Sun Tzu On The Art Of War
The Oldest Military Treatise In The World

SUN TZU ON THE ART OF WAR 
THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD 

Translated from the Chinese with Introduction 
and Critical Notes 

BY 

LIONEL GILES, M.A. 

Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS. 
in the British Museum 

First Published in 1910 

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To my brother Captain Valentine Giles, R.G. in the hope that a
work 2400 years old may yet contain lessons worth consideration
by the soldier of today this translation is affectionately
dedicated.

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Preface 
-------- 

When Lionel Giles began his translation of Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR,
the work was virtually unknown in Europe. Its introduction to
Europe began in 1782 when a French Jesuit Father living in
China, Joseph Amiot, acquired a copy of it, and translated it
into French. It was not a good translation because, according
to Dr. Giles, "[I]t contains a great deal that Sun Tzu did not
write, and very little indeed of what he did."

The first translation into English was published in 1905 in
Tokyo by Capt. E. F. Calthrop, R.F.A. However, this translation
is, in the words of Dr. Giles, "excessively bad." He goes
further in this criticism: "It is not merely a question of
downright blunders, from which none can hope to be wholly
exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard passages were willfully
distorted or slurred over. Such offenses are less pardonable. 
They would not be tolerated in any edition of a Latin or Greek
classic, and a similar standard of honesty ought to be insisted
upon in translations from Chinese."

In 1908 a new edition of Capt. Calthrop's translation was
published in London. It was an improvement on the first --
omissions filled up and numerous mistakes corrected -- but new
errors were created in the process. Dr. Giles, in justifying his
translation, wrote: "It was not undertaken out of any inflated
estimate of my own powers; but I could not help feeling that Sun
Tzu deserved a better fate than had befallen him, and I knew
that, at any rate, I could hardly fail to improve on the work of
my predecessors."

Clearly, Dr. Giles' work established much of the groundwork for
the work of later translators who published their own editions. 
Of the later editions of the ART OF WAR I have examined; two
feature Giles' edited translation and notes, the other two
present the same basic information from the ancient Chinese
commentators found in the Giles edition. Of these four, Giles'
1910 edition is the most scholarly and presents the reader an
incredible amount of information concerning Sun Tzu's text, much
more than any other translation.

The Giles' edition of the ART OF WAR, as stated above, was a
scholarly work. Dr. Giles was a leading sinologue at the time
and an assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and
Manuscripts in the British Museum. Apparently he wanted to
produce a definitive edition, superior to anything else that
existed and perhaps something that would become a standard
translation. It was the best translation available for 50
years. But apparently there was not much interest in Sun Tzu in
English- speaking countries since the it took the start of the
Second World War to renew interest in his work. Several people
published unsatisfactory English translations of Sun Tzu. In
1944, Dr. Giles' translation was edited and published in the
United States in a series of military science books. But it
wasn't until 1963 that a good English translation (by Samuel B.
Griffith and still in print) was published that was an equal to
Giles' translation. While this translation is more lucid than
Dr. Giles' translation, it lacks his copious notes that make his
so interesting.

Dr. Giles produced a work primarily intended for scholars of the
Chinese civilization and language. It contains the Chinese text
of Sun Tzu, the English translation, and voluminous notes along
with numerous footnotes. Unfortunately, some of his notes and
footnotes contain Chinese characters; some are completely
Chinese. Thus, a conversion to a Latin alphabet etext was
difficult.

I did the conversion in complete ignorance of Chinese (except
for what I learned while doing the conversion). Thus, I faced
the difficult task of paraphrasing it while retaining as much of
the important text as I could. Every paraphrase represents a
loss; thus I did what I could to retain as much of the text as
possible.

Because the 1910 text contains a Chinese concordance, I was able
to transliterate proper names, books, and the like at the risk
of making the text more obscure. However, the text, on the
whole, is quite satisfactory for the casual reader, a
transformation made possible by conversion to an etext. However,
I come away from this task with the feeling of loss because I
know that someone with a background in Chinese can do a better
job than I did; any such attempt would be welcomed.

Bob Sutton 
al876@cleveland.freenet.edu 
bobs@gnu.ai.mit.edu 

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INTRODUCTION

Sun Wu and his Book
-------------------

Ssu-ma Ch`ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzu: [1] 
--

Sun Tzu Wu was a native of the Ch`i State. His ART OF WAR
brought him to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu. Ho Lu said
to him: "I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit
your theory of managing soldiers to a slight test?"

Sun Tzu replied: "You may."

Ho Lu asked: "May the test be applied to women?" The answer was
again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made to bring 180
ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzu divided them into two
companies, and placed one of the King's favorite concubines at
the head of each. He then bade them all take spears in their
hands, and addressed them thus: "I presume you know the
difference between front and back, right hand and left hand?"

The girls replied: Yes.

Sun Tzu went on: "When I say "Eyes front," you must look
straight ahead. When I say "Left turn," you must face towards
your left hand. When I say "Right turn," you must face towards
your right hand. When I say "About turn," you must face right
round towards your back."

Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus
explained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to
begin the drill. Then, to the sound of drums, he gave the order
"Right turn." But the girls only burst out laughing. Sun Tzu
said: "If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders
are not thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame."

So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order
"Left turn," whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of
laughter. Sun Tzu: "If words of command are not clear and
distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, the general
is to blame. But if his orders ARE clear, and the soldiers
nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers."

So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be
beheaded. Now the king of Wu was watching the scene from the top
of a raised pavilion; and when he saw that his favorite
concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly alarmed and
hurriedly sent down the following message: "We are now quite
satisfied as to our general's ability to handle troops. If We
are bereft of these two concubines, our meat and drink will lose
their savor. It is our wish that they shall not be beheaded."

Sun Tzu replied: "Having once received His Majesty's commission
to be the general of his forces, there are certain commands of
His Majesty which, acting in that capacity, I am unable to
accept."

Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway
installed the pair next in order as leaders in their place. When
this had been done, the drum was sounded for the drill once
more; and the girls went through all the evolutions, turning to
the right or to the left, marching ahead or wheeling back,
kneeling or standing, with perfect accuracy and precision, not
venturing to utter a sound. Then Sun Tzu sent a messenger to the
King saying: "Your soldiers, Sire, are now properly drilled and
disciplined, and ready for your majesty's inspection. They can
be put to any use that their sovereign may desire; bid them go
through fire and water, and they will not disobey." But the King
replied: "Let our general cease drilling and return to camp. As
for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the troops."

Thereupon Sun Tzu said: "The King is only fond of words, and
cannot translate them into deeds." After that, Ho Lu saw that
Sun Tzu was one who knew how to handle an army, and finally
appointed him general. In the west, he defeated the Ch`u State
and forced his way into Ying, the capital; to the north he put
fear into the States of Ch`i and Chin, and spread his fame
abroad amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tzu shared in the
might of the King.


About Sun Tzu himself this is all that Ssu-ma Ch`ien has to tell
us in this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of his
descendant, Sun Pin, born about a hundred years after his famous
ancestor's death, and also the outstanding military genius of
his time. The historian speaks of him too as Sun Tzu, and in his
preface we read: "Sun Tzu had his feet cut off and yet continued
to discuss the art of war." [3] It seems likely, then, that
"Pin" was a nickname bestowed on him after his mutilation,
unless the story was invented in order to account for the name.
The crowning incident of his career, the crushing defeat of his
treacherous rival P`ang Chuan, will be found briefly related in
Chapter V. ss. 19, note.


To return to the elder Sun Tzu. He is mentioned in two other
passages of the SHIH CHI: --

In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, king of Wu,
took the field with Tzu-hsu [i.e. Wu Yuan] and Po P`ei, and
attacked Ch`u. He captured the town of Shu and slew the two
prince's sons who had formerly been generals of Wu. He was then
meditating a descent on Ying [the capital]; but the general Sun
Wu said: "The army is exhausted. It is not yet possible. We must
wait".... [After further successful fighting,] "in the ninth
year [506 B.C.], King Ho Lu addressed Wu Tzu-hsu and Sun Wu,
saying: "Formerly, you declared that it was not yet possible for
us to enter Ying. Is the time ripe now?" The two men replied:
"Ch`u's general Tzu-ch`ang, [4] is grasping and covetous, and
the princes of T`ang and Ts`ai both have a grudge against him.
If Your Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must
win over T`ang and Ts`ai, and then you may succeed." Ho Lu
followed this advice, [beat Ch`u in five pitched battles and
marched into Ying.] [5]

This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun Wu.
He does not appear to have survived his patron, who died from
the effects of a wound in 496. In another chapter there occurs
this passage: [6]

From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one
after the other: Kao-fan, [7] who was employed by the Chin
State; Wang-tzu, [8] in the service of Ch`i; and Sun Wu, in the
service of Wu. These men developed and threw light upon the
principles of war.

It is obvious enough that Ssu-ma Ch`ien at least had no doubt
about the reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage; and with
one exception, to be noticed presently, he is by far the most
important authority on the period in question. It will not be
necessary, therefore, to say much of such a work as the WU YUEH
CH`UN CH`IU, which is supposed to have been written by Chao Yeh
of the 1st century A.D. The attribution is somewhat doubtful;
but even if it were otherwise, his account would be of little
value, based as it is on the SHIH CHI and expanded with romantic
details. The story of Sun Tzu will be found, for what it is
worth, in chapter 2. The only new points in it worth noting are:
(1) Sun Tzu was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu Tzu-hsu. (2) He
is called a native of Wu. (3) He had previously lived a retired
life, and his contemporaries were unaware of his ability.

The following passage occurs in the Huai-nan Tzu: "When
sovereign and ministers show perversity of mind, it is
impossible even for a Sun Tzu to encounter the foe." Assuming
that this work is genuine (and hitherto no doubt has been cast
upon it), we have here the earliest direct reference for Sun
Tzu, for Huai-nan Tzu died in 122 B.C., many years before the
SHIH CHI was given to the world.

Liu Hsiang (80-9 B.C.) says: "The reason why Sun Tzu at the head
of 30,000 men beat Ch`u with 200,000 is that the latter were
undisciplined."

Teng Ming-shih informs us that the surname "Sun" was bestowed on
Sun Wu's grandfather by Duke Ching of Ch`i [547-490 B.C.]. Sun
Wu's father Sun P`ing, rose to be a Minister of State in Ch`i,
and Sun Wu himself, whose style was Ch`ang-ch`ing, fled to Wu on
account of the rebellion which was being fomented by the kindred
of T`ien Pao. He had three sons, of whom the second, named Ming,
was the father of Sun Pin.

According to this account then, Pin was the grandson of Wu,
which, considering that Sun Pin's victory over Wei was gained in
341 B.C., may be dismissed as chronological impossible. Whence
these data were obtained by Teng Ming-shih I do not know, but of
course no reliance whatever can be placed in them.

An interesting document which has survived from the close of the
Han period is the short preface written by the Great Ts`ao
Ts`ao, or Wei Wu Ti, for his edition of Sun Tzu. I shall give it
in full: --

I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their
advantage. [10] The SHU CHU mentions "the army" among the "eight
objects of government." The I CHING says: "'army' indicates
firmness and justice; the experienced leader will have good
fortune." The SHIH CHING says: "The King rose majestic in his
wrath, and he marshaled his troops." The Yellow Emperor, T`ang
the Completer and Wu Wang all used spears and battle-axes in
order to succor their generation.

