running, the dog sits down with his back to his attackers, pretending he hasn't seen them yet... and just when they get close enough to hear the Chihuahua says...................... "Where's that darn monkey? I sent him off half an hour ago to bring me another leopard!" REMEMBER: IF YOU CAN'T DAZZLE THEM WITH BRILLIANCE, BAFFLE THEM WITH BULL ! -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. Atkinson Ph: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island GroupFax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@t... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "We have suffered a great loss. And in our grief and anger, we have found our mission and our moment...We will not waver, we will not tire, we will not falter and we will not fail!... George W. Bush 9/11/2001 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7654 From: Ocean Group Date: Fri Aug 15, 2003 11:12am Subject: Spy Hunters... http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2003/0811/web-fbi-08-14-03.asp By Sara Michael Aug. 14, 2003 The Justice Department's inspector general (IG) has plenty of suggestions to improve FBI security, but the law enforcement agency said it has already carried out many of them. An IG report released today outlined 21 recommendations for the FBI to improve the security of national information from espionage. At the same time, the FBI released a response, outlining several changes it has already made. Since the arrest of former FBI agent Robert Hanssen two and a half years ago, the bureau has made several security reforms to better detect espionage, including creating a central warehouse for information about people given FBI clearance, and installing a system to track unauthorized access to sensitive documents. "The FBI has already implemented many new measures, including the creation of a special Counterespionage Section to protect critical national security information, and a Penetration Unit to uncover those who would steal and sell our national security secretes to foreign agents," Attorney General John Ashcroft said in a statement. The IG recommended a central repository for derogatory information about FBI agents with access to sensitive information. Bureau officials said they have contracted with a vendor to create a data store with a single interface to enter data on clearance actions and track a person's security clearance activities. "Although we found that the FBI has taken many important steps to improve its internal security program since Hanssen's arrest...some of the most serious weaknesses still have not been fully remedied," the report states. The agency is developing tools to ensure only cleared users can get specific data. The FBI is implementing the Public Key Infrastructure Program to provide users with a digital identity. "The FBI's state-of-the-art Trilogy network will have the capability to provide a new level of security and new capabilities, such as the ability to track unauthorized access to files," the FBI said in the response to the IG report. The report recommends that the FBI track classified information. Agency officials responded that they are in the process of issuing a contract to implement improved levels of security for sensitive electronic and paper documents. Other FBI security improvements that correspond to the IG's recommendations, include: * A permanent unit that was created in May 2002 under the bureau's Counterintelligence Division, to investigate allegations of penetration into the FBI. * Certification of the FBI's Top Secret network and legacy systems to ensure the information systems. * A financial disclosure program begun in May to verify financial information from selected employees. The IG criticized the FBI for "significant, longstanding deficiencies" in internal security. Hanssen used the bureau's Automated Case File system to track sensitive espionage investigations, including references to his own name, the report said. The system, which the report says lacked strong security measures, will be replaced by the Virtual Case File system, expected to be implemented by December. --- Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free. Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com). Version: 6.0.502 / Virus Database: 300 - Release Date: 18/07/2003 7655 From: Fernando Martins Date: Sat Aug 16, 2003 5:03am Subject: Falun Gong take TV satellite http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,,2-10-1462_1402860,00.html Falun Gong take TV satellite 15/08/2003 14:08 - (SA) Beijing - Practitioners of the Falun Gong spiritual movement commandeered China's major television satellite twice this week, the Chinese government said on Friday, reporting the latest satellite hacking by the outlawed group. Sino Satellite, known commonly as SinoSat, was "taken over by illegal TV signals" transmitted by Falun Gong at 21:05 on Tuesday and at 20:23 on Wednesday, the Ministry of Information Industry said. The action prevented Chinese audiences from watching programmes on China Central Television, China Education Television and 10 provincial stations, the government said. Though the government's Xinhua News Agency did not detail what programs were aired during the disruptions, Falun Gong - in hacking activities that began early last year - typically replaces regular fare with messages about its movement and the abuses it says it endures. Falun Gong representatives in the United States acknowledge their hacking activities and say it is the only way they can circulate their message within China. "(Falun Gong) practitioners in China have discovered a non-violent means - one that harms neither people nor equipment - to break through the information blockade and let the people see programs that openly show the human rights violations happening in their own country," Falun Gong spokesman Erping Zhang said last week in a release posted on the group's Web site. The Chinese government banned Falun Gong in 1999 as a threat to public safety and considers it an "evil cult." 7656 From: Steve Uhrig Date: Sat Aug 16, 2003 7:48am Subject: NY PI Conference/Seminar Reposted from the Maryland PI list for anyone who is interested. I am *not* endorsing this event primarily because I believe erroneous credentials are listed for one of the speakers. The organization is not at fault; they repeat what they are given. The organization certainly is professional and ethical. ... Steve ============ The Associated Licensed Detectives of New York State will hold a one- day intensive seminar Saturday, September 20, 2003 at the beautiful Canandaigua Inn-On-The-Lake, Canandaigua, New York. All private investigators and security firms are welcome to attend, including those outside of New York. This seminar will cover such topics as writing effective security surveys, how to avoid legal pitfalls as a private investigator or security firm operator, compliance auditing, corporate due diligence, risk management and the latest information on New York and Federal legislation and compliance issues affecting the investigative and security industries. Registration fee: $90.00 includes 2-hour welcome open bar Friday evening Sept 19th and Continental breakfast, Seminar, luncheon and handouts on Saturday Sept 20th. (After Sept 8th registration fee is $100.) There is an optional Saturday evening dinner with one-hour open bar at additional cost of $40.00. Speakers are: William Dunn, Esq. - General Counsel for Command Security, managing licensing, risk management and compliance in multiple states, Board member of the National Association of Security Companies, and served as NYPD Lieutenant Detective Commander, Bronx and managed fiscal affairs, integrity and contract compliance in Management Information Services Division. Bruce H. Hulme, CFE - NCISS past President and Board member and ALDONYS Legislative Chairman, "Spotlight" Editor and Past President, founder Special Investigations, Inc., and author of chapter "The FCRA and Corporate Investigations" in the book "Corporate Investigations" published by Lawyers and Judges Publishing Co., 2002. Anthony J. Luizzo, PhD, CFE - Founder and Past President of New York City Chapter of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners and Past President of the Society of Professional Investigators with over 38 years law enforcement and security/safety administration, co-author of "Fraud Auditing: A Complete Guide, published by the Foundation for Accounting Education, and founder of LC Security and Accufacts Preemployment Screening. John D. McCann, CFE - Founder of McCann International, counter- intelligence specialist, lectured at Yale and Rice University on intelligence and covert operations, authored book and numerous articles on compliance auditing for security operations and threat assessments, and adjunct instructor Scotti School in Boston. For Hotel reservations call direct to Canandaigua Inn for discounted rate $109 per room at 1-800-228-2801. (Mention ALDONYS and make your reservations now for the reduced price rate) This rate is only in effect for Friday and/or Saturday stays. Make seminar conference checks/money orders payable to: ALDONYS, Inc. c/o Michael Hymanson, Treasurer Pan American Investigation 76 Mamaroneck Ave. White Plains, NY 10601 For credit card payment or questions call Mike Hymanson at 914 949 1888, or for updates and/or any changes concerning seminar contact Conference Co- Chairs Theresa Balfe at 518 765 5537 (theresapi@a...)or Richard Ingraham at 585 415 0505 (peye@r...) or go to www.aldonys.org ================== ******************************************************************* Steve Uhrig, SWS Security, Maryland (USA) Mfrs of electronic surveillance equip mailto:Steve@s... website http://www.swssec.com tel +1+410-879-4035, fax +1+410-836-1190 "In God we trust, all others we monitor" ******************************************************************* 7657 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Sat Aug 16, 2003 10:14am Subject: On the Clothing issue... On the Clothing issue... Personally, I always dress like the CEO or one of the vice presidents at the place I am visiting, or by default wear a very conservative suit. In hospitals, academia, and research facilities I change to match what the doctors or senior scientists are wearing. Of course I always bring several changes of clothing so I can "match up or down", but also to give me something to change into when/if I crawl around in the ceiling. My "TSCM Wardrobe" starts with a dark very conservative suit (I have several dozen) with a white oxford shirt (you can never have enough of these), a dark paisley or similar tie (but a bunch each month), and black shoes. (This is my executive interface or VP outfit). I good quality CONSERVATIVE suit will only cost a few hundred bucks at J.C. Penny's or Sears, but Brooks Brothers also has nice clothes. NEVER buy just one suit, but instead buy two identical jackets, and four or six pair of matching slacks. This is important as the slacks will always wear out faster than the suit. The next step down is tan dockers/slacks, blue oxford, tan shoes, and a dark usually blue tie. Of course the tan trousers are only used in-season. I usually bring along a snappy blue blazer if it would be appropriate. (This is my researcher/MD or Casual Friday outfit) Below that is a pair of black dockers or slacks, blue or white oxford shirt, muted tone tie, black shoes, etc. The shoes can be swapped out for black sneakers when I start going up on a ladder. (This is my "crawling around on the floor", and physical inspection clothing). This is suitable for almost all elements of the sweep EXCEPT those where you risk personal injury... or for cases where your will be in mahogany row (in which case you will wear a suit). Then of course we have the popular blue jeans, polo/Izod shirt/T-Shirt, heavy boots, etc for when I have to work in a basement, attic, suspended ceiling, steam tunnel, man hole, and so on (hip high wadders are optional). Below that is my "climbers outfit" which I use when I have to use a cherry picker, hang off a pole, open access boxes (off-site) or otherwise look like an outside plant person. This usually includes a pair of jeans, a heavy flannel shirt, T-shirt or turtle-neck under that, climbers gloves, heavy boots, climbers belt, tool belt, climbers chaps, and gaff sets. I save the NINJA outfits and military style clothing for Halloween. -jma -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. Atkinson Ph: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island GroupFax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@t... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "We have suffered a great loss. And in our grief and anger, we have found our mission and our moment...We will not waver, we will not tire, we will not falter and we will not fail!... George W. Bush 9/11/2001 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7658 From: Date: Sun Aug 17, 2003 11:57am Subject: File - mission.txt TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List Dedicated to TSCM specialists engaging in expert technical and analytical research for the detection, nullification, and isolation of eavesdropping devices, wiretaps, bugging devices, technical surveillance penetrations, technical surveillance hazards, and physical security weaknesses. This also includes bug detection, bug sweep, and wiretap detection services. Special emphasis is given to detecting and countering espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign intelligence services against the United States Government, United States corporations, establishments, and citizens. The list includes technical discussion regarding the design and construction of SCIF facilities, Black Chambers, and Screen Rooms. This list is also for discussing DIAM 50-3, NSA-65, and DCID 1/21, 1/22 compliance. The primary goal and mission of this list is to "raise the bar" and increase the level of professionalism present within the TSCM business. The secondary goal of this list is to increase the quality and effectiveness of our efforts so that we give spies and eavesdroppers no quarter, and to neutralize all of their espionage efforts. This mailing list is moderated by James M. Atkinson and sponsored by Granite Island Group as a public service to the TSCM, Counter Intelligence, and technical security community. 7659 From: Date: Sun Aug 17, 2003 11:57am Subject: File - Gold List The current version of this list may be found at: http://www.tscm.com/goldlist.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Recommended U.S. TSCM Firms The following is a list of private TSCM firms who specialize in "bug sweeps" and wiretap detection and all of whom have legitimate TSCM training, credentials, and equipment (all are very well respected within the industry). While most TSCM specialists are available for travel outside of a specific geographic area they tend to avoid such engagements, or will limited the services to vulnerability analysis, pre-construction assistance, non-instrumented inspections, simple RF checks, in-place monitoring, or limited TSCM services involving only a briefcase sized in-place monitoring system (such as a single spectrum analyzer, MSS, Eagle, ScanLock, OSCOR, SPECTRE, ROSE, or similar system). These private TSCM firms tend to operate in a specific geographic area limited to a few hundred miles (usually within a four to six hour automobile drive). However, all of the TSCM firms listed here are available for travel anywhere in the United States or the World on short notice, but only provide limited services when operating outside of their normal coverage area. This limited coverage area is due to the logistics involved in transporting hundreds and often thousands of pounds of sophisticated, highly sensitive electronic instruments, equipment and tools. Bug sweeps and wiretap detection involves the use of ladders, pole climbing equipment, LAN analyzers, X-ray systems, large antennas and other equipment which is not easily transported by airplane. TSCM firms also tend to restrict their operations to a specific geographic area to facilitate an expert level of knowledge regarding the RF environment, construction methods used, community zoning, population demographics, civil engineering, aeronautic or maritime facilities, local military bases, and related areas. Knowledge of such regional information is critical for a successful TSCM project. The TSCM specialist must also have an intimate knowledge of the telephone systems, engineering methods, fiber optics, major cable locations, central office switches, test numbers, and related communications infrastructure present or being used in an area (which tends to be very regional). An understanding of what types of eavesdropping devices, methods, and frequencies are being used in an area is also important, as is a knowledge of what type of surveillance equipment is being sold within that region (and other areas). The TSCM Procedural and Protocols Guides used by a specialist also tend to be based on specific issues and variables present in that specific geographic area. On a more interesting note, many of these firms are located in, or near major maritime port cities. The heaviest concentrations are around major cities on the East and West coasts with a very limited presence in the Mid-West, Great Plains, and Rockies. If you are in the Mid-West, Great Plains, or Rockies area you would need to engage a TSCM firm from one of the major port cities. For example customers in Chicago, St. Louis, Memphis, Denver, Salt Lake City, Minneapolis, Billings, etc. would need to fly a TSCM specialist in from Boston, New York, Washington DC, Los Angles, Lexington, or Seattle. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Please be patient when contacting these firms, as if they are out serving a client they may not be able to return your call for several hours. Rates generally are non-negotiable and reflect the cost of the sweep practitioner's time, investment in equipment acquisition and maintenance, several weeks of in-service training a year, travel, administrative and communications time and expense to coordinate the sweep and written report, and a fair profit for their services. It is very unwise to shop for sweeps by using price as a criteria as it only invites getting ripped off. Legitimate TSCM professionals are not interested in, nor will then engage in negotiating for a lower price. When you contact persons on this list, you are talking with someone in the same league as an attorney or surgeon, not a salesman. In fact most of the people listed on this page have more time in their specialized training than do most attorneys or medical professionals. Anything beyond an initial phone call usually will be billable time. Attorneys and doctors don't consult for free, and neither do legitimate TSCM specialists. If a potential client calls with a long list of questions not pertaining directly to hiring the practitioner, or wants to know how to do his own sweep, or wants to know how to use the sweep kit he purchased on his own, expect to pay an hourly rate in advance for consulting services. If you are considering engaging (or have already engaged) a TSCM firm and they are not listed in the following directory you would do well to immediately ask some awkward questions. It is also important you understand that legitimate services by a competent TSCM firm rarely start at less then several thousand dollars for even a basic sweep. Keep in mind that there only a small number of legitimate and competent TSCM counterintelligence specialists or "Bug Sweepers" in the U.S. private sector. Legitimate TSCM firms are in very high demand, hard to find, and expensive; so be patient when trying to find one to help you. Also, the firms listed on this page are not attorneys and cannot tell you whether it is legal or illegal for you to monitor your own phones. Always call a competent licensed attorney for legal advice. Without exception, no one listed here performs eavesdropping services or sells surveillance equipment to any other than government agencies AND WILL NOT REFER YOU TO ANYONE WHO DOES. When you contact any of the following firms please mention that you saw them listed on this web site. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ All of New England, Upstate New York, and the Boston Metropolitan Area (MA, RI, CT, VT, NH, ME, New York State including Long Island, and some of New Jersey) Available on a limited basis to cover any location within 1000 miles of Boston. James M. Atkinson Granite Island Group 127 Eastern Avenue #291 Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 (978) 546-3803 Telephone URL: http://www.tscm.com/ E-mail: jmatk@t... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Stamford, Connecticut Metropolitan Area (also, Manhattan, Long Island, and New Jersey) Sam Daskam Information Security Associates, Inc. 38 Settlers Trail Stamford, CT 06903 (203) 329-8387 Telephone URL: http://www.isa-tscm.com/ E-mail:sales@i... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Norwalk, and Lower Fairfield Country Area (also, Manhattan, Long Island, Philadelphia, and New Jersey) Rob Muessel TSCM Technical Services 11 Bayberry Lane Norwalk, CT 06851 (203) 354-9040 Telephone URL: http://www.tscmtech.com/ E-mail:rmuessel@t... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Greater Philadelphia and Harrisburg Metropolitan Area (also, serving South-Eastern and Central Pennsylvania) Bob Motzer RCM and Associates 609 Sandra Lane Phoenixville, PA 19460 (888) 990-6265 Telephone E-mail: 1RCM@M... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Washington DC and Baltimore Metropolitan Area (also, Virginia, Delaware, and Pennsylvania) Steve Uhrig SWS Security 1300 Boyd Road Street, MD 21154-1836 (410) 879-4035 Telephone URL: http://www.swssec.com/ E-mail: steve@s... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Houston, Dallas, Austin, and Galveston (also, Gulf Coast of Texas and Louisiana) Rick Udovich Communication Security, Inc. 2 Shadow Lane Bay City, TX 77414 (979) 244-4920 Telephone URL: http://www.bugsweep.com/ E-mail: rjudo@s... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Atlanta Metropolitan Area, Southeastern US (also, AL, FL, GA, NC, SC, TN) Buzz Benson Executive World Services, Inc. P.O. Box 33 Braselton, Georgia 30517-0033 (678) 316-7002 Telephone URL: http://www.executiveworldservices.com/ E-mail: sales@e... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Lexington KY Metropolitan Area (also, Louisville, Cincinnati, and Central Midwest) Bill G. Rhoads Intelcom, Inc. 121 Prosperous Place, Suite 4B Lexington, KY 40509 (859) 263-9425 Telephone E-mail: bgr101@a... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Michigan and Surrounding Area (also, Indiana, Ohio, and Northern Midwest Region) Chad Margita Off Duty Security 18301 Eight Mile Rd, Suite 214 Eastpointe, MI 48021 (586) 774-1675 Telephone E-mail: offdutysecurity@c... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Washington State and Seattle WA Metropolitan Area (also, Oregon, and the Pacific North West) Gordon Mitchell Future Focus, Inc. P.O. Box 2547 Woodinville, WA 98072 (888) BUG-KILR Telephone URL: http://www.bug-killer.com/ E-mail: enquiries@b... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ San Francisco and all of Northern California (also, Silicon Valley Area) William Bennett Walsingham Associates, Inc. P.O. Box 4264 San Rafael, CA 94913 (415) 492-1594 Telephone E-mail: walsingham@c... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7660 From: Ocean Group Date: Sun Aug 17, 2003 9:28pm Subject: On the Clothing issue... Simplified as: High Income Sweep: Suit Medium Income Sweep: Dockers and decks Low Income Sweep: Workman's gear :) ************************************** Message: 3 Date: Sat, 16 Aug 2003 11:14:13 -0400 From: "James M. Atkinson" Subject: On the Clothing issue... On the Clothing issue... Personally, I always dress like the CEO or one of the vice presidents at the place I am visiting, or by default wear a very conservative suit. In hospitals, academia, and research facilities I change to match what the doctors or senior scientists are wearing. Of course I always bring several changes of clothing so I can "match up or down", but also to give me something to change into when/if I crawl around in the ceiling. My "TSCM Wardrobe" starts with a dark very conservative suit (I have several dozen) with a white oxford shirt (you can never have enough of these), a dark paisley or similar tie (but a bunch each month), and black shoes. (This is my executive interface or VP outfit). I good quality CONSERVATIVE suit will only cost a few hundred bucks at J.C. Penny's or Sears, but Brooks Brothers also has nice clothes. NEVER buy just one suit, but instead buy two identical jackets, and four or six pair of matching slacks. This is important as the slacks will always wear out faster than the suit. The next step down is tan dockers/slacks, blue oxford, tan shoes, and a dark usually blue tie. Of course the tan trousers are only used in-season. I usually bring along a snappy blue blazer if it would be appropriate. (This is my researcher/MD or Casual Friday outfit) Below that is a pair of black dockers or slacks, blue or white oxford shirt, muted tone tie, black shoes, etc. The shoes can be swapped out for black sneakers when I start going up on a ladder. (This is my "crawling around on the floor", and physical inspection clothing). This is suitable for almost all elements of the sweep EXCEPT those where you risk personal injury... or for cases where your will be in mahogany row (in which case you will wear a suit). Then of course we have the popular blue jeans, polo/Izod shirt/T-Shirt, heavy boots, etc for when I have to work in a basement, attic, suspended ceiling, steam tunnel, man hole, and so on (hip high wadders are optional). Below that is my "climbers outfit" which I use when I have to use a cherry picker, hang off a pole, open access boxes (off-site) or otherwise look like an outside plant person. This usually includes a pair of jeans, a heavy flannel shirt, T-shirt or turtle-neck under that, climbers gloves, heavy boots, climbers belt, tool belt, climbers chaps, and gaff sets. I save the NINJA outfits and military style clothing for Halloween. -jma --- Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free. Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com). Version: 6.0.502 / Virus Database: 300 - Release Date: 18/07/2003 7661 From: Lawrence Dillard Date: Sat Aug 16, 2003 3:30pm Subject: PE exam Louisiana Professional Engineering Exam: 1. Calculate the smallest limb diameter on a persimmon tree that will support a 10-pound possum. 2. Which of the following cars will rust out the quickest when placed on blocks in your front yard? a. 66 Ford Fairlane b. 69 Chevrolet c. Chevelle d. 64 Pontiac GTO 3. If your uncle builds a still that operates at a capacity of 20 gallons of shine per hour, how many car radiators are necessary to condense the product? 4. A woodcutter has a chain saw that operates at 2700 rpm. The density of the pine trees in a plot to be harvested is 470 per acre. The plot is 2.3 acres in size. The average tree diameter is 14 inches. How many Budweisers will it take to cut the trees? 5. If every old refrigerator in the state vented a charge of R-12 simultaneously, what would be the decrease in the ozone layer? 6. A front porch is constructed of 2x8 pine on 24-inch centers with a field rock foundation. The span is 8 feet and the porch length is 16 feet. The porch floor is 1-inch rough sawn pine. When the porch collapses, how many hound dogs will be killed? 7. A man in Ozone, Tennessee, owns a house and 3.7 acres of land in a hollow with an average slope of 15%. The man has 5 children. Can each of the children place a mobile home on the man's land? 8. A 20 ton truck is overloaded and proceeding 900 yards down a steep grade on a secondary road at 45 mph. The brakes fail. Given the average traffic on secondary roads, what are the chances that it will strike a vehicle that has a muffler? 9. A coalmine operated a NFPA Class 1, Division 2 Hazardous Area. The mine employs 120 miners per shift. A gas warning is issued at the beginning of 3rd shift. How many cartons of unfiltered Camels will be smoked during the shift? 10. At a reduction in gene pool variability rate of 7.5% per generation, how long will it take a town that has been bypassed by the interstate to breed a country-western singer? (From Louisiana Legionnaire-Spring 2003 edition.) 7662 From: zack Date: Mon Aug 18, 2003 8:36am Subject: Test Testing to see if I am able to post. Have had e-mail problems. 7663 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Tue Aug 19, 2003 3:39pm Subject: Re: NY PI Conference/Seminar [Semper Boolshitis] Semper Boolshitis We have a problem, and I don't know how to tactfully handle the issue, but suffice to say... John McCann is not what he claims, and a number of his claimed credentials are complete bullshit. He claims to be an instructor with the Scotti school, and yet the Scotti School says that his claim is complete bullshit. According to them he never attended their instructor course, never took their executive protection course, never took advanced driving classes, never took any of their firearms courses, and never completed anything more then a basic 2-3 day limo driver driving course (so, just how could he be teaching?) I am very familiar with Scotti as over the years I have attended virtually every course they teach and actually became CERTIFIED as an instructor several years ago (and have the paperwork, diploma, textbook, course manual, etc to prove it... and have no problem producing appropriate documentation). I should note that when the Scotti School found out about John's claims, they sent him several cease and desist orders (they were, and are still really pissed). A few days later John modified his website to remove his claim of being an instructor for the Scotti School, but every now and then he mentions it in a new forum such as someone elses website, or in a situation like this trade show. The bottom line is that John's claims to be an instructor for the Scotti School is a considerable falsehood. The funny thing is that he found out about the Scotti school through my website (I had a link to Scotti), and he dropped my name all though the class trying to convince other people in the class that he was working with or was associated with me (which he was not). One the one hand he claims, or has claimed on his and other web sites to be a licensed private investigator, and yet the State of New York says that is false and that they have no record of either him or his company being issued such a permit or licence (at least in recent history). An example of such a claim may be found at: http://www.lioninvestigationacademy.com/staffphotos.htm (the page has just recently been taken down) The State of New York also pointed out that it is a felony to claim to be a licensed PI in NY and not actually have such a CURRENT license (cough-cough). If course this is yet another major falsehood. However, according to others in the profession; it is claimed that several years years ago, John McCann submitted an article to Police & Security News. They published the article under his name, and he really played up the publicity, ran ads, etc. The article turned out later to be 100% plagiarized, word for word, from an obscure source. Several people in the business caught him red-handed and notified the editor, and he hasn't tried to get published since. OK, he claims to be a TSCM expert (or 30 years)... If so why has he have virtually nothing published under his name? he has not written TSCM articles, has not really published anything concerning TSCM on his website, has never published any white papers on TSCM, never written any articles on TSCM, and so on. On the one hand he brags about being published, and yet on the other hand there is nothing in print relative to TSCM (of which he claims to be an expert). If we look at the bio in his book (published by Paladin Press) nowhere does it mention he has any experience or expertise with TSCM, basic electronics, counter intelligence, counter espionage, in-grown toenails, or anything even remotely resembling the TSCM business, electronics, academic work or any technical credentials of any sort. When the book was published John was clambering for credibility, so if he was doing TSCM then, why didn't he put it on his bio? I mean after all, he claims to have 20 or 30 years in the business, and yet his bio at that time fails to mention such a credential or background. His bio in the book also fails to mention anything concerning his technical skills, or even the slightest technical capability, course, class, or education. John has previously stated to both me and others that he works for the CIA, how the FBI pays him to install bugs for them, how he is close personal friends with Dick Marcinko, how he trains with SEALs, how he knows everybody at Quantico and so on ad nauseam. He is a bit of an chain-smoking espionage groupie, and is essentially living on his wives money while living out his fantasies pretending to be James Bond (ie: Walter Mitty). He surrounds himself with spook mystique, movie posters, books on espionage, CIA coffee mugs, and so on yet he served only a token amount of time in the Marines, never held a Top Secret security clearance, and has very limited technical skills, background, or training. He joins any organization and collects paper from anyone who accepts his membership dues, but given his reputation and considerable falsehoods he would appear to bring serious discredit to such organizations. John is absolutely obsessed with who is a narc or fed and "who is cool". He is constantly looking over his shoulder, constantly looking for informants or agents, and constantly trying to manipulate others. According to him, the government is stalking him, the black helicopters are landing this weekend, the DEA and FBI has his phones taped, etc, etc, ad nauseam. This in and of itself should tell you something... when someone is overly paranoid, and un-naturally suspicious of others something is seriously amiss. John is rude, abusive, and tries to be a grand manipulator. He tries to get grand-fathered into everything that involves credentials, and expects to get special treatment just because he spent a couple of years in the Marine Corps (Semper Fi, my ass... more like semper bull-shitis). He holds himself out as a spy, and an expert on espionage who in fact commits, and has admitted to corporate espionage. On the one hand he will pretends to kiss your ass, and yet on the other he will stab you in the back in a heartbeat just to make himself feel more important and to fluff himself up (ditto for a few others). He is the only person I have ever met (who has told me in person) that he shows up to do a bug sweep wearing a full battle dress uniform (BDU), complete with a rappel harness, belt, K-Bar knives, semi-automatic pistol in a shoulder holster, and combat boots Of course the Halliburton briefcases, and rack mounted toys from Radio Shack and Super-circuits look impressive to a non-technical person, but instead they amuse those actually performing real TSCM services. He buys flashy toys totally inappropriate for TSCM, and dresses them up in fancy cases to impress his clients. He goes to great pains to conceal that the equipment is amateur toys, and goes out of his way to paint the stuff to look spookier. Sure you can put a $75 dollar scanner in a $400 case and scratch out all of the Radio Shack markings, but it's STILL a consumer toy and not a professional tool. Ditto for dressing up a few hundred pounds of ten year old scrap test equipment that you can buy by the pound. Sure he has some fancy toys, but think for a moment... are they really relevant to TSCM... or for illicit eavesdropping? He does possess a fairly elaborate metal working shop which he seems to have inherited from his father, and he does bend some pretty sheet metal good tin bender. This allows him to make up some impressive and functional packaging and racking and stacking. While his cases may look pretty they do not appears to have been used for any actual work (hint: a TSCM'er who actually DOES sweeps will scratch, scuff, and dent their cases... not have ones that look brand new, almost like they never went into the field). In my opinion (and based on my direct contact over several years with John), I feel that he is absolute poison to the industry, discredits those organizations who allow him to join, discredits people who associate with him, and is a destructive influence to those who he comes in contact with. I realized what he was up to several years back, and have since distanced myself from him (as have others). I also feel that he is just a laughing stock, and a bit of an inside joke in the TSCM business, and his antics makes him look like and even bigger ass-clown. But then of course, your mileage may vary. Also, I should mention that John is extremely envious of others in the profession, he secretly lusts to be like them, would give his left testicle to have equipment like others have, and goes off on a tantrum like a little girl when anyone questions his credentials. One of his favorite games is to have one of his friends vet him in to an organization, then he vets them into some other organization in return, and so on. Semper Boolshitis, It really quite sad, If any other list members have comments on this guy, please feel free to post them to this list. -jma At 8:48 AM -0400 8/16/03, Steve Uhrig wrote: >Reposted from the Maryland PI list for anyone who is interested. > >I am *not* endorsing this event primarily because I believe erroneous >credentials are listed for one of the speakers. The organization is >not at fault; they repeat what they are given. > >The organization certainly is professional and ethical. > >... Steve > >============ > >The Associated Licensed Detectives of New York State will hold a one- >day intensive seminar Saturday, September 20, 2003 at the beautiful >Canandaigua Inn-On-The-Lake, Canandaigua, New York. All private >investigators and security firms are welcome to attend, including >those outside of New York. This seminar will cover such topics as >writing effective security surveys, how to avoid legal pitfalls as a >private investigator or security firm operator, compliance auditing, >corporate due diligence, risk management and the latest information >on New York and Federal legislation and compliance issues affecting >the investigative and security industries. > >Registration fee: $90.00 includes 2-hour welcome open bar Friday >evening Sept 19th and Continental breakfast, Seminar, luncheon and >handouts on Saturday Sept 20th. (After Sept 8th registration fee is >$100.) There is an optional Saturday evening dinner with one-hour >open bar at additional cost of $40.00. > >Speakers are: > >William Dunn, Esq. - General Counsel for Command Security, managing >licensing, risk management and compliance in multiple states, Board >member of the National Association of Security Companies, and served >as NYPD Lieutenant Detective Commander, Bronx and managed fiscal >affairs, integrity and contract compliance in Management Information >Services Division. > >Bruce H. Hulme, CFE - NCISS past President and Board member and >ALDONYS Legislative Chairman, "Spotlight" Editor and Past President, >founder Special Investigations, Inc., and author of chapter "The FCRA >and Corporate Investigations" in the book "Corporate Investigations" >published by Lawyers and Judges Publishing Co., 2002. > >Anthony J. Luizzo, PhD, CFE - Founder and Past President of New York >City Chapter of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners and Past >President of the Society of Professional Investigators with over 38 >years law enforcement and security/safety administration, co-author >of "Fraud Auditing: A Complete Guide, published by the Foundation for >Accounting Education, and founder of LC Security and Accufacts >Preemployment Screening. > >John D. McCann, CFE - Founder of McCann International, counter- >intelligence specialist, lectured at Yale and Rice University on >intelligence and covert operations, authored book and numerous >articles on compliance auditing for security operations and threat >assessments, and adjunct instructor Scotti School in Boston. > >For Hotel reservations call direct to Canandaigua Inn for discounted >rate $109 per room at 1-800-228-2801. (Mention ALDONYS and make your >reservations now for the reduced price rate) This rate is only in >effect for Friday and/or Saturday stays. > >Make seminar conference checks/money orders payable to: > >ALDONYS, Inc. c/o Michael Hymanson, Treasurer Pan American >Investigation 76 Mamaroneck Ave. White Plains, NY 10601 For credit >card payment or questions call Mike Hymanson at 914 949 1888, or for >updates and/or any changes concerning seminar contact Conference Co- >Chairs Theresa Balfe at 518 765 5537 (theresapi@a...)or Richard >Ingraham at 585 415 0505 (peye@r...) or go to >www.aldonys.org > >================== -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. Atkinson Ph: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island GroupFax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@t... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "We have suffered a great loss. And in our grief and anger, we have found our mission and our moment...We will not waver, we will not tire, we will not falter and we will not fail!... George W. Bush 9/11/2001 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7664 From: Date: Tue Aug 19, 2003 1:51pm Subject: CWA Charges Verizon and Two Officers with Wiretap Law Violation CWA Charges Verizon and Two Officers with Wiretap Law Violation for Spying on Union Conference Call With Reporters WASHINGTON, Aug. 19 /PRNewswire/ -- The Communications Workers of America today filed suit against Verizon Communications, Verizon Wireless (Cellco Partnership) and two Verizon officers charging that the company officials violated federal anti-wiretapping laws by accessing an invitation-only CWA teleconference with reporters on August 13. The complaint, filed in federal district court in the District of New Jersey, charges that Verizon Senior Vice President for Investor Relations Thomas Bartlett and Executive Director of Investor Relations Dominic Di Bucci violated Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act through their unauthorized monitoring of the call. CWA had invited 27 specific journalists to hear about the union's negotiations with Verizon as well as plans by the AFL-CIO to support CWA members' bargaining efforts. The conference call was led by AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Richard Trumka and CWA Executive Vice President Larry Cohen, and reporters were invited to ask questions of the two leaders. After the call, CWA learned that the two Verizon executives had gained access to the toll-free call-in number, which had been provided privately to the invited reporters, and listened in without announcing their presence, subsequently reporting the content of the conference to other company officials. "This is an outrageous throwback to the old days of labor turmoil before the Wagner Act of 1935 finally outlawed the practice of management infiltration and spying on union activities," said CWA President Morton Bahr. "Such behavior by senior management officials at a critical time in our negotiations is not helpful to the process. It's an insult to all of our members at Verizon and cannot be tolerated." The lawsuit seeks a declaration that the Verizon officials' actions violated the law, that Bartlett and Di Bucci be enjoined from further such conduct, and that the union be awarded punitive damages. SOURCE Communications Workers of America CO: Communications Workers of America; CWA; Verizon Communications; Verizon Wireless ST: District of Columbia SU: LAW LBR Web site: http://www.cwa-union.org http://www.prnewswire.com 08/19/2003 16:53 EDT [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 7665 From: Dragos Ruiu Date: Wed Aug 20, 2003 2:38am Subject: Pacific Security (pacsec.jp) Call for Papers (Japanese Below) CALL FOR PAPERS PacSec.JP (Pacific Security) http://pacsec.jp Announcing the opportunity to submit papers for the PacSec/core03 network security training conference. The conference will be held November 6/7th in Tokyo. The conference focuses on emerging information security tutorials - it will be a bridge between the international information security technology community and Japan. Please make your paper proposal submissions before Aug 30 2003. Slides for the papers must be submitted by Oct 7th 2003. The conference is November 6th and 7th 2003, presenters need to be available in the days before to meet with interpreters. A number of invited papers have been confirmed, but a limited number of speaking slots are still available. The conference is responsible for travel and accomodations for the speakers. If you have a proposal for a tutorial session then please email a synopsis of the material and your biography and papers, speaking background to core03@p.... Tutorials are one hour in length, but with simultaneous translation should be approximately 45 minutes in English, or Japanese. Only slides will be needed for the October paper deadline, full text does not have to be submitted. The Pacific Security (PacSec) conference consists of tutorials on technical details about current issues, innovative techniques and best practices in the information security realm. The audiences are a multi-national mix of professionals involved on a daily basis with security work: security product vendors, programmers, security officers, and network administrators. We give preference to technical details and education for a technical audience. The conference itself is a single track series of presentations in a lecture theater environment. The presentations offer speakers the opportunity to showcase on-going research and collaborate with peers while educating and highlighting advancements in security products and techniques. The focus is on innovation, tutorials, and education instead of overt product pitches. Some commercial content is tolerated, but it needs to be backed up by a technical presenter - either giving a valuable tutorial and best practices instruction or detailing significant new technology in the products. Paper proposals should consist of the following information: 1) Presenter, and geographical location (country of origin/passport) and contact info (e-mail, postal address, phone, fax). 2) Employer and/or affiliations. 3) Brief biography, list of publications and papers. 4) Any significant presentation and educational experience/background. 5) Topic synopsis, Proposed paper title, and a one paragraph description. 6) Reason why this material is innovative or significant or an important tutorial. 7) Optionally, any samples of prepared material or outlines ready. Please forward the above information to core03@p... to be considered for placement on the speaker roster. 講演論文募集 PacSec.JP (Pacific Security) http://pacsec.jp 現在、PacSec/core03 ネットワーク・セキュリティ　トレーニング・カンファレ ンス開催に向けて、論文の叭付けを行っております。同カンファレンスは、2003 年11月6步(木)、7步(金)の二步間にわたり東京で開催され、主に先端情 セキュリティの チュートリアルを重点的に取り上げます。また、步本と情 セキュリティ技術の 国際社会を結ぶ「 け橋」になることを目的とねています。 カンファレンスにおける講演論文発表の申ね込み叭付けの め切りは、2003年8月30 步(土)とさせていた きます。スライドの最終提出步は、2003年10月7步(火)です。 当步、通訳が必要な方は、カンファレス開催步の数步前に、打合わせのため多少お時 間を用意ねて く必要があります。 招待参 者による論文は多数確定済みですが、当步の講演 においては多少の予備 がある為、現在講演者を募集ねています。講演步の交通費および宿泊等設備 は、主催者側で責任を持って手配致ねます。チュートリアル・セッションでの講演を 希望される方は、講演 テリアル、論文の内容、及び経歴、講演経験の概要を、 core03@p... 迄、電子メールにてお送り下さい。 講演は、一人あたり1時間を予定ねておりますが、同時通訳が必要な 合、 英 または步本 による講演時間は、約45分間とお考え下さい。 尚、スライドの め切りは10月7步(火)とさせて いておりますが、その際に論文の 全文を提出ねていた く必要はございません。 Pacific Security (PacSec) カンファレンスは、情 セキュリティに関する細か い技術や、最近のセキュリティ問題、斬新的なテクニック、及び最も適切と 思われるセキュリティ対策などについて、チュートリアル形式による講演により 構成されています。カンファレンスの参 者は、常にセキュリティと関わる環境にあり、 その分 における専門家達であります。またその国籍や文化も様々です。 セキュリティ製品のベンダー、ロログラ ー、セキュリティ・オフィサー、 ネットワーク管理者など、大変幅広いジャンルの人々が参 される関係上、 講演内容は、技術的に内容の深いもの、または技術者にとっても有益となる内容を 優先させて きます。 カンファレンスの構成は、それ れ独自のロレゼンエーションを講義形式で行います。 講師は、そのロレゼンテーションを通ねて、現在進行中の 究の紹介、セキュリティ製品や 技術製品における更なる教育、向上について多くのエキスパート達と情 交換をする を持つ事が 出来るのです。 ロレゼンテーションは、 白に特定の製品を宣伝するような内容ではなく、 技術革新、チュートリアル、教育的なものに重点をおいて下さい。 商用的なコンテンツがいくらか含まれていても差ね支えはありませんが、その際は、 その製品に関する、貴重なチュートリアルおよび最も適切なセキュリティ対策の説 や、 重大な新技術の詳細などで裏づけをする必要があります。 論文の机上案には、下記の情 を必ず入れるようにねて下さい。 1) 講師情 、所在地（出生国/パスポートに記入されている国籍）、および連絡 先 (電子メールアドレス、住所、電話番号、FAX番号) 2) 勤務先、所 団体 3) 簡単な経歴、出版物および論文のリスト 4) 大きなロレゼンテーションおよび講師経験/経歴 5) 話題の概要、論文の表題 (案) 、および内容の簡単な説 (一段落にまとめたもの) 6) 発表する題材が、革新的また重大な意味を持っている、あるいは重要な チュートリアルである理由 7) 任意で、用意ねた資料または要歨のサンロル カンファレンス講師審査の参考にさせていた きますので、上記 目を core03@p... 迄お送り下さい。 -- pgpkey http://dragos.com/ kyxpgp 7666 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Wed Aug 20, 2003 9:29pm Subject: Semper Boolshittis Let me clarify something, The folks at the Department of State, of the State of New York pointed out something: John McCann himself is not a licensed private investigator, however; there is a "McCann International" with a PI license, but that John is not listed of the actual license. As such John McCann is not a licensed private investigator as he would have to be listed (by name) on the PI license. Sure he may have some kind of relationship with McCann International, but according to the state he is not a PI himself. Reference the following: http://wdb.dos.state.ny.us/lcns_public/LCNS_WDB.LICENSEE_DETAIL_FORM.show?p_arg_names=ID_NUMBER&p_arg_values=11000052095&p_arg_names=FULL_NAME&p_arg_values=NOT+APPLICABLE&p_arg_names=BUS_NAME&p_arg_values=MCCANN+INTERNATIONAL&p_arg_names=ADDR_1&p_arg_values=155+E+DORSEY+LN&p_arg_names=ADDR_2&p_arg_values=&p_arg_names=CITY&p_arg_values=POUGHKEEPSIE&p_arg_names=ST&p_arg_values=NY&p_arg_names=ZIP_CODE&p_arg_values=12601&p_arg_names=COUNTY_NAME&p_arg_values=DUTCHESS&p_arg_names=LIC_DESC&p_arg_values=PRIVATE+INVESTIGATOR&p_arg_names=EXPIRE_DATE&p_arg_values=08%2F11%2F2005&p_arg_names=_show_header&p_arg_values=YES&p_arg_names=_alt_rowid&p_arg_values=RECORD_ID ID Number:11000052095 Name:NOT APPLICABLE Business Name:MCCANN INTERNATIONAL Business Address:155 E DORSEY LN POUGHKEEPSIE, NY 12601 County:DUTCHESS License Type:PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR Expires:08/11/2005 Of course it could just be that the State of New York is lying to the public about him being a PI, and that the Scotti School is simply employing John McCann as a covert operative with a cover as a super-secret instructor. Please check your shoulder holsters at the door. -jma -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. Atkinson Ph: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island GroupFax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@t... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "We have suffered a great loss. And in our grief and anger, we have found our mission and our moment...We will not waver, we will not tire, we will not falter and we will not fail!... George W. Bush 9/11/2001 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 7667 From: Tim Harrison Date: Wed Aug 20, 2003 11:08am Subject: [Fwd: A must Read] -------- Original Message -------- Subject: A must Read From: "evans" Date: Mon, August 18, 2003 7:32 pm To: "Glenn" Subject: Texas A and M Commencement Speech This is long, but an extremely interesting read. A commencement speech you won't hear at the University of California, Berkeley any time soon. This Texas A&M Commencement Speech by Neal Boortz (a Texan, lawyer, Texas Aggie, now nationally syndicated talk show host from Atlanta) is an exception. Agree or not, you will find his views thought provoking. It would have been particularly entertaining to witness the faculty's reaction. COMMENCEMENT SPEECH AT TEXAS A&M Neal Boortz Commencement Address: I am honored by the invitation to address you on this august occasion. It's about time. Be warned, however, that I am not here to wow you; you'll have enough smoke blown your way today. And you can bet your tassels I'm not here to impress the faculty and administration. You may not like much of what I have to say, and that's fine. You will remember it though. Especially after about 10 years out there in the real world. This, it goes without saying, does not apply to those of you who will seek your careers and your fortunes as government employees. This gowned gaggle behind me is your faculty. You've heard the old saying that those who can -- do. Those who can't -- teach. That sounds deliciously insensitive. But there is often raw truth in insensitivity, just as you often find feel-good falsehoods and lies in compassion. Say good-bye to your faculty, because now you are getting ready to go out there and do. These folks behind me are going to stay right here and teach. By the way, just because you are leaving this place with a diploma doesn't mean the learning is over. When an FAA flight examiner handed me my private pilot's license many years ago, he said, 'Here, this is your ticket to learn.' The same can be said for your diploma. Believe me, the learning has just begun. Now, I realize that most of you consider yourselves Liberals. In fact, you are probably very proud of your liberal views. You care so much. You feel so much. You want to help so much. After all, you're a compassionate and caring person, aren't you now? Well, isn't that just so extraordinarily special. Now, at this age, is as good a time as any to be a Liberal; as good a time as any to know absolutely everything. You have plenty of time, starting tomorrow, for the truth to set in. Over the next few years, as you begin to feel the cold breath of reality down your neck, things are going to start changing pretty fast... including your own assessment of just how much you really know. So here are the first assignments for your initial class in reality: Pay attention to the news, read newspapers, and listen to the words and phrases that proud Liberals use to promote their causes. Then compare the words of the left to the words and phrases you hear from those evil, heartless, greedy conservatives. From the Left you will hear "I feel." >From the Right you will hear "I think." From the Liberals you will hear references to groups -- The Blacks, The Poor, The Rich, The Disadvantaged, The Less Fortunate." From the Right you will hear references to individuals. On the Left you hear talk of group rights; on the Right, individual rights. That about sums it up, really: Liberals feel. Liberals care. They are pack animals whose identity is tied up in group dynamics. Conservatives and Libertarians think -- and, setting aside the theocracy crowd, their identity is centered on the individual. Liberals feel that their favored groups have enforceable rights to the property and services of productive individuals. Conservatives and Libertarians, (myself among them I might add) think that individuals have the right to protect their lives and their property from the plunder of the masses. In college you developed a group mentality, but if you look closely at your diplomas you will see that they have your individual names on them. Not the name of your school mascot, or of your fraternity or sorority, but your name. Your group identity is going away. Your recognition and appreciation of your individual identity starts now. If, by the time you reach the age of 30, you do not consider yourself to be a libertarian or a conservative, rush right back here as quickly as you can and apply for a faculty position. These people will welcome you with open arms. They will welcome you, that is, so long as you haven't developed an individual identity. Once again you will have to be willing to sign on to the group mentality you embraced during the past four years. Something is going to happen soon that is going to really open your eyes. You're going to actually get a full time job! You're also going to get a lifelong work partner. This partner isn't going to help you do your job. This partner is just going to sit back and wait for payday. This partner doesn't want to share in your effort, but your earnings. Your new lifelong partner is actually an agent. An agent representing a strange and diverse group of people. An agent for every teenager with an illegitimate child. An agent for a research scientist who wanted to make some cash answering the age-old question of why monkeys grind their teeth. An agent for some poor demented hippie who considers herself to be a meaningful and talented artist, but who just can't manage to sell any of her artwork on the open market. Your new partner is an agent for every person with limited, if any, job skills .... but who wanted a job at City Hall. An agent for tinhorn dictators in fancy military uniforms grasping for American foreign aid. An agent for multi-million-dollar companies who want someone else to pay for their overseas advertising. An agent for everybody who wants to use this agent's unimaginable power for their own personal enrichment and benefit. That agent is our wonderful, caring, compassionate, oppressive government. Believe me, you will be awed by the unimaginable power this agent has. Power that you do not have. A power that no individual has, or will have. This agent has the legal power to use force, deadly force, to accomplish its goals. You have no choice here. Your new friend is just going to walk up to you, introduce itself rather gruffly, hand you a few forms to fill out, and move right on in. Say hello to your own personal one-ton gorilla. It will sleep anywhere it wants to. Now, let me tell you, this agent is not cheap. As you become successful, it will seize about 40% of everything you earn. And no, I'm sorry, there just isn't any way you can fire this agent of plunder, and you can't decrease it's share of your income. That power rests with him, not you. So, here I am saying negative things to you about government. Well, be clear on this: It is not wrong to distrust government. It is not wrong to fear government. In certain cases it is not even wrong to despise government -- for government is inherently evil. Yes, a necessary evil, but dangerous nonetheless .... somewhat like a drug. Just as a drug that in the proper dosage can save your life, an overdose of government can be fatal. Now let's address a few things that have been crammed into your minds at this university. There are some ideas you need to expunge as soon as possible. These ideas may work well in the academic environment, but they fail miserably out there in the real world. First, that favorite buzz word of the media, government and academia: Diversity! You have been taught that the real value of any group of people -- be it a social group, an employee group, a management group, whatever -- is based on diversity. This is a favored liberal ideal because diversity is based not on an individual's abilities or character, but on a person's identity and status as a member of a group. Yes, it's that liberal group identity thing again. Within the great diversity movement, group identification -- be it racial, gender based, or some other minority status -- means more than the individual's integrity, character or other qualifications. Brace yourself. You are about to move from this academic atmosphere where diversity rules, to a workplace and a culture where individual achievement and excellence actually count. No matter what your professors have taught you over the last four years, you are about to learn that diversity is absolutely no replacement for excellence, ability, and individual hard work. >From this day forward, every single time you hear the word "diversity" you can rest assured that there is someone close by who is determined to rob you of every vestige of individuality you possess. We also need to address this thing you seem to have about "rights." We have witnessed an obscene explosion of so-called "rights" in the last few decades, usually emanating from college campuses. You know the mantra: You Have The Right To A Job. The right to a place to live. The right to a living wage. The right to health care. The right to an education. You probably even have your own pet right -- the right to a Beemer, for instance, or the right to have someone else provide for that child you plan on downloading in a year or so. Forget it. Forget those rights! I'll tell you what your rights are! You have a right to live free, and to the results of your labor. I'll also tell you have no right to any portion of the life or labor of another. You may, for instance, think that you have a right to health care. After all, Hillary said so, didn't she? But you cannot receive health care unless some doctor or health practitioner surrenders some of his time -- his life -- to you. He may be willing to do this for compensation, but that's his choice. You have no "right" to his time or property. You have no right to his or any other person's life or to any portion thereof. You may also think you have some "right" to a job; a job with a living wage, whatever that is. Do you mean to tell me that you have a right to force your services on another person, and then the right to demand that this person compensate you with their money? Sorry, forget it. I am sure you would scream if some urban outdoorsmen (that would be "homeless person" for those of you who don't want to give these less fortunate people a romantic and adventurous title) came to you and demanded his job and your money. The people who have been telling you about all the rights you have are simply exercising one of theirs - the right to be imbeciles. Their being imbeciles didn't cost anyone else either property or time. It's their right, and they exercise it brilliantly. By the way, did you catch my use of the phrase "less fortunate" a bit ago, when I was talking about the urban outdoorsmen? That phrase is a favorite of the Left. Think about it, and you'll understand why. To imply that one person is homeless, destitute, dirty, drunk, spaced out on drugs, unemployable, and generally miserable because he is "less fortunate" is to imply that a successful person - one with a job, a home and a future - is in that position because he or she was "fortunate." The dictionary says that fortunate means "having derived good from an unexpected place." There is nothing unexpected about deriving good from hard work. There is also nothing unexpected about deriving misery from choosing drugs, alcohol, and the street. If the Left can create the common perception that success and failure are simple matters of "fortune" or "luck," then it is easy to promote and justify their various income redistribution schemes. After all, we are just "evening out the odds" a little bit. This "success equals luck" idea the liberals like to push is seen everywhere. Democratic presidential candidate Richard Gephardt refers to high-achievers as "people who have won life's lottery." He wants you to believe they are making the big bucks because they are lucky. It's not luck, my friends. It's choice. One of the greatest lessons I ever learned was in a book by Og Mandino, entitled "The Greatest Secret in the World." The lesson? Very simple: "Use wisely your power of choice," That bum sitting on a heating grate, smelling like a wharf rat? He's there by choice. He is there because of the sum total of the choices he has made in his life. This truism is absolutely the hardest thing for some people to accept, especially those who consider themselves to be victims of something or other - victims of discrimination, bad luck, the system, capitalism, whatever. After all, nobody really wants to accept the blame for his or her position in life. Not when it is so much easier to point and say, "Look! He did this to me!" than it is to look into a mirror and say, "You S.O.B.! You did this to me!" The key to accepting responsibility for your life is to accept the fact that your choices, every one of them, are leading you inexorably to either success or failure, however you define those terms. Some of the choices are obvious: whether or not to stay in school. Whether or not to get pregnant. Whether or not to hit the bottle. Whether or not to keep this job you hate until you get another better-paying job. Whether or not to save some of your money, or saddle yourself with huge payments for that new car. Some of the choices are seemingly insignificant: Whom to go to the movies with. Whose car to ride home in. Whether to watch the tube tonight, or read a book on investing. But, and you can be sure of this, each choice counts. Each choice is a building block - some large, some small. But each one is a part of the structure of your life. If you make the right choices, or if you make more right choices than wrong ones, something absolutely terrible may happen to you. Something unthinkable. You, my friend, could become one of the hated, the evil, the ugly, the feared, the filthy, the successful, the rich. Quite a few people have made that mistake. The rich basically serve two purposes in this country. First, they provide the investments, the investment capital, and the brains for the formation of new businesses. Businesses that hire people. Businesses that send millions of paychecks home each week to the un-rich. Second, the rich are a wonderful object of ridicule, distrust, and hatred. Few things are more valuable to a politician than the envy most Americans feel for the evil rich. Envy is a powerful emotion. Even more powerful than the emotional minefield that surrounded Bill Clinton when he reviewed his last batch of White House interns. Politicians use envy to get votes and power. And they keep that power by promising the envious that the envied will be punished: "The rich will pay their fair share of taxes if I have anything to do with it.' The truth is that the top 10% of income earners in this country pays almost 50% of all income taxes collected. I shudder to think what these job producers would be paying if our tax system were any more "fair." You have heard, no doubt, that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Interestingly enough, our government's own numbers show that many of the poor actually get richer, and that quite a few of the rich actually get poorer. But for the rich who do actually get richer, and the poor who remain poor.... there's an explanation -- a reason. The rich, you see, keep doing the things that make them rich; while the poor keep doing the things that make them poor. Speaking of the poor, during your adult life you are going to hear an endless string of politicians bemoaning the plight of the poor. So, you need to know that under our government's definition of "poor" you can have a $5 million net worth, a $300,000 home and a new $90,000 Mercedes, all completely paid for. You can also have a maid, cook, and valet, and $1 million in your checking account, and you can still be officially defined by our government as "living in poverty." Now there's something you haven't seen on the evening news. How does the government pull this one off? Very simple, really. To determine whether or not some poor soul is "living in poverty," the government measures one thing - just one thing. Income. It doesn't matter one bit how much you have, how much you own, how many cars you drive or how big they are, whether or not your pool is heated, whether you winter in Aspen and spend the summers in the Bahamas, or how much is in your savings account. It only matters how much income you claim in that particular year. This means that if you take a one-year leave of absence from your high-paying job and decide to live off the money in your savings and checking accounts while you write the next great American novel, the government says you are 'living in poverty." This isn't exactly what you had in mind when you heard these gloomy statistics, is it? Do you need more convincing? Try this. The government's own statistics show that people who are said to be "living in poverty" spend more than $1.50 for each dollar of income they claim. Something is a bit fishy here. Just remember all this the next time Peter Jennings puffs up and tells you about some hideous new poverty statistics. Why has the government concocted this phony poverty scam? Because the government needs an excuse to grow and to expand its social welfare programs, which translates into an expansion of its power. If the government can convince you, in all your compassion, that the number of "poor" is increasing, it will have all the excuse it needs to sway an electorate suffering from the advanced stages of Obsessive-Compulsive Compassion Disorder. I'm about to be stoned by the faculty here. They've already changed their minds about that honorary degree I was going to get. That's OK, though. I still have my Ph.D. in Insensitivity from the Neal Boortz Institute for Insensitivity Training. I learned that, in short, sensitivity sucks. It's a trap. Think about it - the truth knows no sensitivity. Life can be insensitive. Wallow too much in sensitivity and you'll be unable to deal with life, or the truth. So, get over it. Now, before the dean has me shackled and hauled off, I have a few random thoughts. * You need to register to vote, unless you are on welfare. If you are living off the efforts of others, please do us the favor of sitting down and shutting up until you are on your own again. * When you do vote, your votes for the House and the Senate are more important than your vote for president. The House controls the purse strings, so concentrate your awareness there. * Liars cannot be trusted, even when the liar is the president of the United States. If someone can't deal honestly with you, send them packing. * Don't bow to the temptation to use the government as an instrument of plunder. If it is wrong for you to take money from someone else who earned it -- to take their money by force for your own needs -- then it is certainly just as wrong for you to demand that the government step forward and do this dirty work for you. * Don't look in other people's pockets. You have no business there. What they earn is theirs. What you earn is yours. Keep it that way. Nobody owes you anything, except to respect your privacy and your rights, and leave you the hell alone. * Speaking of earning, the revered 40-hour workweek is for losers. Forty hours should be considered the minimum, not the maximum. You don't see highly successful people clocking out of the office every afternoon at five. The losers are the ones caught up in that afternoon rush hour. The winners drive home in the dark. * Free speech is meant to protect unpopular speech. Popular speech, by definition, needs no protection. * Finally (and aren't you glad to hear that word), as Og Mandino wrote: 1. Proclaim your rarity. Each of you is a rare and unique human being. 2. Use wisely your power of choice. 3. Go the extra mile. Drive home in the dark. Oh, and put off buying a television set as long as you can. Now, if you have any idea at all what's good for you, you will get the hell out of here and never come back. Class dismissed. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 7668 From: Date: Thu Aug 21, 2003 4:16pm Subject: Re: Details See the attached file for details [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 7669 From: frost_bitten_ca Date: Fri Aug 22, 2003 1:28pm Subject: suggests commercial interests have created the virus suggests commercial interests have created the virus Sobig's second attack due at 3 p.m. today By JACK KAPICA Globe and Mail Update Another surprise is in store for computers infected with the Sobig virus, security experts are warning. The virus, the world's most widespread worm which has caused extensive damage to e-mail systems, is set to enter a second phase today (Friday, Aug. 22) at 1900 UTC or 3:00 p.m. EDT. Co-ordinated by atomic clocks, consultants at CGI CIRT in Ottawa say, computers infected by Sobig will connect to 20 machines in the United States, Canada and South Korea. The list is encrypted in the virus body. The machines, CGI CIRT says, appear to be home computers connected by broadband to the Internet. Infected machines will then download a program from a certain Web address and run it. Currently, that Web address doesn't go anywhere, the security people said. They speculate that the address will become active only seconds before the 20 computers start the download, which gives analysts no time to examine the program to defuse it. As a result, no one knows what the program does or how much damage it is capable of doing. Previous versions of Sobig (there have been six in all) have downloaded programs that erase the virus but install a password- stealing program, and install an e-mail proxy that can send spam, without the owner's knowledge. Researchers were able to break into Sobig far enough to gather all the information except the source of the Web address. The spamming feature, CGI CIRT said, suggests commercial interests have created the virus, and not a "typical teenage virus writer." Meanwhile, an antivirus company is warning that a worm similar to the destructive Sobig.F virus, which was programmed to deactivate on Sept. 10, could follow on or near Sept. 11, an antivirus company has warned. If the Sobig virus creators continue their usual pattern, then Internet users should brace themselves on that day, warned Central Command, the Medina, Ohio-based maker of antivirus software and services. The Sobig.F worm, the sixth variant of a worm first seen in January, was discovered on Aug. 19, and is estimated to have infected-millions of systems worldwide. A new variant might draw on all the infected computers to create "a cyber army focusing a digital assault against major on-line services," Central Command said today. When particular conditions are met, the company explained, Sobig.F will attempt to download additional components of the attackers' choice. The conditions include performing tests to determine if the current day is Friday or Sunday between the hours of 19:00 (7 p.m.) and 22:00 (10 p.m.) UTC time. When these conditions are met, the worm will attempt to retrieve further instructions that may include the downloading and execution a back-door hacker program. Called "Trojan" programs, these back-door programs turn computers into zombies doing the bidding of the virus maker, including full control of the infected computer. "The virus authors of Sobig have developed a predictable pattern of releasing new variants soon after the current version deactivates itself," Central Command vice-president Steven Sundermeier said. "If the past repeats itself we could be looking at a newly constructed creation shortly after Sept. 10." Mr. Sundermeier said he feared that the massive army created by Sobig.F could be used to launch an attack on large Internet infrastructures by means of a denial-of-service attack (DoS). Sobig.F has been declared the fastest-spreading e-mail plague of all time. MessageLabs Inc., a company that filters e-mail for corporate clients around the world, said Wednesday it had intercepted more than a- million copies of the Sobig.F virus the previous day, the most it has ever intercepted in a single day. That was one in every 17 e-mail messages the firm scanned. "That's just a number we've never seen before," said Brian Czarny, MessageLabs' marketing director. The most widespread virus of all time, Klez, at its peak accounted for one in 125 messages scanned. Sobig.F continued to spread aggressively on Wednesday, though the pace eased off a bit to about one in 60 messages, he said. The virus spreads through Windows PCs via e-mail and corporate networks. It clogs e-mail systems with messages carrying subject lines like "Re: Details" and "Re: Wicked screensaver." "It's a seeding," Mr. Czarny said. "All they're looking to do is plant that Trojan." With a report from Associated Press http://www.globeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20030822.gtsobigaug22/ BNStory/Technology/ 7670 From: Cornolio Date: Fri Aug 22, 2003 5:01pm Subject: high tech blackmail Hi, So far I have only found one English item in the news about this. http://www.expatica.com/index.asp?pad=2,18,&item_id=33655 So let me translate some of the dutch information about this interesting case : A 45-year old chip designer from Utrecht was arrested June 3. He confessed to have tried to blackmail the 'Campina' food company. He had threatened to poison their products, and demanded 200.000 euro. --- The most remarkable thing about this case is however how he communicated with Campina, and how he thought to receive the money. He forced Campina to open a bank account, and get a 'world card' with it. Then they had to deposit 200.000 Euro on it (about 185.000 US dollar). He ordered them to buy a credit card reader, and read the information off the magnetic-stripe of the 'world card'. Then they had to send him the output of the card reader, together with the pin code. With this information, he then could create a copy of the 'world card' using a card-writer and a blank card. To send him the information, he made them use steganography! Campina received an envelope via snailmail containing a floppy with a stego program and instructions. They had to encode the 'world card' info into a picture of a red VW golf, using the stego program, and a fixed crypto key that was included in the envelope. Finally, they had to place the picture in a fake add on a website where large amounts of people sell/buy second hand cars. He would then read the add, and make a copy of the picture. Decode the stego info out of it, write his own copy of the card, and withdraw money. Without ever having personal contact with Campina (or the police). To be real clever, he did not approach the website with the car adds directly. Police found out the add was approached trough a US anonymizer called SURFOLA.com. SURFOLA.com claims on their website : "We will not give out your name, residence address, or e-mail address to any third parties without your permission, for any reason, at any