EMBARGOED FOR 3 P.M. RELEASE                                   AG
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1994                           (202) 616-2771


   ATTORNEY GENERAL MAKES KEY ESCROW ENCRYPTION ANNOUNCEMENTS

     Attorney General Janet Reno today announced selection of the
two U.S. Government entities that will hold the escrowed key
components for encryption using the key-escrow encryption method. 
At the same time, the Attorney General made public procedures
under which encryption key components will be released to
government agencies for decrypting communications subject to
lawful wiretaps.

     Key Escrow Encryption (formerly referred to as "Clipper
Chip") strikes an excellent balance between protection of
communications privacy and protection of society.  It permits the
use in commercial telecommunications products of chips that
provide extremely strong encryption, but can be decrypted, when
necessary, by government agencies conducting legally authorized
wiretaps.  Decryption is accomplished by use of keys--80-bit
binary numbers--that are unique to each individual encryption
chip.  Each unique key is in turn split into two components,
which must be recombined in order to decrypt communications. 
Knowing one component does not make decryption any more feasible
than not knowing either one.

     The two escrow agents are the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), a part of the Department of
Commerce, and the Automated Systems Division of the Department of
the Treasury.  The two escrow agents were chosen because of their
abilities to safeguard sensitive information, while at the same
time being able to respond in a timely fashion when wiretaps
encounter encrypted communications.  In addition, NIST is
responsible for establishing standards for protection of
sensitive, unclassified information in Federal computer systems. 

     The escrow agents will act under strict procedures, which
are being made public today, that will ensure the security of the
key components and govern their release for use in conjunction
with lawful wiretaps.  They will be responsible for holding the
key components: for each chip, one agent will hold one of the key
components, and the second agent will hold the other.  Neither
will release a key component, except to a government agency with
a requirement to obtain it in connection with a lawfully
authorized wiretap.  The system does not change the rules under
which government agencies are authorized to conduct wiretaps.

     When an authorized government agency encounters suspected
key-escrow encryption, a written request will have to be
submitted to the two escrow agents.  The request will, among
other things, have to identify the responsible agency and the
individuals involved; certify that the agency is involved in a
lawfully authorized wiretap; specify the wiretap's source of
authorization and its duration; and specify the serial number of
the key-escrow encryption chip being used.  In every case, an
attorney involved in the investigation will have to provide the
escrow agents assurance that a validly authorized wiretap is
being conducted.  

     Upon receipt of a proper request, the escrow agents will
transmit their respective key components to the appropriate
agency.  The components will be combined within a decrypt device,
which only then will be able to decrypt communications protected
by key-escrow encryption.  When the wiretap authorization ends,
the device's ability to decrypt communications using that
particular chip will also be ended.

     The Department of Justice will, at the various stages of the
process, take steps to monitor compliance with the procedures.