The SSU-MA FA says: "If one man slay another of set purpose, he
himself may rightfully be slain." He who relies solely on
warlike measures shall be exterminated; he who relies solely on
peaceful measures shall perish. Instances of this are Fu Ch`ai
[11] on the one hand and Yen Wang on the other. [12] In military
matters, the Sage's rule is normally to keep the peace, and to
move his forces only when occasion requires. He will not use
armed force unless driven to it by necessity.

Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting; but
the work composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. [Sun
Tzu was a native of the Ch`i state, his personal name was Wu. He
wrote the ART OF WAR in 13 chapters for Ho Lu, King of Wu. Its
principles were tested on women, and he was subsequently made a
general. He led an army westwards, crushed the Ch`u state and
entered Ying the capital. In the north, he kept Ch`i and Chin in
awe. A hundred years and more after his time, Sun Pin lived. He
was a descendant of Wu.] [13] In his treatment of deliberation
and planning, the importance of rapidity in taking the field,
[14] clearness of conception, and depth of design, Sun Tzu
stands beyond the reach of carping criticism.

My contemporaries, however, have failed to grasp the full
meaning of his instructions, and while putting into practice the
smaller details in which his work abounds, they have overlooked
its essential purport. That is the motive which has led me to
outline a rough explanation of the whole.

One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement
that the 13 chapters were specially composed for King Ho Lu.
This is supported by the internal evidence of I. ss. 15, in
which it seems clear that some ruler is addressed.

In the bibliographic section of the HAN SHU, there is an entry
which has given rise to much discussion: "The works of Sun Tzu
of Wu in 82 P`IEN (or chapters), with diagrams in 9 CHUAN." It
is evident that this cannot be merely the 13 chapters known to
Ssu-ma Ch`ien, or those we possess today. Chang Shou-chieh
refers to an edition of Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR of which the "13
chapters" formed the first CHUAN, adding that there were two
other CHUAN besides. This has brought forth a theory, that the
bulk of these 82 chapters consisted of other writings of Sun Tzu
-- we should call them apocryphal -- similar to the WEN TA, of
which a specimen dealing with the Nine Situations [15] is
preserved in the T`UNG TIEN, and another in Ho Shin's
commentary. It is suggested that before his interview with Ho
Lu, Sun Tzu had only written the 13 chapters, but afterwards
composed a sort of exegesis in the form of question and answer
between himself and the King. Pi I-hsun, the author of the SUN
TZU HSU LU, backs this up with a quotation from the WU YUEH
CH`UN CH`IU: "The King of Wu summoned Sun Tzu, and asked him
questions about the art of war. Each time he set forth a chapter
of his work, the King could not find words enough to praise
him." As he points out, if the whole work was expounded on the
same scale as in the above- mentioned fragments, the total
number of chapters could not fail to be considerable. Then the
numerous other treatises attributed to Sun Tzu might be
included. The fact that the HAN CHIH mentions no work of Sun Tzu
except the 82 P`IEN, whereas the Sui and T`ang bibliographies
give the titles of others in addition to the "13 chapters," is
good proof, Pi I-hsun thinks, that all of these were contained
in the 82 P`IEN. Without pinning our faith to the accuracy of
details supplied by the WU YUEH CH`UN CH`IU, or admitting the
genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi I-hsun, we may
see in this theory a probable solution of the mystery. Between
Ssu-ma Ch`ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of time for a
luxuriant crop of forgeries to have grown up under the magic
name of Sun Tzu, and the 82 P`IEN may very well represent a
collected edition of these lumped together with the original
work. It is also possible, though less likely, that some of them
existed in the time of the earlier historian and were purposely
ignored by him. [16]

Tu Mu's conjecture seems to be based on a passage which states:
"Wei Wu Ti strung together Sun Wu's Art of War," which in turn
may have resulted from a misunderstanding of the final words of
Ts`ao King's preface. This, as Sun Hsing-yen points out, is only
a modest way of saying that he made an explanatory paraphrase,
or in other words, wrote a commentary on it. On the whole, this
theory has met with very little acceptance. Thus, the SSU K`U
CH`UAN SHU says: "The mention of the 13 chapters in the SHIH CHI
shows that they were in existence before the HAN CHIH, and that
latter accretions are not to be considered part of the original
work. Tu Mu's assertion can certainly not be taken as proof."

There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters
existed in the time of Ssu-ma Ch`ien practically as we have them
now. That the work was then well known he tells us in so many
words. "Sun Tzu's 13 Chapters and Wu Ch`i's Art of War are the
two books that people commonly refer to on the subject of
military matters. Both of them are widely distributed, so I will
not discuss them here." But as we go further back, serious
difficulties begin to arise. The salient fact which has to be
faced is that the TSO CHUAN, the greatest contemporary record,
makes no mention whatsoever of Sun Wu, either as a general or as
a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward circumstance,
that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the story of
Sun Wu as given in the SHIH CHI, but even show themselves
frankly skeptical as to the existence of the man at all. The
most powerful presentment of this side of the case is to be
found in the following disposition by Yeh Shui-hsin: [17] --

It is stated in Ssu-ma Ch`ien's history that Sun Wu was a native
of the Ch`i State, and employed by Wu; and that in the reign of
Ho Lu he crushed Ch`u, entered Ying, and was a great general.
But in Tso's Commentary no Sun Wu appears at all. It is true
that Tso's Commentary need not contain absolutely everything
that other histories contain. But Tso has not omitted to mention
vulgar plebeians and hireling ruffians such as Ying K`ao-shu,
[18] Ts`ao Kuei, [19], Chu Chih-wu and Chuan She-chu [20]. In
the case of Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements were so
brilliant, the omission is much more glaring. Again, details are
given, in their due order, about his contemporaries Wu Yuan and
the Minister P`ei. [21] Is it credible that Sun Wu alone should
have been passed over?

In point of literary style, Sun Tzu's work belongs to the same
school as KUAN TZU, [22] LIU T`AO, [23] and the YUEH YU [24] and
may have been the production of some private scholar living
towards the end of the "Spring and Autumn" or the beginning of
the "Warring States" period. [25] The story that his precepts
were actually applied by the Wu State, is merely the outcome of
big talk on the part of his followers. From the flourishing
period of the Chou dynasty [26] down to the time of the "Spring
and Autumn," all military commanders were statesmen as well, and
the class of professional generals, for conducting external
campaigns, did not then exist. It was not until the period of
the "Six States" [27] that this custom changed. Now although Wu
was an uncivilized State, it is conceivable that Tso should have
left unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general and yet
held no civil office? What we are told, therefore, about
Jang-chu [28] and Sun Wu, is not authentic matter, but the
reckless fabrication of theorizing pundits. The story of Ho Lu's
experiment on the women, in particular, is utterly preposterous
and incredible.

Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Ch`ien as having said that Sun
Wu crushed Ch`u and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No
doubt the impression left on the reader's mind is that he at
least shared in these exploits. The fact may or may not be
significant; but it is nowhere explicitly stated in the SHIH CHI
either that Sun Tzu was general on the occasion of the taking of
Ying, or that he even went there at all. Moreover, as we know
that Wu Yuan and Po P`ei both took part in the expedition, and
also that its success was largely due to the dash and enterprise
of Fu Kai, Ho Lu's younger brother, it is not easy to see how
yet another general could have played a very prominent part in
the same campaign.

Ch`en Chen-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note: --

Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art.
But the fact that he does not appear in the TSO CHUAN, although
he is said to have served under Ho Lu King of Wu, makes it
uncertain what period he really belonged to.

He also says: --

The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch`i may be of genuine antiquity.

It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch`en Chen-sun,
while rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in
Ssu-ma Ch`ien's history, are inclined to accept the date
traditionally assigned to the work which passes under his name.
The author of the HSU LU fails to appreciate this distinction,
and consequently his bitter attack on Ch`en Chen-sun really
misses its mark. He makes one of two points, however, which
certainly tell in favor of the high antiquity of our "13
chapters." "Sun Tzu," he says, "must have lived in the age of
Ching Wang [519-476], because he is frequently plagiarized in
subsequent works of the Chou, Ch`in and Han dynasties." The two
most shameless offenders in this respect are Wu Ch`i and
Huai-nan Tzu, both of them important historical personages in
their day. The former lived only a century after the alleged
date of Sun Tzu, and his death is known to have taken place in
381 B.C. It was to him, according to Liu Hsiang, that Tseng Shen
delivered the TSO CHUAN, which had been entrusted to him by its
author. [29] Now the fact that quotations from the ART OF WAR,
acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found in so many authors of
different epochs, establishes a very strong anterior to them
all, -- in other words, that Sun Tzu's treatise was already in
existence towards the end of the 5th century B.C. Further proof
of Sun Tzu's antiquity is furnished by the archaic or wholly
obsolete meanings attaching to a number of the words he uses. A
list of these, which might perhaps be extended, is given in the
HSU LU; and though some of the interpretations are doubtful, the
main argument is hardly affected thereby. Again, it must not be
forgotten that Yeh Shui- hsin, a scholar and critic of the first
rank, deliberately pronounces the style of the 13 chapters to
belong to the early part of the fifth century. Seeing that he is
actually engaged in an attempt to disprove the existence of Sun
Wu himself, we may be sure that he would not have hesitated to
assign the work to a later date had he not honestly believed the
contrary. And it is precisely on such a point that the judgment
of an educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal
evidence is not far to seek. Thus in XIII. ss. 1, there is an
unmistakable allusion to the ancient system of land-tenure which
had already passed away by the time of Mencius, who was anxious
to see it revived in a modified form. [30] The only warfare Sun
Tzu knows is that carried on between the various feudal princes,
in which armored chariots play a large part. Their use seems to
have entirely died out before the end of the Chou dynasty. He
speaks as a man of Wu, a state which ceased to exist as early as
473 B.C. On this I shall touch presently.

But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the
chances of its being other than a bona fide production are
sensibly diminished. The great age of forgeries did not come
until long after. That it should have been forged in the period
immediately following 473 is particularly unlikely, for no one,
as a rule, hastens to identify himself with a lost cause. As for
Yeh Shui-hsin's theory, that the author was a literary recluse,
that seems to me quite untenable. If one thing is more apparent
than another after reading the maxims of Sun Tzu, it is that
their essence has been distilled from a large store of personal
observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only of a
born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of generalization,
but also of a practical soldier closely acquainted with the
military conditions of his time. To say nothing of the fact that
these sayings have been accepted and endorsed by all the
greatest captains of Chinese history, they offer a combination
of freshness and sincerity, acuteness and common sense, which
quite excludes the idea that they were artificially concocted in
the study. If we admit, then, that the 13 chapters were the
genuine production of a military man living towards the end of
the "CH`UN CH`IU" period, are we not bound, in spite of the
silence of the TSO CHUAN, to accept Ssu-ma Ch`ien's account in
its entirety? In view of his high repute as a sober historian,
must we not hesitate to assume that the records he drew upon for
Sun Wu's biography were false and untrustworthy? The answer, I
fear, must be in the negative. There is still one grave, if not
fatal, objection to the chronology involved in the story as told
in the SHIH CHI, which, so far as I am aware, nobody has yet
pointed out. There are two passages in Sun Tzu in which he
alludes to contemporary affairs. The first in in VI. ss. 21: --

Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our
own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter
of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.