time, ever." The Utrecht police informed the FBI, and asked for assistance. Within 24 hours, the FBI cracked the case, supplying the Dutch police with a '@w...' e-mail address and some paypal.com financial data. This data led to the 45 year old chip programmer. After his identity was known, the police ofcourse started surveillance on him. The 'desert terrorist' was arrested red-handed when he withdrew money from an ATM using the world-card copy.... --- Greetings, Barry Wels. 7671 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Fri Aug 22, 2003 9:59pm Subject: FBI's Performance in Robert Philip Hanssen Case A Review of the FBI's Performance in Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen August 14, 2003 Office of the Inspector General ------------------------------------------------------------------------ UNCLASSIFIED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I. Introduction In this report, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) examines the performance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in deterring, detecting, and investigating the espionage of Robert Philip Hanssen, a former FBI Supervisory Special Agent. Hanssen's espionage began in November 1979 - three years after he joined the FBI - and continued intermittently until his arrest in February 2001, just two months before his mandatory retirement date. In addition to its management responsibility to detect espionage among its employees, the FBI is the lead agency for detecting and investigating espionage committed in the United States. Hanssen became an FBI agent in 1976. During his 25-year FBI career, he principally served in Soviet counterintelligence assignments in New York City and Washington, D.C. In the 1980s and 1990s, Hanssen held positions at FBI Headquarters and the State Department that gave him access to a broad range of highly sensitive counterintelligence and military information. On February 18, 2001, after a three-month investigation of Hanssen, he was arrested and charged with committing espionage on behalf of the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, the intelligence service of the former Soviet Union) and its successors. On July 6, 2001, Hanssen pled guilty to espionage charges pursuant to a plea agreement in which he agreed to cooperate with the U.S. government and submit to debriefings. On May 10, 2002, Hanssen was sentenced to life imprisonment. Hanssen's espionage spanned three separate time periods: 1979-81, 1985-91, and 1999-2001. Over more than 20 years, Hanssen compromised some of this nation's most important counterintelligence and military secrets, including the identities of dozens of human sources, at least three of whom were executed. Hanssen gave the KGB thousands of pages of highly classified documents and dozens of computer disks detailing U.S. strategies in the event of nuclear war, major developments in military weapons technologies, information on active espionage cases, and many other aspects of the U.S. Intelligence Community's Soviet counterintelligence program. Shortly after Hanssen's arrest, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the Attorney General asked the OIG to review the FBI's performance in connection with the Hanssen case. This report details the results of the OIG's investigation. II.Summary of the OIG Investigation and Structure of the Report The OIG assembled a team of three Special Investigative Counsel, a project director, three OIG Special Agents, two analysts, and a consultant to conduct this review. The team reported directly to the Inspector General. The team obtained, reviewed, and analyzed more than 368,000 pages of material from the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Justice Department, the National Security Agency (NSA), and the State Department. The team also conducted more than 200 interviews in 12 states and the District of Columbia. We interviewed Hanssen's former colleagues and supervisors at the FBI and State Department, as well as family, friends, and acquaintances who knew Hanssen throughout his life. We interviewed much of the operational hierarchy of the FBI's Intelligence/National Security Division (NSD) during the 1979 to 2001 period. In addition, we interviewed CIA and Justice Department personnel who had substantial involvement with the FBI regarding "penetration" matters - that is, investigating whether a foreign intelligence service has infiltrated or recruited agents within U.S. organizations. The team also interviewed Hanssen extensively. Our full 674-page report is classified at the Top Secret/Codeword level because it contains extremely sensitive classified information regarding sources involved in the Hanssen case and FBI counterintelligence activities. We also produced a 383-page report, classified at the Secret level, which does not contain the detailed information on the sensitive sources that is included in the Top Secret/Codeword version. In addition, we produced this 31-page unclassified executive summary to provide a public summary of the main findings in the more extensive classified reports. We previously provided a copy of all three reports to the FBI for its comments on their factual accuracy and classification, and we made changes where appropriate. In our reports, we divide Hanssen's FBI career into three phases that roughly correspond with the three periods of his espionage and with key FBI penetration-related efforts. One chapter is devoted to each phase, and within each chapter there are three parts: Hanssen's career, Hanssen's espionage, and the FBI's penetration efforts. Chapter One covers the time period between 1976, when Hanssen joined the FBI, and 1985, when he completed his first tour in the Soviet Analytical Unit at FBI Headquarters. This chapter also includes background information concerning Hanssen's childhood, education, and employment prior to becoming an FBI agent. Hanssen's first espionage - conducted on behalf of the GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye, the Soviet Union's military intelligence arm) - took place between 1979 and 1981. The FBI's investigation of Soviet-related penetration leads during this time period was minimal. Chapter Two covers the time period between 1985 - when Hanssen became the supervisor of an FBI technical surveillance squad in New York and volunteered to the KGB - and 1992. Hanssen's FBI career progressed normally during these years, which also constituted his most active period of espionage. With respect to the penetration issue, both the CIA and the FBI suffered catastrophic and unprecedented losses of Soviet intelligence assets in 1985 and 1986, which suggested that a mole was at work in the Intelligence Community. The FBI conducted several analytical efforts - including a major joint project with the CIA - that were unsuccessful at determining the cause of these compromises. Chapter Three begins in 1992 and ends with Hanssen's arrest in February 2001. In January 1992, Hanssen became the Chief of the National Security Threat List Unit at FBI Headquarters, the highest ranking position he held at the FBI. Hanssen's failings as a supervisor and his inability to properly handle classified information led the FBI to remove Hanssen from his Unit Chief position, and he was subsequently detailed to the State Department as the FBI liaison to the Office of Foreign Missions (OFM). He served for six years in the OFM, until shortly before his arrest. With respect to espionage, Hanssen made a clumsy and aborted approach to the GRU in 1993 and then successfully re-volunteered to the KGB in 1999. Hanssen's espionage - which during this period relied heavily on his improper use of the FBI's Automated Case Support (ACS) computer system - continued until his arrest in February 2001. The FBI's penetration-related investigations increased dramatically in the 1992 to 2001 period. The FBI substantially increased the resources it devoted to the penetration issue and successfully identified and prosecuted several individuals who spied for Russia, including CIA officer Aldrich Ames. The most significant espionage investigation that the FBI pursued after the 1994 arrest of Ames, however, was the search for the penetration of the U.S. Intelligence Community who was later determined to be Hanssen. The FBI believed early on that the mole worked at the CIA and subsequently pursued a lengthy investigation of a CIA employee. We now know that from the outset the FBI was focused on the wrong suspect at the wrong agency. Chapter Four of our report examines deficiencies in the FBI's internal security that were apparent during our investigation of the Hanssen matter. This chapter discusses how flaws and deficiencies in the FBI's programs and policies concerning background reinvestigations, financial disclosures, polygraph examinations, computer security, classified document handling, and procedures for reporting and documenting security violations made it easier for Hanssen to commit espionage and more difficult for the FBI to detect him. It also describes the changes that have been made, or not made, to the FBI's internal security program since Hanssen's arrest in 2001. Lastly, Chapter Five summarizes our principal factual findings and sets forth our recommendations for changes in the FBI's counterintelligence and security programs. III.Principal Findings of the OIG Investigation In the following paragraphs, we summarize the report's principal findings concerning Hanssen's career at the FBI, his espionage, and the FBI's penetration-related efforts from 1978 to 2001. A.Hanssen's FBI Career During his 25 years with the FBI, Hanssen was a mediocre agent who exhibited strong technical abilities but had weak managerial and interpersonal skills. Despite his failings as a supervisor, Hanssen was on the FBI's promotional track for much of his FBI career, and he generally received average to favorable performance evaluations. While Hanssen's day-to-day behavior did not suggest that he was engaged in espionage, he continually demonstrated an unwillingness to properly handle classified information. His indiscretions and security violations were largely ignored and wholly undocumented, however, and he was allowed to remain in positions offering him broad access to highly sensitive counterintelligence information. Ultimately, Hanssen's inability to effectively interact with subordinates and colleagues derailed his FBI career. Hanssen received minimal supervision in most of his positions, was not required to produce significant work product, and had ample time to plan and commit espionage while on duty. Hanssen also encountered few security checks at the FBI. He was never asked to submit to a polygraph examination or to complete a financial disclosure form, and he received only one background reinvestigation during his 25-year FBI career. To his FBI co-workers, Hanssen's personal life appeared completely inconsistent with that of a spy. He was married with six children, and appeared to be a devout Catholic who attended mass every day and who was actively involved in Opus Dei, a conservative Catholic lay organization. He also espoused politically conservative and anti-Communist views. Hanssen had no alcohol, drug, or gambling problems, and did not engage in ostentatious spending. Hanssen was an only child whose father, a lieutenant in the Chicago Police Department, emotionally abused him throughout his life. Starting from a young age, Hanssen enjoyed spy-related entertainment, especially James Bond books and movies, collected items associated with espionage, such as a Walther PPK pistol, a Leica camera, a shortwave radio, and opened a Swiss bank account. Hanssen was an average student in college, majoring in chemistry. He drifted through dental school and business school - and became a certified public accountant - before joining the Chicago Police Department. After four years, Hanssen left the police department to join the FBI in January 1976. Hanssen appeared to be an appropriate candidate for the FBI, in light of his college education, master's degree in business administration, experience as a certified public accountant, and service in the Chicago Police Department. The FBI's initial background investigation and interviews did not indicate that Hanssen was likely to commit espionage. While Hanssen came to the FBI with serious personal insecurities, low self-esteem, and a fascination with espionage, these characteristics did not emerge during the application process. Once in the FBI, Hanssen's personality traits set him apart from his FBI colleagues. He had poor interpersonal skills and a dour demeanor, and was an awkward and uncommunicative loner who conveyed a sense of intellectual superiority that alienated many of his co-workers. Early in his career, however, Hanssen demonstrated significant initiative and organizational skills, developing, for example, a case prioritization system that remains in use today at the FBI. He also had an interest in and aptitude for computer work that was highly unusual at the time, and a number of his early supervisors regarded him as smart, technically proficient, and analytical. After graduation from the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia, Hanssen served an initial two-year tour as a Special Agent in Gary, Indiana. While Hanssen sought out counterintelligence assignments in Gary, there was little such work available. At the end of his tour, Hanssen requested a transfer to the FBI's New York Office. Within six months of his arrival in New York, Hanssen arranged to be transferred from a Criminal Division squad to Soviet counterintelligence work, which remained his assignment for most of his FBI career. Hanssen quickly began exploiting weaknesses in the FBI's internal information security. While still assigned to a Criminal Division squad in the FBI's New York Office, Hanssen took advantage of the unrestricted and unmonitored access to the closed file room and spent hours reading Soviet espionage files - without any conceivable "need to know" - managing to identify some of the FBI's most significant Soviet sources in the process. Hanssen - who appeared to have little aptitude for operational work - demonstrated a strong interest in computers and in administrative assignments, and was given responsibility for managing the New York Office's counterintelligence database, a position that put him at the center of the information flow. In the early 1980s, Hanssen served in the Budget Unit and in the Soviet Analytical Unit at FBI Headquarters - positions that provided him with broad access to sensitive information and an opportunity to use his technical and computer skills, but did not require operational work. Because the Budget Unit was responsible for preparing materials justifying the FBI's budget requests to Congress, Hanssen obtained access to sensitive information from all components of the Intelligence Division, and worked closely with the NSA and the CIA to secure joint funding for certain projects. In the Soviet Analytical Unit, Hanssen gained access to the FBI's most sensitive human assets and technical operations against the Soviet Union. He also began a noticeable pattern of mishandling classified information, primarily by disclosing the existence of Soviet sources and investigations to people with no "need to know," such as FBI employees in other divisions and personnel from other agencies. While Hanssen's tours in the Budget and Soviet Analytical Units showed that he was an intelligent, analytical agent with significant computer skills, his performance also revealed that he lacked the interpersonal skills to communicate effectively and perform supervisory duties. Nonetheless, Hanssen's career at the FBI continued to advance. In 1985, Hanssen returned to the New York Office as the supervisor of a technical surveillance squad. Hanssen was a lackadaisical manager who did not interact effectively with his subordinates. Because the squad largely "ran itself," however, Hanssen's limited interpersonal skills did not become a significant issue. Similarly, Hanssen's mishandling of classified information was obvious to his subordinates but was not brought to the attention of his superiors. In 1987, Hanssen returned to the Soviet Analytical Unit in FBI Headquarters as a supervisor, a position that he told the OIG he found "overwhelmingly attractive" because of the extremely broad access to sensitive information it offered. Although Hanssen received very favorable performance evaluations during his second tour in the Unit, his supervisor regarded him as the "strangest person" he had ever worked with in the FBI - a "kind of cipher who was rigid, dour, and a religious zealot." As was the case during his first tour in the Unit, Hanssen produced little work product, and his subordinates regarded him as distant and arrogant. Shortly after his return to the Unit, Hanssen committed a serious security breach by disclosing sensitive information to a Soviet defector he was debriefing. Hanssen's colleagues recognized that he could not be trusted with highly sensitive information and informally attempted to restrict his access. Although this security breach was reported to an FBI supervisor, it was not documented, and no formal action was taken against Hanssen, whose access to sensitive information remained largely unchecked. In 1990, Hanssen became an Inspector's Aide in the Inspection Division, a position that was considered a prerequisite for advancement at the FBI. In this position, Hanssen traveled to FBI field offices to help rate their overall performance. In June 1991, Hanssen became a program manager in the Soviet Section at FBI Headquarters, where he supervised operational programs designed to counter Soviet efforts to acquire scientific and technical information. This assignment was brief and uneventful. In January 1992, Hanssen became chief of the National Security Threat List (NSTL) Unit, a new unit at FBI Headquarters that dealt with economic espionage, theft of trade secrets and critical technologies, and nuclear proliferation. This position required significant management skills and an ability to work effectively with the FBI's field offices, and Hanssen's deficiencies in these areas quickly became apparent. Hanssen's subordinates found him disinterested in the Unit's work and were frustrated by his failure to provide guidance and direction. Rather than engage in the daily work of the Unit, Hanssen frequently sat in his office listening to foreign language tapes for hours at a time. Hanssen also had poor relations with the FBI's field offices, which complained that he rejected an inordinately high percentage of their proposals for investigations. While in the NSTL Unit, Hanssen committed two serious and flagrant security breaches. First, he hacked into the FBI's computer system and accessed highly sensitive Soviet counterintelligence documents located on the hard drives of his colleagues and supervisors in the National Security Division. Hanssen grew nervous about what he had done and decided to report it to FBI management in the guise of revealing a flaw in the FBI's computer security. Hanssen's ruse succeeded, and no one questioned his breach of computer security. Hanssen's second significant breach occurred when, in direct contravention of a decision made by FBI management, he disclosed to the British intelligence service information about a highly sensitive FBI investigation. At about this time, Hanssen also came under investigation by the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility because of a physical altercation with a female FBI support employee. The investigation resulted in a letter of censure and a five-day suspension. The physical altercation, the improper disclosure to British intelligence, and Hanssen's poor performance in the NSTL Unit doomed his chances for further advancement at the Bureau. As part of an FBI-wide program in which Headquarters personnel were reassigned to FBI field offices, Hanssen was involuntarily removed from his position as NSTL Unit Chief in April 1994 and transferred to the FBI's Washington Field Office (WFO), where he was assigned to a computer squad in a non-supervisory capacity. While not an official demotion, Hanssen was no longer on the management track for higher supervisory positions at the Bureau. Hanssen largely ignored his new assignment in the field office and soon began seeking work at FBI Headquarters. For several months, Hanssen worked on computer-related projects for senior NSD officials. In late 1994, FBI management began considering Hanssen as a candidate to fill an FBI position in the Office of Foreign Missions (OFM) at the State Department. OFM regulates selected activities of foreign missions in the United States to protect U.S. foreign policy and national security interests, and also helps foreign missions protect their diplomats and facilities. Hanssen's FBI superiors saw the OFM liaison position as a good "out of the mainstream" job for Hanssen, a supervisory agent who had proven incapable of supervising others. Hanssen started at OFM in February 1995 and remained at the State Department for the next six years. Hanssen's work responsibilities at OFM consumed no more than a few hours a day, and he was wholly unsupervised by either State Department or FBI personnel. The job carried no significant operational or managerial responsibilities, and once Hanssen was at OFM, FBI management largely forgot about him. No one checked on him or his work - or even ensured that he was at work. No performance evaluations concerning Hanssen were completed during the entire six years that he served at OFM. Hanssen took full advantage of the light workload and complete lack of supervision, spending hours each day out of the office, surfing the Internet and watching movies on his personal laptop computer, and visiting friends and acquaintances. During Hanssen's detail to the State Department, the FBI provided him with a desktop computer that was connected to the FBI's ACS computer system. The ACS system gave Hanssen access to thousands of internal FBI classified documents for which he had no "need to know." To determine whether he was under investigation by the FBI, Hanssen also frequently searched the ACS system for references to his own name and address. In addition, he successfully mined the system for information concerning the FBI's most sensitive espionage investigations. While the ACS system had audit capability, Hanssen's improper searches went undetected because the FBI did not conduct audit trail reviews absent an allegation of wrongdoing. Hanssen continued to commit security violations while at the State Department. He improperly disclosed classified information to others - including NSA and State Department employees, close friends, and members of the press. Hanssen's most egregious security breach at OFM - an attempt to install password breaker software on his FBI computer - was discovered by the FBI's computer specialists, who documented the incident and referred it to the FBI's Security Programs Manager. Hanssen told the Security Programs Manager that he had installed the hacking program in order to connect to a color printer, however, and he suffered no negative consequences as a result of this misconduct. As with Hanssen's other security violations, nothing about the matter was recorded in either his personnel or security file. In late 2000, after the FBI received information identifying Hanssen as a Russian mole, the FBI offered him a Senior Executive Service position at FBI Headquarters, where he could be closely monitored. Hanssen was arrested on February 18, 2001. B.Hanssen's Espionage Hanssen was the most damaging spy in FBI history, and he betrayed some of this nation's most important counterintelligence and military secrets, including the identities of dozens of human assets, at least three of whom were executed. Hanssen committed espionage intermittently, starting and stopping several times during his 25-year FBI career. He engaged in three discrete periods of espionage - 1979-81, 1985-91, and 1999-2001 - and unsuccessfully attempted to renew his espionage on behalf of the GRU in 1993. The reasons why Hanssen initially began committing espionage, and repeatedly returned to it, are complex and, as we explain below, changed over time. Many of the factors that have motivated or influenced traitors in the past - such as greed, ideology, career disappointments and resentment, and drug and alcohol abuse - do not apply to Hanssen or do not fully explain his conduct. Our review of the Hanssen case revealed that there was essentially no deterrence to espionage at the FBI during the 1979 to 2001 time period and that the FBI's personnel and information security programs presented few obstacles to Hanssen's espionage. His removal of hundreds of classified documents from the FBI - including original and numbered Top Secret documents - and improper searches of the Bureau's computer system for references to himself and to the Bureau's most sensitive espionage investigations went unnoticed. Because of lax supervision, Hanssen felt free to conduct many of his espionage-related activities while on duty, including creating encryption devices for communicating with the Russians, servicing dead drops, and counting his cash payments from the Russians. These deficiencies in deterrence, detection, and supervision played a major role in Hanssen's willingness and ability to commit espionage over a more than 20-year period. 