February 4, 1994 AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE OF ENCRYPTION KEY COMPONENTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTERCEPTS PURSUANT TO FISA The following are the procedures for the release of escrowed key components in conjunction with lawfully authorized interception of communications encrypted with a key-escrow encryption method. These procedures cover all electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Pub. L. 95-511, which appears at Title 50, U.S. Code, Section 1801 et seq. 1) In each case there shall be a legal authorization for the interception of wire and/or electronic communications. 2) In the event that federal authorities discover during the course of any lawfully authorized interception that communications encrypted with a key-escrow encryption method are being utilized, they may obtain a certification from an agency authorized to participate in the conduct of the interception, or from the Attorney General of the United States or designee thereof. Such certification shall (a) identify the agency participating in the conduct of the interception and the person providing the certification; (b) certify that necessary legal authorization has been obtained to conduct electronic surveillance regarding these communications; (c) specify the termination date of the period for which interception has been authorized; (d) identify by docket number or other suitable method of specification the source of the authorization; (e) certify that communications covered by that authorization are being encrypted with a key-escrow encryption method; (f) specify the identifier (ID) number of the key- escrow encryption chip providing such encryption; and (g) specify the serial (ID) number of the key-escrow decryption device that will be used by the agency participating in the conduct of the interception for decryption of the intercepted communications. 4) This certification shall be submitted to each of the designated key component escrow agents. If the certification has been provided by an agency authorized to participate in the conduct of the interception, a copy shall be provided to the Department of Justice, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review. As soon as possible, an attorney associated with that office shall provide each of the key component escrow agents with written confirmation of the certification. 5) Upon receiving the certification, each key component escrow agent shall release the necessary key component to the agency participating in the conduct of the interception. The key components shall be provided in a manner that assures they cannot be used other than in conjunction with the lawfully authorized electronic surveillance for which they were requested. 6) Each of the key component escrow agents shall retain a copy of the certification, as well as the subsequent written confirmation of the Department of Justice, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review. 7) Upon, or prior to, completion of the electronic surveillance phase of the investigation, the ability of the agency participating in the conduct of the interception to decrypt intercepted communications shall terminate, and such agency may not retain the key components. 8) The Department of Justice shall, in each such case, (a) ascertain the existence of authorizations for electronic surveillance in cases for which escrowed key components have been released; (b) ascertain that key components for a particular key- escrow encryption chip are being used only by an agency authorized to participate in the conduct of the interception of communications encrypted with that chip; and (c) ascertain that, no later than the completion of the electronic surveillance phase of the investigation, the ability of the agency participating in the conduct of the interception to decrypt intercepted communications is terminated. 9) Reports to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, pursuant to Section 108 of FISA, shall, with respect to any order for authorized electronic surveillance for which escrowed encryption components were released and used for decryption, specifically note that fact. These procedures do not create, and are not intended to create, any substantive rights for individuals intercepted through electronic surveillance, and noncompliance with these procedures shall not provide the basis for any motion to suppress or other objection to the introduction of electronic surveillance evidence lawfully acquired.


February 4, 1994 AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE OF ENCRYPTION KEY COMPONENTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTERCEPTS PURSUANT TO TITLE III The following are the procedures for the release of escrowed key components in conjunction with lawfully authorized interception of communications encrypted with a key-escrow encryption method. These procedures cover all electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (Title III), Title 18, United States Code, Section 2510 et seq. 1) In each case there shall be a legal authorization for the interception of wire and/or electronic communications. 2) All electronic surveillance court orders under Title III shall contain provisions authorizing after-the-fact minimization, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2518(5), permitting the interception and retention of coded communications, including encrypted communications. 3) In the event that federal law enforcement agents discover during the course of any lawfully authorized interception that communications encrypted with a key- escrow encryption method are being utilized, they may obtain a certification from the investigative agency conducting the investigation, or the Attorney General of the United States or designee thereof. Such certification shall (a) identify the law enforcement agency or other authority conducting the interception and the person providing the certification; (b) certify that necessary legal authorization has been obtained to conduct electronic surveillance regarding these communications; (c) specify the termination date of the period for which interception has been authorized; (d) identify by docket number or other suitable method of specification the source of the authorization; (e) certify that communications covered by that authorization are being encrypted with a key-escrow encryption method; (f) specify the identifier (ID) number of the key- escrow encryption chip providing such encryption; and (g) specify the serial (ID) number of the key-escrow decryption device that will be used by the law enforcement agency or other authority for decryption of the intercepted communications. 4) The agency conducting the interception shall submit this certification to each of the designated key component escrow agents. If the certification has been provided by an investigative agency, as soon thereafter as practicable, an attorney associated with the United States Attorney's Office supervising the investigation shall provide each of the key component escrow agents with written confirmation of the certification. 5) Upon receiving the certification from the requesting investigative agency, each key component escrow agent shall release the necessary key component to the requesting agency. The key components shall be provided in a manner that assures they cannot be used other than in conjunction with the lawfully authorized electronic surveillance for which they were requested. 6) Each of the key component escrow agents shall retain a copy of the certification of the requesting agency, as well as the subsequent confirmation of the United States Attorney's Office. In addition, the requesting agency shall retain a copy of the certification and provide copies to the following for retention in accordance with normal recordkeeping requirements: (a) the United States Attorney's Office supervising the investigation, and (b) the Department of Justice, Office of Enforcement Operations. 7) Upon, or prior to, completion of the electronic surveillance phase of the investigation, the ability of the requesting agency to decrypt intercepted communications shall terminate, and the requesting agency may not retain the key components. 8) The Department of Justice shall, in each such case, (a) ascertain the existence of authorizations for electronic surveillance in cases for which escrowed key components have been released; (b) ascertain that key components for a particular key- escrow encryption chip are being used only by an investigative agency authorized to conduct electronic surveillance of communications encrypted with that chip; and (c) ascertain that, no later than the completion of the electronic surveillance phase of the investigation, the ability of the requesting agency to decrypt intercepted communications is terminated. 9) In reporting to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2519(2), the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division shall, with respect to any order for authorized electronic surveillance for which escrowed encryption components were released and used for decryption, specifically note that fact. These procedures do not create, and are not intended to create, any substantive rights for individuals intercepted through electronic surveillance, and noncompliance with these procedures shall not provide the basis for any motion to suppress or other objection to the introduction of electronic surveillance evidence lawfully acquired.