The other is in XI. ss. 30: --

Asked if an army can be made to imitate the SHUAI-JAN, I should
answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are enemies;
yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught
by a storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as
the left hand helps the right.

These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the
date of composition. They assign the work to the period of the
struggle between Wu and Yueh. So much has been observed by Pi
I-hsun. But what has hitherto escaped notice is that they also
seriously impair the credibility of Ssu-ma Ch`ien's narrative.
As we have seen above, the first positive date given in
connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is then spoken of as a
general, acting as confidential adviser to Ho Lu, so that his
alleged introduction to that monarch had already taken place,
and of course the 13 chapters must have been written earlier
still. But at that time, and for several years after, down to
the capture of Ying in 506, Ch`u and not Yueh, was the great
hereditary enemy of Wu. The two states, Ch`u and Wu, had been
constantly at war for over half a century, [31] whereas the
first war between Wu and Yueh was waged only in 510, [32] and
even then was no more than a short interlude sandwiched in the
midst of the fierce struggle with Ch`u. Now Ch`u is not
mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The natural inference is
that they were written at a time when Yueh had become the prime
antagonist of Wu, that is, after Ch`u had suffered the great
humiliation of 506. At this point, a table of dates may be found
useful.

B.C. |
|
514 | Accession of Ho Lu.
512 | Ho Lu attacks Ch`u, but is dissuaded from entering Ying, 
 |    the capital. SHI CHI mentions Sun Wu as general.
511 | Another attack on Ch`u.
510 | Wu makes a successful attack on Yueh. This is the first 
 |    war between the two states.
509 |
 or | Ch`u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at Yu-chang.
508 |
506 | Ho Lu attacks Ch`u with the aid of T`ang and Ts`ai. 
 |    Decisive battle of Po-chu, and capture of Ying. Last 
 |    mention of Sun Wu in SHIH CHI.
505 | Yueh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. Wu 
 |    is beaten by Ch`in and evacuates Ying.
504 | Ho Lu sends Fu Ch`ai to attack Ch`u.
497 | Kou Chien becomes King of Yueh.
496 | Wu attacks Yueh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at Tsui-li. 
 |    Ho Lu is killed.
494 | Fu Ch`ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of Fu-
 |    chaio, and enters the capital of Yueh.
485 |
 or | Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu Tzu-hsu.
484 |
482 | Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu Ch`ai.
478 |
 to | Further attacks by Yueh on Wu.
476 |
475 | Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu.
473 | Final defeat and extinction of Wu.

The sentence quoted above from VI. ss. 21 hardly strikes me as
one that could have been written in the full flush of victory.
It seems rather to imply that, for the moment at least, the tide
had turned against Wu, and that she was getting the worst of the
struggle. Hence we may conclude that our treatise was not in
existence in 505, before which date Yueh does not appear to have
scored any notable success against Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so
that if the book was written for him, it must have been during
the period 505-496, when there was a lull in the hostilities, Wu
having presumably exhausted by its supreme effort against Ch`u.
On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the tradition
connecting Sun Wu's name with Ho Lu, it might equally well have
seen the light between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period
482-473, when Yueh was once again becoming a very serious
menace. [33] We may feel fairly certain that the author, whoever
he may have been, was not a man of any great eminence in his own
day. On this point the negative testimony of the TSO CHUAN far
outweighs any shred of authority still attaching to the SHIH
CHI, if once its other facts are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen,
however, makes a feeble attempt to explain the omission of his
name from the great commentary. It was Wu Tzu-hsu, he says, who
got all the credit of Sun Wu's exploits, because the latter
(being an alien) was not rewarded with an office in the State.

How then did the Sun Tzu legend originate? It may be that the
growing celebrity of the book imparted by degrees a kind of
factitious renown to its author. It was felt to be only right
and proper that one so well versed in the science of war should
have solid achievements to his credit as well. Now the capture
of Ying was undoubtedly the greatest feat of arms in Ho Lu's
reign; it made a deep and lasting impression on all the
surrounding states, and raised Wu to the short-lived zenith of
her power. Hence, what more natural, as time went on, than that
the acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly
identified with that campaign, at first perhaps only in the
sense that his brain conceived and planned it; afterwards, that
it was actually carried out by him in conjunction with Wu Yuan,
[34] Po P`ei and Fu Kai?

It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the outline
of Sun Tzu's life must be based almost wholly on conjecture.
With this necessary proviso, I should say that he probably
entered the service of Wu about the time of Ho Lu's accession,
and gathered experience, though only in the capacity of a
subordinate officer, during the intense military activity which
marked the first half of the prince's reign. [35] If he rose to
be a general at all, he certainly was never on an equal footing
with the three above mentioned. He was doubtless present at the
investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu's sudden
collapse in the following year. Yueh's attack at this critical
juncture, when her rival was embarrassed on every side, seems to
have convinced him that this upstart kingdom was the great enemy
against whom every effort would henceforth have to be directed.
Sun Wu was thus a well-seasoned warrior when he sat down to
write his famous book, which according to my reckoning must have
appeared towards the end, rather than the beginning of Ho Lu's
reign. The story of the women may possibly have grown out of
some real incident occurring about the same time. As we hear no
more of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is hardly likely
to have survived his patron or to have taken part in the
death-struggle with Yueh, which began with the disaster at Tsui-
li.

If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a
certain irony in the fate which decreed that China's most
illustrious man of peace should be contemporary with her
greatest writer on war.


The Text of Sun Tzu
-------------------

I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun
Tzu's text. The quotations that occur in early authors go to
show that the "13 chapters" of which Ssu-ma Ch`ien speaks were
essentially the same as those now extant. We have his word for
it that they were widely circulated in his day, and can only
regret that he refrained from discussing them on that account.
Sun Hsing-yen says in his preface: --

During the Ch`in and Han dynasties Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR was in
general use amongst military commanders, but they seem to have
treated it as a work of mysterious import, and were unwilling to
expound it for the benefit of posterity. Thus it came about that
Wei Wu was the first to write a commentary on it.

As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to
suppose that Ts`ao Kung tampered with the text. But the text
itself is often so obscure, and the number of editions which
appeared from that time onward so great, especially during the
T`ang and Sung dynasties, that it would be surprising if
numerous corruptions had not managed to creep in. Towards the
middle of the Sung period, by which time all the chief
commentaries on Sun Tzu were in existence, a certain Chi
T`ien-pao published a work in 15 CHUAN entitled "Sun Tzu with
the collected commentaries of ten writers." There was another
text, with variant readings put forward by Chu Fu of Ta-hsing,
which also had supporters among the scholars of that period; but
in the Ming editions, Sun Hsing- yen tells us, these readings
were for some reason or other no longer put into circulation.
Thus, until the end of the 18th century, the text in sole
possession of the field was one derived from Chi T`ien-pao's
edition, although no actual copy of that important work was
known to have survived. That, therefore, is the text of Sun Tzu
which appears in the War section of the great Imperial
encyclopedia printed in 1726, the KU CHIN T`U SHU CHI CH`ENG.
Another copy at my disposal of what is practically the same
text, with slight variations, is that contained in the "Eleven
philosophers of the Chou and Ch`in dynasties" [1758]. And the
Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop's first edition is evidently a
similar version which has filtered through Japanese channels. So
things remained until Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a distinguished
antiquarian and classical scholar, who claimed to be an actual
descendant of Sun Wu, [36] accidentally discovered a copy of Chi
T`ien-pao's long-lost work, when on a visit to the library of
the Hua-yin temple. [37] Appended to it was the I SHUO of Cheng
Yu-Hsien, mentioned in the T`UNG CHIH, and also believed to have
perished. This is what Sun Hsing-yen designates as the "original
edition (or text)" -- a rather misleading name, for it cannot by
any means claim to set before us the text of Sun Tzu in its
pristine purity. Chi T`ien-pao was a careless compiler, and
appears to have been content to reproduce the somewhat debased
version current in his day, without troubling to collate it with
the earliest editions then available. Fortunately, two versions
of Sun Tzu, even older than the newly discovered work, were
still extant, one buried in the T`UNG TIEN, Tu Yu's great
treatise on the Constitution, the other similarly enshrined in
the T`AI P`ING YU LAN encyclopedia. In both the complete text is
to be found, though split up into fragments, intermixed with
other matter, and scattered piecemeal over a number of different
sections. Considering that the YU LAN takes us back to the year
983, and the T`UNG TIEN about 200 years further still, to the
middle of the T`ang dynasty, the value of these early
transcripts of Sun Tzu can hardly be overestimated. Yet the idea
of utilizing them does not seem to have occurred to anyone until
Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Government instructions, undertook a
thorough recension of the text. This is his own account: --

Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzu which
his editors had handed down, the Government ordered that the
ancient edition [of Chi T`ien-pao] should be used, and that the
text should be revised and corrected throughout. It happened
that Wu Nien-hu, the Governor Pi Kua, and Hsi, a graduate of the
second degree, had all devoted themselves to this study,
probably surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I have had the
whole work cut on blocks as a textbook for military men.

The three individuals here referred to had evidently been
occupied on the text of Sun Tzu prior to Sun Hsing-yen's
commission, but we are left in doubt as to the work they really
accomplished. At any rate, the new edition, when ultimately
produced, appeared in the names of Sun Hsing-yen and only one
co- editor Wu Jen-shi. They took the "original edition" as their
basis, and by careful comparison with older versions, as well as
the extant commentaries and other sources of information such as
the I SHUO, succeeded in restoring a very large number of
doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what must be
accepted as the closes approximation we are ever likely to get
to Sun Tzu's original work. This is what will hereafter be
denominated the "standard text."

The copy which I have used belongs to a reissue dated 1877. it
is in 6 PEN, forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early
philosophical works in 83 PEN. [38] It opens with a preface by
Sun Hsing-yen (largely quoted in this introduction), vindicating
the traditional view of Sun Tzu's life and performances, and
summing up in remarkably concise fashion the evidence in its
favor. This is followed by Ts`ao Kung's preface to his edition,
and the biography of Sun Tzu from the SHIH CHI, both translated
above. Then come, firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien's I SHUO, [39] with
author's preface, and next, a short miscellany of historical and
bibliographical information entitled SUN TZU HSU LU, compiled by
Pi I-hsun. As regards the body of the work, each separate
sentence is followed by a note on the text, if required, and
then by the various commentaries appertaining to it, arranged in
chronological order. These we shall now proceed to discuss
briefly, one by one.


The Commentators
----------------

Sun Tzu can boast an exceptionally long distinguished roll of
commentators, which would do honor to any classic. Ou-yang Hsiu
remarks on this fact, though he wrote before the tale was
complete, and rather ingeniously explains it by saying that the
artifices of war, being inexhaustible, must therefore be
susceptible of treatment in a great variety of ways.