1.First Period of Espionage: 1979 - 1981 Hanssen first began spying for the Soviets in November 1979, just eight months after he transferred to a counterintelligence squad in the FBI's New York Office. While on duty, Hanssen volunteered his services to the GRU by delivering a package to a GRU officer at a Soviet trade organization. In his correspondence with the GRU, Hanssen revealed that he was an FBI agent, but offered no other identifying information. Over the next year and a half, Hanssen conducted clandestine exchanges with the GRU, receiving cash payments totaling at least $21,000. Hanssen's initial decision to commit espionage arose from a complex blend of factors, including low self-esteem and a desire to demonstrate intellectual superiority, a lack of conventional moral restraints, a feeling that he was above the law, a lifelong fascination with espionage and its trappings and a desire to become a "player" in that world, the financial rewards he would receive, and the lack of deterrence - a conviction that he could "get away with it." We believe that the personality flaws and background that Hanssen brought with him into the FBI likely played a more significant role in his decision to commit espionage than anything that happened to him after he became an agent. Hanssen's first period of espionage ended in the spring of 1981, when his wife Bonnie inadvertently discovered him reviewing a GRU communication in the basement of their home. Although Hanssen minimized his espionage in discussions with his wife, he says that he confessed his espionage to an Opus Dei priest within days of Bonnie's discovery. According to Hanssen, the priest granted him absolution and told him that he did not have to turn himself in, but suggested that he donate the money he had received from the GRU to charity. Hanssen said that he broke off contact with the GRU and made multiple $1,000 donations to Mother Teresa's "Little Sisters of the Poor." The most significant information that Hanssen passed during this period concerned the identity of a long-time FBI asset in the GRU. Hanssen's first period of espionage was less damaging to the U.S. intelligence effort than his next two periods of espionage. 2.Second Period of Espionage: 1985 - 1991 Hanssen remained a dormant spy from 1981 until October 1985, when he volunteered to the KGB, the Soviet Union's principal intelligence service. In his letter to the KGB's Washington Residency, Hanssen was careful to maintain his anonymity and did not disclose his prior espionage on behalf of the GRU. Using the alias "Ramon" or "Ramon Garcia," Hanssen provided the KGB with information concerning the Intelligence Community's most important Soviet counterintelligence and military secrets, much of which he had learned while assigned to the Soviet Analytical Unit. Although Hanssen was working in New York from September 1985 to August 1987, all of his operational espionage activity during this period took place in the Washington area. According to Hanssen, he chose to volunteer to the KGB because he believed it was more professional, had a longer-term outlook, and paid more money than the GRU. We believe that Hanssen's decision to resume espionage was motivated by many of the same factors at play in 1979. His obsession with espionage (which he referred to as an "addiction"), his lack of self-esteem and desire for recognition, his belief that he could commit espionage without being detected, and the lack of effective deterrence all played a role. The fact that Hanssen had done it before made it easier for him to do it again. Hanssen's return to espionage also was likely fueled by his knowledge that he had successfully evaded detection in the past and was in a position to demand a large payment from the Russians for the highly sensitive information he had obtained in the Soviet Analytical Unit. During the next six years - the last stages of the Cold War - Hanssen delivered thousands of pages of highly classified documents and dozens of computer disks to the KGB detailing U.S. strategies in the event of nuclear war, major developments in military weapons technologies, identities of active and historical U.S. assets in the Soviet intelligence services, the locations of KGB defectors in the United States, analytical products from across the Intelligence Community, comprehensive budget and policy documents, and many other aspects of the Soviet counterintelligence program. He passed some of the most damaging information within his first two months of espionage, including the true names of the FBI's most significant Soviet sources at the time, KGB officers Sergey Motorin and Valeriy Martynov. Other significant operations that Hanssen compromised during this period included the FBI's espionage investigation of Felix Bloch, a senior State Department official suspected of providing information to the KGB, and an FBI analytical report regarding possible Soviet penetrations. Toward the end of Hanssen's second period of espionage, he became increasingly careless, passing documents that clearly marked him as an FBI employee. For example, when he was assigned to the Inspection Division, he gave the KGB FBI inspection reports and documents that he took from field offices while on inspection assignments. Hanssen also compromised Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) wiretap applications prepared by the FBI. In a particularly reckless move, Hanssen suggested to the KGB that it attempt to recruit Jack Hoschouer, Hanssen's closest friend, who was then serving as a military attach at the U.S. Embassy in Bonn. Hanssen's second period of espionage contributed to the execution of at least three human sources - including Motorin and Martynov - and caused hundreds of millions of dollars worth of damage to U.S. intelligence programs. In return, the KGB gave Hanssen cash payments of at least $500,000, as well as three diamonds. He stored the cash, as much as $100,000 at a time, in a gym bag in his bedroom closet. He also deposited large amounts of the KGB's money into a passbook savings account in his own name at a bank located a block from FBI Headquarters. While Hanssen has not accounted for much of the money he received from the KGB, it is clear that he spent some of it on an addition to his home, cars, tuition payments for his children's private schools, gifts, a loan to his brother-in-law, and at strip clubs. In late 1989, Hanssen began a year-long relationship with a stripper, Pricillia Sue Galey. Hanssen paid for Galey to accompany him on an FBI Inspection Division trip to Hong Kong, bought her a Mercedes Benz, provided her with an American Express card, and gave her jewels, cash, and other gifts. In August 1990, Hanssen's brother-in-law, FBI Special Agent Mark Wauck, heard that Hanssen's wife Bonnie had found $5,000 in unexplained cash in Hanssen's dresser drawer. Wauck reported this and other incidents he found suspicious to a supervisor in the FBI's Chicago Field Office. Although Wauck and the supervisor now have significantly different recollections of their conversation, we believe that Wauck provided the supervisor with enough information to warrant some follow up. Instead, the supervisor readily dismissed Wauck's concerns, in part because there was no policy or procedure mandating that he pass the information on for analysis and possible investigation. This incident highlights deficiencies in the FBI's protocol for the receipt and investigation of derogatory information about an agent. There was no standard procedure for reporting and collecting such information, nor was there a central repository at the FBI responsible for collecting this information. After picking up a $12,000 KGB payment in December 1991, Hanssen again broke off contact with the Soviets. Hanssen told us that he took this action because of his increasing guilt and after confessing his espionage to Catholic priests. We are skeptical of this explanation, however, because Hanssen's decision to halt his espionage coincided with the fall of the Soviet Union, as well as with the initiation of a new FBI/CIA molehunt effort that Hanssen knew about. Both events increased the risk that Hanssen's espionage would be detected or disclosed. 3.Unsuccessful Approach to the GRU: 1993 A year and a half after breaking off contact with the KGB in late 1991, Hanssen made an awkward and unsuccessful attempt to reestablish contact with the GRU. The risks Hanssen took in approaching the GRU in 1993 far outweighed any he had taken during his first two periods of espionage. In July 1993, Hanssen approached a GRU officer in the garage of the officer's apartment building. Hanssen identified himself as an FBI agent, explained that he had worked for the KGB under the name Ramon Garcia, and tried to give the officer a package containing summaries of double agent cases that the FBI was running against the GRU. The GRU officer refused to accept the package, and then reported the approach to his superiors. The Russians filed a protest with the U.S. government - apparently believing that the approach had been an officially sanctioned provocation - and the FBI opened an investigation. Although Hanssen's approach to the GRU officer was reckless in a variety of ways, the FBI's investigation of this incident - which Hanssen monitored through the FBI's computer system - was unsuccessful. Hanssen claimed that two factors motivated this approach to the GRU. First, he wanted an explanation as to why the GRU was still running double agent cases that he had previously compromised to the KGB. Second, he "felt pity" for the GRU and wanted to ensure that it knew which of its sources were actually double agents. Although Hanssen denied that this approach was motivated by a need for money, he sought funds from a wide variety of sources at about this time. Indeed, the day of the failed approach, Hanssen asked his mother for $10,000. In addition, even though Hanssen made this approach the day after his father died, he claimed not to remember the proximity of these two events during his debriefings and OIG interviews. Hanssen's 1993 approach to the GRU was remarkable for its recklessness and self-destructive quality. Unlike his prior periods of espionage, Hanssen had face-to-face contact with a Russian intelligence officer, asked other FBI employees to conduct computer searches concerning this officer, and demonstrated virtually no regard for his personal security. Hanssen told the OIG that when the approach failed, it "shocked [him] back out of that mental state." 4.Third Period of Espionage: 1999 - 2001 In 1999, Hanssen revolunteered to the KGB. Over the next two years, Hanssen provided the Russians with information concerning some of the FBI's most significant KGB sources and most sensitive espionage investigations. Hanssen had obtained most of this information from improper searches of the FBI's ACS computer system. As with his second period of espionage, Hanssen used the pseudonym "Ramon Garcia" and communicated through dead drop exchanges, but passed many documents that were unmistakably FBI products. Hanssen's decision to resume espionage in 1999 was driven by two factors: (1) his discovery - through the ACS system - of the FBI's effort to identify a significant KGB mole believed to be a CIA officer; and (2) his deteriorating finances. While searching the ACS system in the spring of 1999, Hanssen stumbled upon the FBI's most significant ongoing Russian espionage investigation. This case was a search for the KGB mole who turned out to be Hanssen. At the time, however, the FBI's investigation was focused on a CIA officer. Although the FBI did not intend for documents related to this highly sensitive investigation to be uploaded into the ACS system - because of widespread concerns about the system's security - many such documents were uploaded due to failures in training, simple human error, and insufficient concern about maintaining operational security. Within a day of discovering the existence of the investigation, Hanssen obtained the CIA suspect's true name. Hanssen decided to warn the KGB about the investigation and thereby "save" the CIA suspect. Hanssen also stated that the case offered him all of the "excitement" and "stimulation" from espionage that he craved. At the same time, Hanssen's financial situation was the worst it had ever been. Although Hanssen was close to the top of the FBI pay scale, his spending continually outstripped his income. He had significant credit card debts, car loans, bank loans, and tuition payments for his children. While Hanssen's mother had previously supplemented his income, giving him more than $94,000 in the mid-1990s, she told Hanssen in 1997 that she was running out of money. Hanssen claimed that he set a goal of obtaining approximately $100,000 from the KGB, believing that this amount would stabilize his finances, at least until he retired from the FBI and entered the private sector. When Hanssen reestablished contact with the KGB in July 1999, he did so as "Ramon Garcia." Hanssen indicated that he needed money and provided a communications plan using a drop site from his second period of espionage. In August 1999, the KGB paid Hanssen $50,000. Over the next year, Hanssen made several attempts to pass information through dead drop exchanges, but the KGB failed to retrieve his packages. Accordingly, Hanssen resorted to mailing the KGB a disk and a letter which provided the true names of several individuals under investigation for espionage, as well as information concerning two FBI assets in the Russian intelligence services and two significant FBI technical operations. Hanssen's last successful dead drop exchange occurred in November 2000, when he gave the KGB a large stack of classified documents from the ACS system that he had been collecting for over a year. In late 2000, the FBI identified Hanssen as a spy and lured him back to FBI Headquarters - where he could be more easily monitored - with the offer of a temporary Senior Executive Service position involving computer security. Hanssen began his new position on January 13, 2001. On February 12, 2001, the FBI discovered a package containing $50,000 that the KGB had left for Hanssen in a dead drop site. Six days later, on February 18, 2001, after Hanssen had left a package for the KGB in a different dead drop site, he was arrested and charged with espionage offenses. Although Hanssen escaped detection for more than 20 years, this was not because he was a "master spy." While Hanssen took some important steps to maintain his security - such as refusing to reveal his identity to his Russian handlers - and used his knowledge of the FBI's counterintelligence practices and poor internal security to his advantage, much of Hanssen's conduct when committing espionage was reckless. For example, Hanssen (1) set up an FBI camera on a drop site he used for exchanges with the GRU during his first period of espionage; (2) used an FBI telephone line and answering machine for communications with the KGB in 1986; (3) deposited much of the KGB's cash directly into a passbook savings account in his name in the late 1980s; (4) suggested to his Russian handlers in 1991 that they attempt to recruit Jack Hoschouer, his best friend; (5) directly approached a GRU officer in 1993 and revealed that he was an FBI agent who had previously committed espionage for the KGB - an approach that led to a diplomatic protest from the Russians and an FBI investigation that could have identified Hanssen as a mole; and (6) searched the FBI's computer system, during his last period of espionage, for references to his own name, address, and drop and signal sites - conduct that would have been difficult to explain if the FBI had utilized the computer system's audit feature. In sum, Hanssen escaped detection not because he was extraordinarily clever and crafty, but because of longstanding systemic problems in the FBI's counterintelligence program and a deeply flawed FBI internal security program. C.FBI Analytical and Investigative Penetration Efforts: 1978 - 2001 The FBI's penetration efforts in the late 1970s and 1980s suffered from a lack of cooperation with the CIA and from inattention on the part of senior management. In 1985 and 1986, the CIA and FBI lost nearly every significant human asset then operating against the Soviet Union. These losses were unprecedented in scope, quantity, significance, and timing, yet the FBI undertook no sustained effort to determine their cause. Senior management was almost entirely unaware of the scope and significance of these losses, and throughout the 1980s the FBI failed to work cooperatively with the CIA to resolve the cause of these losses or to thoroughly investigate whether an FBI mole could be responsible for these setbacks. We now know that Hanssen compromised many of the assets and operations lost during the mid-1980s. The early 1990s saw significant improvement in FBI/CIA cooperation, with the two agencies undertaking a joint investigation concerning the cause of the 1985-86 asset losses. The FBI drastically increased the number of squads and personnel devoted to espionage investigations, and the FBI's senior management took a much more active role in supervising penetration investigations. The energized penetration efforts led to successful espionage prosecutions of CIA officers Aldrich Ames and Harold Nicholson, FBI Special Agent Earl Pitts, and NSA detailee David Boone. While the FBI worked closely with the CIA's Special Investigations Unit (SIU) on most of these cases, the SIU was not an equal partner. The FBI's failure to keep the CIA apprised of information concerning non-CIA espionage investigations - such as the case involving FBI agent Earl Pitts - undermined the effort to identify Hanssen. In attempting to identify the mole who turned out to be Hanssen, the FBI intensively pursued a CIA suspect. This investigation culminated in the submission of a report to the Justice Department that appeared to seek the prosecution of that CIA suspect, despite the fact that some senior FBI managers had serious reservations about the conclusions of the report and doubted whether the officer - who has since been exonerated by the FBI - was the correct target. Although the FBI pursued penetration leads in the 1990s that we now know related to Hanssen, he received no investigative scrutiny until late 2000. Indeed, the FBI never opened even a preliminary inquiry on any FBI employee in connection with the search for the mole ultimately identified as Hanssen. This was true even though the FBI had access to information suggesting that the mole might be an FBI employee, and believed that the mole had compromised certain FBI assets and operations. Longstanding systemic problems in the FBI's counterintelligence program played an important role in the FBI's failure to uncover Hanssen. Most importantly, the FBI demonstrated a reluctance to consider itself as a possible source for a penetration in the absence of leads identifying a specific FBI target. Thus, the FBI maintained a focus on the CIA as the mole's employer despite information indicating that the mole might be an FBI employee. Ineffective oversight by FBI management and poor coordination with the Justice Department also contributed to the length of the FBI's investigation of the wrong suspect and the failure to pursue alternative avenues. The FBI managers with supervisory authority over the investigation often deferred to line personnel - even when the managers harbored serious doubts about the progress of the investigation - resulting in a tacit endorsement of erroneous analysis and conclusions. This problem was compounded by the FBI's poor coordination with the Justice Department components responsible for overseeing intelligence investigations - the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and the Criminal Division's Internal Security Section (ISS). Because the FBI did not provide the Justice Department with complete information about its investigation - omitting crucial information about weaknesses in proof and investigative setbacks - the Justice Department could not properly evaluate the strength of the FBI's case against the CIA suspect. 1.Ad Hoc Analytical and Investigative Efforts from the 1970s to 1993 In the 1970s and early 1980s, the FBI investigated several source reports of Soviet penetrations of the FBI and CIA. None of the leads from this time period appears to have any connection to Hanssen's espionage. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the FBI's response to learning that an important FBI Soviet asset was compromised or to receiving information indicating that a human penetration was at work was often to create an ad hoc team to examine the issue. These efforts were typically analytical rather than investigative. While each study considered the possibility of an FBI mole, none involved an actual investigation of this issue, and none resulted in an investigation being opened on a specific FBI employee. Likewise, none of these efforts concluded that a penetration of the FBI was responsible for the ongoing compromises that the FBI's Soviet program experienced from the mid-1980s to early 1990s. In late 1986, the FBI learned that its two most significant Soviet assets - KGB officers Motorin and Martynov - had been arrested for espionage within the previous year. This appears to be the first notice the FBI received concerning compromises attributable to Hanssen, who we now know compromised both assets in October 1985, confirming information that CIA officer Aldrich Ames had provided to the KGB in June 1985. After learning that its two most important KGB assets had been arrested, the FBI formed a six-person task force to determine how they had been compromised and whether an FBI mole was responsible. In the course of its review, the Task Force discovered that because of poor document controls and violations of the "need to know" principle it was impossible to determine who within the FBI had had access to the Motorin and Martynov cases. Accordingly, no FBI employee with knowledge of these assets was investigated. Nonetheless, in September 1987 the Task Force issued a final report stating that there was no evidence of a Soviet spy in the FBI. The Task Force, however, did not resolve how the assets had been compromised. During the Task Force effort, the FBI learned that the CIA had likewise suffered catastrophic and unprecedented losses in its Soviet program. Yet, the FBI failed to work cooperatively with the CIA to resolve the cause of these losses. Between 1987 and 1991, the FBI suffered continuing losses of Soviet human assets and technical operations that it could not explain. During this period, the FBI conducted two analytical studies that considered the penetration issue, but neither study led the FBI to investigate the possibility of an FBI mole. The first study was a two-year effort aimed at resolving historical allegations of an FBI penetration. The project proceeded chronologically, and by late 1988 the team had analyzed leads only from the 1950s and 1960s. In an interim report, the team concluded that two penetrations of the FBI existed before 1964, but the team never reached the time period relevant to the FBI's more recent and unprecedented losses. The project was abandoned in the summer of 1989. The second study systematically examined more than 50 FBI operations that had been compromised since 1986, including human assets, technical operations, double agent programs, and recruitment operations. The final report, issued in November 1988, described the continuing, across-the-board problems within the FBI's Soviet operations, but was equivocal with respect to the possibility of an FBI mole. The report suggested that a CIA penetration was a more likely explanation for the FBI's losses. We now know that Hanssen compromised most of the significant operations discussed in the report. In 1991, the FBI and the CIA formed the SIU, which was directed to analyze the numerous FBI and CIA cases lost after 1985 and to prepare a list of suspects who could account for the losses. Simultaneously, the FBI created a new investigative squad at WFO to pursue investigative leads generated by the SIU and, in the meantime, to reanalyze many of the same FBI compromises and penetration leads considered during the FBI's earlier analytical efforts. By the end of 1992, after reviewing numerous FBI and CIA historical compromises without any investigative progress, the squad began to disband while awaiting new leads from the SIU. While the SIU obtained compelling evidence that CIA officer Aldrich Ames was a Russian mole and was likely responsible for many of the compromises at issue, the team's March 1993 final report merely stated that there was a KGB penetration in the CIA who began his espionage in 1985. The report failed to highlight Ames as a suspect worthy of special investigative attention. Instead, Ames was presented simply as one of 40 CIA employees who had access to the Soviet operations compromised in the 1985-86 period. The report did not include a comparable list of FBI employees. Although the SIU's final report raised the possibility of a KGB penetration of the FBI, the team did not undertake or recommend any meaningful action concerning this possibility. 