February 4, 1994 AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE OF ENCRYPTION KEY COMPONENTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTERCEPTS PURSUANT TO STATE STATUTES Key component escrow agents may only release escrowed key components to law enforcement or prosecutorial authorities for use in conjunction with lawfully authorized interception of communications encrypted with a key-escrow encryption method. These procedures apply to the release of key components to State and local law enforcement or prosecutorial authorities for use in conjunction with interceptions conducted pursuant to relevant State statutes authorizing electronic surveillance, and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, Title 18, United States Code, Section 2510 et seq. 1) The State or local law enforcement or prosecutorial authority must be conducting an interception of wire and/or electronic communications pursuant to lawful authorization. 2) Requests for release of escrowed key components must be submitted to the key component escrow agents by the principal prosecuting attorney of the State, or of a political subdivision thereof, responsible for the lawfully authorized electronic surveillance. 3) The principal prosecuting attorney of such State or political subdivision of such State shall submit with the request for escrowed key components a certification that shall (a) identify the law enforcement agency or other authority conducting the interception and the prosecuting attorney responsible therefor; (b) certify that necessary legal authorization for interception has been obtained to conduct electronic surveillance regarding these communications; (c) specify the termination date of the period for which interception has been authorized (d) identify by docket number or other suitable method of specification the source of the authorization; (e) certify that communications covered by that authorization are being encrypted with a key-escrow encryption method; (f) specify the identifier (ID) number of the key- escrow chip providing such encryption; and (g) specify the serial (ID) number of the key-escrow decryption device that will be used by the law enforcement agency or other authority for decryption of the intercepted communications. 4) Such certification must be submitted by the principal prosecuting attorney of that State or political subdivision to each of the designated key component escrow agents. 5) Upon receiving the certification from the principal prosecuting attorney of the State or political subdivision, each key component escrow agent shall release the necessary key component to the intercepting State or local law enforcement agency or other authority. The key components shall be provided in a manner that assures they cannot be used other than in conjunction with the lawfully authorized electronic surveillance for which they were requested. 6) Each of the key component escrow agents shall retain a copy of the certification of the principal prosecuting attorney of the State or political subdivision. In addition, such prosecuting attorney shall provide a copy of the certification to the Department of Justice, for retention in accordance with normal recordkeeping requirements. 7) Upon, or prior to, completion of the electronic surveillance phase of the investigation, the ability of the intercepting law enforcement agency or other authority to decrypt intercepted communications shall terminate, and the intercepting law enforcement agency or other authority may not retain the key components. 8) The Department of Justice may, in each such case, make inquiry to (a) ascertain the existence of authorizations for electronic surveillance in cases for which escrowed key components have been released; (b) ascertain that key components for a particular key- escrow encryption chip are being used only by an investigative agency authorized to conduct electronic surveillance of communications encrypted with that chip; and (c) ascertain that, no later than the completion of the electronic surveillance phase of the investigation, the ability of the requesting agency to decrypt intercepted communications is terminated. 9) In reporting to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2519(2), the principal prosecuting attorney of a State or of a political subdivision of a State may, with respect to any order for authorized electronic surveillance for which escrowed encryption components were released and used for decryption, desire to note that fact. These procedures do not create, and are not intended to create, any substantive rights for individuals intercepted through electronic surveillance, and noncompliance with these procedures shall not provide the basis for any motion to suppress or other objection to the introduction of electronic surveillance evidence lawfully acquired.

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