1. TS`AO TS`AO or Ts`ao Kung, afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti
[A.D. 155-220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the
earliest commentary on Sun Tzu actually came from the pen of
this extraordinary man, whose biography in the SAN KUO CHIH
reads like a romance. One of the greatest military geniuses that
the world has seen, and Napoleonic in the scale of his
operations, he was especially famed for the marvelous rapidity
of his marches, which has found expression in the line "Talk of
Ts`ao Ts`ao, and Ts`ao Ts`ao will appear." Ou-yang Hsiu says of
him that he was a great captain who "measured his strength
against Tung Cho, Lu Pu and the two Yuan, father and son, and
vanquished them all; whereupon he divided the Empire of Han with
Wu and Shu, and made himself king. It is recorded that whenever
a council of war was held by Wei on the eve of a far-reaching
campaign, he had all his calculations ready; those generals who
made use of them did not lose one battle in ten; those who ran
counter to them in any particular saw their armies incontinently
beaten and put to flight." Ts`ao Kung's notes on Sun Tzu, models
of austere brevity, are so thoroughly characteristic of the
stern commander known to history, that it is hard indeed to
conceive of them as the work of a mere LITTERATEUR. Sometimes,
indeed, owing to extreme compression, they are scarcely
intelligible and stand no less in need of a commentary than the
text itself. [40]

2. MENG SHIH. The commentary which has come down to us under
this name is comparatively meager, and nothing about the author
is known. Even his personal name has not been recorded. Chi
T`ien-pao's edition places him after Chia Lin,and Ch`ao Kung- wu
also assigns him to the T`ang dynasty, [41] but this is a
mistake. In Sun Hsing-yen's preface, he appears as Meng Shih of
the Liang dynasty [502-557]. Others would identify him with Meng
K`ang of the 3rd century. He is named in one work as the last of
the "Five Commentators," the others being Wei Wu Ti, Tu Mu,
Ch`en Hao and Chia Lin.

3. LI CH`UAN of the 8th century was a well-known writer on
military tactics. One of his works has been in constant use down
to the present day. The T`UNG CHIH mentions "Lives of famous
generals from the Chou to the T`ang dynasty" as written by him.
[42] According to Ch`ao Kung-wu and the T`IEN-I-KO catalogue, he
followed a variant of the text of Sun Tzu which differs
considerably from those now extant. His notes are mostly short
and to the point, and he frequently illustrates his remarks by
anecdotes from Chinese history.

4. TU YU (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary on Sun
Tzu, his notes being taken from the T`UNG TIEN, the encyclopedic
treatise on the Constitution which was his life- work. They are
largely repetitions of Ts`ao Kung and Meng Shih, besides which
it is believed that he drew on the ancient commentaries of Wang
Ling and others. Owing to the peculiar arrangement of T`UNG
TIEN, he has to explain each passage on its merits, apart from
the context, and sometimes his own explanation does not agree
with that of Ts`ao Kung, whom he always quotes first. Though not
strictly to be reckoned as one of the "Ten Commentators," he was
added to their number by Chi T`ien-pao, being wrongly placed
after his grandson Tu Mu.

5. TU MU (803-852) is perhaps the best known as a poet -- a
bright star even in the glorious galaxy of the T`ang period. We
learn from Ch`ao Kung-wu that although he had no practical
experience of war, he was extremely fond of discussing the
subject, and was moreover well read in the military history of
the CH`UN CH`IU and CHAN KUO eras. His notes, therefore, are
well worth attention. They are very copious, and replete with
historical parallels. The gist of Sun Tzu's work is thus
summarized by him: "Practice benevolence and justice, but on the
other hand make full use of artifice and measures of
expediency." He further declared that all the military triumphs
and disasters of the thousand years which had elapsed since Sun
Tzu's death would, upon examination, be found to uphold and
corroborate, in every particular, the maxims contained in his
book. Tu Mu's somewhat spiteful charge against Ts`ao Kung has
already been considered elsewhere.

6. CH`EN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch`ao
Kung-wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary on
Sun Tzu because Ts`ao Kung's on the one hand was too obscure and
subtle, and that of Tu Mu on the other too long-winded and
diffuse. Ou-yang Hsiu, writing in the middle of the 11th
century, calls Ts`ao Kung, Tu Mu and Ch`en Hao the three chief
commentators on Sun Tzu, and observes that Ch`en Hao is
continually attacking Tu Mu's shortcomings. His commentary,
though not lacking in merit, must rank below those of his
predecessors.

7. CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the T`ang dynasty, for
his commentary on Sun Tzu is mentioned in the T`ang Shu and was
afterwards republished by Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together
with those of Meng Shih and Tu Yu. It is of somewhat scanty
texture, and in point of quality, too, perhaps the least
valuable of the eleven.

8. MEI YAO-CH`EN (1002-1060), commonly known by his "style" as
Mei Sheng-yu, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His
commentary was published with a laudatory preface by the great
Ou-yang Hsiu, from which we may cull the following: --

Later scholars have misread Sun Tzu, distorting his words and
trying to make them square with their own one-sided views. Thus,
though commentators have not been lacking, only a few have
proved equal to the task. My friend Sheng-yu has not fallen into
this mistake. In attempting to provide a critical commentary for
Sun Tzu's work, he does not lose sight of the fact that these
sayings were intended for states engaged in internecine warfare;
that the author is not concerned with the military conditions
prevailing under the sovereigns of the three ancient dynasties,
[43] nor with the nine punitive measures prescribed to the
Minister of War. [44] Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction,
but his meaning is always deep. Whether the subject be marching
an army, or handling soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or
controlling the forces of victory, it is always systematically
treated; the sayings are bound together in strict logical
sequence, though this has been obscured by commentators who have
probably failed to grasp their meaning. In his own commentary,
Mei Sheng-yu has brushed aside all the obstinate prejudices of
these critics, and has tried to bring out the true meaning of
Sun Tzu himself. In this way, the clouds of confusion have been
dispersed and the sayings made clear. I am convinced that the
present work deserves to be handed down side by side with the
three great commentaries; and for a great deal that they find in
the sayings, coming generations will have constant reason to
thank my friend Sheng-yu.

Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am
inclined to endorse this favorable judgment, and would certainly
place him above Ch`en Hao in order of merit.

9. WANG HSI, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original in
some of his interpretations, but much less judicious than Mei
Yao-ch`en, and on the whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is
fond of comparing his own commentary with that of Ts`ao Kung,
but the comparison is not often flattering to him. We learn from
Ch`ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised the ancient text of Sun Tzu,
filling up lacunae and correcting mistakes. [45]

10. HO YEN-HSI of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this
commentator is given as above by Cheng Ch`iao in the TUNG CHIH,
written about the middle of the twelfth century, but he appears
simply as Ho Shih in the YU HAI, and Ma Tuan-lin quotes Ch`ao
Kung-wu as saying that his personal name is unknown. There seems
to be no reason to doubt Cheng Ch`iao's statement, otherwise I
should have been inclined to hazard a guess and identify him
with one Ho Ch`u-fei, the author of a short treatise on war, who
lived in the latter part of the 11th century. Ho Shih's
commentary, in the words of the T`IEN-I-KO catalogue, "contains
helpful additions" here and there, but is chiefly remarkable for
the copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from the dynastic
histories and other sources.

11. CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no great
originality perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid
exposition. His commentator is based on that of Ts`ao Kung,
whose terse sentences he contrives to expand and develop in
masterly fashion. Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say that much
of Ts`ao Kung's commentary would have remained cloaked in its
pristine obscurity and therefore valueless. His work is not
mentioned in the Sung history, the T`UNG K`AO, or the YU HAI,
but it finds a niche in the T`UNG CHIH, which also names him as
the author of the "Lives of Famous Generals." [46]

It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all have
flourished within so short a space of time. Ch`ao Kung-wu
accounts for it by saying: "During the early years of the Sung
dynasty the Empire enjoyed a long spell of peace, and men ceased
to practice the art of war. but when [Chao] Yuan-hao's rebellion
came [1038-42] and the frontier generals were defeated time
after time, the Court made strenuous inquiry for men skilled in
war, and military topics became the vogue amongst all the high
officials. Hence it is that the commentators of Sun Tzu in our
dynasty belong mainly to that period. [47]

Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others
whose work has not come down to us. The SUI SHU mentions four,
namely Wang Ling (often quoted by Tu Yu as Wang Tzu); Chang Tzu-
shang; Chia Hsu of Wei; [48] and Shen Yu of Wu. The T`ANG SHU
adds Sun Hao, and the T`UNG CHIH Hsiao Chi, while the T`U SHU
mentions a Ming commentator, Huang Jun-yu. It is possible that
some of these may have been merely collectors and editors of
other commentaries, like Chi T`ien-pao and Chi Hsieh, mentioned
above.


Appreciations of Sun Tzu
------------------------

Sun Tzu has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of
some of China's greatest men. Among the famous generals who are
known to have studied his pages with enthusiasm may be mentioned
Han Hsin (d. 196 B.C.), [49] Feng I (d. 34 A.D.), [50] Lu Meng
(d. 219), [51] and Yo Fei (1103-1141). [52] The opinion of Ts`ao
Kung, who disputes with Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese
military annals, has already been recorded. [53] Still more
remarkable, in one way, is the testimony of purely literary men,
such as Su Hsun (the father of Su Tung-p`o), who wrote several
essays on military topics, all of which owe their chief
inspiration to Sun Tzu. The following short passage by him is
preserved in the YU HAI: [54] --

Sun Wu's saying, that in war one cannot make certain of
conquering, [55] is very different indeed from what other books
tell us. [56] Wu Ch`i was a man of the same stamp as Sun Wu:
they both wrote books on war, and they are linked together in
popular speech as "Sun and Wu." But Wu Ch`i's remarks on war are
less weighty, his rules are rougher and more crudely stated, and
there is not the same unity of plan as in Sun Tzu's work, where
the style is terse, but the meaning fully brought out.

The following is an extract from the "Impartial Judgments in the
Garden of Literature" by Cheng Hou: --

Sun Tzu's 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all
military men's training, but also compel the most careful
attention of scholars and men of letters. His sayings are terse
yet elegant, simple yet profound, perspicuous and eminently
practical. Such works as the LUN YU, the I CHING and the great
Commentary, [57] as well as the writings of Mencius, Hsun K`uang
and Yang Chu, all fall below the level of Sun Tzu.

Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the
criticism, although he dislikes the audacious comparison with
the venerated classical works. Language of this sort, he says,
"encourages a ruler's bent towards unrelenting warfare and
reckless militarism."


Apologies for War
-----------------

Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest
peace-loving nation on earth, we are in some danger of
forgetting that her experience of war in all its phases has also
been such as no modern State can parallel. Her long military
annals stretch back to a point at which they are lost in the
mists of time. She had built the Great Wall and was maintaining
a huge standing army along her frontier centuries before the
first Roman legionary was seen on the Danube. What with the
perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal States, the grim
conflicts with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the
centralization of government, the terrific upheavals which
accompanied the overthrow of so many dynasties, besides the
countless rebellions and minor disturbances that have flamed up
and flickered out again one by one, it is hardly too much to say
that the clash of arms has never ceased to resound in one
portion or another of the Empire.

No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains to
whom China can point with pride. As in all countries, the
greatest are fond of emerging at the most fateful crises of her
history. Thus, Po Ch`i stands out conspicuous in the period when
Ch`in was entering upon her final struggle with the remaining
independent states. The stormy years which followed the break-up
of the Ch`in dynasty are illuminated by the transcendent genius
of Han Hsin. When the House of Han in turn is tottering to its
fall, the great and baleful figure of Ts`ao Ts`ao dominates the
scene. And in the establishment of the T`ang dynasty,one of the
mightiest tasks achieved by man, the superhuman energy of Li
Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T`ai Tsung) was seconded by the
brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need fear
comparison with the greatest names in the military history of
Europe.