2.Penetration Investigations and the Search for Hanssen: 1993 - 2001 The years between 1993 and 2001 marked one of the most active and productive periods for espionage investigations in the FBI's history. The FBI greatly expanded its counterespionage effort and successfully apprehended a number of significant Russian spies. This period was dominated, however, by the search for a KGB mole who was reportedly more damaging than Ames. The FBI poured enormous resources into this search. The FBI believed early on, however, that the mole was a CIA employee and did not change that view. We now know that the FBI was on the wrong track from the beginning, because the mole the FBI was looking for was Hanssen, an FBI employee. As the investigation unfolded, the FBI focused on a specific CIA employee. Given the information it had at the time, the FBI's initial selection of this CIA employee as the lead suspect was understandable. Although an extensive investigation of this CIA suspect failed to yield any conclusive evidence of espionage, the FBI became convinced that he was a KGB mole. This was due in part to the suspect's ambiguous and sometimes suspicious behavior and in part to a belief that this individual had emerged as the lead suspect as the result of an objective and scientific process. Despite its lack of success in the investigation, the FBI, in a 70-page Investigative Report, informed the Justice Department that the CIA suspect was a significant KGB mole, and sought an opinion as to whether he could be prosecuted for espionage. The FBI should have seriously questioned its conclusion that the CIA suspect was a KGB spy and considered opening different lines of investigation. The squad responsible for the case, however, was so committed to the belief that the CIA suspect was a mole that it lost a measure of objectivity and failed to give adequate consideration to other possibilities. In addition, while FBI management pressed for the investigation to be completed, it did not question the factual premises underlying it. Similarly, the CIA's SIU did not serve as an effective counterbalance to the FBI, because it was not an equal partner in the molehunt. The supervisory failures in connection with the espionage investigation of the CIA suspect are most apparent in the context of the Investigative Report that the FBI presented to the Justice Department. Although several senior FBI managers had serious doubts that the CIA suspect was the correct target, and expected the Justice Department to decline prosecution for a lack of evidence, the Investigative Report was written as if the FBI had no doubt that the CIA suspect was a KGB mole who was the most damaging spy since Ames. Fortunately, the Justice Department never brought charges against the CIA suspect, because while prosecutors were reviewing the case the FBI determined that Hanssen was in fact the KGB mole. In late 2000, the FBI opened an investigation of Hanssen, and on February 18, 2001, he was arrested for espionage. The FBI later exonerated the CIA suspect. IV.Summary of the FBI's Security Programs During Hanssen's Career The Hanssen case highlighted significant, longstanding deficiencies in the FBI's internal security program, many of which were brought to the attention of FBI management over the years but were not corrected. Historically, the FBI has not been in compliance with Executive Orders, Justice Department regulations, and Intelligence Community standards regarding internal security. Although we found that the FBI has taken many important steps to improve its internal security program since Hanssen's arrest - including the implementation of a counterintelligence-focused polygraph examination program, the development of a financial disclosure program, and the creation of a Security Division - some of the most serious weaknesses still have not been fully remedied. These weaknesses expose the FBI to the risk of future serious compromises by another mole. Before Hanssen's arrest, the FBI's security program was based on trust. Rather than taking the sort of proactive steps adopted by other Intelligence Community components - such as requiring regular counterintelligence polygraph examinations, financial disclosures, and meaningful background reinvestigations, and utilizing audit functions regarding computer usage - the FBI trusted that its employees would remain loyal throughout their careers. The Hanssen case shows the danger of that approach. In our review, we observed serious deficiencies in nearly every aspect of the FBI's internal security program, from personnel security, to computer security, document security, and security training and compliance. These deficiencies led to the absence of effective deterrence to espionage at the FBI and undermined the FBI's ability to detect an FBI mole. Moreover, the absence of deterrence played a significant role in Hanssen's decision to commit espionage. As he explained during debriefings: "[I]f I had thought that the risk of detection was very great, I would never have done it." Hanssen also exploited many of these weaknesses - particularly in document and computer security - to pass sensitive information to the KGB. With respect to personnel security, Hanssen was never subject to a wide variety of basic security techniques and procedures that could have deterred or perhaps uncovered his espionage. For example, Hanssen was never asked to submit to a polygraph examination during his 25-year FBI career, despite his extraordinarily broad access to extremely sensitive human and technical intelligence information from across the Intelligence Community. After Ames's 1994 arrest, FBI National Security Division managers argued for an aperiodic, random polygraph program, but the FBI's most senior management rejected that request, largely because of concerns regarding false positives. Hanssen's arrest in 2001 finally prodded the FBI to make a polygraph examination part of the standard five-year background reinvestigation. According to the FBI, by June 2003 it had also expanded its polygraph program by implementing aperiodic, random polygraph examinations. Hanssen likewise was never asked to complete a detailed financial disclosure form during his FBI career. During our interviews, Hanssen identified meaningful financial disclosure as the security technique that would have provided the greatest deterrence to his espionage. As it was, Hanssen felt comfortable depositing thousands of dollars of the KGB's cash in a passbook savings account - listed in his own name - at a bank located a block away from FBI Headquarters. He also safely invented stories about family wealth and successful investments to explain his spending. The FBI reported in July 2003 that a financial disclosure program "will be implemented within the next month." Given that financial gain is often an important motive for committing espionage, developing a credible financial disclosure program is a critical element in improving the FBI's personnel security with respect to both deterrence and detection. Hanssen received his first - and only - background reinvestigation in 1996, 20 years after he had joined the FBI. The FBI has conceded that a number of "red flags" emerged during Hanssen's reinvestigation that were not resolved. The FBI's perfunctory background reinvestigation of Hanssen was not atypical, however. The system in place for background reinvestigations discouraged thoroughness. The principal investigators were not given access to the necessary source materials, such as the employee's personnel file, security file, and credit reports, and they primarily interviewed references supplied by the employee. They did not interview the employee. Moreover, the principal investigators merely collected information; they were not required to provide analysis or to make investigative recommendations. As a result, information developed through background reinvestigations received little analysis. In committing espionage, Hanssen exploited serious weaknesses in the FBI's document and information security. His access to classified national security information - for both hard copies and computer files - was subject to little control or monitoring throughout his FBI career. As a result, he walked out of the FBI with copies and originals of some of the U.S. government's most sensitive classified material - including numbered Top Secret documents - with little fear of being stopped or detected. The FBI's inability to account for its most sensitive documents and failure to limit this information to those with a "need to know" has been noted both by the OIG and by the FBI's internal reviews in the past, but remains uncorrected. This deficiency is significant with respect to both deterrence and detection, because the FBI's inability to account for its most sensitive documents makes an access-based investigation for an FBI mole extremely difficult to pursue. The starting point for any such investigation is a list of those employees who had access to a compromised operation; at the FBI, that determination is often impossible to make. During his last period of espionage, Hanssen used the FBI's ACS computer system to track the FBI's most sensitive espionage investigations - including the investigation that was looking for him. Hanssen also routinely searched the system for references to his own name and home address, and to the signal and drop sites that he used, to assure himself that he was not under investigation. Hanssen conducted thousands of searches for highly sensitive information that he had no conceivable "need to know," without fear that a computer audit would reveal his misconduct. As with his record of cash deposits, it would have been difficult for Hanssen to invent an innocent explanation for his repeated searches regarding his name, address, and signal and drop sites. Even more significantly, an audit of Hanssen's ACS activity would have identified him as someone worthy of investigation. The serious security flaws in the FBI's ACS system - which have been discussed in prior OIG reviews and internal FBI inspection reports - have been apparent since the system's inception in 1995, but have not been remedied. Access restrictions are subject to ready override by Headquarters personnel who, like Hanssen, have no "need to know" about the sensitive operations the access restrictions are designed to protect. The system is likewise prone to human error, with documents concerning highly sensitive operations - such as the Hanssen investigation - being made available to any curious user because of improper uploading or inadequate restriction codes. The ACS system's audit function, mandated by Justice Department regulations and a principal tool against unauthorized usage as well as espionage, was rarely utilized before Hanssen's arrest. Today, more than two years after Hanssen's arrest, the ACS system remains insecure and vulnerable to misuse. The current audit program relies on case agent review rather than third-party auditing. Moreover, the program has only retroactive effect; case agents do not receive real-time notice when someone seeks unauthorized access to their cases. The "need to know" principle is not adequately applied in the computer context within the Counterintelligence Division; all Headquarters Counterintelligence Division agents have access to all cases in the Division whether or not their section or unit is connected to the case. Finally, the system's susceptibility to human error has not been remedied. In response to the OIG's findings regarding the ACS system, the FBI reported in July 2003 that "attempting technical changes to improve ACS security would not be a smart business decision" in light of plans to implement a new automated case system known as the Virtual Case File (VCF). The FBI stated that the first delivery of VCF is scheduled for December 2003. In developing and implementing VCF, it is vital for the FBI to rectify the types of security flaws that have been evident in the ACS system for many years. The FBI's lax approach to personnel and information security also was apparent in its handling of security violations. Hanssen's career was replete with security breaches, none of which were documented in his personnel or security file or (with one exception) reported to the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility, the Security Programs Manager, the NSD's Security Countermeasures Section, the Justice Department Security Officer, or any other central location for review and consideration of appropriate disciplinary action. While these security breaches did not necessarily show that Hanssen was engaged in, or was predisposed to engage in, espionage, they demonstrated that he was unfit to have access to sensitive information. Our review revealed unwillingness within the FBI to report security violations and take them seriously, even when highly sensitive information was involved. The Hanssen case also highlighted the absence of a centralized reporting program for security violations at the FBI, as well as the absence of a unit at FBI Headquarters responsible for collecting derogatory information concerning FBI employees, particularly in the counterintelligence context. In July 2003, the FBI reported that a security incident program had been instituted that will be managed by a new Security Compliance Unit. According to the FBI, the Security Division and the Counterintelligence Division will meet on a monthly basis to discuss counterintelligence-related issues. Many of the security issues that emerged from our review of the Hanssen case stem from deficiencies in training. For example, FBI personnel specialists responsible for employee background reinvestigations did not have the necessary analytical training to assess issues that commonly arise during background investigations. FBI employees using the ACS system did not have sufficient knowledge and training to use the security controls that were built into the system to regulate access to sensitive cases. FBI employees were not knowledgeable regarding the requirements for handling classified materials, particularly at the Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) level. And employees and supervisors were not properly trained in how to report and document security violations. We believe that the FBI will not see significant improvement in its internal security until its employees are better trained on security issues. In sum, the absence of adequate security controls at the FBI made espionage too easy for Hanssen to commit. Because of inadequate document security, he felt comfortable removing thousands of pages of classified documents from FBI offices. Because of lax controls over even the most sensitive information and violations of the "need to know" principle, he knew that he could compromise the FBI's most important Soviet/Russian assets and operations with little risk that the loss of these cases would be traced to him. Because of inadequate computer security, he felt free to conduct thousands of searches on the ACS system for references to himself and for information concerning the FBI's most sensitive counterintelligence cases. Because of the absence of financial disclosure, he felt comfortable depositing thousands of dollars in espionage proceeds into his bank accounts. Because of the absence of polygraph examinations for onboard employees, he never had to confront the issue of what would happen when he failed polygraph questions aimed at determining whether he was or had ever been an agent of a foreign power. And because of a flawed and inadequate background reinvestigation program, he never had to fear that the FBI would uncover spending and other behavior inconsistent with his position at the FBI. The defects in the FBI's security program were the product of decades of neglect. Historically, FBI management did not allot sufficient resources to security and rejected internal recommendations - for example, in the polygraph area - to make necessary improvements to the program. As a consequence, following Hanssen's arrest, the FBI faced enormous challenges in the areas of personnel, computer, and document security. While the FBI has made progress in many of these areas, in others - particularly computer security - problems have not been fully remedied and significant work still needs to be done. The FBI's Security Division must receive appropriate resources and support to ensure that the security program is significantly improved. V.The Failure to Deter and Detect Hanssen's Espionage The FBI's failure to deter and detect Hanssen's espionage over a more than 20-year period cannot be attributed to any individual FBI employee or small group of FBI supervisors. In addition, it is important to note that the agents and analysts who conducted the FBI's penetration investigations were extremely dedicated and hard-working, and demonstrated an impressive commitment to the counterintelligence mission. Their work produced many successes. At the same time, we found overarching problems in the FBI's internal security efforts. Most of the deficiencies discussed in our report are of longstanding vintage and reflect the cumulative decisions of many FBI employees, including the Directors and senior managers who failed to remedy serious flaws in the FBI's personnel, document, and information security programs; the Directors and senior managers who failed to devote sufficient resources and attention to the penetration issue in the 1980s and early 1990s, and failed to resolve how important FBI human sources and operations had been compromised; the unwillingness of line personnel working on the espionage investigation of the CIA suspect to reconsider initial conclusions and judgments in the face of investigative failures, and senior managers' failure to insist that they be revisited; the failure of senior managers to ensure that accurate information was supplied to the Justice Department concerning the investigation of the CIA suspect; the supervisors and colleagues who ignored Hanssen's pattern of security violations and his obvious lack of suitability for handling sensitive information; and the managers who provided such lax supervision of Hanssen that he was able to spend much of his time on non-work related matters, or worse, committing espionage. These were widespread failings. We believe that what is needed at the FBI is a wholesale change in mindset and approach to internal security. The FBI must recognize and take steps to account for the fact that FBI employees have committed espionage in the past and will likely do so in the future. A unit at the FBI must be responsible for asking every day whether there is evidence that the FBI has been penetrated, and the FBI's internal security program must shift from a program relying on trust to a program based on deterrence and detection. The following 21 recommendations are concrete steps the FBI should take to improve its internal security and ability to deter and detect espionage in its midst. VI.Recommendations A.Improving the FBI's Performance in Detecting an FBI Penetration Recommendation No. 1: New Penetration Unit at FBI Headquarters A specialized permanent unit should be created within the Counterespionage Section at FBI Headquarters dedicated to determining whether the FBI has been penetrated. This Unit would be responsible for, among other things, analyzing relevant source information, resolving how compromised assets and operations were lost, and reviewing operations that lost their productivity or effectiveness for no apparent reason, all with a view towards determining whether the Bureau has been penetrated. Recommendation No. 2: Senior Operational Post for Intelligence Community Representative in FBI Counterespionage Section The FBI should create a senior operational position in the Counterespionage Section at FBI Headquarters that will be filled - on a rotating basis - by senior executives from the CIA and other components of the Intelligence Community. B.Improving Coordination with the Justice Department Recommendation No. 3: Criminal Division Involvement in Counterintelligence Investigations Department of Justice Criminal Division personnel should be full participants in counterintelligence investigations once suspicion has focused on a specific individual. Recommendation No. 4: More Substantive Role for OIPR Attorneys OIPR attorneys should have a larger oversight role in ensuring the accuracy and fairness of factual assertions in FISA applications and have direct access to the case agent and the source information relied on in the application. C.Improving Source Recruitment, Security, and Handling Recommendation No. 5: Greater Emphasis on and Resources for New Source Recruitment The FBI should place greater emphasis on and provide more resources for targeting and recruiting intelligence officers in hostile intelligence services who are likely to have knowledge of penetrations of the Intelligence Community. Recommendation No. 6: Stricter Standards for Handling and Tracking Sensitive Information from Significant Human Sources The FBI should adopt stricter standards for handling and tracking sensitive information from significant human sources and should enforce the "need to know" policy in disseminating information from such sources. The FBI should also adopt special handling techniques to better account for dissemination of such information. Recommendation No. 7: Guidelines for Handling Recruitments-in-Place/Defectors The FBI should adopt guidelines for handling active recruitments-in-place and recent defectors that, among other things, limit the disclosure of sensitive information, such as details of ongoing espionage investigations, to such individuals. D.Security Improvements Recommendation No. 8: Central Repository for Derogatory Information The FBI should create a central repository for the receipt, collection, storage, and analysis of derogatory information concerning FBI employees with access to sensitive information. This repository should be directly accessible to Counterespionage Section personnel responsible for determining whether the FBI has been penetrated. The FBI should mandate that information or allegations that reflect on the integrity, suitability, or trustworthiness of an employee be documented and transmitted to this central repository for analysis. The FBI should also train employees in recognizing the types of behavior that should be reported. Recommendation No. 9: Documentation of Security Violations The FBI should create policies and procedures designed to ensure that security violations are reported, documented in an employee's security file, and properly investigated and resolved. A database should be created to track security violations by employees and identify patterns and trends. The FBI should conduct regular security awareness training of its personnel, and this training should include clear instructions regarding the reporting of security violations. Recommendation No. 10: Meaningful Background Reinvestigations The FBI should adopt new procedures to ensure that background reinvestigations are thorough, meaningful, and timely. Responsibility for this program should be consolidated within the Security Division, and an automated case management system should be installed that captures, stores, and facilitates the analysis of personnel security information. Recommendation No. 11: Financial Disclosure The FBI should implement an annual, computer-based financial disclosure program for employees with access to sensitive information. The program - which should include disclosure of all accounts held by the employee and immediate family members in financial institutions - should be designed to detect unusual fluctuations in assets and cash flow as well as extraordinary levels of debt, and should involve both collection of information and analysis. Recommendation No. 12: Random Counterintelligence Polygraph Program The FBI should fully implement a counterintelligence polygraph program for employees with access to sensitive information and develop a counterintelligence polygraph program for non-FBI personnel who are given access to sensitive information. Recommendation No. 13: Enhanced Security Measures for FBI Employees with Unusually Broad Access to Sensitive Information The FBI should consider enhanced security measures - for example, more frequent polygraph examinations, more frequent and thorough background reinvestigations, and more detailed financial disclosures - for employees who enjoy unusually broad access to sensitive information. Recommendation No. 14: Detecting Improper Computer Usage and Enforcing "Need to Know" The FBI should implement measures to improve computer security, including (a) an audit program to detect and give notice of unauthorized access to sensitive cases on a real-time basis; (b) an audit program designed to detect whether employees or contractors are using the FBI's computer systems to determine whether they are under investigation; (c) procedures designed to enforce the "need to know" principle in the context of computer usage; and (d) a program designed to ensure that restricted information cannot be improperly accessed through the use of security overrides or other means. Recommendation No. 15: Tracking Classified Information The FBI should create and implement a program enabling it to account for and track hard copy documents and electronic media containing sensitive information. This program should also be designed to prevent the unauthorized removal of sensitive information from FBI facilities, either through the use of technology that "tags" classified documents and computer media or through other means. The FBI should likewise develop a program to prevent the improper copying of classified information. Recommendation No. 16: Security Compliance Program The FBI should implement a security inspection program that ensures that deficiencies in security are detected and remedied within a reasonable time. Compliance with recommendations from internal audits and inspection reviews, as well as from external oversight reviews, should be tracked and monitored until resolution. Recommendation No. 17: Improving Security Education and Awareness The FBI should make implementation of an FBI-wide security education and awareness program a top management priority. In addition, the FBI should track and regularly monitor the status of employee security training. E.Management and Administrative Improvements Recommendation No. 18: Exercise of Managerial Authority over Espionage Investigations FBI supervisors must guard against excessively deferring to line personnel when supervising significant espionage investigations and must ensure that the Department of Justice is properly briefed on the strengths and weaknesses of potential espionage prosecutions. Recommendation No. 19: Damage Assessments for FBI Spies Damage assessments concerning FBI employees who have committed significant acts of espionage should be led by experienced counterintelligence personnel and be conducted by an Intelligence Community entity, such as the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX). Recommendation No. 20: Recusal Procedures for FBI Employees The FBI should adopt written policies and procedures for recusal of FBI employees and supervisors who may be suspects in an espionage investigation. Recommendation No. 21: Supervision of FBI Detailees The FBI should ensure that FBI detailees serving in other Intelligence Community components and elsewhere are properly supervised and receive regular performance evaluations. August 2003 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Glenn A. Fine Inspector General OIG Investigative Team Scott M. Barden Kevin F. Becks Paul G. Gardephe Stephen D. Kelly Mei Lin Kwan-Gett Jeffrey D. Long Jeffrey K. Vasey Dominic N. Russoli L. Susan Woodside -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. Atkinson Ph: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island GroupFax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@t... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "We have suffered a great loss. And in our grief and anger, we have found our mission and our moment...We will not waver, we will not tire, we will not falter and we will not fail!... George W. Bush 9/11/2001 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7672 From: Charles Patterson Date: Sat Aug 23, 2003 0:13pm Subject: Re: NY PI Conference/Seminar [Semper what?... comments on John McCann Hi Jim, >If any other list members have comments on this guy, please feel free >to post them to this list. >-jma Many on this list and most of the other tscmers on your Gold List know me personally and can vouch for my honesty and sincerity. I have found, especially in the TSCM business, that honesty is by far one of the most important virtues. Therefore I feel the need to add a response to your comments about John McCann. A little about my own background for those who don't know me. Before I began TSCM work on my own in 1995, I worked 18 years in executive protection, specializing in electronic and communications support. Along with the tech support for the ep team, I was responsible for overseeing the organization's PBX and T1 circuits. During those 18 years I came in contact with a number of tscm practitioners and saw the wide range of skill and lack of skill available. The tremendous lack of skill and knowlege, and need for better ethics that I saw in this field is what motivated me to get into TSCM on my own. As you know, Jim, I have been aquainted with John McCann since I first met him at an ASIS show in 1996. He lives a short distance from me and since we were interested in the same field we kept in contact fairly often. During the first few years after meeting him, I had the opportunity to work with John on many projects that included tscm sweeps, in-place monitoring, as well as executive protection assistance (communications). John, like many others on this list, has sought my assistance, particularly in the field of telephone communications, to help supplement their own knowledge and understanding. During this time, John's clients whom I met were often very well respected corporations and security agencies. He was always adamant about being sure his clients were NOT on the wrong side of the law. Your comments included a number of points that I cannot disagree with, yet there are other statements that I find to be inaccurate and some are, frankly, ridiculous. I know that he is a CFE (Certified Fraud Examiner), as he seems to spend more time doing auditing than sweeps these days. As far as Scotti school is concerned, a close friend of mine who is president of a guard agency in Manhattan attended one of Scotti's seminars on executive protection where John was one of the instructors. Thus while John may not be one of their regular driving instructors he has taught classes for them. It appears that some of his better skills may be in executive protection. I have met a number of local security personel who have received ep training from John and they all seem very happy with it. Technical knowledge? yes it's limited, but he keeps good contacts. When I first became aquainted with him, his sweep crew included two guys from local law enforcement and another who was the head of a local two way radio company. When he needed help with phones, that's when he would call me up. Most people cannot be masters of all technical areas, thus it seems appropriate to keep in touch with others who can help. I reguarly get calls from many on this list when they have questions about telephone systems or equipment. TSCM Gear? what I have seen at John's office is 3 spectrum analyzers, (two avcom and one 492P), 1 non lin, 2 Scanlocks, and the usual other assorted tools that make up a good tscm kit. Going on sweeps in battle dress? Whenever I saw John on a sweep he was always very professional and well dressed. Is John paranoid? Absolutely (although some might call it "security concious"), but no black helicopters. Is John rude? probably to some, but he never was to me Does he appear arrogant and self inflated? you bet (like so many others in this field!) -luckily I'm still humble, and proud of it, too. ;-) He does have a machine tool shop in his basement and does some pretty darn good work at fitting equipment into cases. A number of people on this list have seen and publicly admired some of his work at conferences. Yes, there are a couple of Radio Shack scanners in a case with the RS labels covered over, along with an ICOM receiver and a Scanlock in the same case- I never saw that equipment on sweeps, but I did see them in use for in-place monitoring where they were very effective. Does he have CIA mugs? sure (actually quite a large mug collection), Movie posters in his office include "The Conversation" and "Three Days of the Condor". I wouldn't mind getting a copy of that "Conversation" one myself. Does he live on money from his wife? That comment could be considered quite offensive. I have met his wife and she is by far one ot the most humble and nicest people anyone could ever know. She does not come from a wealthy backgound, though, and certainly does not deserve to be part of any personal attacks. I do not know much of John's past before I met him, and I do not know what claims he may have made prior to that time. I have not read his book and cannot find it mentioned at Paladin Press, so it too must be from a while back. I do realize though, that there is bad blood between him and yourself and some others here. My impression is that these things too go back quite a number of years. Your description, though, does not fit the person I have known for the past 7 years. Perhaps time has changed people? Perhaps not. My purpose here is just to testify to what I have seen personnally. In the interest of honesty and fairness I could not let your comments go by uncontested on these points. Thanks for listening. Sincerely, Charles Patterson ----- Original Message ----- From: James M. Atkinson To: tscm-l@yahoogroups.com Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2003 4:39 PM Subject: Re: [TSCM-L] NY PI Conference/Seminar [Semper Boolshitis] Semper Boolshitis We have a problem, and I don't know how to tactfully handle the issue, but suffice to say... John McCann is not what he claims, and a number of his claimed credentials are complete bullshit. He claims to be an instructor with the Scotti school, and yet the Scotti School says that his claim is complete bullshit. According to them he never attended their instructor course, never took their executive protection course, never took advanced driving classes, never took any of their firearms courses, and never completed anything more then a basic 2-3 day limo driver driving course (so, just how could he be teaching?) I am very familiar with Scotti as over the years I have attended virtually every course they teach and actually became CERTIFIED as an instructor several years ago (and have the paperwork, diploma, textbook, course manual, etc to prove it... and have no problem producing appropriate documentation). I should note that when the Scotti School found out about John's claims, they sent him several cease and desist orders (they were, and are still really pissed). A few days later John modified his website to remove his claim of being an instructor for the Scotti School, but every now and then he mentions it in a new forum such as someone elses website, or in a situation like this trade show. The bottom line is that John's claims to be an instructor for the Scotti School is a considerable falsehood. The funny thing is that he found out about the Scotti school through my website (I had a link to Scotti), and he dropped my name all though the class trying to convince other people in the class that he was working with or was associated with me (which he was not). One the one hand he claims, or has claimed on his and other web sites to be a licensed private investigator, and yet the State of New York says that is false and that they have no record of either him or his company being issued such a permit or licence (at least in recent history). An example of such a claim may be found at: http://www.lioninvestigationacademy.com/staffphotos.htm (the page has just recently been taken down) The State of New York also pointed out that it is a felony to claim to be a licensed PI in NY and not actually have such a CURRENT license (cough-cough). If course this is yet another major falsehood. However, according to others in the profession; it is claimed that several years years ago, John McCann submitted an article to Police & Security News. They published the article under his name, and he really played up the publicity, ran ads, etc. The article turned out later to be 100% plagiarized, word for word, from an obscure source. Several people in the business caught him red-handed and notified the editor, and he hasn't tried to get published since. OK, he claims to be a TSCM expert (or 30 years)... If so why has he have virtually nothing published under his name? he has not written TSCM articles, has not really published anything concerning TSCM on his website, has never published any white papers on TSCM, never written any articles on TSCM, and so on. On the one hand he brags about being published, and yet on the other hand there is nothing in print relative to TSCM (of which he claims to be an expert). If we look at the bio in his book (published by Paladin Press) nowhere does it mention he has any experience or expertise with TSCM, basic electronics, counter intelligence, counter espionage, in-grown toenails, or anything even remotely resembling the TSCM business, electronics, academic work or any technical credentials of any sort. When the book was published John was clambering for credibility, so if he was doing TSCM then, why didn't he put it on his bio? I mean after all, he claims to have 20 or 30 years in the business, and yet his bio at that time fails to mention such a credential or background. His bio in the book also fails to mention anything concerning his technical skills, or even the slightest technical capability, course, class, or education. John has previously stated to both me and others that he works for the CIA, how the FBI pays him to install bugs for them, how he is close personal friends with Dick Marcinko, how he trains with SEALs, how he knows everybody at Quantico and so on ad nauseam. He is a bit of an chain-smoking espionage groupie, and is essentially living on his wives money while living out his fantasies pretending to be James Bond (ie: Walter Mitty). He surrounds himself with spook mystique, movie posters, books on espionage, CIA coffee mugs, and so on yet he served only a token amount of time in the Marines, never held a Top Secret security clearance, and has very limited technical skills, background, or training. He joins any organization and collects paper from anyone who accepts his membership dues, but given his reputation and considerable falsehoods he would appear to bring serious discredit to such organizations. John is absolutely obsessed with who is a narc or fed and "who is cool". He is constantly looking over his shoulder, constantly looking for informants or agents, and constantly trying to manipulate others. According to him, the government is stalking him, the black helicopters are landing this weekend, the DEA and FBI has his phones taped, etc, etc, ad nauseam. This in and of itself should tell you something... when someone is overly paranoid, and un-naturally suspicious of others something is seriously amiss. John is rude, abusive, and tries to be a grand manipulator. He tries to get grand-fathered into everything that involves credentials, and expects to get special treatment just because he spent a couple of years in the Marine Corps (Semper Fi, my ass... more like semper bull-shitis). He holds himself out as a spy, and an expert on espionage who in fact commits, and has admitted to corporate espionage. On the one hand he will pretends to kiss your ass, and yet on the other he will stab you in the back in a heartbeat just to make himself feel more important and to fluff himself up (ditto for a few others). He is the only person I have ever met (who has told me in person) that he shows up to do a bug sweep wearing a full battle dress uniform (BDU), complete with a rappel harness, belt, K-Bar knives, semi-automatic pistol in a shoulder holster, and combat boots Of course the Halliburton briefcases, and rack mounted toys from Radio Shack and Super-circuits look impressive to a non-technical person, but instead they amuse those actually performing real TSCM services. He buys flashy toys totally inappropriate for TSCM, and dresses them up in fancy cases to impress his clients. He goes to great pains to conceal that the equipment is amateur toys, and goes out of his way to paint the stuff to look spookier. Sure you can put a $75 dollar scanner in a $400 case and scratch out all of the Radio Shack markings, but it's STILL a consumer toy and not a professional tool. Ditto for dressing up a few hundred pounds of ten year old scrap test equipment that you can buy by the pound. Sure he has some fancy toys, but think for a moment... are they really relevant to TSCM... or for illicit eavesdropping? He does possess a fairly elaborate metal working shop which he seems to have inherited from his father, and he does bend some pretty sheet metal good tin bender. This allows him to make up some impressive and functional packaging and racking and stacking. While his cases may look pretty they do not appears to have been used for any actual work (hint: a TSCM'er who actually DOES sweeps will scratch, scuff, and dent their cases... not have ones that look brand new, almost like they never went into the field). In my opinion (and based on my direct contact over several years with John), I feel that he is absolute poison to the industry, discredits those organizations who allow him to join, discredits people who associate with him, and is a destructive influence to those who he comes in contact with. I realized what he was up to several years back, and have since distanced myself from him (as have others). I also feel that he is just a laughing stock, and a bit of an inside joke in the TSCM business, and his antics makes him look like and even bigger ass-clown. But then of course, your mileage may vary. Also, I should mention that John is extremely envious of others in the profession, he secretly lusts to be like them, would give his left testicle to have equipment like others have, and goes off on a tantrum like a little girl when anyone questions his credentials. One of his favorite games is to have one of his friends vet him in to an organization, then he vets them into some other organization in return, and so on. Semper Boolshitis, It really quite sad, If any other list members have comments on this guy, please feel free to post them to this list. -jma At 8:48 AM -0400 8/16/03, Steve Uhrig wrote: >Reposted from the Maryland PI list for anyone who is interested. > >I am *not* endorsing this event primarily because I believe erroneous >credentials are listed for one of the speakers. The organization is >not at fault; they repeat what they are given. > >The organization certainly is professional and ethical. > >... Steve > >============ > >The Associated Licensed Detectives of New York State will hold a one- >day intensive seminar Saturday, September 20, 2003 at the beautiful >Canandaigua Inn-On-The-Lake, Canandaigua, New York. All private >investigators and security firms are welcome to attend, including >those outside of New York. This seminar will cover such topics as >writing effective security surveys, how to avoid legal pitfalls as a >private investigator or security firm operator, compliance auditing, >corporate due diligence, risk management and the latest information >on New York and Federal legislation and compliance issues affecting >the investigative and security industries. > >Registration fee: $90.00 includes 2-hour welcome open bar Friday >evening Sept 19th and Continental breakfast, Seminar, luncheon and >handouts on Saturday Sept 20th. (After Sept 8th registration fee is >$100.) There is an optional Saturday evening dinner with one-hour >open bar at additional cost of $40.00. > >Speakers are: > >William Dunn, Esq. - General Counsel for Command Security, managing >licensing, risk management and compliance in multiple states, Board >member of the National Association of Security Companies, and served >as NYPD Lieutenant Detective Commander, Bronx and managed fiscal >affairs, integrity and contract compliance in Management Information >Services Division. > >Bruce H. Hulme, CFE - NCISS past President and Board member and >ALDONYS Legislative Chairman, "Spotlight" Editor and Past President, >founder Special Investigations, Inc., and author of chapter "The FCRA >and Corporate Investigations" in the book "Corporate Investigations" >published by Lawyers and Judges Publishing Co., 2002. > >Anthony J. Luizzo, PhD, CFE - Founder and Past President of New York >City Chapter of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners and Past >President of the Society of Professional Investigators with over 38 >years law enforcement and security/safety administration, co-author >of "Fraud Auditing: A Complete Guide, published by the Foundation for >Accounting Education, and founder of LC Security and Accufacts >Preemployment Screening. > >John D. McCann, CFE - Founder of McCann International, counter- >intelligence specialist, lectured at Yale and Rice University on >intelligence and covert operations, authored book and numerous >articles on compliance auditing for security operations and threat >assessments, and adjunct instructor Scotti School in Boston. > >For Hotel reservations call direct to Canandaigua Inn for discounted >rate $109 per room at 1-800-228-2801. (Mention ALDONYS and make your >reservations now for the reduced price rate) This rate is only in >effect for Friday and/or Saturday stays. > >Make seminar conference checks/money orders payable to: > >ALDONYS, Inc. c/o Michael Hymanson, Treasurer Pan American >Investigation 76 Mamaroneck Ave. White Plains, NY 10601 For credit >card payment or questions call Mike Hymanson at 914 949 1888, or for >updates and/or any changes concerning seminar contact Conference Co- >Chairs Theresa Balfe at 518 765 5537 (theresapi@a...)or Richard >Ingraham at 585 415 0505 (peye@r...) or go to >www.aldonys.org > >================== -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. Atkinson Ph: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group Fax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 mailto:jmatk@t... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "We have suffered a great loss. And in our grief and anger, we have found our mission and our moment...We will not waver, we will not tire, we will not falter and we will not fail!... George W. Bush 9/11/2001 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ADVERTISEMENT ======================================================== TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. =================================================== TSKS Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 7673 From: Jay Coote Date: Sat Aug 23, 2003 10:02pm Subject: Xcelite tools as a secret weapon? Does Xcelite or another manufacturer make plastic screwdriver handles that do not smell like someone hurled. You could chuck one of these puppies into a room and clear it in 30 seconds. Needless to say I would not subject a client to them. Is there something better on the market? Jay Coote Los Angeles Specialist in Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Lic: PI17926 TSCM@j... 7674 From: James M. Atkinson Date: Sat Aug 23, 2003 11:20pm Subject: Corporate Profile Hooters: A Case Study 'This thing has incredible legs,' an early investor said. Twenty years later, the restaurant chain has finally hit its stride. FORTUNE Monday, August 11, 2003 By John Helyar Some corporate slogans speak to improving the human condition (DuPont: "Better things for better living through chemistry"). Some speak to elevating human relations (Hallmark: "When you care enough to send the very best.") And then there's the Hooters restaurant chain, which cheerfully admits to no higher calling than lowbrow pleasure: "Delightfully tacky, yet unrefined." So how on earth, in such a politically correct age, in such a failure-prone business, could Hooters have reached age 20 and still be busting out all over? From a single Florida beach bar, Hooters has expanded to 342 locations (27 of them, ahem, abroad), four lines of retail food, one golf tour, and two car-racing circuits (stock and drag). If you laid out the 30 million pounds of Hooters wings served each year, they'd encircle the globe at the equator. If you piled up the 15,000 current Hooters Girls ... well, they'd really be stacked. Even the sky is no longer the limit: Hooters Air started flying in March. It provides service from Newark, N.J., Baltimore, and Atlanta to Myrtle Beach, S.C. Painted in the corporate colors of orange and white, the four 112-seat jets are airborne billboards, with the trademark Hooters owl roosting on their tails. Two Hooters Girls are aboard each flight, emceeing trivia games, hawking Hooters merchandise, and on the whole acting a lot perkier than flight attendants on other airlines who've just taken 20% pay cuts. Is this any way to run an airline? Well, considering that many experienced operators are trying to recover from record-breaking losses, Hooters could hardly do worse. But then Hooters Air is more about building the brand than becoming a serious player in aviation. Hooters' flights of fancy have already brought in reams of free publicity. "You're here, aren't you?" notes Bob Brooks, the man who has sent Hooters soaring. We are at one of his restaurants in Atlanta, sitting amid a swirl of Hooters Girls serving the lunchtime crowd. Brooks hardly seems to notice them. There have been 200,000 Hooters Girls over the years, after all-and the chairman of Hooters of America is no Hugh Hefner. Brooks, 66, is a Methodist family man who grew up on a South Carolina tobacco farm and today lives in a modest home in Myrtle Beach (that, and the area's golf attractions, explain the Hooters hub). His voice is so quiet it's hard to hear in the midday din. But he is no pushover. He has fought diabetes, overcome a stroke, and endured the death of a son, Mark, in a plane crash that also took the life of Alan Kulwicki, a Hooters-sponsored NASCAR driver. He has a simple view of the restaurant business: "Good food, cold beer, and pretty girls never go out of style," says Brooks, who sees great augmentation in Hooters' future. It is already America's tenth-largest full-service restaurant chain, with 2003 revenues estimated at $750 million, and Brooks thinks the country can support 1,000 Hooters. That may be stretching it as much as a Hooters Girl's tank top, says Chicago restaurant consultant Ron Paul. The only two comparable chains that have more than 800 locations (Applebee's and Chili's) draw a large number of women and families. Hooters' relies on 25- to 54-year-old males, who account for 70% of business. On the other hand, "nobody's trying to do what they do," Paul says. "It allows them to stand out in a crowded field." The history of Hooters has more curves and swerves than one of its waitresses wending her way across a crowded room-and is considerably less appealing. For years Brooks and the founders of Hooters fought over everything from menu items to whether Lycra was part of the Hooters ethos. For all the acrimony, which ended in 2001, everyone agrees that Hooters began with a beach bar in Clearwater, Fla., in October 1983. They also agree that the ball got rolling when a restaurant executive named Hugh Connerty wandered in one night in 1984. The six friends who launched Hooters were not seeking to create an American icon. They were a bunch of fun-loving Midwestern transplants who wanted to create their kind of place and who scraped together $140,000 to do it. Three were tradesmen-L.D. Stewart, a painting contractor; Ken Wimmer, his partner; and Dennis Johnson, a brick mason. The others were Ed Droste, a real- estate executive; Gil DiGiannantonio, a liquor salesman; and William Ranieri, a retired service station owner who went by "Uncle Billy" because he was a good 30 years older than his thirtysomething partners. The six didn't know much about the restaurant business, but they knew what they liked: finger food, girls, and golden oldies on the jukebox. Connerty was in Florida scouting locations for a steak house chain he'd started, Colorado Joe's, but he abruptly changed plans after a night at Hooters. The place was lots of fun and, he thought, had loads of potential. He would give the six co-founders $50,000; they would continue to own the trademark and get 3 cents on every dollar the Hooters Girls brought in. They would also keep the rights to build more Hooters locations in a six-county area of Tampa Bay. (They later added the Chicago metro territory.) For his $50,000, Connerty got the right to build Hooters everywhere else in the