In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, from
Lao Tzu downwards, and especially as reflected in the standard
literature of Confucianism, has been consistently pacific and
intensely opposed to militarism in any form. It is such an
uncommon thing to find any of the literati defending warfare on
principle, that I have thought it worth while to collect and
translate a few passages in which the unorthodox view is upheld.
The following, by Ssu-ma Ch`ien, shows that for all his ardent
admiration of Confucius, he was yet no advocate of peace at any
price: --

Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish
violence and cruelty, to give peace to troublous times, to
remove difficulties and dangers, and to succor those who are in
peril. Every animal with blood in its veins and horns on its
head will fight when it is attacked. How much more so will man,
who carries in his breast the faculties of love and hatred, joy
and anger! When he is pleased, a feeling of affection springs up
within him; when angry, his poisoned sting is brought into play.
That is the natural law which governs his being.... What then
shall be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all great
issues, and without any appreciation of relative values, who can
only bark out their stale formulas about "virtue" and
"civilization," condemning the use of military weapons? They
will surely bring our country to impotence and dishonor and the
loss of her rightful heritage; or, at the very least, they will
bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice of territory and
general enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately refuse to modify the
position they have taken up. The truth is that, just as in the
family the teacher must not spare the rod, and punishments
cannot be dispensed with in the State, so military chastisement
can never be allowed to fall into abeyance in the Empire. All
one can say is that this power will be exercised wisely by some,
foolishly by others, and that among those who bear arms some
will be loyal and others rebellious. [58]

The next piece is taken from Tu Mu's preface to his commentary
on Sun Tzu: --

War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions
of government. It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch`iu,
both disciples of Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and
hearing of litigation, the imprisonment of offenders and their
execution by flogging in the market- place, are all done by
officials. But the wielding of huge armies, the throwing down of
fortified cities, the hauling of women and children into
captivity, and the beheading of traitors -- this is also work
which is done by officials. The objects of the rack and of
military weapons are essentially the same. There is no intrinsic
difference between the punishment of flogging and cutting off
heads in war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are
easily dealt with, only a small amount of force need be
employed: hence the use of military weapons and wholesale
decapitation. In both cases, however, the end in view is to get
rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the
good.... Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: "Have you, Sir, acquired
your military aptitude by study, or is it innate?" Jan Yu
replied: "It has been acquired by study." [59] "How can that be
so," said Chi-sun, "seeing that you are a disciple of
Confucius?" "It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; "I was taught by
Confucius. It is fitting that the great Sage should exercise
both civil and military functions, though to be sure my
instruction in the art of fighting has not yet gone very far."

Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the
"civil" and the "military," and the limitation of each to a
separate sphere of action, or in what year of which dynasty it
was first introduced, is more than I can say. But, at any rate,
it has come about that the members of the governing class are
quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or do so only in a
shamefaced manner. If any are bold enough to discuss the
subject, they are at once set down as eccentric individuals of
coarse and brutal propensities. This is an extraordinary
instance in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men
unhappily lose sight of fundamental principles.

When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch`eng Wang, he
regulated ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of
scholarship and learning; yet when the barbarians of the River
Huai revolted, [60] he sallied forth and chastised them. When
Confucius held office under the Duke of Lu, and a meeting was
convened at Chia-ku, [61] he said: "If pacific negotiations are
in progress, warlike preparations should have been made
beforehand." He rebuked and shamed the Marquis of Ch`i, who
cowered under him and dared not proceed to violence. How can it
be said that these two great Sages had no knowledge of military
matters?

We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzu in high esteem.
He also appeals to the authority of the Classics: --

Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: "I have
never studied matters connected with armies and battalions."
[62] Replying to K`ung Wen-tzu, he said: I have not been
instructed about buff-coats and weapons." But if we turn to the
meeting at Chia-ku, we find that he used armed force against the
men of Lai, so that the marquis of Ch`i was overawed. Again,
when the inhabitants of Pi revolted, the ordered his officers to
attack them, whereupon they were defeated and fled in confusion.
He once uttered the words: "If I fight, I conquer." [63] And Jan
Yu also said: "The Sage exercises both civil and military
functions." [64] Can it be a fact that Confucius never studied
or received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that
he did not specially choose matters connected with armies and
fighting to be the subject of his teaching.

Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzu, writes in similar strain:
--

Confucius said: "I am unversed in military matters." [65] He
also said: "If I fight, I conquer." Confucius ordered ceremonies
and regulated music. Now war constitutes one of the five classes
of State ceremonial, [66] and must not be treated as an
independent branch of study. Hence, the words "I am unversed in"
must be taken to mean that there are things which even an
inspired Teacher does not know. Those who have to lead an army
and devise stratagems, must learn the art of war. But if one can
command the services of a good general like Sun Tzu, who was
employed by Wu Tzu-hsu, there is no need to learn it oneself.
Hence the remark added by Confucius: "If I fight, I conquer."

The men of the present day, however, willfully interpret these
words of Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant
that books on the art of war were not worth reading. With blind
persistency, they adduce the example of Chao Kua, who pored over
his father's books to no purpose, [67] as a proof that all
military theory is useless. Again, seeing that books on war have
to do with such things as opportunism in designing plans, and
the conversion of spies, they hold that the art is immoral and
unworthy of a sage. These people ignore the fact that the
studies of our scholars and the civil administration of our
officials also require steady application and practice before
efficiency is reached. The ancients were particularly chary of
allowing mere novices to botch their work. [68] Weapons are
baneful [69] and fighting perilous; and useless unless a general
is in constant practice, he ought not to hazard other men's
lives in battle. [70] Hence it is essential that Sun Tzu's 13
chapters should be studied.

Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi [71] in the art of
war. Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general bearings,
but would not pursue his studies to their proper outcome, the
consequence being that he was finally defeated and overthrown.
He did not realize that the tricks and artifices of war are
beyond verbal computation. Duke Hsiang of Sung and King Yen of
Hsu were brought to destruction by their misplaced humanity. The
treacherous and underhand nature of war necessitates the use of
guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. There is a case on
record of Confucius himself having violated an extorted oath,
[72] and also of his having left the Sung State in disguise.
[73] Can we then recklessly arraign Sun Tzu for disregarding
truth and honesty?


Bibliography
------------

The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun
Tzu. The notes on each have been drawn principally from the SSU
K`U CH`UAN SHU CHIEN MING MU LU, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq.

1. WU TZU, in 1 CHUAN or 6 chapters. By Wu Ch`i (d. 381 B.C.). A
genuine work. See SHIH CHI, ch. 65.

2. SSU-MA FA, in 1 CHUAN or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to
Ssu-ma Jang-chu of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must
be early, as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are
constantly to be met within its pages. See SHIH CHI, ch. 64. The
SSU K`U CH`UAN SHU (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the oldest three
treatises on war, SUN TZU, WU TZU and SSU-MA FA, are, generally
speaking, only concerned with things strictly military -- the
art of producing, collecting, training and drilling troops, and
the correct theory with regard to measures of expediency, laying
plans, transport of goods and the handling of soldiers -- in
strong contrast to later works, in which the science of war is
usually blended with metaphysics, divination and magical arts in
general.

3. LIU T`AO, in 6 CHUAN, or 60 chapters. Attributed to Lu Wang
(or Lu Shang, also known as T`ai Kung) of the 12th century B.C.
[74] But its style does not belong to the era of the Three
Dynasties. Lu Te-ming (550-625 A.D.) mentions the work, and
enumerates the headings of the six sections so that the forgery
cannot have been later than Sui dynasty.

4. WEI LIAO TZU, in 5 CHUAN. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent.
B.C.), who studied under the famous Kuei-ku Tzu. The work
appears to have been originally in 31 chapters, whereas the text
we possess contains only 24. Its matter is sound enough in the
main, though the strategical devices differ considerably from
those of the Warring States period. It is been furnished with a
commentary by the well-known Sung philosopher Chang Tsai.

5. SAN LUEH, in 3 CHUAN. Attributed to Huang-shih Kung, a
legendary personage who is said to have bestowed it on Chang
Liang (d. 187 B.C.) in an interview on a bridge. But here again,
the style is not that of works dating from the Ch`in or Han
period. The Han Emperor Kuang Wu [25-57 A.D.] apparently quotes
from it in one of his proclamations; but the passage in question
may have been inserted later on, in order to prove the
genuineness of the work. We shall not be far out if we refer it
to the Northern Sung period [420-478 A.D.], or somewhat earlier.

6. LI WEI KUNG WEN TUI, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a
dialogue between T`ai Tsung and his great general Li Ching, it
is usually ascribed to the latter. Competent authorities
consider it a forgery, though the author was evidently well
versed in the art of war.

7. LI CHING PING FA (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is
a short treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the T`ung Tien, but
not published separately. This fact explains its omission from
the SSU K`U CH`UAN SHU.

8. WU CH`I CHING, in 1 CHUAN. Attributed to the legendary
minister Feng Hou, with exegetical notes by Kung-sun Hung of the
Han dynasty (d. 121 B.C.), and said to have been eulogized by
the celebrated general Ma Lung (d. 300 A.D.). Yet the earliest
mention of it is in the SUNG CHIH. Although a forgery, the work
is well put together.

Considering the high popular estimation in which Chu-ko Liang
has always been held, it is not surprising to find more than one
work on war ascribed to his pen. Such are (1) the SHIH LIU TS`E
(1 CHUAN), preserved in the YUNG LO TA TIEN; (2) CHIANG YUAN (1
CHUAN); and (3) HSIN SHU (1 CHUAN), which steals wholesale from
Sun Tzu. None of these has the slightest claim to be considered
genuine.

Most of the large Chinese encyclopedias contain extensive
sections devoted to the literature of war. The following
references may be found useful: --

T`UNG TIEN (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148-162.
T`AI P`ING YU LAN (983), ch. 270-359.
WEN HSIEN TUNG K`AO (13th cent.), ch. 221.
YU HAI (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141.
SAN TS`AI T`U HUI (16th cent).
KUANG PO WU CHIH (1607), ch. 31, 32.
CH`IEN CH`IO LEI SHU (1632), ch. 75.
YUAN CHIEN LEI HAN (1710), ch. 206-229.
KU CHIN T`U SHU CHI CH`ENG (1726), section XXX, esp. ch. 81-
 90.
HSU WEN HSIEN T`UNG K`AO (1784), ch. 121-134.
HUANG CH`AO CHING SHIH WEN PIEN (1826), ch. 76, 77.

The bibliographical sections of certain historical works 
also deserve mention: --

CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch. 30.
SUI SHU, ch. 32-35.
CHIU T`ANG SHU, ch. 46, 47.
HSIN T`ANG SHU, ch. 57,60.
SUNG SHIH, ch. 202-209.
T`UNG CHIH (circa 1150), ch. 68.

To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the 
Imperial Library: --

SSU K`U CH`UAN SHU TSUNG MU T`I YAO (1790), ch. 99, 100.


Footnotes
---------

1. SHI CHI, ch. 65.

2. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C.

3. SHI CHI, ch. 130.

4. The appellation of Nang Wa.

5. SHI CHI, ch. 31.

6. SHI CHI, ch. 25.

7. The appellation of Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under the year
637.

8. Wang-tzu Ch`eng-fu, ch. 32, year 607.

9. The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to a work
of the Han dynasty, which says: "Ten LI outside the WU gate [of
the city of Wu, now Soochow in Kiangsu] there is a great mound,
raised to commemorate the entertainment of Sun Wu of Ch`i, who
excelled in the art of war, by the King of Wu."

10. "They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened
wood to make arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the
Empire in awe."

11. The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and
overthrown by Kou chien, King of Yueh, in 473 B.C. See post.

12. King Yen of Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen
says in his preface: "His humanity brought him to destruction."

13. The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the T`U
SHU, and may be an interpolation. It was known, however to Chang
Shou-chieh of the T`ang dynasty, and appears in the T`AI P`ING
YU LAN.

14. Ts`ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap.
II, perhaps especially of ss. 8.

15. See chap. XI.

16. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that WU TZU, which is
not in 6 chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the HAN CHIH.
Likewise, the CHUNG YUNG is credited with 49 chapters, though
now only in one only. In the case of very short works, one is
tempted to think that P`IEN might simply mean "leaves."

17. Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty [1151-1223].

18. He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins.

19. See Chapter 7, ss. 27 and Chapter 11, ss. 28.

20. See Chapter 11, ss. 28. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of
his name.

21. I.e. Po P`ei. See ante.

22. The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large
additions have been made by later hands. Kuan chung died in 645
B.C.

23. See infra, beginning of INTRODUCTION.

24. I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter
of another work. Why that chapter should be singled out,
however, is not clear.

25. About 480 B.C.

26. That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung.

27. In the 3rd century B.C.

28. Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was T`ien, lived in the
latter half of the 6th century B.C., and is also believed to
have written a work on war. See SHIH CHI, ch. 64, and infra at
the beginning of the INTRODUCTION.

29. See Legge's Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge
thinks that the TSO CHUAN must have been written in the 5th
century, but not before 424 B.C.

30. See MENCIUS III. 1. iii. 13-20.

31. When Wu first appears in the CH`UN CH`IU in 584, it is
already at variance with its powerful neighbor. The CH`UN CH`IU
first mentions Yueh in 537, the TSO CHUAN in 601.

32. This is explicitly stated in the TSO CHUAN, XXXII, 2.

33. There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud
would tend to grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus
more fully justify the language used in XI. ss. 30.

34. With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse: -- a
spurious treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because
he was a great general. Here we have an obvious inducement to
forgery. Sun Wu, on the other hand, cannot have been widely
known to fame in the 5th century.

35. From TSO CHUAN: "From the date of King Chao's accession
[515] there was no year in which Ch`u was not attacked by Wu."

36. Preface ad fin: "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are
really descended from Sun Tzu. I am ashamed to say that I only
read my ancestor's work from a literary point of view, without
comprehending the military technique. So long have we been
enjoying the blessings of peace!"

37. Hoa-yin is about 14 miles from T`ung-kuan on the eastern
border of Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by
those about the ascent of the Western Sacred Mountain. It is
mentioned in a text as being "situated five LI east of the
district city of Hua-yin. The temple contains the Hua-shan
tablet inscribed by the T`ang Emperor Hsuan Tsung [713-755]."

38. See my "Catalogue of Chinese Books" (Luzac & Co., 1908),
no. 40.

39. This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzu.

40. Cf. Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo: "His
commentary is frequently obscure; it furnishes a clue, but does
not fully develop the meaning."

41. WEN HSIEN T`UNG K`AO, ch. 221.

42. It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently
discovered chapters 1, 4 and 5 of this lost work in the "Grottos
of the Thousand Buddhas." See B.E.F.E.O., t. VIII, nos. 3-4, p.
525.

43. The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named
was nominally existent in Sun Tzu's day, it retained hardly a
vestige of power, and the old military organization had
practically gone by the board. I can suggest no other
explanation of the passage.

44. See CHOU LI, xxix. 6-10.

45. T`UNG K`AO, ch. 221.

46. This appears to be still extant. See Wylie's "Notes," p. 91
(new edition).

47. T`UNG K`AO, loc. cit.

48. A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the
SAN KUO CHIH, ch. 10.

49. See XI. ss. 58, note.

50. HOU HAN SHU, ch. 17 ad init.

51. SAN KUO CHIH, ch. 54.

52. SUNG SHIH, ch. 365 ad init.

53. The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of
acquainting themselves with Sun Tzu are not behindhand in their
praise. In this connection, I may perhaps be excused for quoting
from a letter from Lord Roberts, to whom the sheets of the
present work were submitted previous to publication: "Many of
Sun Wu's maxims are perfectly applicable to the present day, and
no. 11 [in Chapter VIII] is one that the people of this country
would do well to take to heart."

54. Ch. 140.

55. See IV. ss. 3.

56. The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2.

57. The TSO CHUAN.

58. SHIH CHI, ch. 25, fol. I.

59. Cf. SHIH CHI, ch 47.

60. See SHU CHING, preface ss. 55.

61. See SHIH CHI, ch. 47.

62. Lun Yu, XV. 1.

63. I failed to trace this utterance.

64. Supra.

65. Supra.

66. The other four being worship, mourning, entertainment of
guests, and festive rites. See SHU CHING, ii. 1. III. 8, and
CHOU LI, IX. fol. 49.

67. See XIII. ss. 11, note.

68. This is a rather obscure allusion to the TSO CHUAN, where
Tzu-ch`an says: "If you have a piece of beautiful brocade, you
will not employ a mere learner to make it up."

69. Cf. TAO TE CHING, ch. 31.

70. Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See LUN YU,
XIII. 29, 30.

71. Better known as Hsiang Yu [233-202 B.C.].

72. SHIH CHI, ch. 47.

73. SHIH CHI, ch. 38.

74. See XIII. ss. 27, note. Further details on T`ai Kung will be
found in the SHIH CHI, ch. 32 ad init. Besides the tradition
which makes him a former minister of Chou Hsin, two other
accounts of him are there given, according to which he would
appear to have been first raised from a humble private station
by Wen Wang.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

I. LAYING PLANS

[Ts`ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the
title of this chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in
the temple selected by the general for his temporary use, or as
we should say, in his tent. See. ss. 26.]

1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the
State. 2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to
safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on
no account be neglected. 3. The art of war, then, is governed by
five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's
deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions
obtaining in the field. 4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2)
Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.

[It appears from what follows that Sun Tzu means by "Moral Law"
a principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in its
moral aspect. One might be tempted to render it by "morale,"
were it not considered as an attribute of the ruler in ss. 13.]

5, 6. The MORAL LAW causes the people to be in complete accord
with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of
their lives, undismayed by any danger.

[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "Without constant practice,
the officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for
battle; without constant practice, the general will be wavering
and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."]

7. HEAVEN signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and
seasons.

[The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two
words here. Meng Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, waxing
and waning" of Heaven. Wang Hsi, however, may be right in saying
that what is meant is "the general economy of Heaven," including
the five elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds, and other
phenomena.]

8. EARTH comprises distances, great and small; danger and
security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and
death. 9. The COMMANDER stands for the virtues of wisdom,
sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness.

[The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity or
benevolence; (2) uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self-
control, or "proper feeling;" (4) wisdom; (5) sincerity or good
faith. Here "wisdom" and "sincerity" are put before "humanity or
benevolence," and the two military virtues of "courage" and
"strictness" substituted for "uprightness of mind" and "self-
respect, self-control, or 'proper feeling.'"]

10. By METHOD AND DISCIPLINE are to be understood the marshaling
of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank
among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies
may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure. 11.
These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who
knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine
the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a
comparison, in this wise: -- 13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns
is imbued with the Moral law?

[I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. ss. 5.]

(2) Which of the two generals has most ability? (3) With whom
lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?

[See ss. 7,8]

(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?

[Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts`ao Ts`ao (A.D.
155-220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in
accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to
standing crops, he condemned himself to death for having allowed
him horse to shy into a field of corn! However, in lieu of
losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of
justice by cutting off his hair. Ts`ao Ts`ao's own comment on
the present passage is characteristically curt: "when you lay
down a law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the
offender must be put to death."]

(5) Which army is stronger?

[Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch`en puts it, freely
rendered, "ESPIRIT DE CORPS and 'big battalions.'"]

(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?

[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "Without constant practice,
the officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for
battle; without constant practice, the general will be wavering
and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."]

(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward
and punishment?

[On which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit
will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?]

14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast
victory or defeat. 15. The general that hearkens to my counsel
and acts upon it, will conquer: --let such a one be retained in
command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts
upon it, will suffer defeat: --let such a one be dismissed!

[The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu's treatise
was composed expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho Lu, king
of the Wu State.]

16. While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also
of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
17. According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify
one's plans.

[Sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish
theoric." He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract
principles; "for," as Chang Yu puts it, "while the main laws of
strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and
sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in
attempting to secure a favorable position in actual warfare." On
the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the
cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what
his plans and calculations were for the morrow, because, as he
explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and
would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. The
Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who will attack the first
tomorrow -- I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord Uxbridge.
"Well," continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea
of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can
you expect me to tell you what mine are?" [1] ]

18. All warfare is based on deception.

[The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by
every soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in
so many military qualities, was especially distinguished by "the
extraordinary skill with which he concealed his movements and
deceived both friend and foe."]

19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using
our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must
make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must
make him believe we are near.

20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and
crush him.

[All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When he is in
disorder, crush him." It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzu
is still illustrating the uses of deception in war.]

21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is
in superior strength, evade him.

22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate
him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

[Wang Tzu, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays
with his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning
weakness and immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.]

23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.

[This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch`en has the note:
"while we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire
himself out." The YU LAN has "Lure him on and tire him out."]

If his forces are united, separate them.

[Less plausible is the interpretation favored by most of the
commentators: "If sovereign and subject are in accord, put
division between them."]

24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not
expected.

25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be
divulged beforehand.

26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in
his temple ere the battle is fought.

[Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a
temple to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to
take the field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan
of campaign.]

The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations
beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few
calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It
is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely
to win or lose.


[1] "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

II. WAGING WAR


[Ts`ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must first
count the cost," which prepares us for the discovery that the
subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from the
title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.]

1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in
the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and
a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers,

[The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to Chang
Yu, used for the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier, and
designed for purposes of defense. Li Ch`uan, it is true, says
that the latter were light, but this seems hardly probable. It
is interesting to note the analogies between early Chinese
warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In each case, the war-
chariot was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus
round which was grouped a certain number of foot-soldiers. With
regard to the numbers given here, we are informed that each
swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy
chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided
up into a thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots
and a hundred men.]

with provisions enough to carry them a thousand LI,

[2.78 modern LI go to a mile. The length may have varied
slightly since Sun Tzu's time.]

the expenditure at home and at the front, including
entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and
sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a
thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising
an army of 100,000 men.

2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in
coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will
be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your
strength.

3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the
State will not be equal to the strain.