U.S. He was required to stay faithful to every aspect of the original, right down to the secret wing sauce. The deal was very much in the early Hooters spirit: Originally drafted on a napkin and considered over pitchers, it was sealed days after Connerty proposed it. Beginning in 1985, he took Hooters to other Florida cities and then to other Southeastern markets. But it was soon clear that he had more vision than capital. So Connerty approached Bob Brooks, a business acquaintance, for loans. Brooks was rich, and he knew the restaurant business because some of the big chains bought from his food-service company, Naturally Fresh. He was also tough. In 1988, Brooks called the notes, and when Connerty couldn't pay, took over the Hooters development rights. Connerty's consolation prize: ownership of Hooters restaurants in Jacksonville and Tallahassee. (He no longer owns them and today has no connection with Hooters.) Brooks' takeover stabilized one end of the business but unsettled relations with the founders. There was Hooters Inc. in Clearwater, the corporate entity owned and run by the original six. And there was Hooters of America in Atlanta, owned and run by Brooks. He had the capital to push Hooters into new states, which the founders liked, since they got a piece of every chicken wing sold. But he also kept pushing the restaurants to buy huge quantities of items like salad dressings from Naturally Fresh. The Hooters Six bridled, believing that their version of blue-cheese dressing was sacred. They prevailed in that battle, but the war was on. "You had one group that had the power," says Jim Hammond, an early Hooters executive and now a franchisee with restaurants in three states. That was Hooters Inc., whose trademark ownership restricted what could be done under the Hooters name. Then there was Hooters of America, "which had the money and didn't want to be told what to do." Part of the problem was that Hooters wasn't just about the externals of blond wood and blond bombshells. It was about the subtleties of its leering yet giggling essence. When co-founder Ed Droste started the Hooters calendar in 1986, he made sure it was very good cheesecake but also very funny. The months were out of order, each day had a joke, and the whole month of March was devoted to Iowa humor-e.g., "You know you're from Iowa if you consider being called a Pork Queen an honor." (Droste and Dennis Johnson both hail from Waverly, Iowa.) Ed Droste shaped the Hooters persona, recruiting the first face of Hooters on Clearwater Beach in 1983. Lynne Austin didn't immediately accept his job offer, since she was in the middle of an important bikini contest. But she soon signed on and not only made for great eye candy on Hooters' billboards but also had a gift for sports trivia and a quick wit. When Hooters entered a new market, Droste went to local radio stations with Austin and a complimentary platter of wings. She had listeners eating out of her hand-and, often enough, at the new Hooters. Austin was the prototype of the Hooters Girl-bosomy but also bubbly, an approachable all-American girl, not a distant Miss Universe. And Hooters is great at overcoming the objections of God-fearing communities by establishing itself as a good citizen. It's hard to hate a Hooters Girl who's just helped you raise $10,000 for the Special Olympics. It was the girls that gave Hooters legs that other theme restaurants lacked. The movie memorabilia in a Planet Hollywood might interest a diner the first time, but on the next visit it palls (as did the restaurants, which went bankrupt). Hooters Girls are a renewable resource. Waitresses get a $200 "buddy bounty" for bringing in new talent. Cruder knockoffs like the defunct Knockers chain missed the cheerful insouciance that made Hooters a hit. The Clearwater co-founders thought the suits in Atlanta lacked soul and missed these vital subtleties. "To Eddie Droste, Hooters was a work of art-naughty but not too naughty, an elaborate PG-13 joke," says one person involved in the early days. "Brooks didn't really get it, and if you're not on the same wavelength, it's hard to amicably settle differences." To be fair, some of the conflict may have been due to sellers' remorse as the founders realized that they had sold their baby too quick and too cheap. Some of it was due to the founders' starting to take themselves seriously. In 1983, as the Hooters menu tells it, they could have been "arrested for impersonating restaurateurs." Eventually they came to regard themselves as savvy restaurant pros who knew best. In fact, both sides could be hardheaded. Says Brooks: "It became a matter of 'we' vs. 'them.' " The co-founders maintained that they, as licensors, must approve all aspects of each Hooters. Brooks disagreed. So they would fight over things like tank tops. In the early 1990s, the Six agreed it was time to abandon the bare-midriff look and tuck in the Hooters Girls' tops. First, they had a hard time getting franchisees to comply with the navel blockade. Then Brooks offered his franchisees an alternative to the traditional cotton tank top: Lycra. The Six were appalled; they considered the material too form-fitting and the tone all wrong. As Hooters Inc. president Neil Kiefer puts it, "When the shirt gets too tight and the boobs are hanging out, mama and the kids aren't coming in." Brooks was tired of making big investments in his restaurants and still having to argue about these kinds of things. So in 1994 he leaped at co-founder L.D. Stewart's offer to sell his share in Hooters Inc. Brooks agreed to pay Stewart $10 million for his 51% stake. But since Stewart owned just two of the seven voting shares of Hooters Inc., others needed to be won over. They were instead enraged because under the original agreement, they had the right of first refusal to buy Stewart's shares. In 1995 a Florida judge blocked the sale of Stewart's stake. The five got back the stock and retained control of Hooters Inc. (Now estranged from the group, Stewart couldn't be reached for comment.) But nothing was resolved. That same year the combatants set aside their differences long enough to fight a common enemy. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, a U.S. federal agency, filed a complaint against Hooters, charging its exclusive employment of women as waitresses discriminated against men. It was a potential calamity. As president Rick Akam testified in a court proceeding, "The guiding principle of the system has always been vicarious sexual entertainment to customers." In 1995 the chain counterattacked. It dressed up a restaurant manager named Vince in a Hooters Girl outfit and, complete with blond wig and five o'clock shadow, substituted him for Lynne Austin on billboards and ads bearing their anti-EEOC message, washington, get a grip! It staged a Hooters Girl March on Washington and aired its case at a National Press Club briefing. The era of good feelings did not last: When the EEOC eventually dropped the matter, Hooters of America produced a T-shirt saying She Survives! Hooters Inc. declared the T-shirts a license violation and demand that sales cease. It was back to infighting as usual. In 1998 the co-founders went to federal court, alleging that Brooks had committed various license violations. By then the hostilities were taking a toll on the business. For instance, a TV show called Hooters Movie of the Weak (lame movies interspersed with comedy sketches) was syndicated on stations in 13 major markets-but it was pulled from the air when the Brooks camp challenged its legality. The turmoil at the top slowed the pace of expansion, as franchisees were leery of investing in such a poisoned atmosphere. But then a funny thing happened on the way to Armageddon. The Hooters Inc. crowd in Clearwater began to develop more respect for the Hooters of America crowd in Atlanta. "There was friendship despite all the fighting," says Droste, "and we had to hand it to Bob Brooks. He put his money where his mouth was." It was his idea, for example, to make a splash in sports, the second-biggest interest of the Hooters core clientele. In 1992, Brooks sponsored Alan Kulwicki, who won the Winston Cup as NASCAR's top driver that year. In 1995, Brooks dropped NASCAR to run his own series, the Hooters ProCup stock-car races, and in the same year he added the Hooters minor-league golf circuit. Every time a Hooters tour alum breaks through to win a bigtime tournament-as Ben Curtis did most recently at the British Open-Hooters gets free publicity. By the new millennium, the spirit of detente was taking root. At the end of a day's legal wranglings, the warring factions would go out to dinner together. In 2001, as part of a settlement of the federal litigation, the founders sold Brooks the Hooters trademark for $60 million. They retained the rights to the Tampa Bay and Chicago territories, plus Manhattan. Hooters Inc. also has the rights to develop a Hooters hotel and casino in Las Vegas and to take Hooters to Hollywood. (Ed Droste is working on Hooters: The Movie.) Hooters of America has domain over the rest, giving it the control it has coveted. With the outbreak of peace, Hooters has picked up the pace, adding 38 restaurants last year and 16 already in 2003, about twice the rate of the late 1990s. And Hooters Air may be only the beginning when it comes to Hooters line extensions. Is the world ready for a Hooters cable channel? That's on Brooks' drawing board now. The Methodist from Myrtle Beach may not be as wacky as the Hooters Six, but he seems to have gotten the hang of delightfully tacky. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM, Bug Sweep, Spy Hunting, and Counterintelligence Site on the Internet. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James M. Atkinson Ph: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island GroupFax: (978) 546-9467 127 Eastern Avenue #291http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008mailto:jmatk@t... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "We have suffered a great loss. And in our grief and anger, we have found our mission and our moment...We will not waver, we will not tire, we will not falter and we will not fail!... George W. Bush 9/11/2001 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 7675 From: Date: Sun Aug 24, 2003 2:57pm Subject: Report: U.S. Recruiting Saddam's Spies Report: U.S. Recruiting Saddam's Spies WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S.-led occupation authorities in Iraq have begun a covert campaign to recruit and train Iraqi spies to help identify resistance to American forces, The Washington Post said on Sunday. Citing unnamed U.S. and Iraqi officials, the newspaper said the move to recruit agents of ousted president Saddam Hussein underscores a growing recognition among U.S. officials that American forces alone cannot prevent attacks like the bombing of U.N. headquarters in Baghdad on Tuesday. One senior U.S. official said authorities have stepped up recruitment over the past two weeks. While U.S. officials acknowledged the sensitivity of cooperating with a force that embodied the ruthlessness of Hussein's rule, the officials said an urgent need for better intelligence had forced unusual compromises. The report said officials were reluctant to disclose how many former agents have been recruited. The emphasis in recruitment appeared to be on the intelligence service known as the Mukhabarat but that was not the only source, the Post said. Within that service officials have tried to recruit agents once assigned to Syria and Iran. 08/24/03 07:03 Copyright Reuters Ltd. All rights reserved. The information contained In this news report may not be published, broadcast or otherwise distributed without the prior written authority of Reuters Ltd. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 7676 From: Andre Holmes <1ach@g...> Date: Sun Aug 24, 2003 7:59pm Subject: GOOD NEWS COVERAGE Asia Times ----- Original Message ----- From: Andre Holmes To: ANDRE HOLMES Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2003 8:54 PM Subject: Emailing: ED24Ak05 Middle East THE ROVING EYE The Mukhabarat's shopping list By Pepe Escobar BAGHDAD - While the buildup to the war on Iraq was convulsing world capitals, world opinion and the United Nations, the Mukhabarat - the feared Saddam Hussein secret service machine - was still living in its own Thousand and One Nights bubble. This is what is revealed by a document found by Asia Times Online, among other files, in a nondescript, abandoned Mukhabarat safe house in the Qadissiya district of the capital. Iraqis who read it and translated it had no reason to doubt its authenticity. The handwritten document details a series of meetings between June 2002 and March 2003 (even when war was already raging in Iraq), probably in the same safehouse, involving Mukhabarat agents and representatives of firms from many Arab countries but also from France, Russia and the Netherlands. The document should constitute additional proof that the secret services indeed operated as a parallel state in Iraq - way beyond the reach of United Nations sanctions and trade embargo. All negotiations were secret. And everything was paid in US dollars, cash. All manner of other secrets and not-such-secrets are to be found in what remains of Baghdad. Detailed personal files by Internal Security in Mukhabarat abandoned safe houses in Karada. Compromising files at the torched and looted Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Secret graves in the al-Qarah cemetery of nearly 1,000 political prisoners tortured and mostly hanged at Abu Ghraib prison. And in the basement of another Mukhabarat safe house in Wahda, after a poor torch job, an astonishing room brimming with the latest high-tech surveillance equipment is still practically intact. Possibly much of the equipment was purchased following the meetings detailed at the document found in Qadissiya. From the Alwaeth firm in Syria, the Mukhabarat negotiated to buy machines to conceal fax numbers. They could be delivered in three days. From an unnamed Egyptian firm, it wanted wireless communication systems for buildings, at US$55,000, and a more sophisticated system for $100,000. It also wanted wireless systems from the Iraqi firm, al-Azhal. From an unnamed corporation in Abu Dhabi, the Mukhabarat wanted an array of goods: wireless systems; wireless pinhole cameras with a maximum range of 100 meters (delivery in one month); four-channel AV receivers; pen cameras with a maximum range of 100 meters, connected to video, recording audio and operating on 12V batteries; cameras with a range of 1 kilometers, and upgraded with an outer antenna for 3 kilometers; and night vision goggles with a 1 kilometer range. The goggles could be the most explosive item in the shopping list as Washington had all but accused Syria of selling them to Iraq. According to the document, the negotiations were actually conducted with this unnamed Abu Dhabi corporation. From the Dutch firm Haiman, and also from an unnamed Lebanese firm, the Mukhabarat wanted spray to detect fingerprints on paper and wood, and to detect separate fingerprints from different people. Mukhabarat agents questioned Haiman for any new technology and also wanted to know the prices for card-operated security systems. From the French firm APX, the Mukhabarat wanted to buy listening devices, portable satellites and private security systems. The document states that the Mukhabarat had "direct contacts with a minister in France" who could help the negotiations. The document also states the Mukhabarat desire of trying to improve the security systems of Iraqi embassies around the world. Thus the quest for sophisticated listening devices; small microphones; telephone bugs; transmitter pens; laser systems to check camera performance; listening devices to monitor what happens inside a building from the outside; hidden espionage cameras; night cameras to identify people from a distance of 150 meters; and the smallest color cameras available on the market. From the Alsalam company - country of origin non-identified - the Mukhabarat was trying to buy video cameras inside pens and made-in-Russia long-distance cameras, with a range of 2 to 3 kilometers. In another meeting with an unidentified French firm, the Mukhabarat wanted to purchase equipment to recognize fingertips on glass and wood; machine guns disguised as suitcases; and voice identifying systems that can be matched with databases. It also wanted a spray to identify fingerprints; laser tools to identify fingerprints; a system to identify food poisoning (a key Saddam Hussein obsession); tools to identify explosive materials and give the exact distance between the target and the explosives; and a robot to remove explosives. From the al-Asriya firm - not identified as Iraqi or foreign - the Mukhabarat wanted to buy three different computer systems for $199,000 each (with a discount, it could come to $130,000 each). The systems are called Spread Spectrum (operating between 1,5 and 5 gigahertz). There was an explicit condition for the purchase: the manager of the firm had to send Mukhabarat agents for training out of Iraq - with specialists from Lebanon. And all spare parts should be free. On this particular negotiation, the Mukhabarat was dealing with Muhamad Halewi, a doctor and manager of the Fica firm in Baghdad. And it was also comparing prices with the Abu Dhabi office of a firm called Teltec. The Mukhabarat complains that the prices quoted by the Reeger company - country of origin non-specified - are very high. The document states that if they buy anything from Reeger, training will have to be conducted in Malaysia. The Mukhabarat was actively comparing prices between Iraqi and Syrian firms. It was negotiating to buy Toyota Camrys at $20,500 apiece and Mercedes sedans for $55,000 apiece from the Aldahi dealership in Baghdad, imported from a firm in the United Arab Emirates. From the al-Azar firm, also in Baghdad, it wanted Mercedes vans. From the Jawrah and Hensi corporation in Syria, it received an assurance that the cars could be delivered in two months. And it could also buy on request air-conditioners, Hyundai elevators, copy machines, Panasonic videos and TVs and paper shredders. One thing is certain: not all Mukhabarat papers were shredded as the Americans arrived at the gates of Baghdad. (2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@a... for information on our sales and syndication policies.) Apr 24, 2003 -------------------------------------------------------- Oh no, not again (Apr 23, '03) Saddam everywhere but nowhere to be seen (Apr 23, '03) Affiliates Click here to be one) No material from Asia Times Online may be republished in any form without written permission. Copyright Asia Times Online, 6306 The Center, Queen's Road, Central, Hong Kong. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] 7677 From: mpaulsen6 Date: Tue Aug 26, 2003 10:30pm Subject: STU-III products / OMNI from L3 Com East and other products. I'd like to know if anyone has utilized these items. I'm looking at a deployment for 100-200 of the units and other products from L3 or another vendor, and would like to have a few real world feedbacks. My deployment time is end of q4 04 to q2 05 so I don't want to focus on military/government available only items, as PM's with the companies may have soon to be commercial items ready when we're ready to purchase. Regards, Matt 7678 From: mpaulsen6 Date: Tue Aug 26, 2003 10:34pm Subject: Partnership for Public Warning (PPW) Emergency Alert System (EAS) draft report Comments Wanted The Partnership for Public Warning (PPW) has issued a draft report on the Emergency Alert System (EAS). The purpose of the assessment report is to review the history of EAS, assess the current state of the national warning system, and provide recommendations regarding its future. PPW is now seeking public comment on this report. In addition providing comments, reviewers are invited to suggest recommendations about EAS that should be considered for inclusion in the final report. Comments are due by September 5, 2003. Please see http://www.partnershipforpublicwarning.org/ppw/eas.html for complete details. PPW may be contacted at 7515 Colshire Drive, Mail Stop N655, McLean, VA 22102; (703) 883-2745; e-mail: information@p... 7679 From: mpaulsen6 Date: Tue Aug 26, 2003 10:41pm Subject: ot: Surviving the Secondary Device - the Rules Have Changed Video For those that are first line respondants this may be of interest ************************************************************** Point of Contact: Barbara T. Wisniewski Biehn Training Program Analyst Office for Domestic Preparedness Phone: 202-353-0281 Pager: 877-858-9235 Fax: 202-616-2922 Email: wisniews@o... --- Good morning all The secondary device video is available through the Office for Domestic Preparedness. www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp Synopses of that video and two others follow below. Also currently in production are videos on Incident Command, Unified Command, and Responding to a WMD/HazMat Crime Scene. These are in addition to the monthly CoMNET and Live Response programs that DOJ co-sponsors with TSWG and FEMA. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/comnet.htm You may access all ODP resources through the helpline number below: ODP Help Line - 1-800-368-6498 ODP also operates an information clearinghouse with a virtual library of information and resources, including abstracts, publications, videos, articles, templates, models, samples, and links to other sites. You may access the clearinghouse at http://odp.ncjrs.org You may order up to 5 copies each of the videos through the DOJ Response Center at 1-800-421-6770 For those who require than 5 copies, please fax a request on letterhead to 202-616-2922, please label VIDEO REQUEST Surviving the Secondary Device - the Rules Have Changed Video Produced in partnership with the Georgia Emergency Management Agency, this video is designed to assist public safety officials in making informed decisions concerning the real potential of secondary explosive devices. These devices, which detonate after the initial explosion, target blast survivors, other individuals who converge on the scene, and, more often, responding public safety personnel. The possibility of secondary devices require that public safety officials not only look at how to protect the lives our citizens, but how to protect the responders. This video discusses policies and procedures for effectively responding to and managing a bomb incident, and for better ensuring the safety of the public and the emergency responder. Surviving Weapons of Mass Destruction Video The threat of terrorist incidents involving chemical or biological agents is very real. This training video is designed to enhance the survival and safety of emergency responders during such incidents. Although protecting the public is the principal mission of all public safety agencies, it is also important that emergency responders do not forget their own safety. This video, produced in partnership with the Georgia Emergency Management Agency, approaches safety from the individual responder and an agency perspective. Weapons of Mass Destruction - the First Responder Video Being prepared for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction means knowing what to look for and how to react. Preparation means that all emergency response agencies, including law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services and others, at all levels of government, work together in responding to such events. This video, produced in partnership with the City of Seattle Fire Department, was prepared to familiarize emergency responders with steps they can take to mitigate the effects of such incidents and to better ensure their own and the public's safety. Hope this info is helpful. Regards, Barb Barbara T. Wisniewski Biehn Training Program Analyst Office for Domestic Preparedness Phone: 202-353-0281 Pager: 877-858-9235 Fax: 202-616-2922 Email: wisniews@o... 7680 From: mpaulsen6 Date: Tue Aug 26, 2003 11:21pm Subject: Here we go again... From a few years ago on the list.. this was posted...-m --------------------------------------------------------- Keep this in mind as "Election 2000" gains momentum... On July 1, 1947, witnesses claim a spaceship with five aliens aboard crashed on a sheep and cattle ranch outside Roswell NM, an incident they say has been covered up by the military. On March 31, 1948, exactly nine months after that day, Al Gore was born. -jma =================================================================== Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? =================================================================== James M. Atkinson Phone: (978) 546-3803 Granite Island Group 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk@t... =================================================================== Copyright 2000, James M. Atkinson, All Rights Reserved 7681 From: mpaulsen6 Date: Tue Aug 26, 2003 11:29pm Subject: international intercept capabilities of eschelon, Frenchelon, DCS1000 Hi, Recently this topic has been presented in separate conversations I've had with two gentlemen, one in the industry, one not but related to it as part of their position, so I'd like to know if anyone has current information on these capabilities and the potential reasons for it occurring in a post-cold war scenario with a viewpoint from corporate espionage/information sale over the next 2-3 years from countries that oppose US interests overtly or covertly - ie: france/britain/ US/EU, us/cuba/russia, etc. Thanks, Matt 7682 From: Ocean Group Date: Mon Aug 25, 2003 8:26pm Subject: Req Info... Does anyone know where one can obtain a copy of the National Wiretap Commission report in full? Kind regards John McClane --- Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free. Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com). Version: 6.0.512 / Virus Database: 309 - Release Date: 19/08/2003