4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your
strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains
will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man,
however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must
ensue. 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war,
cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by
any of the commentators. Ts`ao Kung, Li Ch`uan, Meng Shih, Tu
Yu, Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch`en have notes to the effect that a
general, though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer
through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: "Haste may be
stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and
treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they
bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty
by remarking: "Lengthy operations mean an army growing old,
wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the
people; true cleverness insures against the occurrence of such
calamities." Chang Yu says: "So long as victory can be attained,
stupid haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness." Now Sun Tzu
says nothing whatever, except possibly by implication, about
ill-considered haste being better than ingenious but lengthy
operations. What he does say is something much more guarded,
namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness
can never be anything but foolish -- if only because it means
impoverishment to the nation. In considering the point raised
here by Sun Tzu, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator will
inevitably occur to the mind. That general deliberately measured
the endurance of Rome against that of Hannibals's isolated army,
because it seemed to him that the latter was more likely to
suffer from a long campaign in a strange country. But it is
quite a moot question whether his tactics would have proved
successful in the long run. Their reversal it is true, led to
Cannae; but this only establishes a negative presumption in
their favor.]

6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from
prolonged warfare.

7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of
war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of
carrying it on.

[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous
effects of a long war can realize the supreme importance of
rapidity in bringing it to a close. Only two commentators seem
to favor this interpretation, but it fits well into the logic of
the context, whereas the rendering, "He who does not know the
evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is distinctly
pointless.]

8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither
are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.

[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in
waiting for reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for
fresh supplies, but crosses the enemy's frontier without delay.
This may seem an audacious policy to recommend, but with all
great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the
value of time -- that is, being a little ahead of your opponent
-- has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the
nicest calculations with regard to commissariat.]

9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the
enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.

[The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally
means "things to be used", and is meant in the widest sense. It
includes all the impedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.]

10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be
maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to
maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be
impoverished.

[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with
the next, though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement,
moreover, is so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some
corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to Chinese
commentators that an emendation may be necessary for the sense,
and we get no help from them there. The Chinese words Sun Tzu
used to indicate the cause of the people's impoverishment
clearly have reference to some system by which the husbandmen
sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why
should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except
because the State or Government is too poor to do so?]

11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to
go up; and high prices cause the people's substance to be
drained away.

[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left its
own territory. Ts`ao Kung understands it of an army that has
already crossed the frontier.]

12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be
afflicted by heavy exactions.

13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength,
the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths
of their income will be dissipated;

[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted not of
3/10, but of 7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to be
extracted from our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: "The
PEOPLE being regarded as the essential part of the State, and
FOOD as the people's heaven, is it not right that those in
authority should value and be careful of both?"]

while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses,
breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields,
protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount
to four-tenths of its total revenue.

15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy.
One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty
of one's own, and likewise a single PICUL of his provender is
equivalent to twenty from one's own store.

[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of
transporting one cartload to the front. A PICUL is a unit of
measure equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).]

16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to
anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy,
they must have their rewards.

[Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the
soldiers see the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you
capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so
that all your men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his
own account."]

17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots
have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first.
Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and
the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The
captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own
strength.

19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy
campaigns.

[As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled with."
Sun Tzu here reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is
intended to enforce."]

20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the
arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether
the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM


1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of
all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter
and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to
recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a
regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.

[The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa,
consisted nominally of 12500 men; according to Ts`ao Kung, the
equivalent of a regiment contained 500 men, the equivalent to a
detachment consists from any number between 100 and 500, and the
equivalent of a company contains from 5 to 100 men. For the last
two, however, Chang Yu gives the exact figures of 100 and 5
respectively.]

2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme
excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's
resistance without fighting.

[Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of
the old Chinese general. Moltke's greatest triumph, the
capitulation of the huge French army at Sedan, was won
practically without bloodshed.]

3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's
plans;

[Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full
force of the Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of
defense, whereby one might be content to foil the enemy's
stratagems one after another, but an active policy of counter-
attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note: "When the
enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate
him by delivering our own attack first."]

the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces;

[Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzu,
in speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous
states or principalities into which the China of his day was
split up.]

the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field;

[When he is already at full strength.]

and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly
be avoided.

[Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted
upon it in 1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength
before Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than
probable that they would have been masters of the situation
before the British were ready seriously to oppose them.]

The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various
implements of war, will take up three whole months;

[It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here translated as
"mantlets", described. Ts`ao Kung simply defines them as "large
shields," but we get a better idea of them from Li Ch`uan, who
says they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting
the city walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest a sort
of Roman TESTUDO, ready made. Tu Mu says they were wheeled
vehicles used in repelling attacks, but this is denied by Ch`en
Hao. See supra II. 14. The name is also applied to turrets on
city walls. Of the "movable shelters" we get a fairly clear
description from several commentators. They were wooden
missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled from within,
covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey
parties of men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling
up the encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now
called "wooden donkeys."]

and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take
three months more.

[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the
level of the enemy's walls in order to discover the weak points
in the defense, and also to destroy the fortified turrets
mentioned in the preceding note.]

5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch
his men to the assault like swarming ants,

[This vivid simile of Ts`ao Kung is taken from the spectacle of
an army of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the
general, losing patience at the long delay, may make a premature
attempt to storm the place before his engines of war are ready.]

with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the
town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a
siege.

[We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before
Port Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to
record.]

6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops
without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying
siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy
operations in the field.

[Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but does
no harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who
after having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed "Father
and mother of the people."]

7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the
Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be
complete.

[Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter
part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different
meaning: "And thus, the weapon not being blunted by use, its
keenness remains perfect."]

This is the method of attacking by stratagem. 8. It is the rule
in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround
him; if five to one, to attack him;

[Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.]

if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.

[Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight,
indeed, it appears to violate a fundamental principle of war.
Ts'ao Kung, however, gives a clue to Sun Tzu's meaning: "Being
two to the enemy's one, we may use one part of our army in the
regular way, and the other for some special diversion." Chang Yu
thus further elucidates the point: "If our force is twice as
numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up into two
divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon
his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed
from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in
front." This is what is meant by saying that 'one part may be
used in the regular way, and the other for some special
diversion.' Tu Mu does not understand that dividing one's army
is simply an irregular, just as concentrating it is the regular,
strategical method, and he is too hasty in calling this a
mistake."]

9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;

[Li Ch`uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase:
"If attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only
the able general will fight."]

if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;

[The meaning, "we can WATCH the enemy," is certainly a great
improvement on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be
no very good authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that
the saying only applies if the other factors are equal; a small
difference in numbers is often more than counterbalanced by
superior energy and discipline.]

if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.

10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small
force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.

11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark
is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the
bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.

[As Li Ch`uan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; if the
general's ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly
versed in his profession), his army will lack strength."]

12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune
upon his army:--

13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being
ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called
hobbling the army.

[Li Ch`uan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the legs
of a thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One would
naturally think of "the ruler" in this passage as being at home,
and trying to direct the movements of his army from a distance.
But the commentators understand just the reverse, and quote the
saying of T`ai Kung: "A kingdom should not be governed from
without, and army should not be directed from within." Of course
it is true that, during an engagement, or when in close touch
with the enemy, the general should not be in the thick of his
own troops, but a little distance apart. Otherwise, he will be
liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and give wrong
orders.]

14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he
administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which
obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's
minds.

[Ts`ao Kung's note is, freely translated: "The military sphere
and the civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can't handle an
army in kid gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice
are the principles on which to govern a state, but not an army;
opportunism and flexibility, on the other hand, are military
rather than civil virtues to assimilate the governing of an
army"--to that of a State, understood.]

15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without
discrimination,

[That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right
place.]

through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to
circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

[I follow Mei Yao-ch`en here. The other commentators refer not
to the ruler, as in SS. 13, 14, but to the officers he employs.
Thus Tu Yu says: "If a general is ignorant of the principle of
adaptability, he must not be entrusted with a position of
authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The skillful employer of men will
employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, and the
stupid man. For the wise man delights in establishing his merit,
the brave man likes to show his courage in action, the covetous
man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man has no
fear of death."]

16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is
sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply
bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.

17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
(1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.

[Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the
offensive; if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the
defensive. He will invariably conquer who knows whether it is
right to take the offensive or the defensive.]

(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and
inferior forces.

[This is not merely the general's ability to estimate numbers
correctly, as Li Ch`uan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds
the saying more satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it
is possible with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and vice
versa. The secret lies in an eye for locality, and in not
letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzu says: 'With a
superior force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make
for difficult ground.'"]

(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit
throughout all its ranks. (4) He will win who, prepared himself,
waits to take the enemy unprepared. (5) He will win who has
military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.

[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "It is the sovereign's
function to give broad instructions, but to decide on battle it
is the function of the general." It is needless to dilate on the
military disasters which have been caused by undue interference
with operations in the field on the part of the home government.
Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to
the fact that he was not hampered by central authority.]

18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself,
you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know
yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will
also suffer a defeat.

[Li Ch`uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch`in, who in
383 A.D. marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. When
warned not to despise an enemy who could command the services of
such men as Hsieh An and Huan Ch`ung, he boastfully replied: "I
have the population of eight provinces at my back, infantry and
horsemen to the number of one million; why, they could dam up
the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their whips into
the stream. What danger have I to fear?" Nevertheless, his
forces were soon after disastrously routed at the Fei River, and
he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.]

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in
every battle.

[Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the
offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand on the
defensive." He adds: "Attack is the secret of defense; defense
is the planning of an attack." It would be hard to find a better
epitome of the root-principle of war.]

-----------------------------------------------------------------

IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS


[Ts`ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for the
title of this chapter: "marching and countermarching on the part
of the two armies with a view to discovering each other's
condition." Tu Mu says: "It is through the dispositions of an
army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your
dispositions, and your condition will remain secret, which leads
to victory,; show your dispositions, and your condition will
become patent, which leads to defeat." Wang Hsi remarks that the
good general can "secure success by modifying his tactics to
meet those of the enemy."]

1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves
beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an
opportunity of defeating the enemy.

2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but
the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy
himself.

[That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy's part.]

3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against
defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

[Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition of
his troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting
precautions."]

4. Hence the saying: One may KNOW how to conquer without being
able to DO it.

5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to
defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.

[I retain the sense found in a similar passage in ss. 1-3, in
spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me. The
meaning they give, "He who cannot conquer takes the defensive,"
is plausible enough.]

6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength;
attacking, a superabundance of strength.

7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most
secret recesses of the earth;

[Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor
indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy
may not know his whereabouts."]

he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost
heights of heaven.

[Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like
a thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This
is the opinion of most of the commentators.]

Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on
the other, a victory that is complete.

8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common
herd is not the acme of excellence.

[As Ts`ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant before it
has germinated," to foresee the event before the action has
begun. Li Ch`uan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when
about to attack the vastly superior army of Chao, which was
strongly entrenched in the city of Ch`eng-an, said to his
officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and
shall meet again at dinner." The officers hardly took his words
seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had
already worked out in his mind the details of a clever
stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the
city and inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."]

9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer
and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"

[True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, to
move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy's intentions and balk
his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding
a drop of blood." Sun Tzu reserves his approbation for things
that "the world's coarse thumb And finger fail to plumb."]

10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;

["Autumn" hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is
finest in autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a
very common one in Chinese writers.]

to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the
noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

[Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and
quick hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250
stone; Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see
objects no bigger than a mustard seed; and Shih K`uang, a blind
musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.]

11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not
only wins, but excels in winning with ease.

[The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in easy
conquering." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "He who only sees the obvious,
wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface
of things, wins with ease."]

12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom
nor credit for courage.

[Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are
gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the world
as large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for
wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there has
been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage."]

13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes.

[Ch`en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no
futile attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained by
Chang Yu: "One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever
though he may be at winning pitched battles, is also liable on
occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look into the
future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, will
never make a blunder and therefore invariably win."]

Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory,
for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.

14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position
which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for
defeating the enemy.

[A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes. "Position"
need not be confined to the actual ground occupied by the
troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations which
a wise general will make to increase the safety of his army.]

15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks
battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is
destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for
victory.

[Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans
which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if
you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength
alone, victory will no longer be assured."]

16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly
adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to
control success.

17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly,
Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly,
Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.

18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of
quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity;
Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of
chances.

[It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in
the Chinese. The first seems to be surveying and measurement of
the ground, which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy's
strength, and to make calculations based on the data thus
obtained; we are thus led to a general weighing-up, or
comparison of the enemy's chances with our own; if the latter
turn the scale, then victory ensues. The chief difficulty lies
in third term, which in the Chinese some commentators take as a
calculation of NUMBERS, thereby making it nearly synonymous with
the second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of as
a consideration of the enemy's general position or condition,
while the third term is the estimate of his numerical strength.
On the other hand, Tu Mu says: "The question of relative
strength having been settled, we can bring the varied resources
of cunning into play." Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, but
weakens it. However, it points to the third term as being a
calculation of numbers.]

19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's
weight placed in the scale against a single grain.

[Literally, "a victorious army is like an I (20 oz.) weighed
against a SHU (1/24 oz.); a routed army is a SHU weighed against
an I." The point is simply the enormous advantage which a
disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over one
demoralized by defeat." Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix.
2, makes the I to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi's
statement that it equaled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch`uan of the
T`ang dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.]

20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of
pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

V. ENERGY


1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same
principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question
of dividing up their numbers.

[That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc.,
with subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us
of Han Hsin's famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once
said to him: "How large an army do you think I could lead?" "Not
more than 100,000 men, your Majesty." "And you?" asked the
Emperor. "Oh!" he answered, "the more the better."]

2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise
different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a
question of instituting signs and signals.

3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the
enemy's attack and remain unshaken - this is effected by
maneuvers direct and indirect.

[We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzu's
treatise, the discussion of the CHENG and the CH`I." As it is by
no means easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms,
or to render them consistently by good English equivalents; it
may be as well to tabulate some of the commentators' remarks on
the subject before proceeding further. Li Ch`uan: "Facing the
enemy is CHENG, making lateral diversion is CH`I. Chia Lin: "In
presence of the enemy, your troops should be arrayed in normal
fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal maneuvers must
be employed." Mei Yao-ch`en: "CH`I is active, CHENG is passive;
passivity means waiting for an opportunity, activity beings the
victory itself." Ho Shih: "We must cause the enemy to regard our
straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, and
vice versa; thus CHENG may also be CH`I, and CH`I may also be
CHENG." He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when
marching ostensibly against Lin- chin (now Chao-i in Shensi),
suddenly threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden
tubs, utterly disconcerting his opponent. [Ch`ien Han Shu, ch.
3.] Here, we are told, the march on Lin-chin was CHENG, and the
surprise maneuver was CH`I." Chang Yu gives the following
summary of opinions on the words: "Military writers do not agree
with regard to the meaning of CH`I and CHENG. Wei Liao Tzu [4th
cent. B.C.] says: 'Direct warfare favors frontal attacks,
indirect warfare attacks from the rear.' Ts`ao Kung says: 'Going
straight out to join battle is a direct operation; appearing on
the enemy's rear is an indirect maneuver.' Li Wei-kung [6th and
7th cent. A.D.] says: 'In war, to march straight ahead is CHENG;
turning movements, on the other hand, are CH`I.' These writers
simply regard CHENG as CHENG, and CH`I as CH`I; they do not note
that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each
other like the two sides of a circle [see infra, ss. 11]. A
comment on the T`ang Emperor T`ai Tsung goes to the root of the
matter: 'A CH`I maneuver may be CHENG, if we make the enemy look
upon it as CHENG; then our real attack will be CH`I, and vice
versa. The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he
cannot fathom our real intent.'" To put it perhaps a little more
clearly: any attack or other operation is CHENG, on which the
enemy has had his attention fixed; whereas that is CH`I," which
takes him by surprise or comes from an unexpected quarter. If
the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to be CH`I," it
immediately becomes CHENG."]

4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed
against an egg - this is effected by the science of weak points
and strong.

5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining
battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure
victory.

[Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by
pounding the enemy's flanks or falling on his rear." A brilliant
example of "indirect tactics" which decided the fortunes of a
campaign was Lord Roberts' night march round the Peiwar Kotal in
the second Afghan war. [1]

6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as
Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams;
like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four
seasons, they pass away to return once more.

[Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of CH`I
and CHENG." But at present Sun Tzu is not speaking of CHENG at
all, unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a
clause relating to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as
has already been pointed out, the two are so inextricably
interwoven in all military operations, that they cannot really
be considered apart. Here we simply have an expression, in
figurative language, of the almost infinite resource of a great
leader.]

7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the
combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can
ever be heard.

8. There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow,
red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more
hues than can ever been seen.

9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid,
salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more
flavors than can ever be tasted.

10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack -
the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give
rise to an endless series of maneuvers.

11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn.
It is like moving in a circle - you never come to an end. Who
can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?

12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will
even roll stones along in its course.

13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a
falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.

[The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the
context it is used defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu
Mu defines this word as "the measurement or estimation of
distance." But this meaning does not quite fit the illustrative
simile in ss. 15. Applying this definition to the falcon, it
seems to me to denote that instinct of SELF RESTRAINT which
keeps the bird from swooping on its quarry until the right
moment, together with the power of judging when the right moment
has arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly
important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very
instant at which it will be most effective. When the "Victory"
went into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace,
she was for several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell
before replying with a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he
was within close range, when the broadside he brought to bear
worked fearful havoc on the enemy's nearest ships.]

14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset,
and prompt in his decision.

[The word "decision" would have reference to the measurement of
distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before
striking. But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzu meant to use
the word in a figurative sense comparable to our own idiom
"short and sharp." Cf. Wang Hsi's note, which after describing
the falcon's mode of attack, proceeds: "This is just how the
'psychological moment' should be seized in war."]

15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow;
decision, to the releasing of a trigger.

[None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the
simile of energy and the force stored up in the bent cross- bow
until released by the finger on the trigger.]

16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming
disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and
chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be
proof against defeat.

[Mei Yao-ch`en says: "The subdivisions of the army having been
previously fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the
separating and joining, the dispersing and collecting which will
take place in the course of a battle, may give the appearance of
disorder when no real disorder is possible. Your formation may
be without head or tail, your dispositions all topsy-turvy, and
yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question."]

17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated
fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.

[In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary
to tone down the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts`ao
Kung throws out a hint of the meaning in his brief note: "These
things all serve to destroy formation and conceal one's
condition." But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite plainly: "If
you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the enemy on, you
must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to display
timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have extreme
courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make
the enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding strength."]

18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a
question of subdivision;

[See supra, ss. 1.]

concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund
of latent energy;

[The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word
here differently than anywhere else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu
says: "seeing that we are favorably circumstanced and yet make
no move, the enemy will believe that we are really afraid."]

masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical
dispositions.

[Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first
Han Emperor: "Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies
to report on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned,
carefully concealed all their able-bodied men and well-fed
horses, and only allowed infirm soldiers and emaciated cattle to
be seen. The result was that spies one and all recommended the
Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone opposed them,
saying: "When two countries go to war, they are naturally
inclined to make an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet
our spies have seen nothing but old age and infirmity. This is
surely some ruse on the part of the enemy, and it would be
unwise for us to attack." The Emperor, however, disregarding
this advice, fell into the trap and found himself surrounded at
Po-teng."]

19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move
maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy
will act.

[Ts`ao Kung's note is "Make a display of weakness and want." Tu
Mu says: "If our force happens to be superior to the enemy's,
weakness may be simulated in order to lure him on; but if
inferior, he must be led to believe that we are strong, in order
that he may keep off. In fact, all the enemy's movements should
be determined by the signs that we choose to give him." Note the
following anecdote of Sun Pin, a descendent of Sun Wu: In 341
B.C., the Ch`i State being at war with Wei, sent T`ien Chi and
Sun Pin against the general P`ang Chuan, who happened to be a
deadly personal enemy of the later. Sun Pin said: "The Ch`i
State has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our
adversary despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to
account." Accordingly, when the army had crossed the border into
Wei territory, he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on the first
night, 50,000 on the next, and the night after only 20,000.
P`ang Chuan pursued them hotly, saying to himself: "I knew these
men of Ch`i were cowards: their numbers have already fallen away
by more than half." In his retreat, Sun Pin came to a narrow
defile, with he calculated that his pursuers would reach after
dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed
upon it the words: "Under this tree shall P`ang Chuan die."
Then, as night began to fall, he placed a strong body of archers
in ambush near by, with orders to shoot directly they saw a
light. Later on, P`ang Chuan arrived at the spot, and noticing
the tree, struck a light in order to read what was written on
it. His body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows, and
his whole army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu Mu's
version of the story; the SHIH CHI, less dramatically but
probably with more historical truth, makes P`ang Chuan cut his
own throat with an exclamation of despair, after the rout of his
army.] ]

He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.

20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a
body of picked men he lies in wait for him.

[With an emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads, "He
lies in wait with the main body of his troops."]

21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy,
and does not require too much from individuals.

[Tu Mu says: "He first of all considers the power of his army in
the bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account,
and uses each men according to his capabilities. He does not
demand perfection from the untalented."]

Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined
energy.

22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as
it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature
of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to
move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill,
but if round-shaped, to go rolling down.

[Ts`au Kung calls this "the use of natural or inherent power."]

23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the
momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of
feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.

[The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu's opinion, is the
paramount importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden
rushes. "Great results," he adds, "can thus be achieved with
small forces."]


[1] "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG


[Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as
follows: "Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the
offensive and the defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with
direct and indirect methods. The good general acquaints himself
first with the theory of attack and defense, and then turns his
attention to direct and indirect methods. He studies the art of
varying and combining these two methods before proceeding to the
subject of weak and strong points. For the use of direct or
indirect methods arises out of attack and defense, and the
perception of weak and strong points depends again on the above
methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the
chapter on Energy."]

1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the
coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is
second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive
exhausted.

2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy,
but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.

[One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own terms
or fights not at all. [1] ]

3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to
approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can
make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.

[In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the
second, he will strike at some important point which the enemy
will have to defend.]

4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;

[This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao- Ch`en's
interpretation of I. ss. 23.]

if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly
encamped, he can force him to move.

5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march
swiftly to places where you are not expected.

6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it
marches through country where the enemy is not.

[Ts`ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. like
"a bolt from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun
places that are defended, attack in unexpected quarters."]

7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only
attack places which are undefended.

[Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that is
to say, where the general is lacking in capacity, or the
soldiers in spirit; where the walls are not strong enough, or
the precautio